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Introduction
1.1 The Study of Dictatorships...and Develop-
ment
Nowadays, after three waves of democratization, most of the worlds population
still lives under some type of non-democratic regime. Indeed, the Freedom House
(1997) classies just 22% of all countries as having the set of political freedoms
and civil liberties that would pertain to a full-edged democracy (Mueller, 2003).
Alternatively, according to the ACLP dataset1 , which distinguishes democracies
and dictatorships in a dichotomous variable, dictatorships still represented 40%
of the regimes in 2002. Nonetheless, and despite this striking evidence, little
attention has been paid to understand what determines the economic conditions
and general welfare under which that population has to live.
Dictatorships, particularly the most grotesque and outrageous ones, have
1Dataset originally developed by Przeworski et al. for the book Democracy & Development
(2000), and subsequently updated. See also Cheibub and Gandhi (2004).
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inspired almost as many novels as academic books. These literary portraits,
although usually exaggerated, contain in most of the cases relevant clues about
how certain decisions are made, how corrupt regimes emerge and which the fac-
tors that might bring about such political tragedy are. As it will be defended
along this dissertation, political decisions a¤ecting economic performance are
a matter of the e¤ectiveness of accountability, both political and judicial. The
autocrats on these stories illustrate to some extent the conditions that may lead
to the sabotage of such control. Thus, for instance, in The Man of the People,
Chinua Achebe extraordinarily describes the subverting of post-colonial multi-
party systems in Africa. By allegedly standing up for the true -pre-colonial-
African traditions and values, as opposed to those of European inuence of
intellectuals, Minister Nanga gains popular trust and loyalty while he accumu-
lates a fortune by diverting public funds. The common dependence of external
sources of revenue appears very well reected in Miguel A. AsturiasEl Señor
Presidente when the President urgently sends one of his closest collaborators
to the United States to try to restore American nancial aid to his regime.
The eccentric Patriarch in García Márquezs book2 sells the Caribbean Sea to
the Americans, who helped him staying in power. El Recurso del Método, by
Alejo Carpentier, introduces another key element to understand rulers behav-
ior, which is the dictatorscapacity to escape punishment after leaving power
by taking exile. There, the autocrat, the Primer Magistrado, ends up eeing his
country with the help of US agents and settling in his mansion in Paris after
toppled by a general strike. Likewise, Tomás Eloy Martínezs novel, La Novela
de Perón, describes how the former Argentinean ruler writes his memories in
2The Autumn of the Patriarch (El Otoño del Patriarca).
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his exile in Madrid under the francoist regime.
Yet, one of the most interesting features of these novels is the way they
accomplish to give us a picture of the three groups which constantly threaten
dictatorsposition, their closest collaborators, the military and the opposition.
The dictators in El Recurso del Método and La Fiesta del Rey Acab (by Enrique
Lafourcade) both face the challenge of revolutionary upheavals lead by students
while, at the same time, having to keep an eye on his military o¢ cers, minis-
ters, and even family members. Valle-Incláns Tirano Banderas begins with the
repression of a peasant attack over state troops and ends with the killing and
posterior decapitation of the tyrant by the rebels. In García Márquezs novel,
the Patriarch is betrayed by his closest allies, his double and his preferred Gen-
eral. It is precisely a plot led by some captains that manages to eventually
kill Rafael Trujillo as described with full detail in Vargas Llosas La Fiesta del
Chivo.
On the other hand, until very recently, the theoretical literature about non-
democratic regimes has been mainly worried about the distinction between dif-
ferent types of regimes along alternative dimensions. The very rst works were
above all concerned about the rise and form of governance of the totalitarian
regimes that appeared in the inter-war period. In this vein, the classic works of
Arendt (1951) and Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956) provided in depth studies of
the origins as well as listed the dening characteristics of those regimes3 .
Posterior studies expanded the categories of non-democratic regimes but
basically followed the same line of analysis based prominently on the form of
3Friedrich and Brzezinskis (1956) theory proposed six main features characterizing total-
itarian regimes: An ideology; a single party; a terrorist police; a communications monopoly;
a weapons monopoly; and a centrally directed economy. On totalitarianism, see also Burch
(1964), Schapiro (1972) and Unger (1974).
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government. Linzs (1970, 1975) work sought to ll the gap left by the previous
authors o¤ering a broad theory of authoritarianismthat was to be juxtaposed
to that of totalitarianism. Although it was intended to be limited, Linzs concept
and theory contains too much internal variability to be empirically useful as his
development follows a characterization by elimination of those regimes not
suitable to be classied as totalitarian4 . Another branch of work tended to base
their distinctions on variables such as the ideology for one-party regimes as in
the work by Tucker (1961)5 , or the degree of inuence of the military on politics
for military ones (Perlmutter, 1977; Nordlinger, 1977).
Finally, seeking to understand the conditions sustaining di¤erent types of
authoritarian rule, some studies made us aware of the endogenous nature of
authoritarianism, its di¤erent subvarieties and degrees of institutionalization.
It is the case of the studies by Huntington (1970) and ODonnell (1973), who
identied the causes of regime organization regarding the need of mobilization
and the level of modernization, respectively. Similarly, some -more descriptive-
contributions stressed the di¤erences between traditional and modern forms of
dictatorial regimes, dening totalitarian regimes as an extreme form of the latter
(Perlmutter, 1981; Rubin, 1987; on modern tyranny see Chirot, 1994).
Nonetheless, if one is to study the variability existing in terms of economic
performance and policy between dictatorships and autocrats, those sometimes
blurred and overlapping typologies may be of little help. Many of those cat-
egories include so dissimilar regimes in terms of economic success and failure
4The main features of his concept are quite vague and not totally exclusive: i) Presence of
limited, not responsible, political pluralism; ii) absence of elaborate and guiding ideology; iii)
absence of intensive or extensive political mobilization, and iv) a leader (or small group) that
exercises power within formally ill-dened limits but actually quite predictable ones.
5His basic tipology includes fascist, communist and nationalist regimes.
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that show that something is missing on that particular respect.
Actually, the discussion about the relation between regimes and develop-
ment was, by that time, far from clear as well, especially the e¤ect or role that
authoritarian systems may have on economic growth6 . Two completely oppo-
site views dominated the theoretical debate. Some earlier theorists defended
that dictatorial regimes would better promote growth than democracies would.
In their opinion, non-democratic regimes could stimulate growth by restrain-
ing the short-termed pressures for immediate consumption -mainly in the form
of redistribution- coming from myopic voters, labor unions, and other interest
groups that undermine investments (Huntington, 1968). The underlying as-
sumption behind those postulates was that states have a key role to play -and
want to perform it- to improve the functioning of the economy in terms of ef-
ciency, and that this role cannot be performed unless enough state autonomy
is granted.
These arguments were soon proved to be extremely simple and naive, since
they overlooked the contradictions entailed in such a strong defense of state in-
sulation. Although redistribution and rent-seeking by voters, unions or interest
groups may be prevented, state autonomy might involve an almost total lack of
constraints over rulers decisions, allowing the dictator to divert consumption for
himself and his close collaborators, leading to a greater level of ine¢ ciency than
that resulting from democratic redistribution (see, for instance, Olson, 1991;
Przeworski, 1990). Consequently, property rights might be as at risk under
such conditions as under redistributive democracy or, almost certainly, worse.
Recent research has shown that after controlling for the conditions under
6See Przeworski and Limongi (1993) for an excellent review of the literature. See also
Durham (1999).
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they exist, political regimes (democracy vs. dictatorship) exert no e¤ect on
the rate of economic growth (Przeworski et al. 2000). Nonetheless, concerning
dictatorships, history provides us with numerous examples of successful and
disastrous governments in terms of development. Indeed, there have been about
122 dictator spells, for which data are available, during which average income
growth was negative, whereas, in clear contrast, there have been about 164
dictators under whose tenure income grew at average rates above 7 percentage
points. The question is then, why do some harm their economies and others
do not? Is there any common set of constraints that help to explain those
di¤erences? If so, what factors bring them about?
These questions drive us directly to institutions, specially after assertions
such as that of Douglas C. North, who put it like this: I wish a much more
fundamental role for institutions in societies; they are the underlying determi-
nant of the long-run performance of economies (1990: 107). The contention,
although strong, left some aspects still open to debate. Much of the discussion
revolved around the identication of what institutions could matter for growth
and through what specic mechanisms. New concepts such as governance,
stabilityor social cohesionseemed to add to the old appeal to property rights
a more political-economic layer (see, for a review, Keefer, 2004). The tauto-
logical trap repeated once again though; societies enjoying growth were those
well governed, while those falling apart su¤ered from bad governance. Aware
of this condition, scholars in the eld began to examine the specic elements
contained in such a general concept. Within the realm of political institutions,
the discussion has been progressively narrowing towards a general, albeit tacit,
recognition of the centrality of accountability as one of the political founda-
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tions for economic development(Bates, 2006: 31; see also, Przeworski, 2004a;
Keefer, 2005).
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence has been hugely biased towards the
study of democratic systems, where the institutions inuencing accountability
could be easily identied and empirically coded. Authoritarian regimes have
been usually neglected or simply used as a residual category to which demo-
cratic variations could be compared. This dissertation is aimed at lling this
gap. As Cheibub and Przeworski put it, a ner-grain analysis, both of di¤er-
ent democratic institutions and of di¤erent forms of dictatorship, is needed to
identify the impact of politics(1997: 121). We have chosen the second of the
possibilities they point out for this dissertation.
1.2 Accountability, Institutions and Autocracy
Accountability, dened in broad terms, does not necessarily exclude author-
itarian systems, although the mechanisms through which it is exercised may
appear to us as only properly regulated under democratic systems. However,
as both democratic as well as autocratic rulers can anticipate that certain bad
actionsor policies will harm their reelection or their odds of retaining power
(Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson, 1995; Manin, Przeworski and Stokes, 1999),
accountability may act as an e¤ective constraint in both political regimes.
Accountability does not exist per se. Instead, it is a second-order institu-
tional feature of political systems, that is, it is the result of the combination
of some specic conditions and institutional combinations (Przeworski, 2004a).
Consequently, political systems, that is, concrete institutional frameworks, dif-
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fer in the degree of political accountability they allow. According to Lederman,
Loayza and Soares (2005), in democratic regimes, it depends on three main fea-
tures of these systems: The degree of competition, the existence of checks and
balances and the overall transparency of the system. But we know little about
the features that make accountability vary under dictatorship. As pointed out
when citing some of the novels about autocracies, dictators face opposition,
and anticipating the results deliver policies or harshly repress. The logic of the
whole process is the same than that taking place under democracy, but in these
cases instead of measuring the e¤ect of, say, electoral systems, we care about
the potential occurrence of riots, revolutions and coups. As the mechanisms of
accountability vary, so do their determinants.
We identify two general types of accountability. On the one hand, political
accountability relates the rulerspolicy choices with their chances of retaining
power in the future. The underlying process is that accountability allows sanc-
tioning politicians in case they adopt bad policies on behalf of their own interest.
Sanctions imply, in this case, the losing of power. On the other hand, judicial
accountability refers to the criminal sanctions that might be applied as a result
of losing power. We consider punishment in broad terms as we are interested in
the dictatorsutility once they are out of power.
Our principal contention is that political accountability is endogenous and,
as a result, so are dictators time preferences. Under this setting, Olsons (1993)
general claim that a long term perspective is necessary for dictators to develop
an encompassinginterest to promote growth may be awed. If the probability
of rulerssurvival in power is made endogenous with regard to policy (in this
case, taxation), by choosing the rate of rent-extraction, authoritarian govern-
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ments determine at the same time both their chances to retain power as well as
the rate of growth of the economy. As a result, the political economic constraints
a¤ecting that decision will constitute the basic roots of the di¤erences in perfor-
mance across authoritarian governments and not an exogenous time horizon as
in, for instance, Clague et al. (1996). The underlying logic gets altered, since for
the encompassing interest -à la Olson- to appear, a high security in the rule is
needed if the bandit has to become, in his own terms, stationary. In this case,
higher security should be related to a lower rate of graft and, hence, to higher
growth rates. Nonetheless, in models with endogenously constrained politicians,
commonly, rent accumulation will be moderated as long as the accountability
constraint is binding. So in these cases, a more insulated (structurally stable)
ruler will be able to increase his level of rent extraction, making growth rates
shrink.
1.3 Plan of Study
The problems and questions outlined above contain both a theoretical and an
empirical component. This dissertation follows this general division as well,
and its chapters can be divided into two main parts, the rst of which includes
four chapters and deals with the literature review, the theoretical concepts and
model development; while the second one, including four chapters too, is mainly
devoted to put under empirical scrutiny all what is proposed in the rst part.
In Chapter 2 we introduce the basic theoretical and conceptual framework
that underlies this research. We survey the alternative approaches to institu-
tions and the main contributions relating them to economic development. Later
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we describe the causal frame adopted, dene accountability, and defend the role
that accountability may play in determining policy choices under authoritarian
regimes. The Chapter ends with a discussion about the literature on the preda-
tory state aimed at identifying its main insights and shortcomings. We argue
that the problem of models with exogenous time preferences is discussed by not-
ing that in them one crucial part of the story is missing, namely, that dictators
own decisions with respect to policy a¤ect their chances to remain in power in
the future and get the benets derived from it. On the other hand, models with
endogenous time-preference rates tend to compare the optimal tax rate under
the constrained and the unconstrained settings with the aim of comparing be-
havior under both of them. However, concrete comparative statics exercises are
frequently missing. To nd empirical implications of political-economic models
these exercises are essential though.
Chapter 3 develops the concepts and functions involved in our own general
model, such as the accountability function and the post-exit value, which we
rst solve in general form. Later on we specialize the accountability function
and explore the meaning and e¤ect of each of its components. We introduce
the concepts of security and sensitivity. We also develop extensive comparative
statics exercises with regard to the main parameters in the model with the help
of numerical simulations. Moreover, we give detailed account of alternative
functional forms for political accountability and the variations they entail.
The model in Chapters 3 is a purely economic one which helps to study the
direction of the relations between variables. However, the parameters of the
political accountability function are treated as exogenous and we only study the
e¤ects of their changes in value. Chapter 4 addresses the strategic interactions,
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previously neglected for the sake of simplicity, that shape the di¤erent levels
of accountability to which dictators may be subject. To do so we introduce
the alternative mechanisms of accountability present in authoritarian systems
and the actors who may put them into practice and discuss what factors can
determine the relative strength of each of the them.
Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to explore the empirical consequences and
propositions of Chapter 4. In particular, Chapter 5 studies the sources of rev-
enue of authoritarian regimes. Concretely, it tests the validity of the proposition
which contends that dictatorial institutions serve to mobilize economic cooper-
ation for the regime, permitting the collection of higher percentage of taxes
for which compliance is most required. Accordingly, it is showed that dicta-
torial institutions are the result of the combination of two factors: Opposition
strength and the availability of rents non requiring cooperation (such as foreign
aid or oil revenues). On the other hand, Chapter 6 concentrates on the empiri-
cal analysis of political accountability. We study the conditions determining the
di¤erent levels of dictatorssecurity as well as sensitivity. We then move on to
the institutional level. Formal institutions under dictatorship, as shown in the
previous chapter, exist under certain conditions related as well to accountabil-
ity. As a result, these institutions are themselves associated to certain degrees
of accountability by a¤ecting security and sensitivity.
Chapter 7 analyses the other type of accountability considered in this study,
the judicial accountability, which relates to the post-exit utility dictatorsget.
After describing the alternative scenarios a dictator may encounter after being
unseated, we present the data specically constructed for this chapter. We
also propose a simple model to account for the alternative results based on he
12 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
strength of the regime (or the opposition) and the international context. We
then test them and analyze, as in Chapter 6, how institutions relate to this
dimension of accountability.
Chapter 8 deals with economic growth. After taking a look to the increasing
income disparities among authoritarian regimes, again, the empirical analysis
rst deals with the political-economic determinants of growth at the leadership
(or government) level. The variables shown in previous chapters to increase
security are proved there to harm growth, whereas those variables making dic-
tators insensitive are proved to be detrimental as well. The same models are
then applied to study government consumption, obtaining consistent results.
We then examine the e¤ects dictatorial institutions have on both variables us-
ing Heckmans two-step method. As formal institutions are associated with
di¤erent levels of accountability, they are expected -and proved- to have a net
e¤ect on both growth and public consumption. In the last pat of the Chapter, we
o¤er some tentative evidence about the e¤ect that the alternative mechanisms
of accountability have on income growth.
Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the main ndings drawn from this disserta-
tion.
1.4 A Note on the Data
We use in this dissertation a huge dataset resulting from merging di¤erent pre-
viously existing ones and creating a few new variables. Our main data source
has been the ACLP dataset, which was developed by Przeworski et al. for the
writing of the book Democracy & Development (2000), which has been regularly
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updated. This dataset includes several institutional variables to which Gandhi
(2004) added the classication of dictatorial institutions we use here. The po-
litical data were extended from Przeworski et al. by José Antonio Cheibub and
Jennifer Gandhi (2004). The period covered is very extensive and goes from
1946 (or the year of independence from colonial rule) to 2000.
Given that this study concentrates on dictatorial regimes, we needed a clas-
sication from which we could choose those regimes of our interest. We take the
classication developed by Przeworski et al. (2000), which contains a dichoto-
mous classication of political regimes. After splitting the dataset by taking only
those country-year units classied as dictatorships, our sample consists of 139
countries, and 550 di¤erent spells of continuous rule under the same dictator or
authoritarian government. We consider, when taking rulers as units of analysis,
e¤ective heads of government, that is: 1) general-secretaries of the communist
party in communist dictatorships, except in the case of Deng Xiaoping in China;
2) kings, presidents, and de facto rulers in non-communist dictatorships, except
in the cases of Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar where the
e¤ective head is sometimes the prime minister; and 3) military or other gure
when the sources indicate the nominal head is a puppet gure (see Cheibub and
Gandhi, 2004).
Data on economic growth and income are taken from Penn World Tables 5.6
and cover the 1950-2000 period. Other economic and demographic series are
taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002), some of its
variables though -such as tax revenues- are only available from 1970 to 2000.
The Appendix to this thesis reports a detailed description of all the variables
used and the sources from which they were compiled. It also included some notes
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on how the two new variables constructed for this research (dictatorsmode of
exit and rulerspost-exit fate) were coded.
Chapter 2
Institutionalism,
Endogeneity and
Performance
2.1 The Study of Institutions in Contemporary
Political Science
Recent research in political science and, specially, in the subeld of comparative
politics, has turned to examine the origins, the stability, as well as economic
e¤ects of all kinds of political institutions. Institutionalism is, at this respect, as
Diermeier and Krehbiel assert, more of a method than a mission(2003: 124).
From war initiation and duration, to electoral turnout, from economic growth
to citizens political participation, from tax revenues to expenditures, in almost
15
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all imaginable variables, scholars have detected an institutional determinant,
either legislatures, political regimes or electoral systems, and so on.
In the last two decades, institutional analysis has become the most prominent
branch in political science and a fashionable and expanding one in economics.
This new wave of literature, known as new institutionalism, although does
not constitute a unied body of research and thought, appeared with the aim
of overcoming the problems and shortcomings of both traditionalinstitution-
alism as well as behavioralism (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999).
With respect to the former, neoinstitutionalists, as behavioralists did, avoid
relying on structuralism and legalism and refuse to attach any normative con-
clusion or goal to their work (Peters, 1999). With regard to behavioralism, the
institutionalist critique focuses on its treatment of preferences and their aggrega-
tion (Immergut, 1998). Next sections are devoted to describe the main features
and compare the di¤erent approaches identied within the neoinstitutionalist
school.
2.1.1 The Three New Institutionalisms
As remarked above, this new general theoretical core is not homogeneous,
instead, it can be divided into at least three alternative approaches: Historical
institutionalism, rational-choice institutionalism, and sociological institutional-
ism; although there exist numerous border crossers especially from the analytic
narrativesapproach who combine rational-choice theory with in-depth histor-
ical context study and analysis of the selected cases (see Bates et al., 1998).
Historical institutionalism aimed at remedying the deciencies, principally,
of the structuralist approach and group theory, which dominated political sci-
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ence during the 60s and the 70s (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Historical institu-
tionalism concentrates on studying how institutions emerge and relate to con-
crete temporal processes by analyzing macro contexts and developing hypothe-
ses about the combined e¤ects of institutions and processes (Pierson and
Skocpol, 2002: 696). Hall and Taylor (1996) identify four distinctive features of
this school: i) Scholars in this branch tend to conceptualize the relationship
between institutions and individual behavior in relatively broad terms(1996:
938); ii) they emphasize the asymmetries of powerrelated to the functioning
and development of institutions; iii) they pay special attention to time and the
contingencies of history and, concretely, to path dependence processes, unin-
tended consequences, and feedback e¤ects in the development of institutions
and their e¤ects, and iv) they are concerned to integrate to institutional analy-
sis the role that ideas and culture may play from a more interpretativist point
of view (Immergut, 1998). Thus, in Pierson and Skocpols words, historical
institutionalists make visible and understandable the overarching contexts and
interacting processes that shape and reshape states, politics, and public policy-
making(1999: 693).
On the other hand, rational-choice institutionalism, which developed at the
same time as historical institutionalism did, is basically aimed at providing
the microfoundations of institutional analysis in studying the e¤ects of institu-
tions, why they are necessary, and the endogenous choice of a particular set of
them (Weingast, 1999). To do so, rational-choice institutionalists depart from
a broad set of behavioral assumptions: The actors under study have xed set of
preferences or tastes, and by means of their instrumental choices they seek to
maximize the attainment of those preferences (Hall and Taylor, 1996). As a re-
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sult, strategic interaction becomes key in order to understand the determination
and feasibility of certain political outcomes under conditions of interdependence.
Under these premises, it is generally believed that rational-choice theorists em-
brace a functional view of institutions (Thelen, 1999), that is, they begin by
using deduction to arrive at a stylized specication of the functions that an
institution performs(Hall and Taylor, 1996: 945).
Finally, sociological institutionalism, which developed from organization the-
ory, stresses how institutional forms and procedures respond to culturally-specic
practices, according to the more general ones guiding di¤erent societies (Hall
and Taylor, 1996). Thus, the creation of meaning and the relevance of values
enter the research agenda (Peters, 1999). Therefore, according to sociological
institutionalists, institutions are not just formal rules and norms, they should
also include values, culture, symbol systems and conceptual frames into their
denition. As a result, socialization plays a determinant role in understanding
the e¤ect that institutions may have on individual behavior.
2.1.2 Coincidences and Divergences
These three major branches just dened share a common theoretical core, as Im-
mergut (1998) stresses. The rst coincidence is based on their common point of
departure, that is, their lack of trust on observed behavior as the unique source
of analysis. Specically, neoinstitutionalists distinguish between expressed
and realpreferences, since equal preferences under di¤erent institutional con-
ditions may give rise to di¤erent outcomes or choices. Secondly, as opposed to
behavioralists, the neoinstitutionalist approach criticizes the assumption that
preferences can be aggregated. Mechanisms of aggregation may have collateral
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e¤ects on interests such as reshaping or constraining the feasible set of them.
According to this new consideration of political behavior, political processes
may a¤ect and alter collective decision making, that is, the methods for interest
aggregation matter. In Diermeier and Krehbiels words, the aim of contempo-
rary institutionalism is to guide inquiry into which of many more-or-less stable
features of collective choice settings are essential to understanding collective
choice behavior and outcomes(2003: 124).
As Thelen (1999) points out, the di¤erences between these major approaches
to the study of institutions are substantial and have to do with both the theo-
retical goals of their research as well as the conceptual approach to the existing
puzzles. The rst major di¤erence between both schools is also one of the most
controversial. It lies on the generally held consideration that rational-choice
theorists are more involved in general -or even universal- theory building than
historical institutionalists are. The latter are often accused of working at the
level of mid-range theory (Thelen, 1999: 373) due to their focus on a very
limited range of cases. This translates into di¤erences in the process of hy-
pothesis building. Historical institutionalists are prone to begin their research
with the questions posed by an existing empirical puzzle involving one or more
cases. This fact makes historical institutionalists become specially inclined to
base their selection on the dependent variable, i.e., selecting cases where the
phenomena under study have occurred, while ruling out those where they did
not (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). On the contrary, hypothesis building is a
more systematic and deductive process for rational-choice institutionalists. The
uniformity in preferences combined with the variability in constraints and in-
formational availability, allows these theorists to put a greater emphasis on the
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use of counterfactuals. Counterfactual analysis is made possible in game theory
by the study of what has been termed o¤-the-path behavior(Weingast, 1996),
which emphasizes the role that what we dont observe plays in determining what
is actually observed.
Nonetheless, the crucial di¤erence between both bodies of literature lies on,
according to Thelen and Steinmo (1992), the treatment of preferences and their
formation. Hence, it is generally defended that rational-choice theorists treat
preferences as exogenous, while historical institutionalists treat them as endoge-
nous. This contrast, however, is progressively blurring by new contributions in
the rational-choice school that are well aware of the necessity to complete the
assumptions of rationality with a cultural knowledge of the particular settings
(Bates et al. 1998). Accordingly, norms and culture can also play an important
role on rational-choice theory building about political outcomes (Thelen, 1999),
e.g., some argue that they may work as signals in games of incomplete informa-
tion, or as focal points that serve to study which of the alternative equilibria
will be actually chosen.
Another point of divergence between both schools often cited concerns the
general view of institutions. Rational-choice practitioners tend to study institu-
tions from a functional point of view, to sum up, institutions develop because
of their capacity to solve certain collective problems (Pierson and Skocpol,
2002: 708). Alternatively, historical institutionalists criticize this way of pro-
ceeding because it may neglect the existence of long-term e¤ects, of temporal
gaps between actions and consequences, of feedback e¤ects, and of unintended
consequences.
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2.2 Institutions and Economic Development
2.2.1 An Overview of the Debate
There are two main contenders claiming for themselves a better explanatory
power to account for the cross-country disparities in long-run economic perfor-
mance and well-being: The geography theory and the institutional approach.
The third alternative is the cultural view, although it has received little empir-
ical validation1 . On the one hand, the so-called geography theorystates that
ecological zones are the main determinant of long-run development through dif-
ferent mechanisms. Concretely, in its simplest and earliest version, going back
to Montesquieu (1989 [1748]), climate would a¤ect development by exerting
a constant e¤ect on work e¤ort and productivity. To these general arguments,
posterior studies have added the e¤ects of technological availability and diseases
in lowering the growth potential of tropical zones (Bloom and Sachs, 1998).
In contrast, the institutionalist approach emerged principally as a response
to the challenge launched by Norths (1990, 1997) contributions, in which he
claimed: I wish to assert a much more fundamental role for institutions in
societies; they are the underlying determinant of the long-run performance of
economies (1990: 107). According to this new framework, institutions a¤ect
growth because they are would determine how big both the costs of transaction
and those of transformation might be. Przeworski (2004b) summarizes the cen-
tral claim of new institutionalism with regard to economic development in two
basic propositions: a) Institutions matter, and b) institutions are endogenous.
1Weber (1930) was the rst in proposing this link in his seminal work The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism where he established a relation between the beliefs of
Protestantism and the development of capitalism. For a recent and alternative contribution
on this tradition, see Barro and McCleary (2003).
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The number of papers and articles attempting to empirically prove such
contention is by now overwhelming. Following Aron (2000), these contributions
can be classied according to their empirical approach to institutions and how
they measure institutions. First, a huge branch of literature has devoted to
evaluate the e¤ect of institutions by taking alternative measures of the quality
of formal and informal institutions. Measures consisting of subjective ratings of
risk compiled by private rms such as BERI, BI and ICRG2 were found to have
a strong impact on growth and investment (see, among many others, Knack and
Keefer, 1995; Barro, 1996; Clague et al., 1996; Lane and Tornell, 1996).
Second, an even bigger amount of research concentrated on other measures
which described some social or political attributes of institutions with a poten-
tial e¤ect on economic performance. Among them, scholars have paid special
attention to political stability, as it is generally assumed to alter long-term
decisions such as investments and the expected returns of economic activities
(Carmignani, 2003). These studies relied too heavily on datasets such as Banks
(various years) and Taylor and Jodices (1988) to construct aggregated measures
of political instability essentially consisting of the sum of numbers of protests,
coups or changes in the executive, that were added on the right-hand side of nu-
merous growth regressions as proxies for institutions (see, for example, Alesina
and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina et al., 1996; Hassan and
Sarna, 1996). Other studies tended to focus on some other social characteristics
of the countries under study which, through not clear mechanisms, were often re-
garded as being potential determinants of growth rates. Such features included
measures of the degree of ethnic diversity (Easterly and Levine, 1997), religious
2Business Environment Risk Intelligence; Business International, and International Coun-
try Risk Guide respectively.
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composition (Barro, 1996), colonial legacies, or social development (Temple and
Johnson, 1998).
Following this line of research, the rst claim of institutionalism (as summed
up by Przeworski), i.e., institutions matter, was assumed to be out of any doubt;
but the second one, the endogeneity of institutions was almost completely ne-
glected so even the rst claim could be awed. A second wave of research
defending the geography theory took advantage of this evident weakness. More
sophisticated and new versions of this theory argued that tropical areas had an
initial advantage that vanished when agricultural technologies developed and fa-
vored more temperate zones (Sachs, 2001). These underlying conditions would
also a¤ect the institutional designs in di¤erent areas, hence, amplifying its pre-
liminary e¤ect.
The response from the institutionalist side was fast and relied on a new
methodology to prove its point, instrumental variables. Possibly, the strongest
piece of evidence supporting the institutional approach is the paper by Ace-
moglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) in which they argue that a reversal of
fortunesoccurred among world economies, that is, countries that were wealth-
ier in 1500 are the ones that are currently less developed. The basic argument
is as follows: The conditions that European found during colonization shaped
the type of institutions they developed there; hence, poor regions were sparsely
populated, and this enabled or induced Europeans to settle in large numbers
and develop institutions encouraging investment (2002: 1235). The institu-
tions they refer to are those they call institutions of private property, which
ensure property rights for a broad cross-section of society. Bad institutions are
the extractive ones. Likewise, Engerman and Sokolo¤ (1994, 2005, among oth-
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ers) defend the existence of a reversal for the American continent. According to
them, in those areas suitable for sugar and other crops cultivation, with slaved
labor force used in production and where there existed large concentrations of
natives, European settlers were able to establish large latifundia and highly
elitist institutions that permitted to impose economic and political dominance
over the mass of the population.
Criticisms to the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinsons (2002) paper have
mushroomed though. One of the most suggesting points has been launched by
Glaeser et al. (2004) who argue that human capital is a much more basic source
of growth than institutions are. Accordingly, what European settlers brought
to the Americas were not only their institutions but also their human capital.
This is fatal for Acemoglu et al.s analysis. As Przeworski notes, it means that
since the impact of the instrument (settler mortality) on development is not
exhausted by their impact on institutions, the instrument is correlated with er-
ror in the growth equation and the estimates are still biased (2004a:12). On
the contrary, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) support the institutional
approach by nding that -using the same instrument as Acemoglu et al. (2002)-
when controlled for conventional measures of geography, institutions have, at
best, weak direct e¤ects on incomes, although they have a strong indirect e¤ect
on the quality of institutions3 .
More recent contributions by Przeworski (2004a, 2004c), using a new dataset
developed by Maddison (2003), cast serious doubts on the institutional approach
3On the other hand, in a more technical criticism to Acemoglu et al.s paper, Albouy
(2004) points to possible inconsistencies and mistakes in the settler mortality data. As
a consequence he claims that Acemoglu et al.s instrumental variable approach is insigni-
cant, non-robust and su¤ers from weak instrument pathologies. See Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2005) for a response.
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based on the defense made by the reversal of fortunes argument. He shows that
the only major reversal consisted of four British o¤shoots (like Australia or
Canada) passing the income levels of the rest of the world. So it seems that
we should conclude that the question do institutions matter?does not have
a clear answer in the existing literature yet.
2.2.2 Types of Institutions and Causal Paths
When talking about institutions and their e¤ects one needs to be careful in
distinguishing the types of institutions and the relations between them in order
to avoid circular or partial arguments. In other words, one needs to delineate
the concrete causal path linking institution types and economic performance.
The rst question to be answered before attempting to analyze possible causal
e¤ects of institutions is, then, as Rodrik puts it: Which institutions matter
and how does one acquire them?(2000: 4).
The most basic and useful classication distinguishes between economic and
political institutions4 . The former are those that set the rules of the game of eco-
nomic relations. These include formal and informal laws that regulate markets,
exchange, innovation, and so on, determining, thus, the set of opportunities
and constraints to economic agents like, for example, the regulations created
to counter market failures. Among all these, the neoinstitutionalist literature
generally appeals to the degree of property rights protection and contract en-
forceability in order to link institutions and economic development (North and
Thomas, 1973). A good denition of these rights is provided by Barzel: I
dene economic rights over an asset as individuals net valuation, in expected
4An alternative and also common nomenclature consists of distinguishing between market
and non-market institutions. The underlying idea is strictly the same.
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terms, of the ability to directly consume the services of the asset, or to consume
it indirectly through exchange(1994: 394). The argument behind the relation
between development and property rights enforcement is that entrepreneurs,
investors and innovators will not have any incentive to accumulate or innovate
if they anticipate that they will not enjoy the full return to the assets they are
producing or improving. Hence, this literature relates insecure property rights
(equivalent to bad institutions) with underdevelopment5 . In fact, as noted in
the previous section, most of the empirical papers on this eld use as the main
independent variable the risk of expropriationor repudiation of contracts,
as coded in the International Country Risk Guide6 , as overall measures of the
quality of institutions. As a result this literature does little more than conrm-
ing a link between economic environment and development while the common
pool of, social and political, factors determining them are often left aside.
Other scholars argue that the economic institutions that matter for devel-
opment are those that coordinate investment across sectors (Rosenstein-Rodan,
1943; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). The idea is that simultaneous in-
dustrialization of many sectors of the economy may spawn benets for them all
generating a big push. So, for instance, industrialization in one sector may
make investment more attractive in other sector complementary to the former.
Alternatively, recent studies stress the role of the improvement of nancial mar-
kets for development and coordination of investments (Levine and Zervos, 1998;
Beck, Levine and Loyaza, 2000). Finally, a new wave of research highlights the
importance of institutions that stabilize scal and monetary policies such as
5See, for instance, Acemoglu and Johnson (2004).
6 It is elaborated by the Political Risk Services Group.
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independent central banks7 .
Political institutions are, in broad terms, those that formally or informally
regulate the limits of political power, how this power is transferred and the ac-
cess of di¤erent groups and citizens to it. Some practical examples are electoral
systems, judicial independency, presidentialism vs. parliamentarism, political
regimes, etc. I mean practicalbecause this list includes concrete arrangements
that are interrelated and combined in order to produce di¤erent consequences
on broader institutional frameworks we shall call supra-institutions, which ac-
tually dene in general terms the mechanism of impact of institutional arrange-
ments on economic performance. For instance, Rodrik (1999) emphasizes the
crucial role of the institutions of conict-management for economic performance.
According to him, these institutions adjudicate distributional contests within
a framework of rules and accepted procedures that is, without open conict
and hostilities(1999: 386), thereby coordination failures can be avoided. The
institutions of conict-management would constitute in this case the supra-
institutions, whereas the rule-of-law, a high quality judiciary, free elections,
and so on, would be the practical institutional arrangements that allow for ef-
fective conict-management. Similarly, Ritzen, Easterly and Woolcock (2000)
analyze the sources of social cohesiondened as a state of a¤airs in which
a group of people (delineated by a geographical region, like a country) demon-
strate an aptitude for collaboration that produces a climate for change(2000:
6). Hall and Jones (1999) refer to these general dimensions of institutions as
social infrastructuredening it as the institutions and government policies
7A good example of this branch of research is o¤ered by Fischer (1993) who argues that
growth is negatively associated with large budget decits, ination, and distorted foreign
exchange markets.
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that determine the economic environment within which individuals accumulate
skills, and rms accumulate capital and produce output(1999: 84). In a good
environment, hence, individuals are able to capture the social returns of their
actions as private returns.
A di¤erent type of supra-institution receiving an increasing amount of
attention, which I will put my focus on, is accountability, whose e¤ect takes
place through the control of governments and politicians. In broad terms, ac-
countability allows for the punishment of politicians in case they implement bad
policies on behalf of their own interest or of the interest of some other concrete
group. It actually acts as an anticipationconstraint, that is, rulers anticipate
that certain bad actionsor policies will harm their reelection or permanence
in power odds (Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson, 1995; Manin, Przeworski and
Stokes, 1999). The conditions and the obstacles for accountability will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
Once these distinctions have been made, the next step is to establish the
complete causal path linking institutions to economic performance that will be
followed in this dissertation. The full set of links can be specied as in Figure
1.1.
[Figure 1.1]
Note that there are ve arrows in this scheme. The rst and the last ones,
that is, those linking both geography and underlying conditions and eco-
nomic performance to institutional arrangements stress the premise that
institutions are endogenous and will be discussed later on in more detail. Let
us focus now in the other three proceeding backwards.
The last link establishes a relationship between economic institutionsand
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economic performance. As Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson put it, eco-
nomic institutions matter for economic growth because they shape the incentives
of key economic actors in society, in particular, they inuence investments in
physical and human capital and technology, and the organization of production
(2004: 2). Taxes, for instance, are distortionary since they a¤ect the decisions
between investment and consumption. Taxes, thus, a¤ect property rights and
tend to become conscatory when they are overwhelmingly high. As a result,
they may be harmful for economic growth, above all, if used for predatory pur-
poses. It is worth noting that economic institutions not only determine the
level of growth but also a wide range of other economic outcomes. For example,
progressive taxes and redistribution a¤ect the distribution of income leading to
lower inequality. This link, the one establishing a causal relationship between
economic institutionsand development or performance, is the one on which
most of Norths contributions were focused8 , neglecting what may be behind in
the full causal path depicted above.
The second link, from suprainstitutionsto economic institutions, states
that economic institutions are endogenous and, concretely, determined by po-
litical institutions. Hence, they are chosen according to their expected results.
Remember, we argued that conscatory taxes may harm growth, but these taxes
are chosen by a ruler or some kind of government. Recall as well, that we de-
ned suprainstitutionsas a broad mechanism by which particular institutional
arrangements a¤ect economic institutions. As Acemoglu puts it:
what we want to know in practice is not only that institu-
tions(dened as a broad cluster, and therefore almost necessarily
8See, especially, North (1981).
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as a black box) matter, but which specic dimensions of institutions
matter for which outcomes. It is only the latter type of knowl-
edge that will enable better theories of institutions to be developed
and practical policy recommendations to emerge from this new area.
Consequently, the issue of unbundling institutions, that is, under-
standing the role of specic components of the broad bundle, is of
rst order importance(2005a: 24).
As said, a predatory state is expected to make output and economic growth
shrink, but the question is then, what allows for the emergence of a predatory
state? I will defend that it is because of the lack of political accountability that
some dictators enjoy. Accountability permits to punish rulers or governments
for their bad outcomes. As a result, those rulers whose probability to stay
in power is highly dependent on their economic performance will choose good
policies and economic institutions in order to retain power.
Finally, the third arrow links institutional arrangementsand suprainsti-
tutions, emphasizing that accountability or conict-management are second-
order features (Przeworski, 2004a) or broad institutional consequences of prac-
tical institutional frameworks. Therefore, this mechanism remarks the role that
di¤erent institutional designs and combinations have on more general insti-
tutional terms such as political accountability or, as in Rodrik (1999, 2000),
conict-management. This connection remained largely overlooked by the rst
contributions which highlighted harmful e¤ects of instability on economic per-
formance as no link was claimed to exist between formal existing institutional
congurations and their associated levels of stability. We are thus proposing
some sort of hierarchyof political institutions. So the question is what insti-
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tutional arrangements promote political accountability? It is commonly argued
that under democracy, checks-and-balances, contested and free elections may
provide such a second-order result (next section reviews these mechanisms and
their shortcomings). Both institutional arrangementsas well as suprainsti-
tutionsconstitute the core of political institutions.
2.2.3 The Endogeneity of Institutions
Almost nobody discusses today in the neoinstitutionalist school that institutions
are endogenous (Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi, 2004). But what are its causes?
And what are the consequences? Note that in the causal path diagram above, all
institutions have an arrow pointing to them. This shows that institutions, either
instability, accountability or cohesion, are determined by some other factors, ei-
ther observed or unobserved. The arrows linking geography and underlying
conditionsand economic performance to institutional arrangementscap-
ture this last point by showing the two basic sources of institutional endogeneity
(Przeworski, 2004b).
On the one hand, institutions are determined by some sort of underlying
conditions and, maybe unique, features of societies. In other words, institutions
are not randomly assigned or selected, as a result, some kinds of institutions are
more likely to be observed under some specic conditions than others. History
generates them by some concrete process. A nice example of this argument
is provided by Engerman and Sokolo¤s work (1994, 2005). They defend that
inequality and institutions in the American colonies were shaped by their initial
factor endowments: The suitability for the cultivation of sugar and other similar
types of crops and the presence of large concentrations of native population
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promoted the evolution of institutions where small elites of European descents
hold enormous shares of both wealth and political power. Political regimes
(democracy-dictatorship) are an even clearer example. As Przeworski (2004d)
argues, for democracy to survive it has to be self-enforcing, so it has to be an
equilibrium. Concretely, Benhabib and Przeworski (2003) develop a model in
which they show that, conditional on the initial income distribution and the
capacity of the poor and the rich to seize power, each country has a threshold of
capital stock above which democracy survives. Alternatively, Boix (2003) states
that both economic equality and capital mobility promote democracy since the
redistributive consequences of it become, then, less severe for the rich9 .
The second source of endogeneity is founded in the feed-backe¤ects of their
own consequences or outcomes as historical institutionalists already emphasized.
This reversed causality can take place both directly and indirectly. According
to the former, the outcome variable, say, development, directly determines the
causal variable, i.e., institutions. In the indirect possibility, the outcome variable
has an e¤ect on institutions through its error term.
What are the consequences of the endogeneity of institutions? The most
direct consequence is that identifying causal e¤ects becomes a di¢ cult method-
ological problem. Although alternative kinds of estimators are now available,
none of them can give us full solution to all the potential biases stemming from
the use of non-experimental data10 (Przeworski, 2004a). Furthermore, all esti-
9However, Boix after providing a theory of the emergence of democratic regimes, does not
take full advantage of it in the empirical part of his book where regime becomes an independent
variable. Consequently, his results are, at best, doubtful.
10The potential biases are four: i) Baseline di¤erence, which emerges when there are di¤er-
ences in the control state between the units that were treated and those that were not. This
bias is due to omitted control variables; ii) self-selection bias, which occurs when the choice of
treatment is related to its expected consequences; iii) post-treatment bias, when some of the
control covariates may be correlated with the treatment; so changing the former brings about
changes in other variables too; and iv) violation of the stable unit treatment value assumption,
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mators rely on assumptions which are usually untestable. For instance, while the
instrumental variables method is based on the assumption of conditional mean
independence, Heckmans two-step method relies on a concrete distribution for
the error structure.
The second consequence of endogeneity is that institutions may not have any
causal e¤ect on economic performance (or other outcomes) if it happens to be
very strong (Przeworski, 2004a, 2004b). With all these caveats, then, I am not
assuring that institutions do not matter, I am only pointing at the possibility
that it could be so and the reasons for that. Actually, there are reasons to be
both optimistic and pessimistic at this respect. In the pessimistic side we have
the seminal work by Przeworski et al. (2000), Democracy and Development.
They show that, once controlling for selection, political regimes (democracy vs.
dictatorship) have no e¤ect on the rate of economic growth11 , so the observed
di¤erences between regimes are due to the underlying conditions under which
they exist. Similarly, Cheibub (1998) found that regime type does not a¤ect
the overall level of taxation once controlling for the conditions that make us ob-
serve countries as being dictatorships or democracies12 . Yet, relative optimism
comes from the recent work by Persson (2003), Persson and Tabellini (2004),
and, specially, Persson and Tabellini (2003). Employing similar and some other
techniques, they get as main results that: 1) Presidential and majoritarian sys-
tems have smaller government spending than parliamentary and proportional
systems respectively; 2) large districts and personal ballots reduce the level
which means that observations are not independent, so the realizations of the counterfactuals
would a¤ect the value actually observed. See King and Zeng (2004) and Przeworski (2004a).
11Actually, they show that the only e¤ect of political regimes is on the rate of population
growth, dictatorships having higher rates.
12Concretely, the dependent variable he uses in his analysis is the central government total
tax revenue as a percentage of the GDP at factor cost.
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of rent-extraction by politicians; 3) parliamentary systems have more constant
scal e¤ects13 .
2.3 The Logic of Accountability
2.3.1 Democracy vs. Dictatorship
Let us start with a general standard denition of accountability. As Manin,
Przeworski and Stokes put it, governments are accountableif citizens can dis-
cern representative from unrepresentative governments and can sanction them
appropriately, retaining in o¢ ce those incumbents who perform well and ousting
from o¢ ce those who do not (1999: 10)14 . The underlying argument is that
accountability allows for the punishment of politicians in case they adopt bad
policies on behalf of their own interest or of the interest of some other group.
This is the reason why I focus on this particular set of political institutions.
When analyzing dictatorships and their e¤ect on economic growth, we know
that the main obstacle for the latter is that unconstrained rulers can self-enrich
and promote special interests that may harm economic performance. Account-
ability, in determining the probability of surviving in power, may be the basic
instrument to constrain rulersdecisions regarding taxation and graft or, in gen-
eral terms, the type of economic institutions they promote. When modelling
political-economic decisions, accountability usually translates into a probability,
p(), which indicates the likelihood that the ruler or government at time t will
13See Acemoglu (2005b) for a critical review of their work which focuses on the empiri-
cal validity and the theoretical foundations of the instruments used for specic institutions,
concretely, those taken from the previous work by Hall and Jones (1999).
14Representitativemeans, in this context, that the government acts in the best interest of
the public (Pitkin, 1967).
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retain power at time t + 115 . As Przeworski puts it, this function maps the
outcomes generated by rulers on the sanctions inicted on rulers by the society
(2003: 93). So if, for instance, p is a function of general output Y , p(Y ), and Y
turns out to be low, then the society is very likely to throw the ruler out using
the mechanisms at its disposal.
Political systems, that is, concrete institutional frameworks, di¤er in the
degree of political accountability they o¤er. According to Lederman, Loayza
and Soares (2005) it depends on three main features: The degree of competition,
the existence of checks and balances and the overall transparency of the system.
This leads Przeworskis argument to make full sense when arguing that securing
property rights, coordinating investment, and rendering the rulers accountable
are second-order features of complex institutional frameworks. As such they
constitute consequences of specic institutions (. . . )(2004a: 8).
The presence of checks and balances, provided mainly by the separation of
powers, increase the level of accountability of a political system through the
creation of mechanisms to monitor and even punish the misbehavior of other
branches of power. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) argue that checks and
balances work by creating a conict of interests between the executive and the
legislature, requiring both bodies to agree on public policy and disciplining each
other.
Transparency, when existing, provides citizens or organizations with the nec-
essary information to control the government. Consequently, transparency is
basically dependent on the level of freedom of press and expression, the degree
of decentralization of the system, and the information mechanisms within state
15 t does not imply necessarily years, it could be a legislative term, a presidency, or any
other period with some political meaning.
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institutions. Indeed, Adserà et al. (2003) argue that accountability depends
on the degree of citizen information, which prevents politiciansopportunistic
behavior. Taking the free circulation of newspapers per personas a proxy for
voters information they show that a well-informed public (under democracy)
explains between one-half and two-thirds of the variance in the levels of gov-
ernmental performance and corruption. Alternatively, Bordignon and Minelli
(1998) argue that simpler rules are more transparent because they allow citizens
to gain more information on politicians.
Finally, competition makes basically reference to the existence of free elec-
tions that allow citizens to get rid of their undesired rulers and choose new
ones. Elections would serve as a punishment mechanism in the hands of voters
and, thus, act as a solution to the agency problem in which there is asymmetric
information between the principal the public- and the agent the government-
(see, for example, Ferejohn, 1986). The characteristics of the electoral system
can also play a role in here. Some argue that accountability to performance
increases the larger the districts are, since entry of non-corrupt candidates- is
easier and there are a bigger number of candidates. On the other hand, per-
sonal ballots, contrary to party-list ones, allow voters to judge candidates at
an individual basis and exercise, consequently, a higher level of accountability
(Myerson, 1993; Persson, 2003).
Elections are perhaps the main instrument for accountability in democratic
systems, but they can only be used every four or ve years. During that period,
stable democratic governments do not have to much fear that any group or sec-
tor may challenge their tenure16 . There is the possibility of an impeachment or
16See Benhabib and Przeworski (2003) for a study of the conditions that make this stability
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a motion of condence, but if the government is supported by a su¢ cient major-
ity its probability to stay in power in the next period is just one17 . Nonetheless,
elections present some serious di¢ culties concerning their e¤ectiveness as a con-
trol mechanism. First, elections may serve as a prospective instrument and
thereby used to choose good politicians not just to punish bad ones. Secondly,
voters may use elections to retrospectively punish but not actually to reward
and reelect those governments that perform well. Third, voters have only one
instrument and one day to decide about a big number of dimensions and policy
issues, so it might well be that voters keep o¢ cials accountable for other issues
rather than material well-being18 . This issue goes back to Riker (1986) who
stressed the presence of di¤erent heresthetical strategies, which consist of the
manipulation of dimensions, what essentially means that politicians structure
the choices available to suit their desires and preferred outcomes. According to
Ferejohn, electoral heterogeneity makes possible for o¢ cials to play o¤ some
voters against others to undermine their accountability to anyone(1999: 132).
Fourth, voters may have di¢ culties in attributing responsibilities. Due to the
separation of powers, the possible existence of coalition governments and an
increasing number of international organizations (European Union, IMF, etc.),
voters can not exactly discern who is responsible for the potential bad outcomes
of some policies. If citizens are unable to assign responsibility for changes in
their welfare, elections can hardly serve to control incumbents(Maravall, 2005:
4). Information asymmetry reinforces this e¤ect. Finally, according to Sánchez-
possible.
17See Maravall (2005) for a study of the survival condiditons of democratic governments that
takes into account not only the replacement through election but aso through conspiracies
of other party or coalition members.
18Like, for example, supporting the invasion of Iraq, the territorial unity of the state, cor-
ruption scandals or the quality of public services.
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Cuenca (2003), there are two types of voting, the ideological voting and the
performance one. If the vote is ideological, the decision rule is just based on
ideological closeness (between the voters own position and that of the party)
so no e¤ective accountability takes place.
Indeed, Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) found empirical evidence that the
survival of heads of governments (under democracy) is actually independent of
economic conditions19 . What are the implications of this at the formal level?
Following the logic depicted above, it may seem that in general the dependence
of p on Y turns out to be weak under democracy, but more interestingly, it
is hinted that this dependence may vary as a consequence of some social and
institutional features and be subject to manipulation and noise.
We claim that the accountability function can be dened in the very same
terms when analyzing authoritarian governments. One could argue though,
that if accountability is di¢ cult to take place under democratic regimes, it
will be impossible to occur under dictatorship. Nevertheless, although there are
arguments that may lead us to think that this is fairly true, there are also reasons
to assert that dictators may be accountable to citizens too. Accordingly, we
propose to dene a probability function for dictators which considers predation
-which is assumed to harm economic performance- as an endogenous variable,
so it can be dened as follows, p = p(), where  is the rate of rulers rent
extraction20 .
The systemic features that permit a higher level of accountability in democ-
19They use di¤erent variables to capture the economic performance such as the rate of
change of ination, the growth rate of the labor force, the growth of per capita consumption,
government consumption and the rate of growth of per capita income.
20The logic of the argument does not change if we consider either  , Y or the rate of growth,
as  is assumed to hamper growth.
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racies might be greatly undermined under authoritarian regimes. The rst and
most obvious feature of dictatorships that goes completely against accountabil-
ity is its lack of transparency. This is embodied by the suppression or severe
restrictions on the freedoms of expression and press and, as a result, informa-
tional asymmetries between government and citizens become much more acute
than they actually are in democratic systems21 . The second obvious argument
against accountability under dictatorship has to do with the separation of pow-
ers. As it is generally known, dictatorships are characterized by their concen-
tration of power in the hands of an individual or, at best, a reduced number
of them (like military juntas, councils of national salvation, politburos, etc.).
Finally, periodic elections do not take place in authoritarian regimes. Although
there are doubts, as explained above, that elections can really serve to hold gov-
ernments accountable, this is even more di¢ cult if they are not celebrated or, if
so, under a very constrained and corrupt environment and only for plebiscitary
reasons22 .
However, there are reasons to believe that dictators may be accountable to
citizens, especially for economic outcomes. First of all, although the concentra-
tion of powers existing in dictatorships certainly prevents the e¤ective presence
of checks and balances, it makes also impossible to blur the attribution of re-
sponsibilities. When things go bad and a crisis takes place, everyone knows for
sure whose the fault is. All ngers will point to the dictator and his closest
collaborators.
21See Merat Amini (2002) for a nice exposition of how data were changed and manipulated
under the Shahs rule in Iran and how economic policy was managed.
22See Schedler (2002) for a review of the di¤erent tactics authoritarian rulers can use to
manipulate the results of elections. Besides, the author asserts that elections are just held to
legitimate the regime.
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This last e¤ect may be reinforced by the lack of information and transparency
of the regime. When information is deliberately scarce, it is easier for people
to blame the government when economic performance worsens than thinking
of more elaborated arguments about the functioning of the domestic and the
international economy or the impact of exogenous shocks, above all when power
is concentrated and enjoys a great level of autonomy.
A second mechanism strengthening accountability may take place in peoples
minds. People prefer freedom to oppression. This is to say that dictatorship has
a cost in itself on individualsutility (Sen, 1991; Benhabib and Przeworski, 2003.
No one likes to be oppressed by a dictatorship (Przeworski, 2004d: 18). So
when freedom is severely cut and the possibilities of consumption are restricted,
material well-being increases its weight in the utility function of citizens. This
relates to legitimacy issues. Since authoritarian rulers use to seize power by
irregular and even violent means, they cannot, in general, appeal to popular
support as a source of legitimacy so many of them turn to economic performance
as the reason that justies their permanence in power.
Under dictatorship, periodical mechanisms for choosing and replacing lead-
ers, such as elections, do not generally exist. Dictators face what Wintrobe
(1998) calls the Dictators Dilemma, which makes reference to the lack of in-
formation that the dictator has about his actual level of support among the
population. Thus, dictators have in each period a probability of being over-
thrown by di¤erent political actors or groups and their policy choices will be
constrained by this probability. In addition, in the absence of routine ways to
remove leaders, questions about constituency arise, that is, questions about the
proper identication of the principalin this context. One needs to investigate
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who can put pressure on the ruler and what satisesthose who can do e¤ec-
tively so. Under dictatorship such mechanisms of accountability are much more
costly for those who may want to put them into practice. We identify three
sources of threat to dictators rule: The elite, the military, and the masses. The
rst may carry out a palace putsch taking advantage of their privileged position
and access to the ruler; the second may stage a coup using the weapons they
have at their disposal and the skills to use them; and the third may rebel, launch
strikes and so on.
Dictatorial institutions merit comment as well. As contended for democ-
racies, formal institutions are associated with di¤erent levels of accountability.
There are one-party authoritarian regimes, dictatorships with legislatures, dic-
tatorships with multiple parties within a parliament, and regimes without any of
these formal institutions. Accountability levels may vary between them as they
do for democratic systems with alternative electoral systems, party systems, or
dissimilar degrees of power separation and checks and balances. The potential
variations in the economic results between such institutional arrangements will
be explained by providing their specic causal mechanisms in the next chapters.
2.3.2 Modelling State Capture Under Accountability. A
Survey
The causes and consequences of the predatory activity of the state are a central
issue in the eld of the political economy of development and growth. It has been
assumed that rent-extraction and, more generally, corruption lead growth rates
to shrink and, as a consequence, retard development. The question at stake is
then, what makes rates of extraction di¤er across countries and leaders? The
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literature explaining the di¤erences in the level of state capture is relatively
scarce, although there are some signicant contributions. We can divide this
literature into two main groups of models: Those in which the time-preference
of the ruler or the political agent remains totally exogenous and those in which
it is endogenously determined, although by di¤erent parameters. Generally, in
all these models (either formal or not) there is one ruler whose objective is to
self-enrich by maximizing the value of present and future rents by means of
xing the tax rate and in some cases the level of public spending.
Any ruler has his own time-discount factor which establishes the value he
attaches to prospective future rents. Yet, there is another element determining
what the actual present value of rents is, which is the incumbent rulers proba-
bility of survival in power, in other terms, the political accountability function.
Thus, the higher this probability is, the higher the weight attached to rents at
future time periods will be. In other words, the value at present time of the
rents at some future date will be higher, the higher the probability that the ruler
will still be in power at that date. As said, then, one can nd models in which
this time preference is endogenously determined by the rulers own decisions
and others in which it is not or in which this parameter is simply absent.
Models with exogenous time-preferences may make a priori distinctions be-
tween di¤erent types of dictators with regard to these discount factors or simply
include a probability term to the maximization problem that does not depend
on any other parameter in the model. Olsons (1993) and McGuire and Olsons
(1996) seminal works belong to the former type of models. In them, they posed
the argument about the encompassinginterest of the revenue-maximizing dic-
2.3. THE LOGIC OF ACCOUNTABILITY 43
tator23 . Thus, autocrats with long time horizons (called stationary bandits) have
a more encompassing interest in providing public order and other goods than
do more insecure ones, the roving bandits24 . For the stationary bandit type of
ruler, as they put it, as the monopoly tax-collector, he bears a substantial part
of the social loss that occurs because of the incentive-distorting e¤ects of his
taxation (...). This limits the rate of his tax theft(McGuire and Olson, 1996:
72-73). So, in sum, the dictator is also (self-)constrained by his considerations
about future accumulation. This argument has tried to be empirically tested by
Clague et al. (1996), who conrmed the main hypotheses, although using as a
proxy for the discount rate the age of the current regime. Nonetheless, regime
duration is endogenous what casts doubts on their estimated coe¢ cients.
In his contributions, Wintrobe (1990, 1998, 2001) does not even make the
level of self-enrichment as the unique maximand25 . He distinguishes between
tinpot and totalitarian dictators, assigning to the former an interest in their
own-consumption while the latters rst preference would be to increase their
power. How these preferences emerge, we just do not know.
Regarding exogenous probabilities, i.e., models that include some sort of
political survival parameter but without making it a function of any other pa-
rameters determined in the model, the underlying problem is the same than for
the former works, namely, one part of the story is missing. In this second case,
although potential instability is considered, the ruler does not face any trade-o¤,
since his decisions are not a¤ecting the likelihood of remaining in power so one
can not derive comparative statics that would be essential to understand policy
23For a critical review and analysis of Olsons contributions see Rose-Ackerman (2003).
24For an application of these concepts to the African countries see Rowley (2000).
25See also Mueller (2003).
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variations across units. For instance, Tohmé and Dabús (2001) add a parameter
in the maximizing problem of the ruler that captures the probability of staying
in o¢ ce after some time horizon and it is assumed to have an exogenous con-
stant negative variation rate, so instability just increases with time. In Chen and
Fengs (1996) and Fengs (2003) pieces, we nd a more general analysis of the
e¤ect of political regimes on economic results, although politicians/governments
are not even considered as maximizing agents in their settings; solely individu-
als maximize consumption and an exogenous probability of regime breakdown
a¤ects their second period discounted utility. As a result, lower probabilities of
regime continuity negatively a¤ect the growth rate of the country.
In some other contributions in the eld, the probability constraint is just
absent, mainly because of the static nature of the models or due to their focus
on other types of potential economic constraints. This is the case of Marcouiller
and Youngs (1995) model (see also Buchanan and Faith, 1987; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1998). They study whether the possibility to turn to the informal sec-
tor may lead the predatory state to refrain from excessive plunder considering
that goods produced by each sector are imperfect substitutes. Their answer is
negative: the formal economy could be squeezed out of existence by contin-
ual increases in the tax rate when the elasticity of substitution is low and by
continual reductions in public order when the elasticity of substitution is high
(Marcouiller and Young, 1995: 631). Empirical evidence reported by Friedman
et al. (2000) shows that higher taxes lead actually to less uno¢ cial activity,
although corruption increases it.
In a fully dynamic setting, Barros (1990) paper studies the e¤ect of gov-
ernment spending on economic growth and considers the possibility of a self-
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interested ruler. He concludes that a self-serving ruler will tax at higher rates
than a benevolent one but will provide the e¢ cient level of public expenditures
(as the benevolent government). So, as in Olsons article, a ruler whose tenure
is totally secure seems to care about future accumulation and in this case fullls
the productive-e¢ ciency condition.
These insights reviewed so far, although valuable, lack the richness that
making time-preference endogenous involves since they skip one fundamental
part of the decision-making process. The most recent contributions on the eld
have attempted to correct this shortcoming by making politiciansor govern-
ments decisions in relation to self-extraction and/or public spending to a¤ect
their stability/durability in power as well. This dependence of survival in power
on the rulers own decisions compels him to trade o¤ enrichment in the short-
term with the chances of remaining in power for a longer period. The desire
to extend tenure may, then, temper the abuse of power (Klick, 2004), making
accountability to come into play. However, there are interesting di¤erences be-
tween the alternative models based, principally, on the variable a¤ecting the
probability of survival or, in other words, on the possible sources of endogeneity
and the type of threat rulers have to handle.
In Grossman and Nohs (1990, 1994) models, the rent-maximizing ruler likeli-
hood to be in power in the future depends on his current tax and spending policy
since the representative producers currently expected utility is included in the
probability function. As a result, when these variables are important for politi-
cianssurvival, the equilibrium tax rate and public investment can be relatively
benevolent. As to public investment, Grossman and Noh get the same result as
Barro (1990), that is, the self-interested ruler choice of public goods would be
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the same chosen following a welfare/growth-maximizing criterion. This insight
is challenged by Acemoglu (2005a) who states that when the state is weak and
lacks the power to tax in an e¤ective way, the ruler will underinvest in order
to be able to extract rents. Findlay (1990) also shows that a ruler maximizing
surplus will provide less than the optimal level of public services26 .
Overland, Simons and Spagat (2000) put the endogeneity of survival in a
di¤erent way. Specically, they make it a function of domestic capital devel-
opment. The process is similar though, since capital accumulation is in itself
a function of taxes and government spending but, on the other hand, in this
case, initial conditions matter too. The idea underlying this relationship is
that domestic capital development increases the number and inuence of indi-
viduals with an interest in the continuance of the current political status quo
(Overland, Simons and Spagat, 2000: 4). Overland et al.s model yields mul-
tiple equilibria: If the initial level of capital stock existing in the economy is
high enough (beyond the bifurcation point) the dictator will not plunder but
promote steady growth, otherwise, a high extraction low performance equilib-
rium is reached. There is, nevertheless, something odd in their formulation:
In the denition of the dictators problem, they only allow him to choose the
split of output between consumption and investment, but not the fraction of
consumption he appropriates (and the authors do not give any reason for that).
Contrarily to Overland et al.s assumption about the source of endogeneity,
Robinson (2000) somehow sees the increase of domestic capital (infrastructure)
as enhancing the risks for dictators, so, generally, it is in their interest to retard
development. He argues that public investment, which promotes development,
26See also Findlay and Wilson (1987).
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improves the ability of agents outside the ruling elite to contest political power27 .
There are, nonetheless, two shortcomings in this assumption: First, public in-
vestment may make the repressive capacity of state forces more e¤ective too
and, arguably, at a higher rate; and second, public goods provided by preda-
tory leaders may have the only objective to deter banditry so they can extort
more since the exit option (in this case, banditry) has higher costs (Moselle and
Polak, 2001). Robinsons (2000) conclusions derived from his model are, on the
other hand, at odds with Olsons arguments. Robinson claims that those rulers
who expect to stay more time in o¢ ce will be the greater thieves.
In general, in the models reviewed so far, it is considered that those who
may oust the government are the producers or households a¤ected by taxes.
There are more detailed works focusing on specic actors or specic political
settings. For instance, Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000) assume that autocrats
can only be ousted by a coup. In their setting, the probability of staying in
power in the next period depends on the realization of output in the previous
period and the peoples willingness to passively follow the commands of a new
ruler28 . Focusing on democratic systems in which citizens are entitled to vote
periodically, Ventelou (2002) studies di¤erent alternatives by which strategic
voters can a¤ect the probability of politicians re-election in order to avoid
a take the money and run equilibrium29 . A general model of insurrections
is developed by Grossman (1991) in which the ruler faces a double trade-o¤
27 In other versions of the model, he allows agents out of power to allocate part of their
capital to subverting power as well.
28See Sutter (2000) for a game-theoretic model of coups.
29These mechanisms are: a) To organize a periodicity for elections, so for a length of t peri-
ods, the politician is totally secure; b) to use clientelism assigning budget misappropriations
to a group of voters to assure their support; and c) to introduce uncertainty about the real
type of politician.
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in choosing the tax rate that maximizes income for his clientele since higher
taxes have an e¤ect on both the time peasants devote to production and to
insurrection activities.
It is worth noting that the underlying intuition behind models with exoge-
nous and endogenous time-preference rates is, in general, the opposite. For the
encompassing interest -à la Olson- to emerge, a high security in o¢ ce is required
if the bandit has to become, in his own terms, stationary. As a result, in this
case, higher security should be related to a lower rate of graft and, hence, to
higher growth rates. On the other hand, in models with endogenously con-
strained politicians, commonly, plunder will be curbed as long as the survival
constraint is binding. So in these cases, then, a more insulated (stable) ruler
will be able to increase his level of rent extraction, harming growth.
2.4 Conclusion. What is left?
New institutionalism has put institutions at the core of the research agenda.
Although approaching the issue from di¤erent views and strategies, new insti-
tutionalisms share a common core: They are all well aware of the gap existing
between political demands and preferences and the actual outcomes, so their
analyses have turned their attention to the norms and procedures used for ag-
gregating individual choices.
When studying economic development and its causes, new institutionalists
have tended to view institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2004). As stressed above, this assertion is
not devoid of problems both at the theoretical and methodological levels. The
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questions that arise are basically two: If institutions are the causes, which are,
then, the causes of the causes? And second, which institutions must we pay
attention to?
Institutions are endogenous, that is, they are determined by some factors
and variables to be properly studied. In other words, institutions are not ran-
domly assigned or selected as a treatment in an experiment. In order to identify
the potential causal e¤ect of any cause, in this case, institutions, one needs to
theorize rst about what underlies the existence and form of them.
On the other hand, one needs to choose the dimension of institutions that
may a¤ect the outcome under study. We must, then, develop arguments justi-
fying which are the institutions that matter for development. We defend in this
dissertation that these institutions are the institutions of accountability. The
assumption behind this selection is that well-functioning accountability mecha-
nisms can drastically reduce the extraction capability of rulers. This framework
is suitable to be applied both to democratic as well as to authoritarian regimes.
Indeed, the literature analyzing predatory rule often depart from this setting as
it incorporates uncertainty in governmentsdecisions based on their likelihood
of not losing power.
The literature on state capture, reviewed in the last section, presents two
basic shortcomings. The problem of models with exogenous time preferences
is obvious as one crucial part of the story is missing: Dictatorsown decisions
with respect to policy a¤ect their chances to remain in power in the future and
get the benets derived from it. Furthermore, models with endogenous time-
preference rates tend to compare the optimal tax rate under the constrained and
the unconstrained settings. However, concrete comparative statics exercises are
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frequently missing. To nd empirical implications of political-economic models
these exercises are essential though. As a result, these contributions lack a
careful analysis of the conditions under which the probabilistic constraint has
an actual e¤ect, since its solely existence does not guarantee its e¢ cacy as an
anticipation mechanism.
Chapter 3
Optimal Predation and
Accountability under
Dictatorship
3.1 Introduction. Variability in DictatorsBe-
havior
The causes and consequences of the predatory activity of the state are a central
issue in the eld of the political economy of development and growth. It has
been assumed that rent-extraction and, more generally, corruption lead growth
rates to shrink and, as a consequence, retard development. The question at
stake is then, what makes rates of extraction di¤er across countries and lead-
ers? In other words, why is that Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, former Dominican
51
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Republic dictator (1930-1961), was able to own 80% of industrial production
and make 60% of the labor force depend on his rms or the state (Moya Pons,
1995), while Pinochet (who ruled Chile from 1973 to 1990) had onlyabout 8
million dollars (or more, as the investigations proceed) at the Riggs Bank in the
US1? The di¤erences between autocratic rulers are absolutely astonishing. Ac-
cording to some estimates, Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaires former dictator) had total
control over 17-22 percent of annual national budget for his own personal and
discretionary use. Other estimates point that the 1981 budget allocation for the
Presidency -that is, just Mobutu- was 1.48 billion Belgian francs, to which one
must add 600 million francs just for personal expenses of the leader (Callaghy,
1984). Jean Bedel Bokassa, Central African Republics former dictator, spent
the whole annual state budget in one day and one thing, his coronation as the
new emperor Bokassa I. In Malawi, after being deposed it was revealed that
Kamuzu Banda had direct control over the 35% of his countrys GDP (Sánchez
Piñol, 2006).
We thus need to model the optimal rent-extraction rate under di¤erent con-
ditions for a dictator who maximizes his own consumption. I follow Buchanan
and Tullock (1965) in viewing political actors as rational economic agents pur-
suing their self-interests, and Levi (1988) in assuming that rulers maximize
revenue to the state (1988: 10), and in this concrete case, in order to turn it
into personal rents. In Brennan and Buchanans words, revenue maximization
remains a suitable simplication of government behavior(2000: 34). Similarly,
Findlay (1990) suggests that assuming that rulers seek to maximize rents ap-
plies to the less developed countries but not to advanced industrialized ones.
1As recently made public by a report by the US Senate Subcommittee on Investigations
(July, 2004).
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As Brough and Kimenyi put it, dictators must be viewed as purposive self-
interested individuals (1986: 40). Extreme cases of theft by authoritarian
rulers have received much attention in the literature, mostly, however, in re-
lation to transitions from this kind of rule or by in-depth historical accounts.
Indeed, they have been called kleptocracies (see, for instance, Grossman and
Noh, 1990; Grossman, 1999; Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier, 2004), sultanis-
tic regimes (Chehabi and Linz, 1998), neopatrimonial regimes (see, for example,
Eisenstadt, 1973; Clapham, 1985; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Brown-
lee, 2002), tinpots (Wintrobe, 1990, 1998) or predatory dictators (Fatton, 1992;
Robinson, 2000; Moselle and Polak, 2001).
Examples of this kind of authoritarian rule have abounded specially in
African countries leading the continent to fall dramatically behind. For this
reason, the literature on comparative development has tended to focus on the
causes of the so-called African tragedy and to treat this type of corrupt regimes
simply as a region centered disease2 . Certainly, Africa may have been the re-
gion where some of the most outrageous examples of rapacious leaders -namely,
Mobutu, Moi, Bokassa, Mengistu, Doe and so on- have taken place, but the
phenomenon is not African exclusive. Asia, South America, Central Amer-
ica and the Caribbean have also producednotorious thieves; names such as
the Duvaliers, the Somozas, Batista, Trujilllo, Ferdinand Marcos and Suharto
will come rapidly to our minds. Most of dictators have pursued self-enrichment
in a more or less evident way. Look at the case of Pinochet; he promoted
market-oriented policies following the monetarist principles of the Chicago Boys
in order to achieve rapid growth. He, thus, launched a rapid change towards
2See, among many others, Bates (1981), Easterly and Levine (1997), Sachs and Warner
(1997), Collier and Cunning (1999), and Sala-i-Martin and Arcadi (2003).
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deregulation and privatization, abolishing taxes on wealth and prots and the
minimum wage, privatizing the pension system, state industries and banks, but
he did not forget to keep an small portion of the benets for himself as re-
ported above. Even one of the paradigms of the developmental state engaged
in rent-extraction. Under Park Chung Hee (South Korea, 1963-1979), political
elites took millionaire donations from big business corporations. If these funds
were not provided the loans to big rms could have get called by the Bank of
Korea, or they could be subject to tax audit (Kang, 2002). Kim Jong-pil, head
of the Korean CIA was reported to have accumulated more than $50 million in
property and businesses. Actually, some despots appear -or appeared- in the
Forbes Magazine ratings of the richest people in the world. You can nd there,
for instance, Saddam Hussein, Iraqs former dictator, with an estimated fortune
of two billion dollars3 .
In this Chapter we pave the way for the understanding of such variability.
Contrarily to the works in which the types of dictator are distinguished ex ante
by assuming that they have distinct preferences (i.e., di¤erent maximands) or
di¤erent discount rates, we suggest that they all share a generic objective, self-
enrichment, so policy di¤erences will be brought about by the variations in the
political constraints they have to face and the economies they govern.
In the rst section, we present de basics of the models, nd the optimal
households saving rate, and study the dictators choices when no accountability
constraint is binding. In the second section, we solve dictators problem under
accountability and we dene the parameters -and the concepts behind- of the
accountability function and its specic form. Consequently, the concepts -or
3Check the website for more information: http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/
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dimensions- of security and sensitivity are presented. Later on, the consequences
of the rst-order condition are fully explored by doing multiple comparative
statics exercises.
Finally, we explore alternative accountability functions and their conse-
quences in terms of comparative statics with the aim of checking whether the
previous results can be generalized. We repeat some of the exercises but taking
both concave and convex functions as a potential source of policy variation and
alternative hypotheses.
3.2 The General Model
Both approaches to the political economy of development reviewed in Chapter 2
have one important shortcoming that will be addressed in the model presented
in this chapter. The problem of models with exogenous time preferences is that
one crucial part of the story is missing: Dictatorsown decisions with respect to
policy a¤ect their chances to remain in power in the future and get the benets
derived from it. So I will develop a simple model related to the second group of
works reviewed, i.e., those in which the time-preference is endogenous.
On the other hand, models with endogenous time-preference rates tend to
compare the optimal tax rate under the constrained and the unconstrained
settings with the aim of comparing behavior under both of them. However,
concrete comparative statics exercises are frequently missing. To nd empirical
implications of political-economic models these exercises are essential though.
As a result, these contributions lack a careful analysis of the conditions under
which the probabilistic constraint has an actual e¤ect, since its solely existence
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does not guarantee its e¢ cacy as a self-restraining mechanism. On the other
hand, the di¤erent parameters in the survival probability function may have
di¤erent e¤ects. Therefore, albeit keeping the setting of the model as simple
as possible, I will concentrate in a full development of the relevant possible
comparative statics, specially, with regard to the parameters that form the
probability function that may constrain self-interested rulers.
3.2.1 Basics of the Model and Denitions
The model will consist of two periods and two actors, the dictator and a repre-
sentative household. Its fundamental elements are the following:
1) The production function: Output y at time t is produced out of one
productive factor, capital (k). Capital is accumulable. We thus have that
yt = f(kt) (3.1)
We assume a simple production function in which output yt at time t is
produced with capital kt and technology is linear
yt = rkt (3.2)
where r is a constant rate of return, r > 1. Consumption is a constant share
of output, (1 s), where s is the saving and, hence, the investment rate that will
be chosen by the representative household; so consumption at time t is simply
ct = (1  s)yt (3.3)
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From here we can easily deduce, then, that output at time t+ 1 is going to
be
yt+1 = r(kt + syt) = yt + rsyt (3.4)
so the growth rate of this economy is
t =
yt
yt
= rs (3.5)
where s will be endogenously determined.
2) The dictator is a purely self-interested agent who exercises sovereign power
to maximize rents. Accordingly, he can be compared to any other private enter-
prise or consumer in microeconomic theory. In contrast, households maximize
consumption. So we have that, for the dictator, utility is UD(Rt), while for
the representative household it is UH(ct), where Rt stands for rents which are
actually dictators consumption -to be dened below- and the subscript t for
the time period.
We use the particular type of CRRA utility functions in which  = 1, so the
utility functions are logarithmic
UD(Rt) = log(Rt) (3.6)
UH(ct) = log(ct)
The ruler extracts rents by taxing at a non-negative rate  households in-
come in the two periods, consequently, rents at time t are
Rt = yt where  2 [0; 1] (3.7)
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It is worth noting that  is capturing whatever mean the dictator may use
in order to get a share of householdsincome. It can be argued, as Acemoglu
(2005a) does, that taxation is a much more institutionalized and predictable way
to get resources than simple expropriation, which is basically arbitrary and more
uncertain. Although the distinction may be relevant in practice, we assume that
in the model  represents any activity to extract rents that the autocrat may
use, so we will think of it, generally, as the rate of rent-extraction. The only
condition is that it has to be anticipated by the household and, consequently,
that the resulting transfer of resources has a distortionary e¤ect by altering the
calculus of those who make the investment decisions.
3) There is an endogenous probability that the dictator stays in power in
the second period, which we call the political accountability function. We call
it the accountability function because it relates the rulerspolicy choices with
their chances of retaining power in the future. In case politicians adopt bad
policies, sanctions involving the removal from o¢ ce may be applied. As said,
this probability is endogenously determined in the model since it depends on the
tax rate chosen by the dictator in order to maximize rents over the two periods.
This dependence of survival in power on the rulers own decisions compels him
to trade o¤ enrichment in the short-term with the chances of remaining in
power for another period. So actually, accountability acts as an anticipation
mechanism, thereby rulers anticipate that certain bad actionsor policies will
harm their odds of reelection or permanence in power, foreseeing, thus, the
consequences of their policy choices4 . Hence, if he lives for two periods (t = 0
and t = 1), the probability of remaining in power in t = 1 can be generally
4See, for example, Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson (1995) and Manin, Przeworski and
Stokes (1999).
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dened as
Pr(survival) = p() (3.8)
where 0  p()  1
where p < 05 , that is, higher extraction reduces the likelihood of keeping
power.
As a result, the probability of survival is dened as a function of  , which
stands for the tax rate chosen by the dictator to solve his problem6 . This will
allow us to make the time-preference of the ruler endogenous, as defended. The
mechanism for this is quite straightforward: The value at present time of the
rents at some future date will be higher the higher the probability that the ruler
will still be in power at that date.
4) If the dictator is thrown out of o¢ ce he gets an exit value, Uexit. It
represents the utility the dictator gets once he is out of power, so the ruler gets
Uexit in the second period with probability 1 p(). Therefore, we are assuming
that the payo¤s for di¤erent post-o¢ ce scenarios may vary for di¤erent dictators.
We shall call this term, judicial accountability. Indeed, as commented above,
once they are out of power, dictators must face a very uncertain future in which
the results might be fatal. Some models simply assume that this utility is zero,
so the ruler (dictatorial or not) gets nothing once he is out of o¢ ce so the second
term in the expected utility equation just vanishes. But what if a dictator is very
afraid of what may happen to him if he is ousted? Or, what if, alternatively,
5The subscript indicates the rst derivative with respect to that parameter, in this case  .
6The results would not change if we take p(t), i.e., if we make the probability of keeping
power a function of growth, t, since, as shown below, the rate of economic growth is a
negative function of  , so the underlying idea is the same. We take, then, p() in order to
simplify the notation. The same happens if we take p(y1), for identical reasons.
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one dictator is sure that in case his tenure is jeopardized by whatever actor he
will be able to y out the country and live in exile with the money saved in
an account in a Swiss bank? It is clear, then, that post-exit scenarios and how
they are valued may make some di¤erence.
We can think of the simplied term Uexit as some sort of expected consump-
tion once the dictator is not in power, Uexit = log(c0), to which the dictator
attaches a probability, q, that makes that value to be lower. Actually, note that
if Uexit =  4, it means that c0 = 0:0183, which is fairly low. We explore this
possibility in Chapter 7, where the term Uexit will be substituted by
[qU low + (1  q)Uhigh]
where q denotes the probability of a very low utility post-exit scenario -such
as house arrest, jail or execution- taking place, while Uhigh would comprise
situations in which the ruler scapes punishment.
5) Putting all these elements together we can now dene both the dictators
and households general problems. For the representative household it is
max
s
t=1X
t=0
UH(ct) = U(c0) + U(c1) = log(c0) +  log(c1) (3.9)
where  is the discount factor of the representative household-producer and
s is the saving rate which will be dened and specied below.
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On the other hand, the dictators problem is
maxE

t=1X
t=0
UD(Rt) = U(R0) + 

p()U(R1) + (1  p())Uexit

(3.10)
s.t. 0  p()  1
and to the households problem
where  is the dictators discount factor.
We will proceed in the following way in this chapter: The rst step is to
solve the households problem. As said, the representative household maximizes
consumption over the two periods by choosing the saving and, consequently,
the investment rate of the economy subject to distortionary taxes. Given that
households only live for two periods, there are no savings in the second one.
By solving this problem we will get the equilibrium saving rate and we will
be able to derive the pattern of accumulation of capital and the growth rate.
Secondly, we will proceed by solving the dictators problem subject only to
one of the two possible constraints according to which the dictator takes the
optimal saving rate chosen by the representative household as given so he is
constrained by the path of capital accumulation. The second constraint is the
accountability function since it makes time preference endogenous. Thirdly,
using a general notation, we will solve the dictators problem constrained by
both the accountability and accumulation path with the aim of analyzing the
general solution and the implications of the rst-order condition.
By solving the autocrats problem we will get a tax rate that will be a
function of a series of variables from the model. For our interest, the most
relevant parameters will be those that dene the accountability of dictators;
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although we will also pay attention to the economic conditions such as the initial
income. In sum, in opposition to the works such as Wintrobes (1990, 1998) or
Muellers (2003) in which dictators are distinguished ex ante by assuming that
they have di¤erent preferences (i.e., di¤erent maximands), we suggest that they
all share a generic objective, to maximize rents, so policy di¤erences will be
brought about by the variations in the constraints they have to face and the
economies they govern. The point at stake in the former type of modelling
(such as Wintrobes) is, as Przeworski puts it, that we can always invent some
objective that would lead the actor to behave in the way that was observed
(2003: 86). Comparative statics constitute the key instrument through which
such variations can be truly investigated and, as a result, hypotheses derived.
3.2.2 Households Behavior: The Saving Rate
In this subsection we will develop the model by following the three steps just de-
scribed above and by specializing the functional forms of the elements dened in
the previous section (namely, the production and the accountability functions).
As said, the representative household chooses s (the saving rate) in order to
maximize the utility of consumption in the two periods. Therefore, substituting
(3) and (5) into (3.9), we get the specic households problem
max
s
t=1X
t=0
UH(ct) = log [(1     s)y0] + (log [(1  )(1 + rs)y0]) (3.11)
where  is the households discount factor. Note that in the second period,
though, households do not invest, they simply consume all non-taxed income at
their disposal since, by assumption, they only live for two periods. Households
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utility is negatively related to taxes but positively to income. The problem
above yields the following rst-order condition
@
Pt=1
t=0 U
H(ct)
@s
=
1
s+    1 +
r
rs+ 1
= 0 (3.12)
which equals the marginal benet of consuming at present to the marginal
cost of reduced investment on output in the future.
Solving for s we get, then, the households optimal saving rate under equi-
librium, which is
s =
r(1  )  1
r(1 + )
(3.13)
Note that s is negatively related to  , that is, to rent-extraction, so, in fact,
we actually have that s = s() where s < 0
7 , given that the representative
household anticipates that a share of its income will be taxed at rate  . If taxes
are anticipated to be high, the overall level of investment is going to be low in
response. On the other hand, substituting s in (13) into (3.5) we have that the
growth rate is
 = rs =
r(1  )  1
(1 + )
(3.14)
From here, and given the only extractive nature of the government (dictator),
that is, given that he does not spend any of the revenue to provide public goods
or productive investment to the economy, we see that the growth maximizing
tax rate -which would be chosen by a benevolent social planner- is simply equal
to zero since the derivative of  with respect to  is negative yielding, therefore,
7The actual derivative is s =   1+ , which is undoubtedly negative.
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a corner solution
@
@
=
 r
(1 + )
< 0
Thus, taxes are distortionary because they a¤ect the calculus of households
via the rate of return of its investment. As a result, the e¤ect on the growth
rate is negative as well. In fact, the growth rate of consumption in a simple AK
production function model with constant relative risk aversion utility function
in which there are at-rate taxes would be c = [r(1  )]
1
   1 from which we
know that @c@ < 0, so growth decreases with taxes in this alternative context
as well8 .
3.2.3 Total Security and Long-Term Considerations
Before proceeding to solve the dictators problem under accountability and to
study the comparative statics, let us analyze with greater detail one specic
case that underlies the general model. This case refers to the completely secure
dictators, that is, those for whom the accountability function equals 1. There-
fore, this ruler knows in advance he is going to remain in power in the second
period with probability p() = 1. As a result the exit value and the account-
ability function disappear from the problem and will not represent a constraint
to be considered when deciding the rate of extraction. The only constraint still
present is the one posed by the households choice of its optimal investment rate
(s). The question that arises is whether this latter constraint is e¤ective or
not in restraining the voracity of a selsh and fully insulated -non accountable-
ruler.
8The parameters are the usual ones:  is the rate of time preference,  is the tax rate,
r is the rate of return, and  is the magnitude of the elasticity of the marginal utility of
consumption.
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The autocrats problem can be thus rewritten as follows
max

t=1X
t=0
UD(Rt) = log(y0) + 

log((1 +
r(1  )  1
1 + 
)y0)

(3.15)
This expression, di¤erentiating with respect to  , yields the following rst
order condition
@
Pt=1
t=0 U
D(Rt)
@
=  1 + 
(1 + r(1  2))
(1 + r(1  ))  R 0 (3.16)
Solving for  we get the equilibrium rent-extraction rate chosen under total
security in a two period framework, which is
p=1 =
(1 + r)(1 + )
r (2 + 1)
(3.17)
The equilibrium tax rate is a function of  and r; p=1 = p=1(; r), where
p=1 < 0 and 
p=1
r < 0
9 .
Note that the resulting tax rate is very high. Actually, it could only be less
than 1 as long as r > 1+ which implies a rate of return of more than 100%
if  < 1. This is denitively not feasible. Thus, the resulting equilibrium tax
rate in a two period framework and with a totally secure dictator is 1, that is,
total rapacity when no accountability mechanism is present. In fact, if we as-
sign the following values to the parameters,  = 0:95 and r = 1:210 , we get that
 = 1. What does it imply? The result shows that households accumulation
path does not represent an e¤ective constraint for the dictator in a two-period
framework. Therefore, a ruler only constrained by the disincentive e¤ects of
9Again, the subscript indicates rst derivative with respect to that parameter.
10These values are not random, they are usually employed in other economic models.
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households expecting high taxes does not even choose a tax rate at the peak
of the La¤er curve in order to maximize revenue but the expropriatory corner
solution. As Engineer puts it, [t]he La¤er curve may be no defence against an
unconstrained Leviathan (1997: 4). This result reveals an interesting insight
consisting in that, in a two period framework, a dictator does not care about the
accumulation of capital so the householdsdecisions with respect to investment
do not represent an e¤ective constraint in the dictators decisions with regard
to rent-extraction. No encompassinginterest seems intervene. The insulated
ruler is aware that a lower tax rate allows for a higher saving rate and, subse-
quently, a higher output in the second period on which to impose taxes, but he
just does not care when he is expected to live only two periods.
When thinking about two periods, one tends automatically to think of years,
nevertheless, we could think of other and longer time frameworks in a more gen-
eral or abstract way, not necessarily involving just years. One way to introduce
a long-term perspective in the model would be to consider that each period
in it lasts actually n years or units. In this case n would represent the time
that takes for the accountability function to be e¤ective. Using this mechanism
we can extend the duration of the periods and explore its consequences for the
equilibrium tax rate.
The new problem, assuming again that Pr(survival) = 1, can be rewritten
as follows
max

t=1X
t=0
UD(Rt) = log(y0) + 
n [log((1 + rs)ny0)] (3.18)
Note that n becomes the exponent for both the discount factor and the rate
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of growth, indicating the times (periods) the have to be multiplied as time units
become longer. The rst-order condition for this problem is now
@
Pt=1
t=0 U
D(Rt)
@
=  1 + n

1 + r[(1  )  n]
(1 + r(1  ))

R 0 (3.19)
Equating it to zero and solving for  we get the equilibrium tax rate when
the dictator is totally secure in o¢ ce and time periods last n time units
 l =
(1 + r)(1 + n)
r (1 + n(1 + n))
(3.20)
The resulting optimal tax rate,  l (where superscript l stands for long-
term), is now a function not only of r and  as in (3.17) but also now of n:
 l =  l(; r; n). Remember that the role of n is to introduce a way to extend
the time periods so that we can check whether, at certain time, long-term con-
siderations lead the dictator to set a lower tax rate in order to allow the capital
to accumulate and the taxable output to grow faster in the future. Comparative
statics with regard to n yield the following result
@ l
@n
=  
n[1 + (ln)n(1 + r) + r] + 2n(1 + r)
r (1 + n(1 + n))
2 < 0 (3.21)
Therefore, the longer the time period, the lower the rent-extraction xed by
the self-interested ruler, allowing for capital accumulation so he can tax a bigger
output in the future. In Figure 3.1 we can see this pattern in a clearer way.
In the y-axis we have the optimal tax rate, whereas the length of the periods
is in the x-axis. The horizontal thicker line shows the maximum level of taxes
possible, that is, 1.
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[Figure 3.1]
Note, then, that under a certain value of n the equilibrium tax rate is always
1, but it decreases as n increases. If we assume again that the discount rate is
0.95 (), and that the rate of return to capital is 1:20 (r), we get that the values
of  as a function of the length of the periods (n) are the following
 l
8>><>>:
= 1 if n  1:74
< 1 if n > 1:74
(3.22)
We can observe that the value from which  is less than 1 is not really
high, just almost 2; note, besides, that  l ! 0 as n ! 1. In sum, a long
term perspective in the dictators decisions does not take too long to appear, he
just needs a two-year period to start worrying about capital accumulation and
reduce taxation to foster investment and output in the long-run. Moreover, this
critical value of n decreases as r increases11 .
3.3 Predation under Accountability
3.3.1 General Solution
Let us now introduce accountability, in its various forms, into the general prob-
lem. In general terms, that is, without specializing the accountability and utility
functions, the dictators problem can be dened as follows (as we did in subsec-
tion 2.1)
11The mechanism is simple since a bigger r means that the marginal benets of capital
accumulation increase.
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maxE

t=1X
t=0
UD(Rt) = U(y0) + 

p()U(y1) + (1  p())Uexit

(3.23)
s.t. 0  p()  1
and s.t. the households problem
The rate of rent-extraction that will be chosen to maximize rents in the
two periods is, thus, a¤ecting the probability of retaining power p(), on the
one hand, and y1 through its negative e¤ect on the households saving rate.
Di¤erentiating (3.23) with regard to  yields the following rst order condition
UR0
@R0
@
+ 

@p()
@
U(R1) + p()UR1
@R1
@
  @p()
@
Uexit

= 0 (3.24)
where, in fact, @p()@ < 0,
@R0
@ > 0, and
@y1
@ < 0 given that the marginal
utility of taxes in t = 1 is @U(R1)@ = U
0

y1 + 
@y1
@

, since Rt = yt12 . The
structure of condition (3.24) states that the ruler will increase the rate of ex-
traction up to the point where his marginal utility of rents equals the his loss in
terms of lower expected probability of getting rents in t+ 1 instead of the exit
value Uexit and the cost of reduced investment in future income. Specically,
the condition above can be rearranged as follows
UR0
@R0
@
+

p()UR1y1 +
@p()
@
Uexit

= 

@p()
@
U(R1) + p()UR1


@y1
@

(3.25)
Therefore extraction negatively a¤ects both the likelihood of staying in power
12Subscripts indicate rst derivative with respect to that parameter.
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as well as output in t = 1 through its negative e¤ect on the households optimal
saving rate, as shown in subsection 2.2. Also recall that in subsection 2.3 we
studied the conditions under which capital accumulation may represent an ef-
fective constraint to the autocrat. The results showed that only accountability
may dodge the grabbing handin this two-period framework, that is, the fact
that on the right-hand side we have @y1@ < 0 will not be acting as a restraining
mechanism for the self-interested ruler (since when p() = 1 he captures all
income available).
The equations just presented dene the general structure of the solution of
the problem that the dictator solves and helps us to understand what elements
may lead to a lower or a higher level of extraction. Next chapter will be devoted
to make full sense of this rst order condition, specially, by specifying concrete
alternative forms for the accountability function p().
3.3.2 Specialized Solution
In order to fully develop the model depicted in the previous chapter and to com-
prehend the e¤ects of the parameters, we need to specialize the accountability
function, that is, dene a concrete form and explore the meaning and e¤ect of
each of its components.
Let us begin by assuming a simple functional form, so we can concentrate
on the denitions and the comparative statics. We dene as a rst step, a linear
probability function of the following form
0  (A B)  1 (3.26)
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The function consists, therefore, of two parameters (A and B) and one vari-
able, the tax rate (), which makes it endogenous. We call A the security
parameter, while B is called the sensitivity parameter. Hence, the extent to
what the tax rate,  , a¤ects dictators survival probability is determined by his
level of sensitivity (B), which acts as the coe¢ cient for the variable  . A high B
coe¢ cient implies a high decrease in the probability of staying in power given a
unitary increase in the tax rate and, hence, a higher level of political accountabil-
ity based on the economic results of the rulers policies. On the other hand, the
parameter A captures the dictators structural security. Security refers to the
overall probability of being overthrown independently of the economic growth
or the rate of extraction xed. Assume, then, that  is zero, hence, the proba-
bility of survival is just A, the intercept in a linear specication. This is only a
simplication since dictatorssurvival in power depends on many variables, so
security is related to all of those with the exception of economic performance
(directly related to the predatory activity of the regime), and measured by the
sensitivity coe¢ cient.
Once the accountability function is dened, we can now describe the e¤ective
constraint it poses on the tax rate the autocrat will choose. This constraint is
the following and describes the whole range of values that  might take
0  min    max = A
B
 1 (3.27)
It tells us that the maximum tax rate allowed by the probability constraint
is AB , which can be equal or less than 1, while the minimum might be zero.
Once solved the rst stage of the model (see section 2.2) and specied the
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concrete functional form of the accountability function we can now turn to
the dictators problem. The dictator acts as an Stackelberg leader as in Barro
(1990), therefore, he just chooses the rate of graft that maximizes his own
rents knowing the households optimal accumulation path in advance, that is,
knowing (3.13)13 . Recall that the autocrats utility is UD(Rt) = log(yt), where
Rt = yt are the rents the dictator extracts by applying a non-negative tax rate.
So rewriting and specifying the dictators problem we get
max

E
t=1X
t=0
UD(Rt) = log(y0) + (3.28)


(A B) log((1 + rs)y0) + (1  (A B))Uexit

s.t. s =
r(1  )  1
r(1 + )
and 0  Pr(survival) = (A B)  1
Since we already know that s is determined by the representative household,
which actually chose s in order to maximize its utility of consumption in the
two periods, we can substitute it into the problem above to get the complete
dictators problem
max

E
t=1X
t=0
UD(Rt) = log(y0) + (3.29)


(A B) log

(1 +
r(1  )  1
1 + 
)y0

+ (1  (A B))Uexit

Di¤erentiating with respect to  we get the rst-order condition for the
above problem. Note that we allow for the possibility that this condition is
13The path of capital accumulation.
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either constantly positive or negative, so corner solutions may be found. First-
order condition is then
@E
Pt=1
t=0 U
D(Rt)
@
=  1+


 B

log

(1 +
r(1  )  1
1 + 
)y0

+ (A B)

1 + r(1  2)
 [1 + r(1  )]

+BUexit

R 0
(3.30)
and rearranging terms
 1 + 

A

1 + r(1  2)
 [1 + r(1  )]

+BUexit

R


B

log

(1 +
r(1  )  1
1 + 
)y0

+B

1 + r(1  2)
 [1 + r(1  )]

(3.31)
This last equation, to repeat, illustrates that the self-interested dictator
chooses the policy that equates the expected marginal benets from taxation to
the marginal cost that this rate of extraction has in reducing the probability of
being able to enjoy future rents from power, but increasing those of getting the
post-exit value, Uexit, instead.
Following the structure of the rst-order condition detailed in the expressions
(24) and (25) detailed in the previous subsection, we have that
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UR0
@R0
@
=  1
@p()
@
=  B
UR1
@R1
@
=

1 + r(1  2)
 [1 + r(1  )]

where
@y1
@
=  r

y0
 + 1

where the rst and third expressions are the marginal utilities of extraction
in period 0 and 1 respectively. The second denes the marginal cost of taxes
in terms of likelihood of retaining power; and the fourth the marginal cost of
taxation in terms of output for period t = 1.
To get the equilibrium rate of rent-extraction we would have to solve for 
the expression (3.30) above, but since it can not be analytically done we will
proceed by solving it with the help of some tables and gures based on numerical
simulations. In doing so, the comparative statics will be developed with respect
to the terms of interest, that is, the e¤ects on  -the equilibrium tax rate- of
a marginal change in the variables below. From rst-order condition (3.30) one
can easily deduce that the optimal tax rate, , is going to be a function of the
following parameters: The rate of return (r), the discount factors ( and ),
the initial income (y0), the security term (A), the sensitivity term (B) and the
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post-exit pay-o¤ (Uexit), so we get that
 = (r; y0; ; | {z };A;B;Uexit| {z })
Economic Accountability
conditions function
Thus, we can distinguish two sorts of variables that determine both the
optimal rate of rent-extraction chosen by the dictator and the probability of
staying in power. On the one hand, the underlying economic conditions under
which the dictator seeks to maximize his own consumption consist of three
elements: The initial income, the rate of return and the discount factors. On
the other hand, the equilibrium is determined by the accountability function,
which has the three elements mentioned above: A, B and Uexit. The following
sections are devoted to carefully make comparative statics exercises combining
the e¤ects of various of the aforementioned parameters.
3.4 Comparative Statics
3.4.1 Comparative Statics with regard to A (Security)
As explained before, the parameter A captures the structural security a dictator
has once in power. It is the intercept of the linear probability function used so
far: (A   B). As A increases, so does the overall level of dictators security,
that is, he faces lower probabilities of being toppled by whatever actor.
Comparative statics with regard to A are, then, based on @

@A , i.e., the partial
derivative of  with respect to A, which using general notation and the implicit
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function theorem is
@
@A
=  FA
F
=  UR1
@R1
@
SOC
(3.32)
which is positive due to the fact that the second-order condition (SOC ) is
negative, and dictators marginal utility of rents is increasing in  , so UR1 ;
@R1
@ >
0.
Since there are other parameters implied in the determination of the optimal
rate of extraction, the e¤ect of changes in A values will be analyzed in relation
to di¤erent values of other parameters (B, Uexit and y0) to check whether its
e¤ect changes under di¤erent underlying conditions. So we will be performing
mainly the mixed partial derivatives of  with respect to A and B; formally,
@2
@A@B
14 .
The simulations assume specic values for the parameters listed in the previ-
ous section, and that describe the economy, just for illustrative purposes. They
are: ;  = 0:95, r = 1:2 and, for the moment y0 = 2 -so initial income is low-
and Uexit =  4 and  20 (two dissimilar post-exit accountability values). Table
3.1 shows the optimal values of , obtained solving the rst-order condition
numerically for  (recall that  = 1 implies total conscation).
Numbers in bold represent the maximum tax rate allowed by the probabil-
ity constraint (0  (A   B)  1) when a corner solution exists and it would
actually correspond to  = 1, that is, when the rst-order condition is posi-
tive15 . Note that in the table there are some numbers in parentheses for the
high values of sensitivity (B) and low As as well. The reason is that they do
not correspond to the actual optimal point resulting from solving the rst-order
14 It should be equal to @
2
@B@A
by Schwarz Theorem.
15See condition (2) for the e¤ective constraint on .
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condition for  numerically since the results one gets from doing so produce
negative survival probabilities. They are corner solutions too. For example,
when A = 0:1 and B = 0:7, the result of the rst-order condition equation is
 = 0:438, which would be the optimal tax rate to be chosen by the ruler.
Nonetheless, substituting these values in the probability function (A B) one
gets (0:1 0:70:438) =  0:206 which is not possible since, by probability theo-
rems, 0  Pr(survival) = (A B)  1. The maximum , therefore, is AB  1.
Note, as well, that when A = 0:1 and B = 0:3, even though the optimal solution
would be 1 (corner solution), the dictator can only set  = 0:333 because of
the restriction posed by the probability function. So numbers in bold and in
parentheses are these maximum tax rates admitted by the constraints on the
probability numbers (AB ).
[Table 3.1]
Let us now examine the e¤ect of A on . When sensitivity is very low (in
this case, when B = 0:1) and the exit value is  4, the security dimension has
no e¤ect on the optimal rate of extraction since the dictator always chooses
the take everything setting  = 1 given that it barely a¤ects his probability
of staying in power. Apart from this case, we can easily demonstrate that the
e¤ect of security on the rate of extraction is positive for the rest of values of B.
Formally we get then that under this very particular setting @

@A jB>0:1 > 0.
When we increase the exit value to  20, the positive e¤ect of security on
graft takes place at all levels of sensitivity. So we can state that in general
@
@A > 0. Di¤erent security conditions can make an important di¤erence in the
economic results of a country under authoritarian rule. A very secure dictator
with A = 1 and quite insensitive (for instance B = 0:3) expecting a relatively
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bad exit value (-4) will choose a tax rate of 0:901, expropriating almost all the
income produced in his country, while a much insecure one, with A = 0:1, will
just tax at a rate of 0:333.
Why is the e¤ect of A on  positive? Recall equation (3.25): Since under
this functional form, security does not a¤ect the slope @p()@ (which is negative),
and given that -as shown in subsection 2.3- the possible restraining e¤ect of
@y1
@ < 0 is ine¤ective in this framework, A only a¤ects the right-hand side of
(3.25), i.e., the weight of future benets of extraction. This means that, in the
rst-order condition, the marginal cost in terms of decreased survival probability
is not a¤ected by the size of the security parameter. On the contrary, it only
inuences positively the likelihood of staying in power in t = 1 and getting rents.
3.4.2 Comparative Statics with regard to B (Sensitivity)
Returning to Table 3.1, we can observe that the e¤ect of the sensitivity para-
meter on the optimal rate of extraction is negative for all values of A. Formally,
then, @

@B < 0. The reason is that a higher slope of the accountability function
increases the marginal cost of rising taxes in terms of the probability of retaining
power in the next period and getting Uexit instead. This is due to the fact that
@p()
@ = B < 0, so using the implicit function theorem we obtain
@
@B
=  FB
F
=  U
exit   U(R1)  UR1 @R1@
SOC
(3.33)
where the denominator is negative -from the second-order condition (SOC )-
and the numerator is negative as well as long as the utility of staying in power
is higher than that of losing it (Uexit).
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The e¤ect of this parameter remains quite homogeneous for all values of A.
This e¤ect is, at the same time, stronger when changes occur in the small values
of B. For instance, when A = 0:5 (and Uexit =  20), a two point increase in
B, from 0.1 to 0.3, reduces the optimal tax rate from 0:633 to 0:245, whereas
when B is already high, say, an increase from 1.2 to 2, has more or less the same
marginal e¤ect than from only 0:067 to 0:041.
This dimension of the rulers accountability reveals to be fundamental to
understand economic results under dictatorship (and, presumably, under any
other regime). Its e¤ect on the tax rate is much bigger than the e¤ect of the
security parameter. The reason is simple. Through the sensitivity parameter
the extraction rate a¤ects the probability of staying in o¢ ce and, as a result,
the time preference of the autocrat. This forces him to trade o¤ self-enrichment
at present time with survival and more rents in the future. The lower the
sensitivity, the weaker the trade-o¤ that the dictator has to face.
3.4.3 Comparative Statics with regard to U exit (Post-Exit
Utility)
Remember that Uexit stands for the utility the dictator may get once he has
been deposed entailing, therefore, some very di¤erent scenarios (as will be shown
in Chapter 7). The e¤ect of the exit utility values is as follows: As dictators
perceive and foresee a more negative utility for them after losing power, they
will tend to restrain their own actions with regard to graft while staying in
power. Formally, thus, we have that @

@Uexit > 0. The logic is straightforward:
The lower the exit value, the higher the relative utility of remaining in power is
relative to that of losing it, and to assure this, lower taxes must be xed.
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[Table 3.2]
Besides, as can be easily checked in Table 3.2, the e¤ect of this post-exit
value turns out to be very important in determining the e¤ective level of rent-
extraction. The di¤erences this parameter can generate without changing the
values of A and B are enormous. For instance, when security is relatively high
(A = 0:8) and sensitivity has an intermediate level (say, 0:7), we see that for a
Uexit =  2 the optimal tax rate is 0:802, which implies almost total conscation,
whereas if the exit utility is very high,  14 (e.g., being imprisoned), the optimal
rate of extraction is only 0:182, which is much more benevolent.
There is another interesting e¤ect of the exit utility which takes place mainly
through the e¤ect of the security parameter (A). We have already seen that, in
general, the higher exit negative value is, the lower the tax rate chosen by the
dictator will be. When this post-exit utility is very low the leader taxes with
the aim of getting rents but also seeking not to lose power, so the e¤ect of the
probability constraint becomes less important. The lower the Uexit, the higher
the rulerstemptations to grab a higher portion of the cake for themselves are.
It is in these cases when the probability constraint may become really binding,
above all with respect to the security parameter (A). The pattern can be easily
observed in Figure 3.2. When Uexit is very low (-20) the average e¤ect of
the security parameter on the tax rate is constant and positive. Nonetheless,
when Uexit is only relatively low (-4) the e¤ect of A is no longer constant, it
turns out to be very strong and positive for its low values. The weight of the
security parameter is higher when the exit utility is low, so as the dictator is
more secure he prefers to risk a little bit more and extract more rents, since he
does not fear that much the consequences of being overthrown. Actually, the
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associated survival probabilities for these low values of A are zero. They are so
insecure that extract as much as they can and run.
[Figure 3.2]
The e¤ect on the sensitivity parameter is negligible instead as Figure 3.2
shows (right-hand side) as well. A higher Uexit only makes the slope somewhat
increase, so the strong negative e¤ect of B is mainly found in its low values (see
dashed line).
3.4.4 Poor and Rich Dictatorships (the E¤ect of Income)
Initial conditions play a fundamental role in many models of economic growth
and development. Concretely, following Ray (2000), in models with multiple
equilibria, persistent disparities on long-run cross-country growth patterns have
two main reasons . Firstly, underdevelopment emerges as a consequence of a
self-fullling failure of expectations. The key mechanism here is that of com-
plementarity. Thus, two opposite outcomes may be observed. One in which
everybody invests since they expect that others will do so; and the other, where
a coordination failure occurs and no investment takes place. This may hap-
pen either through inter-industry links or demand complementarities (Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).
The second group of models stresses the role of certain historical congu-
ration in the selection among various equilibria. These legacies do not have to
be necessarily linked to the initial levels of capital stock or income. Di¤erent
sets of factors may determine the path towards one equilibrium or another, for
instance, inequality, traditions, institutional structures, etc. (Ray, 2000).
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Following the setting of the model developed in the second section, better
initial conditions, namely, higher y0, augment the value of staying in power
since there is more output from which taxes can be collected. Therefore, if one
holds taxes constant, an increase in y0 involves directly more rents that go to
the hands of the ruler. Thus, if the dictator can get the same amount of rents
but taxing less, and, consequently, facing a lower risk of being thrown out, it
can be hypothesized that the higher the level of initial income, the lower the
optimal tax rate chosen by the self-interested dictator. Table 3.3 proves it by
taking di¤erent values for A, B and y016 .
[Table 3.3]
Whatever the chosen values for A and B are, a higher initial income always
leads to a lower level of rent-extraction, so we have that @

@y0
< 0 for all possible
specications. The strongest e¤ect of initial income are found in the case of
a secure and somewhat sensitive ruler (A = 0:8, B = 0:7); while when the
dictator is secure and quite insensitive (0.2), the negative e¤ect of income is
not so important. In the rst case, taxes go from a maximum of 0.576 to a
minimum of 0.373 -when initial income is 15-. On the other hand, for the
secure/insensitive ruler going from an income of 1 to an income of 15 only leads
to decrease the tax rate in 0.102.
In addition, for equal levels of initial income equilibria can di¤er a lot. Take,
for example, the case when y0 = 1, that is, a backward economy. In this
case, we nd two extreme values for the rate of extraction, the highest one is
1, which means total expropriation. However, the minimum we nd for the
16We assume Uexit =  4 and r = 1:2 for illustrative purposes.
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assumed values is 0.15, which is a relatively benevolent tax rate. When y0 = 15,
enormous di¤erences are found despite the country is richer. The maximum tax
rate under this conditions is as high as 0.898 (for the secure/insensitive ruler),
while the minimum is just 0.155 (when the leader is very sensitive).
Similarly, although the gures are not reported, we have that @

@r < 0, so the
rate of return of capital has a negative e¤ect on rent extraction as it increases.
A higher rate of return implies a higher output and it is exogenous, so it allows
the dictator to put more money into his pockets without necessarily increasing
the risks of being unseated.
3.4.5 Growth Rates and Survival Probability
Once analyzed the e¤ect of the main parameters in the model on the optimal
rate of extraction chosen by the dictator, we proceed now to see how it reects
on the growth rates, , and the autocratssurvival probability.
Regarding the two main parameters of the accountability function (A and
B), Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show their e¤ect on both the growth rate as well as the
probability of survival based on the simulations carried out for di¤erent values
of the other parameter. The values for the simulations are as follows: A goes
from 0.1 to 1 with increments of 0.1, while B goes from 0.1 to 3 with increments
of 0.1 as well. The exit value, Uexit, has been set to  20.
[Figure 3.3]
In Figure 3.3 we observe the e¤ect of the security parameter for three values
of B. As A (security) increases, so does the average probability of survival of
the rulers; note that the slope of the line is pretty high in all cases. On the
contrary, growth rates are decreasing with A (security). Note that this e¤ect is
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stronger when sensitivity is low. Hence, more secure leaders are able to predate
at higher rates. As they feel more secure in power, dictators decide to extract
a higher portion of rents; if, besides, sensitivity is low, the economic tragedy
is unavoidable. Remember that this is so because the security parameter is
independent of  (tax rate), therefore, it is not part of the slope. As a result,
if it is higher, it increases the probability of staying in power regardless of the
rate of extraction.
For B, the trends are the opposite with respect to those found for A, that is,
there is a positive and strong relationship between growth and the sensitivity
parameter, although the slope is decreasing; whereas the relationship between
the dictatorsprobability of survival and this parameter is negative and very
tenuous (see Figure 3.4). As it can be seen, that for low security, the lines are
almost at. This has to do with the fact that dictators do not let their odds of
being deposed to decrease that much; so when A is already low, no extra risk is
taken.
[Figure 3.4]
3.5 Economic Results under Linear Accountabil-
ity Function
At this point we can draw a rst map of the expected growth rates for di¤erent
types of dictators according to the two main dimensions of the accountability
function: Security and sensitivity (and controlling for the exit value). Com-
bining both dimensions we will make a general prediction about the expected
growth rates that each type of ruler will attain.
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The following Table (3.4) shows the predicted growth rates for di¤erent com-
binations of the security and sensitivity values according to the values assumed
so far. This table groups the range of values for the security and sensitivity para-
meters in three intervals and shows the predicted growth rates for two di¤erent
values of the exit utility.
[Table 3.4]
The resulting portrait is clear. Those rulers who are expected to be the most
predatory ones (highest graft and lowest growth rates) are those who enjoy the
lowest levels of sensitivity and the highest levels of security and that, besides,
would not face an uncertain or negative post-exit scenario17 . A higher level of
security broadens the range of possible tax rates the dictator can apply, while
the low sensitivity implies that the probability of being thrown out will not
be much a¤ected by that tax rate. The result is obvious, a high level of rent
extraction. The trade-o¤ between more rents today and lower probability of
staying in power in the next period is very attenuated in this case.
On the contrary, the rulers who are expected to improve economic perfor-
mance are those very sensitive and not much secure. As political survival is
fragile and very dependent on the tax rate chosen, the options for the rent-
maximizing dictator facing a strong and e¤ective trade-o¤ between stealing
more and remaining in power are reduced.
Between these two extremes there is a wide range of possibilities; these, how-
ever, seem to be mainly driven by the importance of the sensitivity parameter.
When Uexit =  20, note that the rst three best performing cells are those
17We know as well that richer dictatorships will impose lower taxes so they will grow at
higher rates.
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with the highest level of sensitivity and, then, ordered according to their level
of security. The same happens with the other two levels of sensitivity. When
Uexit =  4, the gures change slightly since the second best performing ruler is
that with a moderate level of sensitivity (1-1.9) but the lowest level of security.
This can also be observed if we group the values of the sensitivity parameter
into six categories (not reported).
3.6 Alternative Accountability Functions
So far we have assumed the simplest possible form for the accountability function
(linear), so we have been able to concentrate on the comparative statics result-
ing from the solution of the model. Nonetheless, one question automatically
emerges: Are the results a¤ected by the form of the accountability function? In
other words, we have to check if the patterns so far identied hold under di¤er-
ent specications, that is, after changing the underlying assumptions. Thus we
will be able to test whether the previous results can be generalized or not. If
results actually change, alternative hypotheses can be derived.
The linear probability function has nice properties that simplify the notation
and help to understand the theoretical concepts behind the model, such as
securityand sensitivity. However, under this concrete specication and due
to linearity, the e¤ect of the tax rate on the survival probability is constant for
the whole range of values of  , i.e., the slope B is constant. This is no longer true
when the the shape of the probability function is either concave or convex. In
the rst case, the slope is decreasing, while in the second it is increasing. Figure
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3.5 portrays the alternative functions for the very same values of A and B18 . The
next subsections explore di¤erent variations in the form of the accountability
function. The rst part of the model in which households choose their optimal
saving rate does not change.
[Figure 3.5]
3.6.1 Concave Accountability Function
To keep things simple, let us assume a quadratic probability function of the
following form
0  Pr(survival) = (A B2)  1 (3.34)
A is still the security parameter -the intercept- and B the sensitivity one.
Note that since f 00() < 0, the slope of the function is decreasing. This implies
that marginal increases in the extraction rate have small e¤ects on the proba-
bility of staying in power at low levels of  , but this e¤ect becomes bigger as
 increases. Put it in a di¤erent way, if taxes are low and the dictator wants
to increase self-enrichment, he can do so without a¤ecting much his chances to
retain power in the next period.
As a result of this function, the e¤ective constraint for the dictator with
regard to rate of extraction is now
0  min    max =
p
AB
B
 1 (3.35)
18The probability of survival is represented in the y-axis, while the rate of extraction is
represented in the x-axis.
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So the dictator problem is now
max

E
t=1X
t=0
UD(Rt) = log(y0)+


(A B2) log((1 + rs)y0) + (1  (A B2))Uexit

(3.36)
s.t. s = r(1 ) 1r(1+) and 0  Pr(survival) = (A B2)  1
Under this new setting, rst-order condition is
@E
Pt=1
t=0 U
D(Rt)
@
=  1 + 

 2B

log

(1 +
r(1  )  1
(1 + )
)y0

+
(3.37)
(A B2)

1 + r(1  2)
 [1 + r(1  )]

+ 2B(Uexit)

R 0
Note that the structure of the equation is very similar to that of (3.30).
Then, the question is, does concavity make any di¤erence? Table 3.5 reports
the equilibrium tax rates for both types of accountability functions and for
common values of the security and sensitivity parameters19 .
[Table 3.5]
The results are the same than in the linear specication with regard to the
general signs of the comparative statics. Thus, as above, the e¤ect of security on
the rate of rent-extraction is positive, while the e¤ect of sensitivity is negative;
so again: @

@A > 0 and
@
@B < 0. The di¤erences are found in the size not in the
directions of the e¤ects. On average, under a concave accountability function,
19The rest of the parameters in the equation are held constant at the following values:
y0 = 2, r = 1:2, ;  = 0:95, and Uexit =  20.
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the level of graft is higher for all values of A and B considered to illustrate these
points. Why is that so? Under this setting, all rates of extraction are relatively
low (mainly due to the fact that Uexit =  20, and could also be because of y0);
for the concave case, this implies that the dictator is in the low risk section
of the curve, given that the slope is also a function of  , that is, that part in
which increases in taxes lead only to small increases in the risk of losing power.
In general, the di¤erences in the size of the e¤ect of A for both types of
function are small, only somewhat higher for the linear function when sensitivity
is low, and just the opposite when sensitivity is high (1.5 and 3). What is always
higher under the concave specication is the e¤ect of B. Note that in the rst
order condition, the marginal costs in terms of survival probability are for the
concave case multiplied by 2B , whereas only by B in the linear case, so now
the slope is also a function of the rate of rent-extraction.
3.6.2 Convex Functions
Convex probability functions can be of two types, which di¤er in the e¤ective
constraint that they may impose on the dictators options based on their prop-
erties and on whether A (security) a¤ects the slope of the function. In spite of
these di¤erences to be explored below, in both functions the slope is increasing.
The rst type we are going to discuss can be written, in general terms, as
follows
0  Pr(survival) = (A B 1b )  1 (3.38)
where b  2
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Given the function assumed above now, the range of possible values that 
may take is
0  min    max =

A
B
b
 1 (3.39)
Thus dictator now maximizes
max

E
t=1X
t=0
UD(Rt) = log(y0) + (3.40)


(A B 1b ) log

(1 +
r(1  )  1
1 + 
)y0

+ (1  (A B 1b ))Uexit

so rst-order condition yields the following result
@E
Pt=1
t=0 U
D(Rt)
@
=  1 + 
"
 B
1 b
b
b

log

(1 +
r(1  )  1
(1 + )
)y0

+
(3.41)
(A B 1b )

1 + r(1  2)
 [1 + r(1  )]

+B

1 b
b
b
(Uexit)
#
R 0
where now @p()@ =  B 
1 b
b
b .
As in the concave function, the slope of the accountability function that
determines the marginal cost of increasing taxes is a function of  , and now also
of b. Besides, as in the concave and linear cases, this marginal cost in terms of
survival chances is again independent of the security parameter A. Therefore,
as in the previous cases, we get that @

@A > 0. Besides, we can also a¢ rm
that, as usual, the e¤ect of B, for the reasons detailed, is negative: @

@B < 0.
No direct comparisons can be made with the rates of extraction in Table 3.5
since it would imply choosing a value for b. However, following the previous
argumentations we can a¢ rm that they are going to be lower than those got
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under the linear specication. Given the convexity of the function, at low values
of  , an small increase in the rate of extraction translates into a high decrease
in the probability of survival. Therefore, the e¤ect of B is also expected to be
higher.
What about the role of b? Simple manipulation shows that the slope of the
accountability function is positive in b
@( B 
1 b
b
b )
@b
= B
1 b
b

ln  + b
b3

> 0
as a result, at lower values of  and high b, the slope of the accountability
function becomes rapidly at, therefore, taxes can be increased taking only low
risks. Therefore, we can state that @

@b > 0.
3.6.3 The Exponential Accountability Function
The exponential probability function -a subset of the convex ones- has interest-
ing properties that may add interesting insights to our analysis. The function
can be specied as follows
0  Pr(survival) = Ae B  1 (3.42)
with the parameters having the same meaning and general properties. Yet
the e¤ective constraint is totally altered in this case. Now it is simply
0    1
This is due to the fact that there exists no value of  for which the prob-
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ability of survival is absolutely 0; actually, we have that Pr(survival) ! 0 as
 !1.
The dictators problem, thus, can be simply dened as follows
max

E
t=1X
t=0
UD(Rt) = log(y0)+

Ae B log

(1 +
r(1  )  1
1 + 
)y0

+ (1  (Ae B ))Uexit

(3.43)
and rst-order condition is just
@E
Pt=1
t=0 U
D(Rt)
@
=  1 + 

 ABe B

log

(1 +
r(1  )  1
(1 + )
)y0

+
(3.44)
(Ae B )

1 + r(1  2)
 [1 + r(1  )]

+ABe B (Uexit)

R 0
An interesting new fact merits now comment. In opposition to all other
accountability function specications, in the exponential case the slope of the
probability of retaining power is @p()@ =  ABe B , so it is also a function of
A (security), besides B and  . Consequently, the security parameter is now
a¤ecting not only the marginal benet of taxation -as before-, but also its mar-
ginal cost in terms of survival probabilities. The consequences of this must be
carefully explored since the results are going to depend thus on which of the
e¤ects prevails and under what conditions.
So far we have checked that the general patterns of the relationships between
the parameters of the accountability function and the optimal rate of extraction
do not vary with the form of the probability function. The exponential form is
the exception. Multiple equilibria with di¤erent e¤ects emerge. We will refer
to them as the low-extraction and the high-extraction equilibrium and denote
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them by  low and high respectively. Figure 3.6 shows the equilibrium values of
 resulting from the simulations for various values of A. There are two clear
trends for each of the types of equilibria -low and high rent-extraction-. The
e¤ect of B remains unchanged, being negative for both kinds of equilibria.
[Figure 3.6]
Note, rst, that for A = 0:1 there is only one equilibrium -corner solution-
, that is 1 or complete conscation, probably as a result of setting a too low
level of income (y0). But from there two opposite trajectories with respect to the
security parameter arise: For the high-extraction set of equilibria, more security
leads to higher tax rates, while for the low-extraction set, more security makes
the dictator tax at lower and more benevolent rates. We have thus that
@
@A
8>><>>:
@high
@A > 0
@ low
@A < 0
Besides, under this setting the e¤ect of the initial income (y0) varies with
both types of equilibria as well, concretely, we have that
@
@y0
8>><>>:
@high
@y0
> 0
@ low
@y0
< 0
so, for the high extraction rulers, a higher initial income only means a better
chance to grab a bigger piece of the cake given their reduced chances to remain
in power in the second period.
In sum, when exponential political survival probabilities are observed, two
possible scenarios, with opposite e¤ects on rent-extraction, growth and com-
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parative statics results appear even under the very same underlying conditions.
Rudimentary numeric calculations show that when two solutions exist -internal
or corner-, the lower tax rate always provides the ruler with higher utility, so
UD( low) > UD(high) for all A  0:2
accordingly, under equilibrium,  low will be the chosen extraction rate20
entailing that actually @
low
@y0
< 0 and @
low
@A < 0
21 .
3.7 Conclusions. LÉtat cest moi?
In this chapter we have put the basis for a general model of the political economy
of predation and accountability under dictatorship. In doing so, we have dened
the main concepts implied in the general formulation, such as the accountability
function or the exit value (judicial accountability). The accountability function
relates the rulers policy choices with their chances of being unseated in the
future, while the exit value simply represents the utility the dictator gets as a
result of losing power.
Technically, we have dened the concrete forms of both the production func-
tion and the utility functions of the actors considered as well as the elements
they consist of. To keep it as simple as possible, production has been assumed
to be linear in capital and utility functions to be logarithmic. We have rst
solved the households problem which yielded the optimal saving rate and, as a
result, the rate of growth of income of the economy. The results show that if
20 In the previous model, there also exist equilibria out of the range that are never chosen
by the ruler since internal solutions always provide him with higher utility.
21Sensitivity maintains its negative e¤ect.
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taxes are anticipated to be high, then, there is going to be a low level of private
investment, and less output in the second period.
The second step has consisted of checking to what extent capital accumula-
tion represents a constraint for a self-interested dictator (in a two period frame-
work), in other words, whether the fully secure dictator is actually an station-
ary bandit, using Olsons terminology. The solution for the two-period model
shows that an isolated leader will rapaciously plunder the economy extracting
rents at the maximum level.
Third, we have reported the rst-order condition for the dictators problem
under accountability without specializing all the functions involved. The struc-
ture of this condition states that the ruler will increase the rate of extraction
up to the point where his rents equal his loss in terms of lower expected proba-
bilities of getting rents in t+1 instead of the exit value and the cost of reduced
investment in future income, although this last part has proved to be ine¤ective
in dodging the grabbing hand. The probability function has been termed the
political accountability function and has been specialized later on and make it
to consist of two parameters. The security dimension (A), which is the inter-
cept of the function and gauges the underlying stability of the dictators rule.
The second one is the sensitivity parameter (B), which is simply the coe¢ cient
attached to the tax rate in the probability of remaining in power. The extent
to what the tax rate,  , a¤ects the probabilities of the dictators survival is de-
termined by this parameter then. Therefore, a high level of sensitivity implies
that taxes have a bigger impact on the probability of survival.
So, the question is, what do dictators do? Under what political and eco-
nomic conditions can we expect to nd isolated rapacious rulers? Making an
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exercise of institutional engineering, for dictatorships to experience grow, their
rulers should be kept accountable by two means: First, their level of security,
independently of economic results, should be relatively low. On the other hand,
sensitivity must be high, one should nd some sort of socioeconomic conditions
or institutional settings that may allow the a¤ected groups to pressure the ruler
when economic outcomes are bad. Likewise, predatory rulers are to be found
in systems where security is very high while sensitivity is very low. Regarding
the post-exit value, a low expected utility after leaving power will lead the ruler
to restrain his greed, since the costs of losing power are high. So, if the level of
political accountability is low and, in addition, the autocrat expects to be able
to retain the power or leave the country in case opposition increases, corruption,
conscation and plundering will get even worse.
The economy matters as well. According to the results, lower rates of extrac-
tion will be found when the initial income and/or the rate of return to capital
are high. So imagine an underdeveloped country, with poor capital endowments
and small returns to it; imagine, besides, that the current dictator is secure in
o¢ ce, and the business and private sectors are weak so he is also insensitive.
Imagine too, that he has a chopper in the backyard or a plane prepared to y
the country in case he feels really threatened. We know the result: Abusive
rent-extraction, kleptocracy, negative growth rates, and poverty.
These results hold for di¤erent specications of the form of the account-
ability function. Nonetheless, there exists an alternative scenario with regard
to security. In the model in which the exponential accountability function was
considered, the e¤ect of security (A) on extraction turns out to be negative.
Chapter 4
Theorizing about the
Political Accountability
Function
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we developed a model in which the dictator was con-
strained by a probability function when deciding the amount of rents he wanted
to extract from the representative household. In its more simple formula-
tion, this probability function was assumed to have the following linear form:
0  (A   B)  1. The function is, thus, dened by two parameters, A and
B, and the variable  , and will be referred as the accountability function. As it
has been explained,  stands for the tax rate the dictator applies to households
income in order to extract rents for his own discretionary use. The extent to
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which this rate of extraction a¤ects the probabilities of the dictators survival
is determined by the sensitivity parameter B. And A captures the autocrats
initial or structural level security.
Not all dictators are equally sensitive to performance when they are in power.
Some seek legitimacy in their economic results in order to consolidate their po-
sition, whereas some others base their policies on a more or less deep ideological
ground or use a democratic façade to make their decisions appear as being based
upon the true popular will (Brooker, 2000). Moreover, it is not clear the extent
to which we can a¢ rm that there actually exists some kind of legitimacy un-
der authoritarian regimes derived from good economic performance. Some kind
of rational compliance towards who is ruling in a benet-producing way would
be more appropriate in dening the process taking place under non-democratic
rule.
In democratic systems there are clear and regulated mechanisms by which
rulers and governments can be replaced. Citizens are empowered to do so when
elections are held, and the opposition parties may resort to an impeachment or a
motion of condence in-between election years. Dictatorships are characterized
by the lack of these regular accountability mechanisms so political actors have
to turn to more costly means to get rid of their undesired rulers. Authoritarian
rulers must face, then, what Wintrobe (1998) calls the Dictators Dilemma,
which makes reference to the lack of information the dictator has about his
actual level of support among the population. In the absence of routine ways to
remove leaders, questions about constituency arise, so under certain conditions
a dictator will have to pay attention to the claims of broader sectors of society,
while under others, these groups can be repressed and their demands ignored.
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The aim of this chapter is to theorize about and to disentangle the conditions
and variables that may make a given dictator to be (or not) secure in power
and under which conditions he is going to be sensitive (in accountability terms)
to the performance of the economy he governs with relative autonomy. Con-
cretely, under what conditions does economic growth become an important (and
signicant) variable for the survival of the ruler?. To elucidate it, the chapter is
structured as follows: Section 2 denes the mechanisms through which political
actors may overthrow the incumbent dictator and their implications for the ac-
countability process. In Section 3 a simple game-theoretic model is developed to
account for regime openness and accountability. Section 4 and 5 theorize about
the determinants of security and sensitivity taking into account the insights of
the model. Section 6 concludes by detailing the hypotheses to be tested in the
following chapters.
4.2 The Mechanisms of Accountability
We dene as accountability mechanisms the means by which each of the ac-
tors may throw the incumbent ruler out or, in other words, the technologies
for replacing leaders (Przeworski, 2003), which basically diverge in how costly
they are1 . As we specied in Chapter 2, we refer to accountability functions as
those that relate sanctions to performance, and to the mechanisms by which
the societye¤ectuates these sanctions as accountability mechanisms(Prze-
worski, 2003: 93). This implicitly entails a distinction between di¤erent groups
with unequal destabilizing capabilities and interests which is generally miss-
1By costs I mean not only the actual e¤ort that those seizing power have to exert due
to collective action problems, relative strength, etc. but also the material costs, such as the
destruction of assets and killing that may be involved.
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ing in models about government turnover2 . The possibility of a coup by some
elite members is the unique option considered by some authors, while others
only address the probability of a revolution occurring. But as Snyder correctly
notes, revolution is only one of a number of possible political trajectories of
neopatrimonial regimes(1992: 379).
Moreover, the ways in which dictators are overthrown, changed or simply
substituted are not random but, rather, they are endogenous to the type of non-
democratic regime and leadership existing in a given country. Indeed, as Bratton
and Van de Walle state regime type in turn inuences both the likelihood that
an opposition challenge will arise and the exibility with which incumbents can
respond (1994: 454). In the same vein, Geddes a¢ rms that di¤erent kinds
of authoritarianism break down in characteristically di¤erent ways (Geddes,
1999a: 117). Concretely, Geddes(1999a) study focuses on authoritarian break-
down and the type of transition most likely to occur. She sees the form of
transition as a result of the types of relations between factions within di¤erent
authoritarian regimes. Using simple game theory she argues that, within the
military, since most o¢ cers value the unity and capacity of the military as an
institution more than being in power, military regimes tend to be more prone
to hand power to civilians if it threatens the unity and cohesiveness of the in-
stitution. Consequently, in this case, internal disagreements and splits usually
lead to negotiated transitions. On the contrary, in personalist and single-party
regimes intra-elite competition does not lead to giving power up. In these cases,
according to Geddes, the benets of cooperation are su¢ ciently large to insure
continued support from all factions(1999b: 13). This is why personalist rulers
2A recent exception is the work by Maravall (2005) on government survival in democratic
systems.
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do not hand power and prefer to y the country and single-party rule is the
most stable one.
Elites may replace leaders through either formally or informally regulated
ways, or by means of a palace putsch. Both ways are the least costly of the
whole existing range of possibilities for obvious reasons. In the rst case, no
violence or struggle actually takes place, while in the second type of change, the
privileged access to the incumbent dictator coalition members enjoy as well as
their capacity to build their own support groups make possible a rapid change.
The former method is put in practice maybe foreseeing the potential struggles
for power after the dictators death or retirement, or perhaps to ensure the
continuation of a certain dynasty in power. For instance, the Somozas dynasty
ruled Nicaragua -with US support- for 43 years. The rst Somoza was Anastasio,
a Nicaraguan general and then president from 1937 to 1947 and from 1950 to
1956 when he was assassinated. Luis Somoza Debayle, Anastasios eldest son,
assumed the presidency under a provision in the constitution for the possible
sudden death of his father, as it actually did occur. Luis encouraged new leaders
to emerge in the Liberal party and even had the constitution amended to keep his
younger brother, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, from running for president in 1963.
In Haiti, François Papa Doc Duvalier declared himself president for life,
and rewrote the constitution after a rigged election to pass power onto his son
Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier upon his death3 . Under monarchy regimes,
the successor is designed mainly by the rule, either written or traditionally
transmitted, of inheritance principle4 . In general, there is almost no room for
3On February 1986, Jean-Claude Duvalier left the country aboard a US Air Force plane
and the military seized the power without any opposition.
4North Korea is unique among the worlds communist regimes in its functioning as a de-
facto monarchy. The North Koreas leader, Kim Il-Sung, was succeeded by his son Kim
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uncertainty in these cases, although disputes may arise about who is the actual
successor within the royal family. In Swaziland, after 61 years as monarch,
Sobhuza died and Prince Makhosetive Dlamini was selected as his successor
in 1982; he was crowned King Mswati III in 1986. Another formal (although
maybe not written down) procedure of leadership change takes place within
one-party regimes, and concretely, within the party elites. For example, during
the PRI regime in Mexico, power struggles took place within the party in order
to decide the next presidential candidate; once the candidate had been decided;
the electoral circuswas able to begin5 .
In other cases those pertaining to the ruling elite have turned to a coup or,
specically, a palace putsch in promoting the upcoming of either a new dictator
or a more democratic regime. These outbreaks are usually the result of open
struggles to take over the benets of power. For instance, Park Chung-Hee (who
took control of power in 1961 taking part in the military junta, and was elected
president in 1963) was assassinated on October 26 1979 by Kim Jaekyu, the
director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and long-time friend. Even
in monarchy regimes, kings have to keep an eye on their closest relatives or
collaborators who may be willing to seize power and its associated privileges. For
example, Zahir Shah came to the throne at the age of 19, after the assassination
of his father in November 1933, having previously served as a Cabinet minister.
In a bloodless coup on July 1973, Zahir Shah was deposed. The leader of the
coup, Mohammad Daud Khan was in fact the kings brother-in-law and cousin
who proclaimed Afghanistan a republic with him as its president.
Jong-il when he died at age 82 on July 8, 1994, in Pyongyang.
5On leadership change during the PRI regime see, for example, Cornelius and Craig (1991),
Varela (1993), and Langston (2001).
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Military coups are a more costly way to seize power since the rebellious
faction may have problems of information and trust before the seizure attempt
(Geddes, 1999a). Peaceful military coups, in which just the threat to the use of
force is enough to trigger the change, are the exception. For instance, leadership
instability became common in Benins post-colonial history, between 1960 and
1972, a succession of military coups brought about many changes of govern-
ment. In 1963, following demonstrations by workers and students, the armed
forces staged a successful coup, deposing the president Hubert Maga and putting
Justin Ahomadegbé into power (in alliance with Apithy). The last of these coups
brought to power Major Mathieu Kerekou as the head of a regime apparently
professing strict Marxist-Leninist principles and policies.
Finally, regular citizens may also rebel against oppressive and corrupt dic-
tators. This is by far the most costly way for replacing a leader and, most
probably, the whole regime. However, the probability of a revolution (and mas-
sive riots, civil wars, etc.) is in general remote (see the descriptive data below).
Back in the 70s, Tullock (1974) stated that participation in such event is deter-
mined by personal gain or loss (see also Roemer, 1985). All kind of collective
action problems arise, then, that make broad popular movements very di¢ cult
to e¤ectively organize. Although it is, therefore, a much less frequent event, dic-
tators can not just ignore the possibility of a broad popular backlash. In 1979,
the Islamic Revolution, which constituted a true subversive popular movement,
drove the dictator Mohammed Reza Pahlevi the Shah- into exile6 . In Cuba,
Batista was so condent of his power that on May 15, 1955, he released Castro
and the remaining survivors of the Moncada attack, hoping to dissuade some of
6See Ryszard Kapuscinski (1992) for an historical and journalistic in-depth analysis of the
Shahs regime and the posterior Islamic Revolution.
104CHAPTER 4. THEORIZING ABOUT THE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION
his critics. However, by late 1955 student riots and anti-Batista demonstrations
had become frequent to which the regime responded with a brutal repression.
Due to their continued opposition to the autocrat, the University of La Havana
was temporarily closed on November 30 1956. At last, the Cuban Revolution
through a guerrilla war led by Fidel Castro and Ernesto Guevara ousted Batista
in 1959.
4.3 A Simple Model
4.3.1 Basics
The early literature on non-democratic regimes tended to focus on repression
as the main instrument to retain power, theorizing, thus, about the repressive,
coercive and control capabilities -and strategies- of di¤erent types of regimes
and driven principally by the turning point in that issue that the emergence
of totalitarian systems represented (see Arendt, 1951; Friedrich and Brzezinski,
1961; Schapiro, 1972; Kirkpatrick, 1982). Although common sense may lead us
to think of dictatorships as characterized by repression, fear and even brutality,
no dictator can survive only by means of sticks. They need some sort of support
as well, and support has its price. Through cooptation, rulers decrease the
probability of upheaval by other groups by fragmenting them (Bertocchi and
Spagat, 2001).
All dictators use a combination of cooptation and repression to lengthen their
tenure. Wintrobe (1990, 1998, 2001) characterizes di¤erent types of dictator-
ships according to their use of both repression and loyalty in order to maximize
either power or self-enrichment. For the Soviet case, Gerhenson and Grossman
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(2001) state that the nomenklatura determined the extent of co-option and the
level of repression by equating marginal benets and marginal costs of both
activities so as to maximize the utility of their standard of living conditional on
their members remaining in power.
Let us put the problem in formal terms. Assume there is one policy dimen-
sion, a, where a 2 [0; 1]. This policy consists of the degree of regime openness,
that is, the degree of control over policy and accountability of the authoritar-
ian regime materialized in its degree of institutionalization. There are three
unitary actors involved in the game: D, the incumbent dictator; E, the elite,
and O, the opposition to the regime. The status quo level of regime control
and isolation is 1, involving no control at all. Indirect utilities, with Euclidean
preferences, are linear in policy outcome, so U i(a) =  ja  aij; where ai stands
for the ideal policy of actor i, i 2 fD;E;Og. For the sake of simplicity, let us
assume that aE = 1 and aO = 0, that is, elite members prefer the regime to be
tightly closed and not to share their inuence in the decision-making process, so
they can exclusively benet from corruption and cronyism or any other policy of
their interest. On the contrary, the opposition forces prefer a fully open regime,
namely, democracy.
The timing of the game is as follows (see Figure 4.2): First, the ruler (D)
must decide whether to repress the opposition or make it an o¤er on policy
initiating, thus, negotiations observing aD. Should he choose to repress, he
succeeds in keeping the opposition under control with probability 1   h, while
he fails with probability h. If the dictator e¤ectively represses opposition, policy
a remains at its initial level, 1, and he must pay a cost7 , , where  2 [0; 1]. If
7Repression costs.
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the opposition wins the struggle, they set regime control at its preferred level,
a = 0.
[Figure 4.2]
If the ruler chooses to approach the opposition, then O may accept the o¤er
and participate within the regimes institutions or rebel. If the opposition rebels,
it succeeds with probability p and he sets its most preferred regime and policy.
The probability of losing the struggle is, hence, 1  p, so a remains at 1 and D
faces repression costs. We further assume that p > h due to the fact that the
opposition may interpret the approach of D as a prove of a certain degree of
weakness, so some information is revealed on that side.
Finally, if the opposition accepts, it is the turn of the elite -E- to decide
whether to accept the agreement reached or to stage a coup. If a coup is staged,
it is successful with probability g, a remains at 1 and the dictator is replaced;
whereas the coup is e¤ectively repressed with probability 1 g. If the elite loses,
policy is set at a = x, i.e., that agreed between D and O. It is also assumed that
g > p, so the capability of the elite of toppling the dictator is much higher than
that of the citizen opposition. Alternatively, if the the elite accepts, a is xed to
ae and because of the economic cooperation of the opposition, there is benet 
in terms of tax revenue and cooperation, where  2 [0; 1]8 . Therefore, if natural
resources and commodities or foreign aid abound, this benet tends to zero as
no cooperation is needed to raise revenue from either taxes on international
trade or the benets of public enterprises. Table 4.2 summarizes the payo¤s of
the players under the alternative scenarios regarding policy a.
8The logic is similar to that in Bourguignon and Verdier (2000). In their setting, education
provided to a portion of lower-class individuals yields a public return.
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[Table 4.2]
Note that losing an struggle for power has a cost !i for each of the players,
where i 2 fD;E;Og and !i 2 [0; 1].
4.3.2 Analysis and Equilibria
Using backwards induction to identify the equilibrium, we must start with the
decision of the elite. The elite will accept as long as UE(Accept)  EUE(Coup),
that is, if
 j1  aej+   g( j1  1j   ) + (1  g)( jx  1j   !E) (4.1)
which can be transformed into
ae  mE = 1   + g( ) + (1  g)(1  x  !E) (4.2)
where x  mO (see below). So mE is, in fact, the minimum level of control
(a) the elite will accept given its bargaining power as determined by g, since
it is the policy result that makes it indi¤erent between accepting and trying to
seize power9 ; if the degree of institutional accountability allowed by D is lower
than that, a coup is certainly going to take place. Note that a bigger  makes
the elite more willing to accept a lower level of a, that is a greater level of
accountability. On the contrary, a bigger capacity to successfully overthrow the
current ruler, makes the maximum level they would accept higher, i.e., the level
of regime openness they are willing to tolerate decreases with their capacity to
9We assume that if the elite is completely indi¤erent it would rather accept than to face
an uncertain struggle.
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seize power.
Let us turn now to the oppositions decision. Again, O will only accept Ds
o¤er if, given that E accepts, UO(AcceptjEAccepts)  EUO(Rebel), therefore
 jae   0j  p( j0  0j) + (1  p)( j1  0j   !O) (4.3)
Rearranging terms we get
ae  mO = (1  p)(1 + !O) (4.4)
So mO stands for the minimum level of regime institutionalization and open-
ness that the opposition will accept given its relative bargaining power as deter-
mined by p. The implication of this is quite straightforward: The dictator will
not call the opposition to start any negotiation if his o¤er is going to be higher
to that set in (4.4), because then the utility of repressing would be higher given
that p > h.
Finally, the incumbent dictator must decide whether to repress or to begin
to negotiate with O a new institutional setting with limited accountability. D
observes his preference aD, which we assume, for simplicity, to be uniformly dis-
tributed over the interval aD 2 [; 1]. Suppose, then, that going to a level lower
than  actually involves beginning a transition to democracy so all privilege
and benets from power may disappear for the incumbent ruler. The expected
payo¤ of repressing is
EUD(Repress) = h( j0  aDj   !D) + (1  h)( j1  aDj   ) (4.5)
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The dictator prefers to repress rather than getting a policy result, ae , non ac-
ceptable by the elite (since it is < mE) since EUD(Repress) > EUD(Approach
OjCoup) for a su¢ ciently high g10 . The same occurs with respect to O, that
is, if the o¤er the dictator is willing to make is higher than mO, the opposition
will rebel, so the ruler is better-o¤ by repressing without revealing any infor-
mation. Therefore, EUD(Repress) > EUD(Approach OjRebellion), since, as
stated above, p > h.
As a result, D will only proceed to negotiate policy if mO  mE , that is,
if the maximum acceptable accountability level to the elite is smaller or equal
to the minimum level of regime openness that the opposition would accept. On
the contrary, if mO < mE , no agreement will be reached and a will remain at its
initial level, 1. The accountability result, ae, and the decision of D will be based,
then, on the expected benets of regime openness through the mobilization of
cooperation, , and on aD, dictators own preferences.
Figure 4.3 shows the underlying conditions that induce D to start the ne-
gotiation for coopting O into a regime new institutional structure. In case aD
lies in region I -which is actually very unlikely- and mE > , the ruler will set
the regime openness level at the maximum possible permitted by the constraint
posed by the elite, that is, at mE . If aD lies in region II, D can choose his most
preferred outcome within the interval dened above, aD 2 [; 1]. If aD is bigger
than mO, the ruler will choose an openness level equal to the minimum level
of aperture and control that the opposition would accept, that is, ae = mO as
long as aD  mO+12 (region III in the gure).
10That is, if g  g0 =  x+1 h(1+ !D)
1+!D x  , which we assume it is so, in other words, the
dictator prefers to repress the opposition rather than facing a coup or a palace putsch whatever
the benets of cooperating with O might be.
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[Figure 4.3]
Finally, if aD > mO+12 , the dictator would not approach O unless the switch-
ing from ae = 1 to ae = mO (which is the maximum he would o¤er in this
situation) pays-o¤ in terms of revenue benets, . For this to happen,  will
have to fulll the following condition
  0 = h( j0  aDj   !D) + (1  h)( j1  aDj   ) +mO   aD + 0 (4.6)
where 0 denote repression costs under institutionalized regime, where, be-
sides, 0 < . If  < 0, the dictator will opt for keeping the regime closed with
total political autonomy at ae = 1, the status quo level. Table 4.3 summarizes
the equilibria and the conditions for their existence.
[Table 4.3]
The e¤ect of  is twofold in determining the equilibria. On the one hand,
by lowering the policy level the elite is willing to accept -mE- it eases that the
condition mO  mE e¤ectively holds. Indeed, mO  mE means, from (4.2) and
(4.4), that
(1  p)(1 + !O)  1   + g( ) + (1  g)(1  x  !E) (4.7)
which holds, hence, if
  00 = 1 + g( ) + (1  g)(1  x  !E)  (1  p)(1 + !O)
On the other hand, we also know that as long as   0, the dictator will
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prefer a limited level of regime openness (ae = mO < 1) even though his most
preferred level is actually aD = 1.
What are then the key determinants of the levels of accountability of a
given regime and their levels of security and sensitivity? As said, two factors
determine the equilibria of the game. Firstly, the need of cooperation to obtain
revenues and, second, the relative strength of both the opposition and the elite.
Sensitivity levels are the result of the presence or absence of natural resources or
foreign aid, since they determine whether cooperation is needed or not to collect
revenues. So tax policy enters into politics as, independently of group strength,
cooperation is needed and more openness is o¤ered in exchange. Secondly,
regardless of the rulers rents availability, the other actors in the game are
endowed with some level of capability to depose the incumbent dictator, so
they determine the overall level of security of his tenure. Summing up, security
and sensitivity are functions of the following parameters
Political Accountability
8>><>>:
A = A(g; p; h)
B = B()
Concerning the degree of institutionalization of authoritarian regimes and
their associated levels of security and sensitivity, their combination may be more
subtle regarding that g, p and h play a key role in their conguration as well.
Formal institutions (such as parties and legislatures) are, according to the model,
the result of the combination of the strength of the potential opposition and the
necessity to mobilize cooperation to increase tax revenue, which is consistent
with what other authors have pointed out (Smith, 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski,
2006). As just said, the increasing benets of mobilizing cooperation when aid
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or primary commodities are scarce, lead the elite as well as the ruler to accept
a more open institutional system; while the organizational capacity allows each
of the actors who may represent a credible threat to dictatorsstability in o¢ ce
to push for a more favorable policy outcome. For instance, a higher p allows the
opposition to set his minimum acceptable degree of openness at a lower level
according to (4.4), while, on the contrary, for the case of the elite, a higher g
involves a reduction in the maximum level of institutionalization it is willing to
accept.
Recall that in determining the degree of regime institutionalization and ac-
countability there is also an important empirically unobservable factor playing
a role, namely, the dictators own preferences, aD11 . Preferences may be as-
signed or deduced ex post, but not generally known ex ante. Dictators may
di¤er in the level of openness they are willing to implement and accept. Some
dictators became impressed by the soviet experience so, as Smith points out,
there are also reasons to believe that the strength of single-party regimes might
vary more than others because of di¤usion. That is, the attractiveness of the
mass-mobilizing party model presented a powerful model for regime formation
across the post-colonial world(2004a: 3). This was precisely the case of many
post-colonial regimes that engaged in what has been termed African Social-
ism. Similar processes could happen for leaders who were educated in western
democracies and who, consequently, may develop a preference for democratic
institutions to be later possibly applied in their countries of origin. In sum,
11There may be other unobservable variables as well that could be more di¢ cult to identify.
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there are two basic sets of determinants of institutions
Pr(Institutionalization) = F
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Observable variables
8>><>>:
Access to rents  ! 
Strength of E and O  ! g; p; h
Unobservable factors  ! aD (Dictators preferences),   (other)
The conclusion is that institutions are endogenous and, as we will show in
the following chapters, this has profound empirical consequences when estimat-
ing their e¤ect on any policy or economic result, especially when there are also
unobservable factors potentially a¤ecting the presence or not of such institu-
tions.
Keeping this in mind, the relation between institutionalization and sensitiv-
ity is straightforward and predicted to be monotonic, that is, the greater the
inclusiveness of regimes institutions, ae, the higher the level of control and in-
uence over policy o¤ered by the ruling elite. Security, though, shows a di¤erent
pattern. A limited degree of institutionalization, like, ae = mO, indicates that
mO is relatively close to 1 so the opposition is not too strong, while, at the same
time, the elite, although possibly stronger, gets some of the benets of cooper-
ation in exchange for its support and, as x is smaller as well, it is more willing
to accept some regime inclusiveness (see (4.2)). On the contrary, a high level of
institutionalization, such as a multi-party system12 , is the result of the combina-
tion of a more powerful opposition and a big expected benet, , from economic
cooperation. Figure 4.3 shows that as the opposition becomes stronger, the
minimum level of representation it would accept, mO, moves leftward -closer to
0-, therefore  must be bigger so as to assure that mE  mO, which happens
12Also known as electoral authoritarianism", anocracy, or hybrid regime.
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if   0. Finally, note that, according to the model, for a su¢ ciently high g,
the dictator prefers the status quo (ae = 1) to any institutional opening, so the
dictator keeps a closed system while loyalty from a strong elite must be bought
through the delivery of private goods, what makes him very dependent on the
availability of rents.
Figure 4.4 portrays the predicted relationships according to the model be-
tween institutionalization, security and sensitivity, which, taken as hypotheses,
will be empirically tested in Chapter 6.
[Figure 4.4]
4.4 The Determinants of Security
The overall security of a dictator depends on his capacity to coopt a particular
fraction of the population and repress the rest of them. Simultaneously, the
cooptation necessities are determined by the organizational strength and col-
lective action capacity of the groups, that is, g, p and h. The next subsections
review the literature seeking to trace the potential variables that may determine
the capacities of the various groups and, consequently, the dictators structural
security.
4.4.1 Elite Members and Relative Strength
The main risk for a dictators survival stems from his own support or ruling
elite as we contended in the model above by assuming that g > p; h. The issue
goes back to Machivelli (1950 [1532]) who in the sixteenth century stated that:
He who becomes prince by help of the nobility has greater di¢ -
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culty in maintaining his power than he who is raised by the populace,
for he is surrounded by those who think themselves his equals, and
is thus unable to direct or command as he pleases(page 36)
Certainly, there are always key groups backing a dictator and beneting
from their position. And no ruler can retain power without the support of
some sectors (Egorov and Sonin, 2005). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999; 2003)
refer to them as the winning coalition, that is, the subset of the selectorate of
su¢ cient size such that the subsets support endows the leadership with political
power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised
members of the society (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 51)13 . Gallego and
Pitchik (1999), in their model on leadership turnover, call this subgroup the
kingmakers. This nite group of kingmakers is the key coalition whose
support maintains the ruler in power and, moreover, decide individually whether
or not to withdraw their support. In case the leader is overthrown, it is assumed
the new leader will have to be chosen from among the kingmakers14 .
If including members into the regime network structures is an important
variable determining its longevity, the opposite should be true as well. Dix
(1982) states that regime narrowingleading to elite divisions is one of the two
key variables explaining the breakdown of many non-democratic regimes. Sim-
ilarly, Snyder (1992, 1998) stresses that in cases like the neopatrimonial rulers
of Iran, Nicaragua and Cuba alienation of elites encouraged the formation of
13The selectorate is a subset of the citizenry [that] has an institutionally legitimate right
to participate in choosing the countrys political leadership (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999:
148).
14The logic is also valid in communist states. Brezhnev (General Secretary of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982, and twice Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet -head of state-, from 1960 to 1964 and from 1977 to 1982) formed his own
power coalition based on patron-client networks after Khrushchev was forced to resign. At
the core of his administration were the Dnepropetrovsk politicians (those who had moved up
with him since the 30s) and other elite members who served with him (Willerton, 1987).
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broad, multi-class revolutionary coalitions(Snyder, 1992: 383). In his seminal
work, ODonnell and Schmitter stated that there is no transition whose be-
ginning is not the consequence -direct or indirect- of important divisions within
the authoritarian regime itself (1986: 19). Regarding the breakdown of com-
munist one-party regimes, Kalyvas argues that the key mechanism of decay
was, therefore, the desertion of party o¢ cials because of a shift in the sources
of their revenue and income (...), rather than the emergence of civil society and
the resistance of ordinary citizens to the state (1999: 339). To sum up, as
Moore does, we simply take regime elite or coalition to mean arrangements in
which ruling elites provide resources to social elites and groups in exchange for
political support(2004: 3).
Such an determinant support must be properly rewarded by the ruler satis-
fying the preferences of those in the elite to avoid being given the cold shoulder.
As a result, the hard-linersstrength depends at that respect on whether they
are able to develop deep patronage networks (Brownlee, 2002). However, dic-
tatorships may di¤er in the type and the way by which those rents are gener-
ated and allocated to their closest collaborators15 . When primary commodities
abound, dictators can create big monopolies that can be distributed among the
elite members. Besides, revenues can be collected by taxing international trade,
without requiring an extensive and e¢ cient tax administration, and export and
import licenses delivered. Furthermore, primary sectors do not generally re-
quire a strong business class, modern administration and qualied workers. An
example will clarify this point. Just after declaring Martial Law in Philippines
(1972), Ferdinand Marcos began the process of building around him a loyal elite
15And, potentially, their most dangerous enemies.
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of new oligarchs and co-opting some traditional ones. To do so, nonetheless, in-
centives and cash were needed. Sugar, coconuts, and grain -among others- all
became monopolies under Marcos and were given to his cronies for private ac-
cumulation (Hawes, 1987; Thompson, 1998; Kang, 2002). Juan Ponce Enrile
(the defense minister) and Eduardo Cojuangco, two of Marcos supporters, were
able to monopolize the coconut industry. Marcos ordered through presidential
decree all coconut processing companies to sell out or a¢ liate with UNICOM,
whose Board was chaired by Enrile (Bello et al. 1982).
Other good sources of rents are oil and mineral wealth. The huge amount of
oil revenues makes the state turn into a distributive machine which must decide
which social groups are to be favored in the process of oil-based rent-seeking
(Smith, 2004b). The evidence reported by Smith (2004b), although referred
to regimes and not to leaders, indicates that oil wealth is robustly associated
with regimeslonger durations and lower levels of protest. Indeed, Kuwait and
Qatar have been ruled by the same dynasties since the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries respectively16 . In both states the transition to oil was accomplished
through a tacit deal between the Amir and trading families, a trade of formal
power for wealth. In exchange for receiving a sizable portion of oil revenues, the
merchants renounced to their historical claim to participate in decision making
(Crystal, 1989: 433).
Conversely, when resources are scarce, benets are distributed using institu-
tions such as a single-party regime. Party organizations, as said above, provide
system members with a durable frame where to resolve di¤erences, bargain and
advance in inuence. As a result, dominant party systems generate and main-
16The Sabahs in Kuwait and the al-Thani in Qatar.
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tain a cohesive leadership cadre (Brownlee, 2004a). In Smiths words, during
routine periods, strong parties provide a means for incorporated groups to
present their political and policy preferences to the regime, channeling inter-
ests in much the same way that Huntington foresaw in the single-party rule
of the 1960s. During periods of crisis, the crucial task of party institutions is
to provide a credible guarantee to in-groups that their long-term interests will
be best served by remaining loyal to the regime(2005: 431). Geddes (1999a)
proposes that cadre interactions within a one-party system resemble those of
the Staghunt game, that is, a sort of incentive structure in which the best op-
tion for elite factions is to cooperate in order to hold o¢ ce. Indeed, Schnytzer
and uteriµc (1998) nd that the rents distributed to members were far more
important than the popularity of policies and repression in determining party
membership in communist one-party regimes.
Party structures may also become essential during succession periods. Fac-
tional disputes for leadership can be addressed within the organization without
altering the stability and functioning of the regime. The Mexican PRI is a
clear example of this pattern. Moreover, especially one-party regimes, large
sectors of the population can also be integrated in what Kasza (1995a) calls
administered mass organizations that are formal organizations structured
and managed by the states ruling apparatus to shape mass social action for
the purpose of implementing public policy(1995a: 218). These organizations
extend state control in many di¤erent ways, namely, following Kasza (1995a):
Material dependency, consumption of time, organization of support, o¢ ces and
honors and self-directed local administration17 .
17See Kasza (1995a and 1995b) for more details.
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The specic strength of elite members may vary according to the leaders own
position. Both civilian and military rulers may, thus, face a higher threat from
their own collaborators and elites. Rival factions within the army may become
the major threat for military dictators due to two factors. First, as members
of the armed forces, factionalist groups have equal access to military equipment
and weapons as the rest of its members. And, second, as Geddes (1999a) points
out, the military may prefer to hand power to civilians if their cohesiveness is
endangered by the exercise of power. Lacking a concrete source of legitimacy,
civilian rulers may be threatened by both other elite members and the military18 .
In this case, rival factions may nd easier to threat the incumbents rule by
staging a palace putsch. Monarchs hold the strongest position vis-à-vis their
ruling coalition; since their power is based on tradition and dynastic rights which
usually derive from Gods will, any potential rival lacking these characteristics
that make him suitable for governing will nd it di¢ cult to justify his seizure
and stabilize his power (Ludwig, 2002). This is the basic reason why most of the
palace putsches occurred within monarchical regimes are staged by members of
the own royal family as noted in section 2.
Nonetheless, many leaders became heads of government after having had a
leading role in the struggle for independence from their colonial states. These
18Some leaderslack of condence of on the military, reecting that vulnerability, led them
to create personal guards or militias (directly appointed by themselves) for their protection in
order to reduce their dependence on the military for security and undermine its cohesion. For
instance, Eric Gairy formed in 1970 the paramilitary group known as the Mongoose Gangto
face the opposition headed by the New Jewel Movement. Papa Doc Duvalier (Haitis former
President for Life) created in 1958 the Tontons Macoutes (Bogeymen) who were some kind
of esoteric police headed by Clément Barbot and organized as a private militia estimated
to number 9.000-15.000 and used to terrorize and murder opponents. Recruits were drawn
initially from the capital citys slums and equipped with antiquated small arms found in the
presidential palace. They received no salary, relying instead on extortion and petty crime.
Another clear example is Saddams Iraqi Republican Guard, which began its life in the early
1980s. This organization served as the core around which an elite o¤ensive force was built. It
had to be used during the war with Iran since the Republican Guard forces were much better
trained and equipped than the Regular Army. All of the RGFC troops were volunteers.
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rulers may nd themselves more secure in power as the legitimacy gained though
their anti-colonial activism might well deter other elite members -and the military-
from plotting against him due to the lack of citizen support. Such were the cases,
for example, of Julius Nyerere, Habib Bourguiba and Kenneth Kaunda, who af-
ter leading the ght for independence became their countriesrst presidents19 ,
and remained in power for more than twenty years unchallenged20 . Likewise,
the process of a new elite building after independence makes those favored by
the new leader more dependent on him for obtaining privileges and keeping their
position.
4.4.2 When People Take the Streets. . . The Organizational
Capacity of Citizens
Let us now turn to the potential determinants of p and h, in other words, the
collective strength of the opposition21 . We need to pay attention to the un-
derlying conditions that may foster or hinder popular mobilization. At this
respect, resource mobilization theory has recently proposed a new way to study
and understand protest movements and rebellion beyond relative deprivation
arguments22 and strictly rationalistic approaches23 . Accordingly, although de-
privation might be a necessary condition, it is not a su¢ cient one. Departing
from the assumption that movement actions are rational, existing conict will
19Tanganyika (which became Tanzania later), Tunisia and Zambia, respectively.
20Nyerere retired in 1985; Bourguiba was substituted due to his senility, and Kaunda con-
ceded multiparty elections.
21Both probabilities have essentially the same determinants, but p is assumed to be higher
than h because after approaching O, some information about the actual capacity of the regime
to repress is revealed as noted above.
22On relative deprivation see, for example, Auvinen (1997), Dudley and Miller (1998),
Feierabend, Feierabend and Gurr (1972) and Gurr (1970).
23See, among others, Grossman (1991), Muller and Weede (1990) and Weede and Muller
(1998).
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lead to the emergence of social movements if some changes altering the amount of
resources, group organization and opportunities for collective action take place.
The major issues, therefore, are the resources controlled by the group prior
to mobilization e¤orts, the processes by which the group pools resources and
directs these towards social change, and the extent to which outsiders increase
the pool of resources (Jenkins, 1983: 532-533). In this vein, the rise of what
has been called electoral authoritarianismor hybrid regimesamong many
other names- may provide such movements with those opportunities stressed by
this late approach given the conditions under which they are created, as shown
in the model above. The allowance of a limited level of autonomy by regime
authorities provides opposition members with more room for organizing and
coordinating previously latent and clandestine groups.
The international pressure exerted by democracies has had a big and positive
e¤ect on the organizational strength and resource availability of the opposition
forces and, consequently, on the creation of institutions in authoritarian systems
in order to escape from this more hostile climate. As Diamond correctly notes,
thus the trend toward democracy has been accompanied by an even more
dramatic trend toward pseudodemocracy(2002: 27).
Developed and stable democracies have given nancial and strategic sup-
port to some opposition movements or have resorted to economic sanctions with
the aim of weakening foreign, and very usually authoritarian, governments24 .
Sanctions might increase their e¤ectiveness [of opposition groups] in mobilizing
collective action against the regime by signaling the support of foreigners for the
oppositions cause (Kaempfer et al., 2004: 37). The number of democracies
24The list of countries under US unilateral sanctions can be checked in:
http://usaengage.org.
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in the world has been sharply increasing since the mid seventies, what allows
multilateral sanctions on dictatorial governments -specially if they are backed
by some international organization- to become more e¤ective as well as to in-
crease the number of those unilaterally established (Drezner, 2000; Kaempfer
and Lowenberg, 1999). Indeed, as Marinov (2005) reports, while there were
only ve countries subject to sanctions around 1950, the number had increased
to 47 by the mid 90s. Recent evidence shows that economic pressure serves to
destabilize the rule of those leaders it targets (Marinov, 2005).
In other cases, support to opposition groups comes in a more direct way
from democratic governments as well as non-governmental organizations. For
instance, the Anti-apartheid Movement, founded in London in 1959, was created
by South-African exiles and their supporters to mobilize international support
for the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress. Solidarity,
the union that headed the anticommunist opposition in Poland, was nancially
aided by American Trade Unions; at the same time, international agencies re-
fused to grant debt-ridden Poland economic aid until it legalized Solidarity. At
the state level, examples abound as well. US administration had been both
training and funding Iraqi anti-Saddam groups such as the Iraqi National Ac-
cord25 and the Iraqi National Congress26 before the invasion in 2003. In Europe,
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation provided nancial and other support for Social-
ist politicians during dictatorships in Spain and Portugal (Pinto-Duschinsky,
1991: 55).
Nonetheless, the e¤ectiveness of these measures may be counterbalanced by
25Funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, British intelligence, and the Saudis, the INA
staged a failed coup attempt in 1996.
26The INC had received millions in U.S. aid for military training.
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the presence of regional support for a given regime. When the proportion of
other authoritarian governments in the region is high, and cooperation between
them exists, cross-border smuggling may become more di¢ cult for opposition
groups. The provision of military help by friendly countries and the establish-
ment of operative bases in foreign countries will most probably be hindered as
well as the possibility of crossing the borders to avoid domestic prosecution.
Finally, the structural approach stresses the role that some underlying fac-
tors within the countries may play on determining the levels of protest and/or
violence. Of these factors, the most relevant is the level of ethnic dominance or
competition. Ethnic dominance theory argues that the political and economic
control of one hegemonic group may provoke the protest of smaller excluded
groups. In general, it is argued that higher ethnic fractionalization hinders
broad popular collective action by increasing information costs and distrust be-
tween groups, so despite it may ease intra-group mobilization, it can, at the
same time, hamper inter-group coordination (Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier,
2004; Padró-i-Miquel, 2004).
When broader sectors of society are considered, patronage networks are im-
possible to reach everybody in view of the fact that the resources in the hands
of dictators are limited or even scarce (considering that a proportion of them
is devoted to self-enrichment) (Gibson and Ho¤man, 2002). In this case, only
public goods might be e¤ective in keeping the masses toothless. Foreign aid may
also help to reduce pressure on dictators own budget constraint since it is an
extra source of cash that can be delivered to society without a¤ecting dictators
and his greedy croniesshare of the spoils.
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4.4.3 Military Intervention. To Stay or Not in the Bar-
racks
Although, in general, the military can be regarded as a part of the ruling elite
in authoritarian regimes, they are an especial group or conglomerate with
very particular preferences and goals. Consequently, it is worth considering
them separately in order to better understand their motivations to intervene
into politics.
As it has been outlined before, the military have the means to seize power
since they have control over the weapons of a given country and the skills to use
them e¤ectively. However, this might be again a necessary but not a su¢ cient
condition for military intervention in politics. As Luttwak (1969), Finer (1976
[1962]), Nordlinger (1977) and Brooker (2000) point out, there must exist some
kind of opportunities or preconditions and the appropriate incentives to make
that decision27 . The factors mentioned for the case of the elite which served to
reinforce leaders security in relation to rival groups may be as essential in this
case as in the political and economic elitesin shaping the scope of the costs of
challenging the incumbents position.
There is a large amount of empirical -both quantitative as qualitative28 -
literature about military intervention and it has identied several factors that
may bring it about. I will only review the most important or most commonly
included in the analyses since, generally, they are not exclusively focused just
on dictatorships but consider both democratic and authoritarian regimes.
In her seminal work, OKane (1981) identies two main preconditions under
27What Finer termed the dispositionand the opportunityand Nordlinger the whyand
when.
28See, for instance, Andrews and Raanan (1969) for an in-depth study about Ecuador.
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which coups are more likely to occur. The rst one has to do with export
of primary goods dependence in poor countries (specially democracies). That
dependence makes the economy of a country more sensible to price crises and,
hence, external shocks dramatically a¤ect growth and government revenue. The
other factors are obstacles that may deter the occurrence of coups. Concretely,
she cites three: The recent independence of a government which may generate
a honeymoone¤ect; the past coups experience29 , and the presence of foreign
troops because they cannot be fully neutralized by the conspirators. Londregan
and Poole (1990) concentrate on the economic conditions for coups as well. They
nd a pronounced inverse relationship between coups and income and show that
high rates of economic growth tend to inhibit coup occurrence (see also Galetovic
and Sanhueza, 2000). They demonstrate the inuence of past coups as OKane
(1981) did: once the ice is broken, more coups follow(Londregan and Poole,
1990: 152). Similarly, in a posterior work, OKane (1993) emphasizes again that
the actual causes of coups are economic rather than political. She argues that
specialization in and dependency on primary goods for export, exacerbated by
poverty, are the most important explanatory factors.
Addressing the explicit preferences of the military as an institution, the
early literature on military intervention a¢ rmed that what the armed forces
hate the most is social unrest and mobilization within the country (ODonnell,
1973) and, generally, they seize power with the purpose of re-establishing or-
der as, in their view, incumbent government has failed to do so (Finer, 1976;
Nordlinger, 1977). More recently, Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000) argue that
coup attempts are more likely when there is widespread discontent against the
29As she asserts in general, where no precedent has been set, it can be expected that
potential conspirators will at rst try less drastic measures (OKane, 1981: 295).
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incumbent ruler since it acts as a signal that people may comply with lead-
ership change30 . But through co-optation and leverage delivered by allowing
political parties (Johnson, Slater and McGowan, 1984), the opposition can be
to some extent controlled, avoiding, thus, riots and massive protests and, thus,
helping to keep the military into the barracks. Similarly, as Jackman puts it,
this suggests that one-party dominance is probably an integrative force(1978:
1273).
4.5 The Conditions for Sensitivity
Many dictators survive to acute economic crisis, and some have remained in
power for several years even in spite of widespread corruption and that negative
growth gures for long periods of time. For instance, José Eduardo dos Santos
stayed 22 years in power in Angola even though the average growth rate during
his rule was as bad as -1.0831 ; Samuel Doe ruled Liberia for ten years during
which GDP per capita decreased on average at a rate of -3.50; Kenneth Kaunda
(Zambia) was able to rule for 27 years while average per capita income growth
was negative (-.776)32 . Other examples are Jerry Rawlings, Mathieu Kerekou,
Mobutu Sese Seko, François Duvalier, Sukarno, Saddam Hussein, the king Fahd,
etc.
Previous cross-national research has already shown that growth has little
e¤ect on democratization (Gasiorowski, 1995; Limongi and Przeworski, 1994).
This tells us that the e¤ect of growth on survival is not constant across rulers
30Their empirical evidence shows that higher levels of popular unrest, measured as the sum
of riots, demonstrations and strikes in a given year, increase the likelihood of coups.
31The data may not cover the entire period.
32Actually, he once a¢ rmed, we are in part to blame, but this is the curse of being born
with a copper spoon in our mouths" (cited in Ross, 1999).
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and regimes, but that some underlying conditions determine whether this e¤ect
may be signicant or not, which we hypothesized to be the availability of rents
B = B()
As it has been stressed, authoritarian rulers and regimes di¤er with respect to
the segments of their societies from which they obtain support and revenues and,
consequently, to which they must be more responsive. The group interested in
growth is a multi-class sector, formed by private-sector business groups, middle-
class and popular-sectors. As Haggard and Kaufman note, the private sector
is well placed to play an organizational and nancial role within the opposition
(1995: 30). Later on, they state:
A plausible hypothesis that combines economic conditions in
both the long and short run is that authoritarian regimes are more
vulnerable to economic downturns in middle-income capitalist coun-
tries. In such societies, wealth holders are more sharply di¤eren-
tiated from the political elite. Social groups hold substantial and
independent organizational and material resources that are crucial
to regime stability. The middle and working classes are politically
relevant and there are lower barriers to collective action on the part
of urbanized low-income groups. Countries tting this description
are also more likely to have prior histories of party politics, labor
mobilization, and civic association.(1995: 36)
There are some conditions, instead, where these social groups holding sub-
stantial and independent organizational and material resourcesare weak or even
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inexistent so their material resources are no longer crucial to regime stability.
The key seems to be revenue policy and the literature about the scal theory
of governance provides us with some important clues. This kind of theories
contend that when citizen cooperation is not needed for revenue to be raised,
governments have fewer incentives to defer to their interests33 . Primary sectors
do not generally require a strong business class, modern administration and
qualied workers. Furthermore, Gylfason and Zoega (2002) argue that when
the share of output that accrues to the owners of natural resources rises, the
demand for capital falls; moreover, they also show that resource dependence
slows down the development of the nancial as well as the educational system.
Revenues are collected from di¤erent streams, and as we stated in the model
above, economic cooperation is only needed if one of the main sources on which a
government can rely are those more subject to higher free-riding and monitoring
problems (Lieberman, 2002), namely, taxes on incomes, prots and capital gains;
taxes on goods and services; taxes on property, and payroll taxes. But for certain
governments, the main sources of revenue are others not precisely requiring
either cooperation nor an extensive administration. Following Ross, theories
of the rentier state contend that when governments gain most of their revenues
from external sources, such as resource rents or foreign assistance, they are freed
from the need to levy domestic taxes and become less accountable to the societies
they govern(1999: 312)34 . Under these circumstances, i.e., when countries get
most of their revenue from one stream or from foreign aid, the expected benets
of mobilizing cooperation through institutionalization, , are negligible. Figures
4.5.a, b and c show the di¤erent revenue streams as a percentage of the GDP for
33See, for example, Levi (1988), More (1995), Ross (2004) and Ho¤man and Gibson (2006).
34See also Karl (1997).
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three di¤erent types of countries: Oil-exporting countries, primary-commodity
exporting countries, and countries without a considerable amount of natural
resources35 .
[Figures 4.5.a, b and c]
Indeed, a simple look at the data on revenue of theWorld Development Indi-
cators reveals that oil-exporting countries get on average 61.7 percent (18.4% of
the GDP) of their revenues from non-taxed sources, while non-exporting author-
itarian regimes get only 18.8% of their revenues (4.4% of the GDP). Primary-
commodity exporting countries, instead, levy most of their incomes from taxes
on international trade, concretely, 29% on average of their revenues come from
this stream (6.30% of the GDP). On the contrary, revenue policy is proven to
be much more balanced and diversied in economies where the amount of nat-
ural resources is not so overwhelming. Note that in Figure 4.5.c none of the
revenue sources is greater than 5% of GDP and that the di¤erences between
them are minor; even their collections of security taxes and other taxes (which
include property taxes) more than double those of resource-rich states: 1.33%
and 1.11% for resource-poor countries, while only 0.57% and 0.57% for resource-
rich ones. As Rasizade asserts, a regime with oil revenue is less accountable
to ordinary citizens; it does not have to collect their triing taxes or meet their
tedious demands. A portion of the petrodollars must be spent on the armed
forces to keep the masses in line, but the rest can be split among the political
elite(2002: 353).
35The subsamples are based on the following variables: oil exporting country, which is
a dummy variable coded 1 if the average ratio of fuel exports to total exports in 1990-1993
exceeded 50%, 0 otherwise; and primary commodity exporting country, which is a time
invariant dummy variable coded 1 if the average ratio of non-fuel primary products exports
in 1990-1993 exceeded 50% of total exports, 0 otherwise.
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Similarly, concerning foreign aid, some authors have already noticed how
aid may reduce government accountability and the demands for reform via its
e¤ect on revenue policy (Moore, 1995; Brautigam, 2000) and foster rent-seeking
(Svensson, 2000). Indeed, the data show that there is an strong negative cor-
relation between aid per capita and the percentage of revenue from taxes on
income, prots and capital gains and from taxes on goods and services. Specif-
ically, the correlation is  =  0:16 for taxes on incomes, and  =  0:25 for
taxes on goods and services. Hence, as resource receipts, foreign aid and loans
constitute an extra source of rents in the hands of the regime heads when other
domestic sources of revenue are scarce36 . For example, along the years, Jordan
Hashemite dynasty has received funds from either British Administration, Arab
oil producers and the United States. From 1973 to 1988, aid averaged 43 percent
of the Jordan public budget (Moore, 2004). In Zambia, aid was equivalent to
32.7 percent of GNP by 1993 (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). Indeed, there
is no embarrassment in giving aid to non-democracies and corrupt countries.
As Alesina and Dollar (2000) show, colonial past and political alliances are the
major determinants of foreign aid37 . E.g., they report that Portugals share
of aid going to countries that were its colonies is 99.6%, and that of France is
57%. Besides, there is some evidence that shows that more corrupt governments
receive more foreign aid (Alesina and Weder, 1999).
These features help to understand, on the other hand, why in primary com-
modities exporting dictatorships the levels of protest are lower than in non-
exporting ones (see Table 4.4). The annual average number of both demon-
36Aid may include budgetary support, security collaborations, concessionary loans, loan
forgiveness, and nancing of di¤erent kinds of development projects.
37Using UN votes as proxy for political alliances.
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strations, riots as well as strikes is signicantly inferior in resource-rich dicta-
torships38 . The pattern is almost identical for oil exporting and non exporting
dictatorships with regard to the levels of social conict (although for di¤erent
reasons to be commented below)39 . And, regarding aid, the correlations are neg-
ative and signicant. In sum, it seems clear that rent-rich dictatorships lack the
characteristics that Haggard and Kaufman stress as essential for the existence
of pressure towards an e¤ective accountability with regard to economic perfor-
mance. In fact, most of the dictatorial regimes that did not democratize during
the 70s and 80s were in Africa and the Middle East, the most resource-rich
regions in the world.
[Table 4.4]
It is clear, thus, that resource exporting states have generally remained un-
derdeveloped and have few chances to catch up since their growth rates have
shown to be systematically lower as well (Sachs and Warner, 1995). Each one
of the di¤erent explanations trying to account for this regularity focus on a
di¤erent aspect, say, the economic factors, sectorial approaches, state-centered
theories and so on; however, their degree of connection is high sharing, most
of them, common arguments and mechanisms that link natural resources to
underdevelopment40 .
Social group centered approaches suggest that resource abundance enhances
the political inuence on non-state actors who favor growth impeding policies
(Urrutia and Yukawa, 1988; Ross, 1999). Other theories, appealing to the lead-
ersmotivations, defend that resource abundance induces policy-makers to act
38The data are taken from Banks (1996).
39See Smith (2004b).
40See Ross (1999) for an excelent review.
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myopically and with excessive optimism, and even exuberance, overextracting
resources and fostering clientelism that prevents e¢ cient economic planning
and economic diversication and, eventually, long-run development (Robinson,
Torvik and Verdier, 2003).
The state-centered approach has two main branches: One, theories centered
on the protection of property rights and state-owned enterprises, and, two, the
theories of the rentier state. For the rst, nationalization of natural resources
and the consequent management of this wealth by state-owned enterprises has
introduced a high level of ine¢ cacy and corruption that foreign multinationals
had previously eradicated (Shafer, 1983; Brough and Kimenyi, 1986).
The theories of the rentier state have developed two main explanations. The
rst one develops the proposition that such abundance of external resources
fosters predatory states, greater distributional conicts and, then, the milita-
rization of politics. The second argument links rent availability to rent-seeking
behavior and corruption41 . These versions are more useful to explain the lack of
a strong private sector in primary commodity-exporting authoritarian regimes
in conjunction with the elements o¤ered by those approaches focused on social
groups interests and the leadersmotivations (see above) and the ine¢ cacy of
state-ownership.
4.6 Conclusions (or Hypotheses)
This chapter has focused on developing empirically testable insights about the
conditions that may determine the levels of security and sensitivity of a given
41For a critical assessment of the theory of the rentier state see DiJohn (2002)
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dictators rule and how they relate to institutions. The main conclusions derived
from the model can be summarized as follows:
 Institutions under dictatorship are endogenous and determined by both
observable and unobservable factors. The observed factors include the
abundance of non-cooperative rents, and the strength of the actors, spe-
cially the opposition. Among other potential variables, dictators own
preferences represent a key unobserved determinant of institutionaliza-
tion.
 The exogenous determinants of security are to be found in the variables
a¤ecting the relative strength of both the elite and the opposition groups.
On the other hand, sensitivity levels are driven by the availability of non-
cooperative rents such as non-tax revenues, taxes on international trade
or foreign aid.
 Regarding the relationship between institutionalization, security and sen-
sitivity, our predictions show that sensitivity is expected to monotonically
increase with institutionalization. In contrast, security shows a di¤erent
pattern: It increases at low levels of institutionalization and then sharply
decreases.
The rest of the chapter has been devoted to nd clues among the existing
literature about what the determinants of the relative strength of both the elite
and the opposition groups may be. At this respect, the following has been
proposed:
 To keep the elites loyalty when no cooperative rents are obtained, the
rulers must resort to distribute rents stemming from natural resources and
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commodities. We have also predicted that elite strength may be lower
in monarchies where power legitimacy hinges on tradition and dynastic
membership. Furthermore, rulers may nd themselves more secure in
power as the legitimacy gained though their anti-colonial activism might
well prevent other elite members from plotting against them.
 Past instability and external dependence are pointed by the literature to
be major determinants of military interventions into politics as well as
those a¤ecting elite strength, such as colonial history or type of leader.
 Regarding citizen opposition, its organizational capacity is expected to be
inuenced by the following factors: Their initial organizational strength,
which will be greater if the previous regime was a democracy; the di¢ cul-
ties posed by a big proportion of authoritarian regimes in the region; the
support o¤ered by foreign democratic governments; the degree of ethnic
fractionalization, which may hinder group coordination, and the creation
of a multi-party system.
Chapter 5
The Sources of Revenue of
Authoritarian Regimes
5.1 Introduction. Revenue Sources
The model in the previous chapter contains a set of assumptions and results
that must be carefully studied and tested. One of the most important concerns
the capacity of dictatorial institutions to mobilize economic cooperation. Ac-
cordingly, the expected benets of institutionalization in terms of tax revenues,
, were argued to be a decisive parameter driving the equilibria of the game.
On the other hand, if   0, what happens if natural resources and primary
commodities or aid abound, the dictator and the elite lack the incentives to
open and accept institutions. As a result, there are two main contentions that
need empirical validation: First, that, as shown in the equilibria, the creation
of institutions is the result of the strength of the opposition and the need to
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mobilize economic support when resources are scarce; and second, that institu-
tionalization e¤ectively mobilizes economic support.
Revenues are essential for any state since they determine the size and scope
of public policies, and even of rulers self-enrichment. In Liebermans words,
levels of tax collections are of intrinsic interest simply because they are a key
source of government revenue that provides funding for welfare, defense, and
other government programs around the world, and because of their inuence
on markets (2002: 91). Yet taxes are not the only source from which gov-
ernments, especially authoritarian ones, gather their public resources. Indeed,
non-tax revenues have represented more than 30% of total revenue in countries
such as Congo, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Sri Lanka, or Myanmar; and even
more than 70% in oil-exporting countries such as Kuwait or Bahrain. Hence,
revenues and rent-extraction are not just taxes. Furthermore, taxes are not
homogeneous in the sense they are imposed onto very di¤erent bases and may
entail a very dissimilar level of administrative and political costs. The choice,
then, between the various alternatives is not just a matter of taste but responds
to both strategic as well as economic considerations.
Recent studies on the tax e¤ort of countries and their tax mix have begun to
pay attention to institutions as a signicant source of cross-country variability,
although dictatorships in all their forms have generally been, however, neglected
or simply included as a reference category to which democratic systems are
compared in terms of the size and scope of public policies (Cheibub, 1998; Boix,
2003; Mulligan et al. 2004).
Nonetheless, dictatorships are not homogeneous; they di¤er in their insti-
tutional conguration as well. Some ban all kind of parties and representative
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institutions, while others create a single party through which control is extended
and support mobilized, and others even take the form of quasi-democracies, al-
lowing the existence of multiple parties within a legislature. We hypothesize
that these di¤erent forms of organization will have an e¤ect on how dictatorial
regimes collect their revenues. We have to be cautious, nonetheless, since insti-
tutions exist under certain conditions and do also respond to strategic consider-
ations of rulers, as we contended in Chapter 4. The questions to be answered are
then: Are institutions the result of the need to mobilize economic cooperation?
Do dictatorial institutions have any e¤ect on the revenue policy of authoritarian
regimes after controlling for the conditions that may generate them?
To address these questions this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the main arguments about the endogeneity of institutions and their
potential e¤ect on revenue policy. Section 3 explores the three basic factors
determining the combination of revenue sources -apart from institutions- ac-
cording to the existing literature. The methodology employed to estimate the
empirical models is described in Section 4. In the next section, we report the
results of the multinomial models for dictatorial institutions, and subsequent to
that, the revenue data are described and the results of the selection corrected
models detailed. Section 6 concludes.
5.2 Institutions, Cooperation and Revenues
Under democracy there is general agreement among researchers that if tax-
payers perceive that their interests (preferences) are properly represented in
political institutions and consider government to be not wasteful but helpful,
138CHAPTER 5. THE SOURCES OF REVENUEOF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
their willingness to vote for higher levels of taxation and comply with their tax
obligations will increase(Bird et al. 2004: 16). This proposition has received
broad empirical support in the literature (Lassen, 2000; Bird et al. 2004), so
the questions that almost automatically emerge are then: Is this true for au-
thoritarian regimes? Can institutions under dictatorships mobilize economic
support?
To be systematic we need to proceed by imposing some classication that
captures the appropriate dimensions within authoritarian regimes for the study
of their revenue policy. In view of that, we distinguish three types of author-
itarian regimes according to their formal institutional conguration: i) Non-
institutionalized dictatorships1 ; ii) regimes with a single institution, i.e., either
a non-partisan legislature, a single party, or both; and, iii) fully institutionalized
dictatorships, where both multiple parties and a legislature exist. Recent stud-
ies stress that these institutions serve to co-opt the potential opposition groups
and mobilize support and cooperation through the distribution of perks, privi-
leges and, sometimes, policy concessions and inuence (Brownlee, 2004a; Smith,
2005; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006). Institutions, then, reect the broadness
of the regime in terms of group inclusion, so it can be expected that di¤erent
dictatorial regimes will have a di¤erent impact in the way and the alternative
instruments used to extract resources from the societies they govern.
Non-institutionalized dictatorships do not tend to ask for cooperation and
their stability is based on a narrow power coalition as the potential opposition is
1Often named personalist regimes; see, for instance, Jackson and Rosberg (1984) and Ged-
des (1999a). According to the former, personal rule is an elitist political system composed of
the privileged and powerful few in which the many are usually unmobilized, unorganized, and
therefore relatively powerless to command the attention and action of government (Jackson
and Rosberg, 1984: 424).
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weak and can be severely repressed by the regime forces. As Haggard and Kauf-
man put it, the capacity of rulers in very poor countries to prolong their dom-
ination was facilitated by the relative weakness of organized interests. Highly
dependent private sectors and geographically dispersed rural cultivators lacked
the independence or organization to launch sustained protest against declin-
ing economic conditions(1995: 36). Furthermore, the usual presence in these
countries of exportable commodities or mineral wealth rules out the necessity
to solicit economic cooperation and rents are delivered to the members of the
supporting coalition through deep patronage networks (Gibson and Ho¤man,
2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Extraction of rents is less dependent in
such cases on taxes on incomes and prots, which require higher levels of coop-
eration and compliance from a broad sector of the population and an e¤ective
and extensive administration. Which are, then, the sources of revenue of this
sort of regimes?
Under such conditions, neopatrimonial rulers have incentives to create state-
owned enterprises and agricultural monopolies to have full control over resources
and divert them as a typical expression of parochialcorruption (Scott, 1972).
Dictators can create public enterprises or big monopolies to be distributed
among elite members and cronies while collecting revenues from their activ-
ity. Besides, in predominantly agricultural and commodity-exporting economies,
revenues can be collected by taxing international trade without requiring an ex-
tensive and e¢ cient tax administration, as well as export and import licenses
can be delivered and sold to close collaborators. For instance, in Rwanda,
during Habyarimanas rule (1973-1994), the main members of the Akazu (the
presidential clan) were in charge of the Ocir-café and Ocir-thé, the co¤ee and
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tea agencies (Verwimp, 2003).
Non-tax revenue comes basically from oil and mineral wealth. Revenues from
oil make the state turn into a distributive machine which must decide just which
social groups are to be favored in the process of oil-based rent-seeking (Smith,
2004b). Indeed, in Kuwait and Qatar, Crystal notes that in both states the
transition to oil was accomplished through a tacit deal between the Amir and
trading families, a trade of formal power for wealth. In exchange for receiving a
sizable portion of oil revenues, the merchants renounced to their historical claim
to participate in decision making(1989: 433).
Parasitic behavior by the self-serving bureaucracy becomes widespread. Any
administrative service and paperwork, from issuing licenses and permits to sanc-
tions, may serve under these regimes to extort the public and to exact valuable
goods from citizens, while government property is often sold on the black market
(Scott, 1972).
Besides, in order to stabilize their tenure, kleptocratic rulers often resort
to a divide and rule strategy (Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier, 2004), that is,
they thwart any cooperation attempt between citizens to throw the ruler out
by means of imposing punitive taxation on mobilized citizens, while redistrib-
uting benets to loyal ones. Discriminatory extraction is more easily imposed
through, for example, nes and fees, which can be arbitrarily applied to concrete
individuals or sectors of the society2 .
All in all, it is expected that non-institutionalized regimes will have a greater
reliance on non-tax revenues and on taxes on international trade than more
institutionalized dictatorships, constituting these two sources, at the same time,
2Fines and administrative fees are included in the non-tax revenue category; see below the
denitions of the variables.
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the main streams of revenue of this sort of dictatorships.
Voluntary tax compliance3 is easier to be found in regimes where citizens
receive in exchange some inuence, transparency and control, albeit very lim-
ited, on the decision about resource allocation (Ferejohn, 1999). Particularly
when su¢ cient numbers of people do not accept the states demands for taxes
as legitimate, collections are likely to su¤er (Lieberman, 2002: 94) and, as a
result, free-rider problems as well as political opposition may emerge. Taxes
on income and prots and on goods and services are more di¢ cult to collect;
indeed, an e¤ective and broad administration is needed, and cooperation among
citizens has to be mobilized to avoid tax evasion and opposition. As Lieberman
puts it, when it comes to questions of capacity and collective action, collections
of taxes on income, prots, and capital gains still reect levels of state-society
and intra-society coordination and cooperation(2002: 100). There is, in fact,
an extensive amount of literature relating taxation to progressive democrati-
zation and accountability4 . The basic claim goes as follows: The necessity to
raise taxes from new bases or increase the existing ones leads governments to
open their institutions and become more representative in exchange. The likely
price for institutionalized dictatorships might be an increase in their levels of
contestation5 .
Mobilizing support can only be achieved by institutionalized dictatorships
and, especially, by fully-institutionalized regimes, where by allowing limited
representation and political organization of the potential opposition the regime
3Or quasy-voluntary compliance in Levis (1988) terms.
4See, for instance, Bates and Lien (1985), North and Weingast (1989), Huntington (1991),
Brennan and Buchanan (2000 [1980]), and Ross (2004).
5We explore this proposition in the following chapter.
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is able to increase its levels of perceived legitimacy, e¢ ciency and credibility6 .
Through one-party systems not only perks and privileges are distributed, in
addition parties provide a site for political negotiation within the ruling elite
that represents more than reliable patronage distribution. By o¤ering a long
term system for members to resolve di¤erences and advance in inuence, parties
generate and maintain a cohesive leadership cadre(Brownlee, 2004b: 7). The
dominant party provides the di¤erent groups with the appropriate arena where
they can pursue their interests by inuencing policy decisions, while it allows
the dictators to mobilize cooperation (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2004; Smith,
2005). Parties can, besides, organize support throughout the country, so the
governments control and administration can reach a broader part of the state
territory (Kasza, 1995a, 1995b).
In Egypt, for example, the rise of a young new business elite in the 90s posed
a threat to Hosni Mubaraks ruling party, National Democratic Party. This new
group sought to create its own party that was to be called Future Party and
that would compete with the NDP. The party, however, never saw the light.
Instead, the traditional NDP elite made room to accommodate this emerging
group headed by Mubaraks son, Gamal Mubarak (Brownlee, 2004b).
Similarly, legislatures provide the opposition with a forum where demands
can be expressed and agreements reached with the corresponding regime elites.
For instance, in Brazil, during military rule, the legislature was dominated by
two parties, the pro-government ARENA7 , and the o¢ cial opposition organi-
zation, MDB8 . Nevertheless, in 1967-68, both parties rejected a government-
6These are the three factors identied by Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) that would inuence
taxpayersbehavior and, as a result, the tax capacity of the government.
7Aliança Renovadora Nacional.
8Movimento Democrático Brasileiro.
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sponsored tax bill and an international trade bill (Gandhi, Gochal and Saiegh,
2003; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006). In the USSR, the Supreme Soviet saw
activated, specially after Stalins death, its kontrol function9 which, as Van-
neman puts it, it probably represents a moderate answer to the demands of the
more radical economic and political reformers(1977: 166). Moreover, kontrol
involved investigating and auditing at all levels of soviets by the commissions
(Vanneman, 1977: 105). At the legislative level, the subcommissions system
just created turned into a rather e¤ective means of combining public opinion
sampling with expertise sampling(1977: 162).
Furthermore, the composition of those legislatures reects very similar rep-
resentative patterns concerning the more prominent groups or sectors present
in them. In Zambia, under Kaundas presidency, over 40 per cent of successful
candidates in the National Assembly were businessmen or small traders or had
business interests (Tordo¤, 1977), the sectors more potentially a¤ected by taxes
on prots and incomes. Likewise, the 32 percent of the leaders in the Spanish
Cortes under the Francoist regime were listed in the directory of corporation
and large business leaders and the great majority of them had high education
levels10 (Linz, 1979: 105). In Kenya, during Kenyattas rule, no businesses
were nationalized and promises about tax and other incentives (for instance,
the creation of a stock market) were made to new investors (Hopkins, 1979).
Consequently, we hypothesize that the more institutionalized the authoritarian
regime is; the higher the percentage of taxes that will be collected from incomes,
prots and capital gains, property, from goods and services as well as payroll
9To be translated as monitoring or supervising.
10The percentage of members of the Spanish authoritarian legislature who had only primary
education was below 7% (Linz, 1979: 105).
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ones.
5.3 Other Factors Determining the Revenue Struc-
ture
The basic theoretical models explaining the tax structure of countries identify
three basic factors determining the combination of revenue sources (Hettich
and Winer, 1988; Hettich and Winer, 1997; Kenny and Toma, 1997; Kenny and
Winer, 2001): i) The size and availability of the potential tax bases; ii) enforce-
ment and collection costs, and iii) the substitution e¤ects. Next subsections are
devoted to summarize the di¤erent mechanisms through which these alterna-
tive factors outlined above may a¤ect tax structures in the concrete context of
authoritarian regimes.
5.3.1 The Tax Bases
The tax base refers to the assessed value of a set of assets, investments or income
streams that is subject to taxation. Intuition says that an increase in the size of
a concrete tax base leads to a higher reliance on it. In other words, the tax bases
dene the extraction possibilities of governments and inuence the instruments
they may use in order to raise taxes.
This is especially true for oil and primary commodity exporting countries.
Almost no country uses severance taxes (taxes on goods and services) to get
revenues from oil (Kenny and Winer, 2001); this would, in general, imply a
privatization of its extraction and commerce. Indeed, according to the WDI 11
11World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002).
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data, taxes on goods and services as a percentage of the GDP represented only
1.4% in oil exporting countries, and 4.92% in non-exporting ones. A similar
pattern applies to many primary commodity exporting countries. In order to
maximize revenue, dictatorships have opted for nationalizing these sectors, so
revenues are raised through the huge prots of these public enterprises12 . As
a result, non-tax revenues and taxes on international trade are expected to be
higher in these economies, while taxes on income and prots lower. This is in
fact the logic of the so-called Rentier States (Yates, 1996; Karl, 1997), which
some authors argue it could be also applied to states enjoying large foreign
aid receipts13 . For instance, along the years, Jordan Hashemite dynasty has
received funds from either the British Administration, Arab oil producers or
the United States. From 1973 to 1988, aid averaged 43 percent of the Jordan
public budget (Moore, 2004). In Zambia, aid was equivalent to 32.7 percent of
GNP by 1993 (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997).
Accordingly, an economy largely based on trade would rely more on inter-
national trade taxes, and, arguably, less on other sources of revenue. Trade
is generally measured by the sum of imports plus exports as a percentage of
the GDP and the existing empirical evidence is contradictory (Riezman and
Slemrod, 1987; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993).
Regarding the social structure, a high proportion of dependent people may
undermine the capacity of levy taxes on incomes due to the diminution of the
labor income tax base. On the contrary, the percentage of population living in
urban areas is predicted to have the opposite e¤ect since it proxies the size of
12Seventy-ve percent of the total oil production in the World, and 90% of the reserves are
in the hands of state-owned enterprises (Morrison, 2005).
13See Therkildsen (2002) for a discussion.
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potential industrial and services workers.
5.3.2 Enforcement and Collection Costs
Collecting taxes involves administrative costs. Governments with limited ad-
ministrative reach raise resources from sectors easy to tax. One major factor
which prevents an increase in the number of taxed commodities is the admin-
istrative cost of taxation (Yitzhaki, 1979: 475). Lieberman (2002) o¤ers a
general classication in terms of state capacity and monitoring requirements
involved by each tax revenue streams and the potential free-rider problems en-
tailed. According to him, those involving more collection costs are the taxes
on income, prots and capital gains, and on property. At a medium level of
di¢ culty we nd the taxes on consumption and social security contributions.
Finally, the revenue stream involving the lowest level of administration capacity
would be the international trade taxes.
Accordingly, the cost of supervising incomes, prots, properties, and the ex-
change and production of goods and services should be signicantly lower in
more densely populated areas and in those with higher levels of urbanization.
Conversely, revenues from foreign trade are cheaper and simpler to collect: Taxes
on exports and imports can be raised at few points of entry and exit of products,
requiring, thus, a reduced administrative apparatus. Besides, in this case, elab-
orate accounting and supervision is not strictly necessary and evasion is rather
complex (Kubota, 2005).
On the other hand, as Kenny and Winer point out, some taxes, such as the
income tax and goods and services taxes, require widespread literacy; obviously,
tax forms cannot be lled unless the taxpayer can read (2001: 31). This
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capacity is more di¢ cult to be found in sparse agriculturally based societies.
5.3.3 Substitution E¤ects
Tax revenues reect an economic and political equilibrium. Accordingly, the
choice of the extraction instruments responds to collection costs and politi-
cal feasibility (in terms of cooperation, opposition and tax evasion). These
political-economic conditions and determinants of the tax mix inform us about
the presence of substitution e¤ects. Countries relying on a particular tax in-
strument due to political-economic constraints will, consequently, tend to rely
less on other sources of revenue.
The substitution logic leads governments to focus their tax e¤orts on the
relatively bigger and accessible tax bases of their countries. This is the logic
the literature argues it exists in most of oil producing countries. Countries in
which oil is exported do not depend on income taxes. Similarly, countries with
a larger percentage of trade to the GDP will rely more on taxes on international
trade, and less on other bases.
Accordingly, the positive e¤ect of one variable capturing the size and col-
lection costs of a given tax base may turn into a negative e¤ect on other types
of revenue sources as alternative revenue sources are part of the same political-
economic equilibrium.
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5.4 Methodology: Estimating the E¤ect of In-
stitutions
As discussed in section 2 and formally shown in Chapter 4, institutions in dicta-
torships are created in order to perform specic political and economic functions.
Therefore, they are not randomly distributed among dictatorship spells. Con-
sequently, in order to study their e¤ect if any- on any policy one must control
for the conditions (both observable and unobservable) under which they exist,
otherwise the estimated coe¢ cients would su¤er from selection bias. In other
words, we cannot simply add a variable for institutions in the right hand side of
a regression model as it is generally done. An example will help to clarify the
importance of controlling for selection: The equilibria of the model in Chapter
4 made clear that regime inclusiveness (i.e., institutionalization) is the result of
two sort of factors; some are observable, such as non-cooperative rents availabil-
ity () and the organizational strength of the other actors of the game (g; h; p,
specially the opposition), while others are unobservable, such as the dictators
own preferences (aD). Selection bias may be produced by observable factors.
As multi-party systems are more abundant in resource-poor countries, it might
well be that their greater reliance on taxes on incomes and prots is caused to
this fact, leaving no role to institutions. Therefore, we must correct for selection
on observables.
Furthermore, suppose that leaders of developing countries educated in west-
ern universities, convinced of the benets of democratic institutions, prefer more
institutionalized and pluralist regimes and, at the same time, are more prone
to ask citizens for economic cooperation in order to raise taxes. Unobserved
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variables would be a¤ecting in this case both the dependent variable as well as
our main independent variable, and, as a result, any estimation not controlling
for that fact would be biased as well.
All in all, our aim is to estimate a model of the following form
Y = X + I + " (5.1)
where I stands for institutions, X stands for a vector of observable vari-
ables, and Y is the dependent variable (revenue in this case); thus, potential
unobservable factors are captured by the error term, ". If any of these un-
observable factors also a¤ects the institutional design of the regime, I, that
is, if Cov(I; ") 6= 0, then the estimated coe¢ cients  would be biased due to
selectivity.
As a result, we need to model and study the causes of the causes as a rst step
or, in this concrete case, the conditions under which dictatorial institutions are
created and exist. To correct this potential selection bias, we follow Heckmans
(1979) two step method. Accordingly, in the rst place, institutions become
the dependent variable of a probit or logit model such as (suppressing time
subscripts):
Pr(Y = j) = Z+  (5.2)
where Z stands for a vector of observed determinants of institutions, while
 captures the unobserved factors, and j represents each institutional organiza-
tion14 . From this model and under some distributional assumptions15 , we get
14Say, j = 0 for non-institutionalized dictatorships, j = 1 for regimes with a single institu-
tion, and j = 2 for fully institutionalized regimes.
15Concretely, that " and  are jointly normally distributed.
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the inverse Mill ratios, which allows us to correct for the unobserved factors
and rule out the endogeneity problem. In the case of dictatorial institutions, we
have used a multinomial logit model and used Lees (1983) method to get the
inverse Mill ratios, j . The logic of the procedure is exactly the same though.
In the second stage, we turn back to policy and estimate for each sub-
sample of j (institutions) the following equation (suppressing again time and
space subscripts to simplify notation) augmented by the Mills ratios (j)
Yj = ^jXj + jj + j (5.3)
The resulting coe¢ cients j are now unbiased due to the inclusion of the Mills
ratios, so they can be used to calculate for the entire sample what the value of
Y would have been had those countries been under institutions j (generating
the corresponding counterfactuals), that is
Y^ = ^jX (5.4)
Finally, we can calculate the selection-corrected averages for each institu-
tional conguration for the whole sample, and the di¤erence between these
averages will inform us about the actual net e¤ect of institutions on policy
outcomes.
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5.5 Description of the Data and Results
5.5.1 The Endogeneity of Institutions under Dictatorship
As it has been already remarked, dictators use institutions to mobilize political
and economic support and co-opt the potential opposition. There are, then,
two main observable factors determining the existence or creation of institutions
under authoritarian rule, namely, the presence of natural resources and strength
of the opposition.
The presence of exportable resources makes economic cooperation become
irrelevant for dictators rents and revenue extraction through taxes. As defended
by the taxation leads to representationargument, if little revenues are levied
from taxes whose collection needs compliance, no representation will be o¤ered
in exchange (Ross, 2004). We include, thus, a dummy variable capturing the
presence of either oil or primary commodities in the country16 . As foreign aid
may be another good source of non-cooperative rents, we also incorporate the
variable aid per capitain our models.
Regarding the organizational strength of the other actors (basically the po-
tential opposition), we measure it using several variables. The increasing num-
ber of democratic systems in the world has added an extra source of pressure
for political liberalization over authoritarian rulers. Under these conditions,
many authoritarian rulers resort to provide the regime with some democratic
credentials, such as elections and multi-party systems, to pass as democracies.
Therefore, we include in the analysis the variable democracy share in the world
which is simply the percentage of democratic regimes (other than the regime
16See the Appendix for a description of the data used throughout this chapter.
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under consideration) in the world in a given year. Conversely, we introduce the
proportion of dictatorships within the same region. The propensity towards re-
pression of opposition present in a given country is measured, following Gandhi
and Przeworski (2006), by the sum of past transitions to authoritarianism. How-
ever, we also take into consideration the fact that if the regime has previously
been a democracy, the opposition may have a stronger a democratic culture
as well as a higher organizational capacity used to carry out a more e¤ective
political opposition. Consequently, we include a dummy variable coded 1 if the
previous regime was a democracy. Coordination problems within the opposi-
tion groups are more likely to arise when confrontation among distinct ethnic
groups may arise (Padró-i-Miquel, 2004), so to take into account this possibility
we incorporate the index of ethnic fractionalization in the model.
Military rulers are weaker vis-à-vis their elite members. At the same time,
the military constitutes an institution in itself based on hierarchy and discipline
which may inhibit the creation of extra political organizations may not be nec-
essary. This possibility is captured by a dummy variable coded 1 if the e¤ective
head is -or ever was- a member of the military by profession, 0 if civilian or
monarchy. Similarly, we constructed a dummy for civilian rulers. Furthermore,
the type of head of government might partially capture the preferences of rulers
for the degree of regime openness, aD, tending to be, those of civilian and mili-
tary rulers, more on the left than those of monarchs since they can not rely on
tradition and dynastic rights to stabilize their tenure (see the model Chapter
4). The potential erosion of leadership is captured by the number of years the
ruler has been in o¢ ce prior to that year.
We have also considered the possible e¤ect of other control variables that
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take into account the colonial history of countries. This has been done by
including a dummy variable coded 1 for every year in countries that had been
a British colony after 1919, 0 otherwise.
The dependent variable, institutions, is categorical and takes value 0 if
the dictatorship has no institutions, 1 if there exists one party (single-party
system), a legislature or both, and 2 if a multiparty system is allowed by the
dictator17 . This classication is consistent with other existing ones which focus
on some empirical consequence of institutions18 (Gandhi, 2004; Howard and
Roessler, 2006) and coherent with the new emerging theoretical interest on
competitive authoritarian regimes (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky and Way, 2002;
Ottaway, 2003). Table 5.1 shows the result of two alternative estimation logit
models, multinomial and ordered logit.
[Table 5.1]
In general, all the variables are highly signicant and with the expected
signs. The presence of exportable resources and foreign aid has a strong and
negative impact on the likelihood of creating or allowing institutions within the
regime (both types), especially multiple institutions. The e¤ect of ethnic frac-
tionalization is negative as well for both types of institutions; this conrms the
collective action view according to which the dictator thwarts rebellion taking
advantage of pre-existing di¤erences in the population.
The years in power have a positive impact too, probably institutions are used
17Multi-party systems always exist within a legislature.
18The Classication by Howard and Roessler (2006), follows a step by step procedure in
which regimes are divided according to whether they hold elections, if these are contested, and
if they are free. Regimes with no elections are called closed authoritarian; those with elections
are hegemonic authoritarian, and those with contested elections are named competitive
authoritarian. However, we prefer our formal institutional classication as the cellebration of
elections may be the result of contextual circumstances and regime legitimacy crisis.
154CHAPTER 5. THE SOURCES OF REVENUEOF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
to restore loyalty after progressive leadership erosion. Even the Shah turned to
the one-party system (with the Rastakhiz Party) in the last years of his rule
(1975) in a last attempt to handle the increasing discontent due to the worsening
of the economic conditions in Iran. The idea of imposing such a system was
raised in 1974 by a participant in the Queens Council, Gholamreza Afkhami,
a Ph.D. from a American university and professor of political science at the
National University of Iran (Amini, 2002).
Given that the monarchy is the reference category, both military as well
as civilian leaders are more prone to create institutions, especially the latter.
Monarchies, on the one hand, resort to more traditional forms of loyalty and
legitimacy and, on the other hand, most of them exist in oil exporting countries
in the Middle East. The nature of the previous regime has a di¤erent e¤ect
for each of the two institutional varieties (and is signicant in both cases).
The e¤ect on the likelihood of allowing a multi-party system having previously
been a democracy is positive (and signicant), which is fully consistent with
our predictions. On the contrary, a democratic past has a negative impact
on the existence of a one-party system or a regime with a legislature (in the
multinomial model). Having been a British colony in the past also diminishes
the probabilities of developing some kind of institution.
The international pressure exerted by democratic countries has a big and
positive e¤ect on the creation of institutions in authoritarian systems in order
to shield from the attention of a more hostile international context. As cited
earlier, the trend toward democracy has been accompanied by an even more
dramatic trend toward pseudodemocracy(Diamond, 2002: 27). Conversely, a
high number of autocracies within the same region hinders institutionalization.
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5.5.2 Authoritarian Institutions and Revenues: Some De-
scriptive Patterns
Let us now turn to the dependent variables and their observable patterns. The
data for the revenue categories are taken from theWorld Development Indicators
and cover the period 1970-2000. We study the ve main sources of public rev-
enue, namely: Non-tax revenue; taxes on income, prots and capital gains; taxes
on international trade; taxes on goods and services; social security taxes, and
other taxes19 . In the WDI dataset these variables are measured as a percent-
age of current revenue, so we have transformed them to get the corresponding
standardized percentages with respect to the GDP. Table 5.2 reproduces the
denitions as provided by the World Banks WDI.
[Table 5.2]
Figure 5.1 shows the averages, for the whole time period considered, of the
ve variables as a percentage of current revenue for each of the institutional
arrangements of all dictatorial regimes that existed and for which data was
available. As it clearly appears, there are systematic di¤erences between dicta-
torial regime types which are consistent with our theoretical predictions. Non-
institutionalized regimes get most of their revenue from both taxes on interna-
tional trade (25.3% of revenue) as well as non-tax revenue (28.2% of current
revenue), which are the sources of revenue that involve less monitoring and col-
lection costs. On the contrary, fully institutionalized dictatorships present a
more balanced tax mix, relying mostly on taxes on incomes, prots and capital
19Hence, we agree with Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) in considering essential for the full under-
standing of revenue policy, especially among developing countries, the inclusion of non-tax
revenues.
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gains -which represent 25.8% of their total revenues-, and on taxes on goods and
services which constitute 25.3% of their current revenue. Dictatorships with a
single institution appear as an intermediate model.
[Figure 5.1]
History provides us with bizarre examples. For instance, as mentioned above,
co¤ee exports represented the 60-80% of the revenue in Rwanda during the Hab-
yarimana regime. Oil revenues account for more than 90% of total revenue in
Kuwait in 1986-1991 under Sheikh Jabir Al Ahmad Al Jabir Al Sabah rule. In
1989, the government of Myanmar headed by Than Shwe began decentralizing
economic control and has since liberalized some portions of the economy. How-
ever, the lucrative industries of gems, oil and forestry remain in the hands of
the military government, and represent more than 50% of total state revenue.
In sum, the data reveal that the two main sources of revenue under dicta-
torship are either non-tax revenue or taxes on income, prots and capital gains.
In fact, both sources of state resources seem to act as substitutes to each other,
as the high and negative correlation,  =  0:395, between them shows. We
also nd a strong negative relationship ( =  0:435) between the percentage of
revenue coming from non-tax sources and the share levied from taxes on inter-
national trade. This correlation is even higher,  0:596, for non-institutionalized
authoritarian regimes, which depend much more heavily on these two extractive
instruments, as mentioned above.
This pattern seems to reect two alternative approaches of governments with
respect to the resources and products prevailing in the country. When the agri-
cultural and commodity-exporting sectors are the prevailing ones, dictatorships,
particularly those with no institutions, resort to taxes on international trade in
5.5. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND RESULTS 157
order to get revenues from this sector. Indeed, the correlation between the
share of agriculture as a percentage of the GDP and taxes on trade (as a per-
centage of current revenue) is 0:53 in non-institutionalized regimes20 , whereas
the correlation with non-tax revenues is  0:47.
5.5.3 The Control Variables: Tax Bases and Collection
Costs
As remarked in the theoretical sections, there are other factors that may be
a¤ecting the structure of revenues under any type of regime due to their inuence
on i) the size and availability of the potential tax bases, and on ii) how costly
to collect some types of taxes is. The variables used to capture these two
dimensions (in accordance with the existing literature on the topic) are the
following:
With regard to the size of the tax bases, the rst and more obvious variables
to be included are those measuring the presence of exportable resources such as
oil or primary commodities. Both variables are expected to exert a positive e¤ect
on non-tax revenue and taxes on trade respectively and, possibly, a negative
one on taxes on incomes and prots. Similarly, we include the variable aid per
capita to control for cases where its high amount permits the ruler to apply
lower rates to incomes and prots. In opposition, more developed and diversied
economies are able to rely more on tax revenues, specically on taxes on incomes
and prots. Thus we take into account the potential e¤ect of the log of GDP per
capita as a determinant of a countrys tax structure (Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999).
The degree of trade openness is captured by including the sum of exports
200:40 for the whole sample.
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and imports as a percentage of the GDP, and it is obviously expected to have
a positive e¤ect on the level of revenue levied from taxes on international trade
due to both its e¤ect on the size of the tax base as well as on the low collection
costs associated to commerce as remarked.
Other variables are related simultaneously to both tax base and collection
costs e¤ects: Population density, the percentage of the total population living
in urban areas, and the value added of the agricultural sector as a percentage
of the GDP. These three variables capture similar dimensions since all reect
the stage of development and the social structure of a given country. And just
a¤ecting the level of collection costs, we have added to the models the variable
surface, which gauges the area of the country in squared kilometers. We also
include a variable measuring the absolute size of the governments budget, that
is, current revenue as a percentage of the GDP, to control for scale e¤ects (Kenny
and Winer, 2001).
Other control variables included are: The age dependency ratio, to capture
the potential societal pressure for a bigger size of government, and the degree
of ethnic fractionalization to control for di¤erential treatment of groups within
society to reduce accountability.
5.5.4 The Selection-Corrected Models of Revenue
Let us rst summarize and remind what we expect to nd. Unless natural
resources or foreign aid abound, dictators rely on more costly sources of rev-
enue for which compliance and cooperation, mobilized through institutions, are
required. These, say, cooperative sources include principally taxes on income,
prots and capital gains, property taxes, payroll taxes, and taxes on goods and
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services. Back to the model in Chapter 4, the tests performed here will allow
us to either accept or reject the assumption that institutionalization involves
expected benets in terms of tax revenue, .
For the estimation of the models we have used two alternative methods as
shown in Table 5.3. However, the most reliable results are derived from the
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions models. Given that each component of the
revenue policy is part and result of a political-economic equilibrium in which
the government chooses the best strategy to maximize revenue, the variables are
simultaneously determined, so they are part of a system of equations21 . The
coe¢ cients have been estimated using panel data techniques applying panel
corrected standard errors too. The selection-corrected coe¢ cients for the SUR
models are reported in the appendix of this Chapter.
Table 5.3 summarizes both the observed and the selection-corrected aver-
ages of each source of revenue for each one of the di¤erently institutionalized
dictatorship types (standard deviations in parentheses). To make the data com-
parable, the dependent variables are now measured as a percentage of the GDP.
The observed results and di¤erences between sub-samples are entirely coherent
with our theoretical predictions.
[Table 5.3]
Note that the portrait one gets from analyzing the observed data does not
change that much once controlled for the conditions under which dictatorial
institutions exist. The order of the averages only changes for the taxes on
international trade and for the social security ones when one controls for selec-
tion. In fact, and especially for the case of taxes on international trade, it is
21Breusch-Pagan tests have been run to check for dependent equations.
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after controlling for selection that the results coherently conrm our theoretical
hypotheses.
The main results obtained from our analyses can be summarized as follows.
Dictators that ban all kind of political institutions basically rely on two sources
to get their revenues, to be precise, non-tax revenues and taxes on international
trade, that is, those entailing less costs and not needing compliance. On average,
non-institutionalized regimes collect from non-tax sources about the 8 percent
(as a percentage of the GDP) of their resources, whereas taxes on international
trade represent about the 6% of the GDP. Alternatively, the more institution-
alized a dictatorship is, the larger amount of the resources it can levy from a
more monetized economy by means of mobilizing cooperation, that is, the more
e¤ectively it can tax incomes, prots, goods and services and property. The
existence of  is conrmed.
The strategies for revenue collection are quite evident; non-institutionalized
regimes not only depend more on non-tax revenue and on taxes on interna-
tional trade than the other types of dictatorships do, but they also rely more
on these two sources of revenue than on any other. In contrast, more insti-
tutionalized regimes present a much more balanced reliance on the alternative
revenue streams at their disposal, diversifying revenue at a greater extent. Note
that the di¤erence in the averages of the four main types of taxes is lower than
2 percentage points for authoritarian regimes with either a single or multiple
institutions (see Table 5.3).
The next question to be addressed after conrming the existence of such sys-
tematic di¤erences between di¤erently institutionalized dictatorships is whether
these di¤erences are relevant at the statistical level. Table 5.4 reports the dif-
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ferences between the averages for each institutional arrangement and shows the
results of the corresponding t-tests. The sign of the di¤erence should be inter-
preted as follows: No inst. vs. single inst.means that the average of second
institutional setting is subtracted to the average of the rst, so a negative dif-
ference shows that the average of the second -single inst. in this example- is
bigger than that of the rst -"no inst."-. In general, the di¤erences are still sig-
nicant -in particular for the SUR models- after controlling for selection bias, so
we can conrm that institutions matterfor revenue policy, even under dicta-
torship, and that they e¤ectively mobilize economic cooperation o¤ering limited
accountability in exchange.
[Table 5.4]
To sum up, the degree of institutionalization of a dictatorial regime is, in-
dependently of the conditions (observable and unobservable) under it exists,
an important determinant of its revenue policy. The dependence on revenue
streams that do not require the cooperation or compliance of the citizens is
much greater for non-institutionalized regimes. Even after controlling for the
conditions under which these regimes exist, the di¤erences in the averages with
respect to more institutionalized regimes are still systematic and statistically
signicant. For non-institutionalized systems, this di¤erence is bigger than 3
percentage points with respect to regimes with a single institutions and about
2.7 with fully institutionalized ones in the case of non-tax revenue.
A similar gure is observed with regard to taxes on international trade. The
existence of  can be traced by looking at the -statistically signicant- higher
percentage of revenue from incomes and prots, goods and services and other
taxes that more institutionalized regimes are able to collect (as a percentage of
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GDP). The results are monotonic, that is, more institutionalization leads to a
higher percentage of tax revenues levied from bases that require compliance.
5.6 Conclusions
The model in Chapter 4 contains a set of assumptions and results that must be
carefully tested. One of the most important concerns the capacity of dictatorial
institutions to mobilize economic cooperation. This fact was captured by the
existence of some expected benets of institutionalization in terms of tax rev-
enues, , which were argued to be a decisive parameter driving the equilibria
of the game as independently of the overall security of the ruler, the need for
revenue could compel him and some elite sectors to incorporate the opposition
into a more broad regime institutional structure.
Revenue policy reects the dictatorsstrategies to levy resources and may
indicate how they relate with the society and how they approach other policy
choices. Unaccountable personalist rulers willing to maximize their own self-
enrichment will not either seek any cooperation from the society they govern in
order to extract resources. Consequently, unable or not compelled to ask for any
cooperation from the citizenry, these sort of rulers resort to other means rather
than costly taxation in order to get their revenues and discretionary rents.
When natural resources do not abound, and foreign aid is scarce, authori-
tarian regimes must seek the economic cooperation of some social sectors due to
the fact that these other tax bases at their disposal involve higher administra-
tive costs and more extended free-riding possibilities for taxpayers. In exchange
for compliance, these regimes o¤er limited political organization and represen-
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tation within authoritarian institutions. As a result, the more institutionalized
the regime is, the higher the percentage of revenue it should be able to collect
from taxes on incomes, prots and capital gains, taxes on goods and services,
taxes on property and payroll ones taxes.
What does all this translate into at the empirical level? Our logistic regres-
sions for institutions have made clear that they are endogenous. Dictatorial
institutions are the result of the need to mobilize cooperation to raise revenues
when resources and foreign aid are scarce. But they also respond to cooptation
motivations, so as the strength of the potential opposition augments so does the
level of openness of the regime.
On the other hand, our selection-corrected results make evident that revenue
policies of di¤erently institutionalized dictatorships vary according to strategic
and economic considerations. Specically, authoritarian institutions play a key
role in mobilizing support and allowing the revelation of preferences and in-
formation among citizens. Non-institutionalized regimes rely basically on two
sources of revenue: Taxes on international trade and non-tax revenue for which
no compliance is needed and which involve little administrative complexities.
On the other hand, in more institutionalized dictatorships the reliance on
the alternative revenue streams is much more balanced, collecting a similar
percentage (on average) from taxes on income, prots and capital gain, taxes on
goods and services, taxes on international trade and even non-tax revenues. The
higher the degree of institutionalization of the regime, the higher the percentage
of taxes it is able to collect from income, prots and gains, from goods and
services, and from property and payroll.
These ndings inform us about the logic of sensitivity under authoritarianism
164CHAPTER 5. THE SOURCES OF REVENUEOF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
and conrm the general claim no taxation without representation.
Chapter 6
The Empirics of the
Political Accountability
Function
6.1 Introduction
We now move on to the empirical research of the alternative mechanisms of
accountability -the technologies for throwing leaders out, as Przeworski (2003)
names them- and the two components of the political accountability function
-security and sensitivity-, and to put under scrutiny the rest of the theoretical
propositions developed in Chapter 4. We will proceed as follows:
First, we will explore the variables determining the strength and organiza-
tional capacity of the elite, the military and the opposition and, therefore, the
rulerslevels of security, following the theoretical statements made throughout
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the Chapter 4. Secondly, we turn to sensitivity and explore whether it is true
that non-cooperative rents make rulers less accountable with regard to rent-
extraction and taxation as the scal theories of governance propose. Finally, we
will turn our attention to formal institutions and put under empirical scrutiny
our hypotheses concerning institutions and their associated levels of security
and sensitivity.
All in all, the aim of this Chapter is then to confront the theory and the
assumptions involved in it with the objective of understanding the determinants
of political accountability under dictatorial regimes at empirical two levels. On
the one hand, we concentrate on rulers as the units of analysis to study whether
the factors proposed in Chapter 4 help to explain their probability of survival.
Secondly, we focus on institutions and analyze, keeping in mind that they are
endogenous, how they relate to the two dimensions of political accountability in
order to understand the mechanisms whereby they may a¤ect growth.
In the previous Chapter we have already demonstrated that dictatorial in-
stitutions help to shape the scal policy of regimes by increasing the share of
revenues levied from, especially, incomes, prots, and goods and services. At
the theoretical level this implies that given that institutions succeed in mobilize
economic cooperation, they have to grant a higher degree of leverage to the
opposition groups as a consequence of the trade-o¤ between taxation and rep-
resentation. Therefore, institutions can be well expected to increase the level of
dictatorspolitical accountability with regard to taxation.
The Chapter is then organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical
models that explain the determinants of security under dictatorship by analyzing
the mechanisms of accountability. Section 2 also presents the analyses on the
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determinants of the levels of sensitivity by studying the e¤ects of tax increases
in resource-rich and resource-poor economies and in those which receive large
amounts of foreign aid. We also run general models of dictatorssurvival to test
the overall e¤ect of the various variables. In Section 3, we turn to dictatorial
institutions and seek to classify them according to their estimated levels of
security and sensitivity using alternative measures for both dimensions. Section
4 summarizes the main results.
6.2 On the Determinants of Security and Sensi-
tivity
6.2.1 Mechanisms of Accountability, Group Strength and
Security
Not all dictators tenures end in the same way1 . As contended in Chapter
4, the threats to dictatorspower might come from either their own elite, the
military or from opposition groups. This fact has been generally neglected by
the literature on leadership duration (Bienen and Van de Walle, 1991, 1992).
Elite members and the armed forces resort to plots, pressures to resign, coups
and assassination in order to take over power. The way by which the latter
may trigger the ruler demise is a massive popular action (strikes, revolutions,
riots, guerrilla war, etc.). Revolutionary movements -to use a general term-
should be actually broad coalitions if they are to be powerful and e¤ective.
Lower classes ally with the middle and even the upper class for the sake of a
1When using the term dictator I am referring to both those that ruled individually as
well as those regimes characterized by collective rule such as National Salvation Councils,
Military Juntas, etc.
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common goal (Goodwin, 2001). In Goodwins words, these movements use to
be (1) multiclass movements that were unied by (2) widespread anger against
state authorities (. . . )(1994: 582). As coordination is essentially di¢ cult, the
possibility of a popular revolution is extremely remote(Brough and Kimenyi,
1986: 40).
Accordingly, there are several actors involved in the leadership change process
resorting to alternative accountability mechanisms and not all of them are in-
uenced by the same considerations and, hence, variables (Gallego, 1996, 1998).
The relative strength of each of these actors was captured in the model by the
probabilities h, p and g which reect each groups strength; where g is the proba-
bility that the elite successfully ousts the dictator, and p and h are the structural
probabilities of the ouster being carried out by the opposition forces. Conse-
quently, we argued that security will be a function of the variables determining
the probabilities outlined above
A = A(g; p; h)
where
@A
@g
;
@A
@(p; h)
< 0
where, to repeat, A is the security parameter of the political accountability
function as dened in Chapter 3. So group strength is thought to undermine
leaders overall stability.
Dependent and Independent Variables
To test our hypotheses from the model regarding security levels, we must rst
test the assumptions involved in them. To be able to so and in order to dis-
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tinguish those distinct probabilities and describe their explanatory factors, we
have constructed a new variable named WAYOUT 2 which identies and codes
which actor has been the main one involved in the leadership demise: The power
elite, the military, the peopleor some foreign country3 . If each group has its
own preferences and organizational capacities, then, di¤erent variables will be
signicant in reducing the probabilities of elite, military and popular seizures.
Table 6.1 reports the frequencies of the variable WAYOUT. Recall that one
of our main assumptions in the theoretical model in Chapter 4 was that the
probability of being toppled or replaced by the elite is, in general, much higher
than that of being overthrown by a revolutionary movement, that is, g  p; h.
Indeed, as it can be seen, most of ruler changes, 60.05 percent (242), are pro-
moted or simply occur within the regime elite. These changes can be violent or
relatively peaceful depending on whether the level of institutionalization of the
regime is high or some kind of explicit or implicit rule regulates the succession
process. Actually, 56 out of the 242 leader changes (23.14%) that took place
within the elite were explicitly violent or because of some open factional conict
within the coalition.
[Table 6.1]
The second most common way to get rid of autocrats is a purely military
coup. 27.54 percent (111) of ruler changes were carried out by the armed forces,
2See Appendix for more details on the construction of the variable.
3 It has been given, though, priority to domestic actors. So where there has been collab-
oration between domestic and foreign actors I have coded as if only the domestic actor was
involved. Consequently, in the dataset there are just three leaders toppled almost purely by
foreign actors; in these cases the key role was played by the external forces: Idi Amin (Uganda),
Pol Pot (Democratic Kampuchea, by then) and Manuel Antonio Noriega (Panama). Amin
was toppled by Tanzanian troops in 1979; Pol Pot was ousted after a Vietnamese invasion,
and Noriega by a US invasion (called Operation Just Cause).
Leaders that died in power are not generally coded unless succession was already established.
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which can be considered, in some way, to be part of the power coalition. Instead,
revolutions, guerrilla warfare, mass movements and riots that lead to the collapse
of states, regimes or governments are much less frequent. Only 47 out of 403
(11.66%) of the changes in leadership were carried out by the citizen opposition,
either through violent or non violent action. It is worth mentioning too that
some military interventions were actually triggered by the previous existence of
di¤erent kinds of social unrest, but they have been coded as coups since the
actor that nally ousted the ruler were the armed forces.
Concerning the independent variables, they intend to capture the factors
specied at the theoretical level in Chapter 4. So, for the elite we argued that
a non-institutionalized regime will depend on the availability of rents (from
exportable economic sectors such as oil and commodities) to buy o¤ support by
means of the delivery of private goods. Consequently, we introduce a variable
capturing whether the country is resource rich or not. Resource rich country
is a dummy variable coded 1 if the average ratio of oil or primary-commodity
exports to total exports exceeds 50%, 0 otherwise.
If rents are scarce, the ruler delivers benets and policy concessions through
a one-party system or a legislature, or mobilizes cooperation through a multi-
party system to increase tax revenue. To measure institutionalization we use
two dummy variables: Single institution, coded 1 if either a single-party, a
legislature or both exist, and multiple institutions, coded 1 if a legislature
with multiple parties exists.
Furthermore, we outlined the possibility of elite members being more threat-
ening if the ruler is either military or civilian. Here we use dummy variables
as well: First, military, coded 1 if the e¤ective head is or ever was a member
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of the military by profession, 0 if civilian or monarchy; and, second, civilian,
coded 1 if the e¤ective head is civilian. Monarchis the omitted category. The
potential legitimacy gained by leading the ght for independence of the country
is captured by a dummy, colony before, which takes value 1 if the country was
previously a colony, 0 otherwise.
With regard to citizen opposition, as long as resources are available to the
regime, cooperation is unnecessary so limited political autonomy will not be
granted, and no representation o¤ered either. Organizational capacity may be
enhanced by the support from foreign democracies and international organiza-
tions, while it could be hampered by the presence of authoritarian neighbors
in the region, as suggested in Chapter 4. To capture the potential inuence
of the international context we include two variables: The yearly proportion of
democracies in the world and the proportion of dictatorships within the same
region. Apart from these external factors, organizational strength may be result
of the regime history in the sense that if the previous regime was democratic,
although afterwards banned and repressed by the new regime, pre-existing or-
ganizations can use their social capital and mobilizational capacity to oppose
the new authoritarian ruler. Consequently, we use a dummy variable coded 1
if the previous regime was a democracy, 0 otherwise. Similarly, if in exchange
of economic cooperation (), the dictator has granted limited representation,
the mobilizational capacity of opposition groups augments, so the dummy for
multiple institutionshould be positive for the case of exits triggered by citizen
collective movements. Moreover, we include the index of ethnic fractionalization
in order to nd out whether diversity hinders coordination between groups. For-
eign aid per capita is used to capture the dictators capacity to buy o¤ support
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through the delivery of public goods. Finally, we also control for the number of
past transitions to authoritarianism to gauge regime repressiveness.
It is worth mentioning that in survival models duration dependency, h(t),
may become a problem to be handled. The most general way to do so is by the
inclusion of temporal dummy variables for the j time points (Han and Haus-
man, 1990; Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998). This approach, although general,
may reduce dramatically the number of degrees of freedom and generate a big
number of coe¢ cients di¢ cult to interpret. The second way to deal with dura-
tion dependency is through the transformation of the time values what can lead
to a ner characterization of the underlying process. A common transformation
at this respect is to use the logarithm of the trend or di¤erent polynomials such
as cubic transformations- (Box-Ste¤ensmeier and Jones, 2004).
Results. Multinomial Logit
Table 6.2 shows the results of the multinomial models with and without the
institutional dummies4 . The necessity to di¤erentiate exit modes is, given the
results, out of any doubt. Some variables are important in decreasing or increas-
ing the hazard of exit depending on what kind of actor is principally involved in
the change of ruler, whereas others have di¤erent signs depending on the type
of actor considered.
[Table 6.2]
4The estimates for the foreign intervention mode of exit in the multivariate models have
been omitted due to their lack of relevance. The conditions and calculations triggering the
intervention of foreign countries are out of the scope of this study and the variables we are
interested in (see, for instance, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995); besides, there are
only three genuine cases in our dataset.
6.2. ON THE DETERMINANTS OF SECURITY AND SENSITIVITY 173
Overall, the results conrm our main hypotheses. To reduce the hazard of
being threaten by the members of the elite or power coalition having deliverable
resources is an important factor as column 1 shows. To keep the elitesloyalty
private goods must be delivered. Resources coming from abroad in the form of
aid are also helpful although not signicant. Ethnic fractionalization increases
the hazard of overthrown in the elite case possibly because it denes clear lines
along which alliances can be dened creating alternative bases of support5 . Cu-
riously, two variables predicted to have an e¤ect on revolutionary movements
led by the opposition play a role here as well. First, the proportion of democ-
racies in the world seems to weaken dictators at a general level by increasing
the political costs of holding power (Marinov, 2005), so the relative strength of
the elite augments; whereas more dictatorships in the region may improve the
relative capacity of the incumbent ruler. As we also expected, elite members
may more e¤ectively threaten civilian as well as military rulers (the two dummy
variables are positive and highly signicant) than monarchs do. Military inter-
vention is more likely if the ruler is either civilian or military too. In contrast,
military coups are less likely in regimes surrounded by other dictatorships in the
region. On the other hand, note that the e¤ect of resource abundance is positive
although not signicant; what is consistent with those studies that pointed out
external dependence as a potential cause of coups. Being a new country after
colonization reduces the likelihood of a coup by both the elite and the military
(see model 2) as predicted.
5Londregan, Bienen and Van de Walle (1995) reject the hypothesis that states that if the
leader pertains to the largest ethnic group, the lower the probability of losing power is. Instead,
they show that for leaders from smallest ethnic groups, the probability of unconstitutional
replacement is not a¤ected by ethnicity, while it actually is for leaders of larger ethnic groups.
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Turning to the society drivenruler change, the results conrm again the
theoretical predictions about the organizational capacities of groups. Note
that in this case the e¤ect of ethnic fractionalization is negative -although not
signicant- since it may hinder collective action establishing dividing lines on
peoples identications that could be manipulated by a dictator willing to apply
a divide and rule strategy (see Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier, 2004, and,
especially, Padró-i-Miquel, 2004). On the other hand, the inherited organiza-
tional structures from the previous democratic regime increase the mobilization
capacity of the opposition. Concerning the international factors, as hypothe-
sized, a higher proportion of democracies in the world fosters opposition against
dictatorship, while, again, the regional share of authoritarian systems hinders
it. Non-cooperative rents, such as resources and aid, renders o¤ering political
autonomy to the opposition unnecessary for levying revenues, so the dictators
turns to repression rather than to mobilize cooperation.
In the model in column 3 we have added the dummy variables for institutions.
Institutionalization help to keep elitesloyalty, as shown in the model in Chapter
4, since it helps to mobilize economic cooperation and increase expected revenue
( in the model). Besides, a single party or a legislature provide an arena for
political conciliation within the ruling elite that represents more than simply
patronage distribution. The party o¤ers a long-term system for members to
resolve di¤erences and advance in inuence what actually creates cohesion and
dependence on the current leader/system (Geddes, 1999a, 1999b; Brownlee,
2004a). This is basically why a system of limited institutionalization such as a
single party-rule or a legislature is closer to the elite preferences of no regime
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openness, so its e¤ect is greater6 .
The results also conrm another of our main assumptions in the model,
namely, that regime openness involves a greater level of accountability and
mobilizational capacity of the opposition with the coe¢ cient for multi-party
systembeing signicant at the 0:05 level. As the table reports, the greater the
level of institutionalization, the higher the probability of an outbreak from the
citizen opposition. The taxation to representation arguments seems to apply. If
cooperation brings more e¢ ciency in states tax collection (as demonstrated in
Chapter 5), a higher degree of autonomy has to be granted to citizens within
regime institutions.
6.2.2 Non-cooperative Rents and Sensitivity
The second contention from the model concerned sensitivity and the presence
of non-cooperative rents in the country. Specically, it was argued that as long
as cooperation is not needed no accountability will be o¤ered in exchange to
the opposition. In resource-rich countries most of revenues are levied either
from non-tax revenue, taxes on international trade or foreign aid, so using the
parameters employed in the model we can state that
B = B()
where
@B
@
> 0
6 In terms of our model, given that elite preferences are aE = 1, that is, no institutional-
ization, it can be assumed that
 jaj=1   1j <  jaj=2   1j
where j = 1 represents a regime with a single institution, and j = 2 a multi-party system.
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where, recall from the model in Chapter 4,  stands for the expected benets
of mobilizing economic cooperation; hence, as aid and resource exports abound
 ! 0, so, equally, B  ! 0. And, recall from model in Chapter 3, B is the
sensitivity parameter of the political accountability function.
The argument, although not new, has never been directly tested. There is
some evidence linking the need to raise tax revenue to democratization (Ross,
2004) and some relating non-tax revenue availability to greater authoritarian
stability (Morrison, 2005), but none explicitly testing whether resource abun-
dance reduces the sensitivity of governments -authoritarian in this case- to in-
creases in taxes and extraction.
Back to Table 6.2, some evidence supporting our proposition can already be
found. In column 5, the two variables capturing the presence of non-cooperative
rents, foreign aid per capita and the exportable resources dummy, both signi-
cantly reduce the likelihood of a takeover by the opposition forces. Note, besides,
that the e¤ect is signicant but not as strong as it was predicted in Chapter 3
(see Figure 3.3).
To provide our argument with a more meaningful and specic test we have
run survival models for dictators (using logistic regression) dividing the sample
according to the variable resource-rich countryand foreign aid per capitaand
introducing a variable which captures the increases in taxes on incomes, prots
and capital gains. The marginal e¤ect of this variable will serve us to get a
rough measure of sensitivity. The dependent variable is now HEADOUT, which
takes value 1 the year a ruler is overthrown or resigns regardless of the actors
involved, and 0 otherwise. The rest of the variables follow the specication of
Table 6.2 in the previous section.
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Nonetheless, the actual level of sensitivity can not be directly deduced from
the coe¢ cient obtained from the logistic models. Recall that under the lin-
ear specication of the political accountability function (see Chapter 2), the
sensitivity parameter B is in fact the slope of the probability function, that is,
@p()
@
=
@(A B)
@
=  B
In the logit model, the coe¢ cients  gauge the marginal e¤ect of the variables
on the log of the odds, not on the probability of the event, so for the kth
independent variable x, say, the increase in taxes, we actually have that
@ Pr(y = 1)
@xk
6= k
given that in logit models the marginal e¤ect, which we take in this case as
proxy for the level of sensitivity, is actually
@ Pr(y = 1)
@xk
=
@F (x0)
@xk
= f(x0)k = P (1  P )k
The results for the alternative sub-samples are reported in Table 6.3 and
show the predicted patterns (see the rows in bold). Both the coe¢ cients and
marginal e¤ects of an increase in taxes on incomes monotonically increase as the
we set more strict constraints on the availability of non-cooperative rents, and
so does their level of statistical signicance7 . Therefore, sensitivity levels grow
as resources shrink or, the other way round, as the need for cooperation becomes
more imperative. The e¤ect of an increase on income taxes becomes signicant
7The pattern is similar for taxes on goods and services.
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at the 0.10 level as an explanatory factor for dictatorssurvival when only those
countries with no exportable resources or commodities are considered, while the
marginal e¤ect is more than seven times bigger than that of rent-rich counties.
In addition, when foreign aid is scarce -see the third column- the estimated
marginal e¤ect of tax increases almost doubles and the variable is signicant at
the 0.05 level.
[Table 6.3]
The actual size of the e¤ect can be better observed in Figure 6.1, elaborated
from the estimates in Table 6.3. The x-axis measures the average tax increase
for each sub-sample in Table 6.3, whereas the y-axis represents the estimated
dictatorsprobability of survival (the rest of the variables are kept constant at
their means). The di¤erences in sensitivity levels are made evident by the sharp
decreases in the probability of keeping power as taxes raise for rulers whose
access to non-cooperative rents (resources and foreign aid) becomes more and
more restricted, specially for those with resource-poor economies and foreign
aid under sample average.
[Figure 6.1]
6.2.3 A General Specication. DictatorsSurvival
Once identied the variables that shape the two dimensions of political ac-
countability at the leadership level, it is now time to run general and strictly
parsimonious models of survival. Two aspects must be kept in mind: First,
according to Figure 3.2 (in Chapter 3), the variables a¤ecting positively (nega-
tively) security are expected to exert a positive (negative) and signicant e¤ect
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on the general probability of dictatorssurvival. On the contrary, according to
Figure 3.3, the e¤ect of the variables shaping the sensitivity parameter, albeit
negative, is predicted to be small and, most probably, not signicant, thereby
conrming their correct identication. The reason for this is simple. As these
variables determine the extent to which extraction or taxes are going to make
the survival probability change, and as taxes are chosen by the ruler, so he does
it knowing how sensitive he is and, therefore, rendering this parameter almost
ine¤ective. In other words, as the e¤ect of sensitivity on the accountability
function depends on the rate of extraction chosen, the ruler manipulates it in
order to control the amount of risk he is willing to take.
The dependent variable is HEADOUT again. Table 6.4 reports the re-
sults using alternative estimators. Although we can think of leadership change
processes as continuous in nature, the data used are discrete so models for binary
dependent variables can be used as well in estimating the coe¢ cients. Discrete-
time data with a binary dependent variable conveys the same information as
the duration time (Box-Ste¤ensmeier and Jones, 2004). For this reason, and to
check the robustness of the results, both discrete-time as well as continuous-time
models have been employed. In the case of discrete-time models, logistic as well
as complementary log-logistic regressions have been run. As the complementary
log-log function is asymmetric, in datasets with few ones(that is, failures) re-
sults could di¤er between them. Regarding continuous-time parametric models,
the tests have been performed using theWeibull function. In this kind of model
the baseline hazard can be monotonically decreasing, monotonically increasing
or even at with respect to time.
[Table 6.4]
180CHAPTER 6. THE EMPIRICS OF THE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION
The two variables identied above as determining the levels of sensitivity,
resource availability and aid, are negative but not signicant regardless of the
estimation method. Only in the third specication, the resourcesdummy turns
out to be only slightly signicant at the 0.1 level. In contrast, the rest of the vari-
ables, except ethnic fractionalization8 , have statistically signicant and stronger
e¤ects on the probability of a demise regardless of the estimation method. Not
being monarch makes the rulers less secure. So does having had a recent de-
mocratic past and a high proportion of democracies in the world. Conversely,
if the previous regime was a colony or the number of authoritarian neighbors is
high enough, the overall level of security augments.
Figure 6.2 shows the tted survival and the cumulative hazard functions
as estimated by the Weibull function in the continuous-time model in column
1. The graph, using average values of the covariates, portrays a negative non-
constant e¤ect of time (duration) on the survival function, which is the proba-
bility of survival up to time t. The function is monotone decreasing9 .
[Figure 6.2]
6.3 Political Accountability and Formal Institu-
tions
After having demonstrated that dictatorial institutions are endogenous and hav-
ing, besides, explored the exogenous determinants of security, the question that
remains to be answered is: Do institutions matter for security and sensitivity? If
8Recall from Table 6.2 that this variable has contradicting e¤ects. On the one hand, it
increases elite intervention and, on the other hand, hampers popular mobilization.
9The hazard function is then monotone increasing.
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institutions are basically the result of the need for economic cooperation (which
is a function of the presence of resources) and the mobilization strength of the
potential opposition, do they actually have any e¤ect? or, rather, do their dif-
ferences stem from the dissimilar underlying conditions under which they exist
(which have already shown to exert an important e¤ect of both dimensions)?
If it is true that single institutions such as one-party systems or legislatures
serve, as argued, to channel elite demands, to coopt the potential opposition, to
distribute perks and privileges and to provide an stable arena for negotiation
and conict resolution, then one can expect to nd a positive e¤ect of this type
of dictatorship on security and sensitivity levels, regardless of the conditions
that explain its existence.
Similarly, multi-party systems can have an e¤ect on accountability regard-
less of the variables that determine their creation such as opposition strength.
Permitting a higher level of autonomy as well as the creation of opposition
parties may increase opposition groupsmobilization resources as a result of
abandoning clandestineness and thereby furthering their control capacity over
governmental policy decisions. Furthermore, recall that, as detailed in Chap-
ter 5, this kind of mixed system was found to be much less likely to exist in
countries where resources, primary commodities or foreign aid abound. Given
that these two variables have been shown to hinder accountability to taxation,
multi-party systems can be expected to be more sensitive than the rest.
In Chapter 5 we have already seen how institutions have an important im-
pact on revenue policy. Concretely, it was shown institutionalization e¤ectively
serves to mobilize taxpayers compliance so taxes on incomes, prots, goods and
services, and property represent a bigger share of total revenue in institution-
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alized regimes. As it is certain, it should be also true that institutions allow
the opposition to better control rulers decisions concerning certain policy areas
such as taxation if their compliance is to be e¤ectively obtained. Consequently,
sensitivity can be expected to increase with institutionalization.
6.3.1 An Indirect Measure of Security: Institutions, Demon-
strations and Riots
One way to situate the institutional congurations under dictatorship in a map
dening their respective levels of security is to look at their levels of unrest.
Dictators face the so-called Dictators dilemma (Wintrobe, 1998), which refers
to the dictatorslack of information about his real level of support among the
population, as no regular and institutionalized mean exists to measure it (such
as elections), and dissent remains hidden. As a result, dictators must resort to
what can actually be observed in the streets, namely, protest.
If dictators create judgments about their level of stability by just evaluat-
ing the observable levels of protests as a proxy for social discontent, we can
approximate their overall stability by estimating selection-corrected models to
ascertain under what type of institutions there are more subversive activities,
say, riots and anti-regime demonstrations.
The methodology applied to correct for selection bias is the same we used
when we estimated the models of revenue in Chapter 5. With this purpose
we rst estimate both Poisson as well as cross-sectional time-series models -
using panel corrected standard errors- in which we include the Mills ratios
previously calculated. The two dependent variables are the number of riots and
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demonstrations as dened in the Banksdataset10 which cover the 1946-1996
period for most of the worlds countries (see the codebook in the Appendix). The
selected independent variables are aimed at capturing the di¤erent explanatory
factors that theories about dissent and protest in the context of authoritarian
regimes proposed.
Gupta, Singh and Sprague (1993) argue that repression deters protest activ-
ities at low and high levels in non-democracies where, therefore, the relationship
can be represented by an inverted U-curve. We proxy repression by the number
of purges, that is, following Banks dataset denition, any systematic elimina-
tion by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime
or the opposition. To test the non-linear relationship, the squared number of
purges will be included too. We also incorporate the number of any politically
motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government o¢ cial or politi-
cian to test whether the instability and vulnerability atmosphere that this may
generate furthers the number of visible protest activities11 .
To control for cross-country di¤usion of dissent, the average number of
demonstrations and riots per year in each region is incorporated into the model
(Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). In Oliver and Myerswords, social move-
ments can be understood as interrelated sets of di¤usion processes(1998: 2),
so one should control for potential spillover e¤ects.
Economic development conveys a lot of structural and social changes that
may foster conict. It increases the level of social complexity, involves more
10Riots: Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of
physical force.
Demonstrations: Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary
purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding
demonstrations of a distinctly anti foreign nature.
11Both variables are taken from Banks (1996) too.
184CHAPTER 6. THE EMPIRICS OF THE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION
industrialization and urbanization and, hence, more distributional conicts. So
we include the real of GDP per capita and the squared income per capita.
The hypothesis is that there is some threshold from which the cost of turmoil
becomes so high that not protesting turns out to be the best strategy since
too much is at stake in turning against the regime. We expect an inverted U-
curve relationship between GDP per capita and protest. We also consider the
percentage of urban population in order to control for the resource mobilization
approaches12 . Furthermore, real government share as a percentage of GDP in
1985 international prices is used as a proxy for the level of redistribution existing
in the country.
To control for policy polarization and ethnic dominance we use the ethnic
composition -the largest ethnic groups percentage of the population- of the so-
ciety as a proxy. Regarding the nature of the previous regime, once democracy is
overthrown, most of that organizations and groups will still try to carry out their
activities, albeit clandestinely. Some democratic culture is likely to prevail and
we guess it is not easy to erase. We capture the nature of the previous regimes
by adding a dummy variable coded 1 if the country had been a democracy at
any point prior to its entry into the sample, 0 otherwise. Finally, the dummies
oil-exporting country and primary commodity-exporting country have also
been added to the right-hand side of the equation to capture the presence of
natural resources. Rents diverted from non-tax revenues may act as a conict
smoother (Smith, 2004b).
Table 6.5 reports both the observed and selection-corrected average number
12Urbanization, in conjunction with the growth of industrial capitalism and mass media
and with the building of modern states, in general, has contributed to a shift from reac-
tive, community based actions to proactive actions by large-scale special purpose association
(Auvinen, 1997: 180).
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of demonstrations and riots under authoritarian regimes. There appears to be a
high level of coherence in the order of the observed and the selection-corrected
averages. The most secure regimes are those with either a single institution or
no institution at all, whereas multi-party dictatorships present the highest levels
of organized street-level protest.
[Table 6.5]
The averages conrm the prediction raised in Chapter 4, which pointed out
that a curvilinear relationship between institutionalization and security should
exist. Table 6.6 shows the results of the t-tests that check the statistical signif-
icance of the net e¤ect of institutions once controlling for the conditions under
which the exist. The di¤erences are all statistically signicant at the maximum
level, so we can conclude that institutions do have, certainly, an e¤ect.
[Table 6.6]
In sum, if we take demonstrations and riots as a proxy for authoritarian
rulers perceived security, we nd that dictatorships with a single institution
(one party, a legislature or both) are those with a signicant higher level of
security, closely followed by those regimes with no institutions. The levels of
insecurity are much higher under multi-party regimes whatever the indicator and
estimation we consider. This is consistent with Gates et al.s (2006) ndings
on institutions duration. Particularly, they show that dictatorships with high
levels of political participation are the most unstable kind of political system.
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6.3.2 Security and Dictatorial Institutions. Alternative
Indicators
Security and regime institutionalization were predicted to follow a curvilinear
relationship in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.4). The selection-corrected averages on
protest reported above conrm it, whereas the results of the empirical model in
Table 6.2 already indicate us how the process operates. The expected benets
associated with increasing institutionalization induce the elites to be more will-
ing to accept regime openness in exchange. Moreover, albeit granted, a limited
level of institutionalization is the most preferred outcome to elite members in
order to keep a minimum power coalition. So in the second model in Table 6.2,
one can easily observe that when institutions are introduced in the analysis,
the e¤ect of the single institutiondummy is stronger than that of multiple
institutionsalthough, as shown in Chapter 5, cooperative-rent mobilization is
actually more e¤ective under the latter. On the other hand, as shown in the last
column of Table 6.2, the likelihood of a takeover led by the opposition groups
augments with institutionalization, particularly under multi-party systems for
which the coe¢ cient is signicant.
Furthermore, and to better conrm our hypotheses, we develop another mea-
sure of security using the model estimated for sensitivity displayed below (see
Table 6.8). We take the overall dictatorsprobability of being removed but set-
ting taxes at a specic value, in this case, zero. The logic behind taking this
specic probability is assuming that -back in our original model- the rate of
extraction is in fact zero, therefore the accountability function, in this case, is
just
(A B  0) = A
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and, thus, we get a general measure of security levels13 . The starting points
of the lines in Figure 6.2 and their order inform us about this measure in a
visual way. Note that the line of the predicted probability of survival under
regimes with a single institution begins at the highest level of all when taxes
are very low. It is closely followed by the security level of non-institutionalized
regimes. When we set the rate of tax increase at zero and hold the rest of
the variables constant14 , the order of security levels between regime types is
consistent with that we found using averaged levels of protest then. To repeat,
the most secure type of rule is still the single institution regime, followed by
the one with no institutions and, nally, the authoritarian governments with
multiple institutions. Besides, as predicted, fully institutionalized systems are
the most insecure of them all.
Table 6.7 summarizes the empirical information and measurements of secu-
rity levels discussed so far. All the indicators developed and discussed prove
the pattern we predicted in Chapter 4 (see, especially, Figure 4.4). Institution-
alization increases security when it is moderate (single institution), but when
it exceeds that point (multi-party system), security turns out to be even lower
than in regimes with no institutions.
[Table 6.7]
6.3.3 Sensitivity, Taxes and Institutions
Sensitivity is a matter of group inclusion and mobilization as far as institutions
are concerned. So as long as institutionalization involves broadening the scope of
13Given that we are estimating exit probabilities, lower probabilities indicate greater
security.
14These estimations have been done using the SPost commands. See Long and Freese (2003).
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demands that can be channeled within the decision-making process, sensitivity is
expected to increase. In Chapter 5 we demonstrated how economic cooperation
is successfully mobilized by dictatorial institutions, what is translated into a
higher percentage of revenue levied from taxes requiring compliance. However,
this cooperation comes at the price of more e¤ective control of policy decisions
a¤ecting taxes and revenue, as already remarked.
The results in Table 6.2 already o¤ered a avor of the underlying process.
In column 6, one can see that, e¤ectively, there is an increase in the chances
of an opposition ouster as the regime openness -as captured by the two institu-
tional dummy variables- augments, and that the threat of revolution decreases
if dictators dispose of natural resources and/or foreign aid as no cooperation is
required. To be more precise, we can compute the predicted probability of a
rebellion using model 2 in Table 6.2 for each of the institutional combinations
while holding the rest of the variables constant at their sample means, formally
Pr(y = 3jInstitutions = j;x = mean)
where y = 3 represents an opposition takeover and j 2 f0; 1; 2g stands for
each institutional combination. The estimation shows that, indeed, opposition
intervention is more likely to occur under fully-institutionalized dictatorships.
The probability is 0:0071. For regimes with a single institution, the probability
decreases to 0:0040; and, nally, for regimes with no institutions it is just 0:0017.
Therefore, if it is true that institutionalization fosters sensitivity -as it seems
to be-, we can expect to nd a stronger e¤ect of performance variables on
dictatorssurvival as the degree of institutionalization augments. We do so by
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dividing the whole sample into three sub-samples for each type of institution. We
then run logistic models including a variable gauging taxation and controlling
for other economic indicators such as government spending as a percentage of
the GDP, the rate of ination and the growth rate of the economy. Table 6.8
reports the results. The corresponding Mills ratios (j) have been incorporated
in each of the models in order to correct the coe¢ cients by controlling for the
conditions under which institutions exist.
[Table 6.8]
The rst model in the top of the table only includes the increases in taxes
as a percentage of the GDP as independent variable (and the transformations
aimed at controlling for duration dependence). An increment in the tax revenues
of government entails an increase on the likelihood of being thrown out only in
institutionalized regimes, and it is signicant just in the case of multi-party
dictatorships.
In the second model we control for other economic indicators15 , but the
result regarding tax increases still holds and marginal e¤ects keep growing with
the degree of institutionalization of the regime. Note, besides, that the e¤ect
of government spending is signicant an negative only in fully institutionalized
regimes where public goods may be provided to broader groups within society
whose demands are better represented through the integration of the opposition
within the widened regime institutions.
Figure 6.3 graphically shows the patterns estimated from Table 6.8 to better
observe the logic of the results (the rest of the variables are held constant at
15We follow a similar specication to that in Cheibub and Przeworski (1999).
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their means). The increases in taxes, shown in the x-axis, have major e¤ects on
the autocratsprobability of survival (y-axis) under regimes with multi-party
systems. The e¤ect is negative too but no so strong for regimes with a single
institution (and not signicant), while for non-institutionalized autocracies is
only slightly positive.
[Figure 6.3]
6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have empirically proved that authoritarian regimes di¤er in
their levels of political accountability, in particular, in the dimensions of security
and sensitivity dened in previous chapters. The objective was twofold: First of
all, to study the exogenous determinants of authoritarian leaderssecurity and
sensitivity; and second, to classify the authoritarian regimes, following their
institutional structure, according to their levels of both security and sensitivity.
To do so, we have proceeded in basic three steps. The rst one has con-
sisted in stating that there are di¤erent sectors in society with very dissimilar
preferences and organizational strength which make the levels of security vary
according to di¤erent variables. The models that distinguish the type of exit of
the dictator by focusing on the actor/group which seizes power have conrmed
this contention. Rents obtained from resources or perks and privileges distrib-
uted through single institutions reduce the chances of a putsch by the members
of the power elite. Besides, military as well as civilian rulers have been proved to
be more insecure than monarchs. On the other hand, the international context
and the available organizational resources play a key role in determining the
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e¤ectiveness of the opposition in posing a credible threat on dictatorstenure.
Secondly, we have analyzed the economic conditions of sensitivity. The ev-
idence shows that the existence of exportable resources, primary commodities
and foreign aid makes rulers less sensitive to economic results and extraction
as cooperative rents become unnecessary for revenues to be raised as the scal
theories of governance defend. To test it, we have run survival models divid-
ing the sample of rulers between hose with economies resource abundant or aid
receivers, and those lacking this sort of rents. We show that as rents become
scarce, the e¤ect of tax increases on the likelihood of survival augments.
A general specication of a survival model has conrmed our previous con-
tentions by putting together the variables determining security and sensitivity
at the leadership level. To do so, we have run both continuous-time and discrete-
time duration models. The variables gauging security levels have, in general,
strong e¤ects on dictatorssurvival probability, while those capturing sensitivity
are shown to exert a negative but tenuous e¤ect. As these variables determine
the extent to which extraction or taxes are going to make the survival probabil-
ity change, the ruler chooses taxes knowing how sensitive he is and, therefore,
rendering this parameter almost ine¤ective.
The third and nal step has consisted in empirically classifying regimes ac-
cording to their levels of political accountability in the two dimensional space
dened by the dimensions of security and sensitivity. Using alternative mea-
sures, dictators ruling regimes with multiple institutions are shown to be char-
acterized by the highest levels of sensitivity and the lowest levels of security of
all institutional combinations. Regimes with a single institution are the most
secure of all, and less sensitive than regimes with multiple institutions. Finally,
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non-institutionalized dictatorships are the most insensitive and relatively secure
(a little bit less than regimes with a single institution).
Chapter 7
The Judicial Accountability
of Dictators
7.1 Introduction
This Chapter is devoted to investigate the post-exit utility parameter, Uexit,
that dictators get with probability (1   (A   B)) and, more concretely, the
probability and conditions under which some of these post-exit scenarios and
utilities occur. As shown in Chapter 3, the value of this parameter has a relevant
role in determining the level of extraction and, as a result, the rate of growth
of the economy. If it is expected to be very low, dictators will moderate their
level of graft in order to try to remain in o¢ ce and avoid, then, being toppled
and potentially have to face fatal outcome -a very low or zero utility. On the
contrary, when this utility is not too low the tax rate xed by the dictator can
be higher. As Ayittey puts it, for far too long, African dictators and a cohort of
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elites have plundered their countries, committed atrocities against their people,
and bolted to the West to enjoy their booty(1994: 32).
We refer to this parameter as the judicial accountability of dictators because
punishment may take as a consequence of losing power or the its exercise. So
the threat of punishment allows for accountability to exist, and the fact that
it takes place once tenure is over and it is usually carried out through some
sort legal means (by national or international courts) leads us to call it judi-
cial. In Benhabib and Przeworskis words, criminal accountability concerns
actions and maps them on criminal sanctions (2005: 7). Even though anti-
corruption legislation may have been passed in several authoritarian regimes
and international treaties on human rights protection may be signed, they are
both barely applied by biased judicial institutions and are often ignored and/or
modied at will. For instance, in Burkina Faso, under Compaorés rule, two new
anti-corruption bodies were created: The National Ethics Committee and the
High Authority for Coordinating the Fight against Corruption. The members
of both institutions are named by the President, so anti-corruption laws remain
largely ignored. In his anniversary as President of Togo, Eyadema announced
the establishment of the National Commission for the Fight against Corruption
and Economic Sabotage. Nevertheless, Eyadema dismissed Togos Prime Minis-
ter, Agbeyome Kodjo, when he accused Eyadema and his cronies of corruption.
Punishment becomes under these circumstances a probabilistic matter and an
uncertain result once rulers are out of power, but, as seen, almost impossible
while dictators are still governing.
We proceed as follows: Next section explores the consequences for extraction
of attaching to each post-exit scenario a probability. The third section presents,
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using historical examples, the alternative post-exit scenarios considered here
and describe the new variable constructed. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 review, at the
theoretical level and using game theory, the variables and conditions that may
inuence the fateof a dictator once he is out of power. Section 5 focuses on
the potential obstacles to e¤ective judicial accountability for new democratic
governments; section 6 on the strength of the outgoing regime and ruler, and
section 7 on the international context. Section 8 presents the variables and the
results of the empirical models. Section 9 concludes.
7.2 Probabilistic Judicial Accountability and Ex-
traction
Post-exit scenarios might be di¢ cult to foresee. Indeed, as pointed out in Chap-
ter 2, we can think of the simplied term Uexit as some sort of expected con-
sumption once the dictator is not in power, Uexit = log(c0), to which the dictator
attaches a probability, q. Suppose, then, that there are only two post-exit sce-
narios, one that is relatively good for the outgoing ruler, Uhigh, such as exiling
or remaining in his country unpunished; and another one that is bad, U low, such
as being imprisoned. Let thus q be the probability that, once the ruler is out of
power, he is punished, so he just gets U low. As a result, the general dictators
problem drawn in Chapters 2 and 3 would be now written as follows
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s.t. 0  p()  1 and 0  q  1
and to the households problem
So, after substituting p() and y1 as in the second section of Chapter 31 , we
get the following rst-order condition
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Note then that now the optimal rate of extraction is a function of q as
well once we take U low and Uhigh as given. Therefore, if we know that the
lower the post-exit utility a dictator gets after losing power, the lower his level
of plundering will be, it logically follows that a greater probability q that the
outgoing dictator gets a low utility will certainly lead to a lower level of rent-
extraction. The simulations in Figure 7.1 makes this point clear for given values
of A, B, U low and Uhigh. In sum, we have that, under equilibrium, @

@q < 0
and, consequently, @

@q > 0, where  denotes the growth rate of the economy.
1That is, using the growth rate dened in Chapter 2 and a linear political accountability
function, (A B).
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[Figure 7.1]
Indeed, applying the implicit function theorem to (7.2) we obtain that
@
@q
=   Fq
F
=  B(U
low   Uhigh)
SOC
< 0 (7.3)
where SOC stands for second-order condition. The above expression is neg-
ative due to the fact that the second-order condition (in the denominator) is
negative, while the numerator is also negative since, by denition, U low < Uhigh.
7.3 What After Being in Power? DictatorsFate
Given the possible post-exit scenarios just described, let us turn to whether they
are to some extent predictable or there are some tendencies we can discern. To
do so, let us rst take a look at the data to see what has happened to dictators
after leaving power. Table 7.1 shows the di¤erent exitoptions and the number
of rulers who experienced them. Data cover all the dictators in 199 countries
who ruled at any time between 1946 and 2000 for whom information has been
found.
[Table 7.1]
Clearly, the most common resultafter a dictator has been deposed or has
left o¢ ce is that he stays in the country and lives there as a civilian, at least
in the short term2 . 163 dictators (30%) remained in their countries without
2The coding of the variable has considered the scenario that took place just after the
dictator left o¢ ce and whether it lasted for a reasonable period of time. Thus, for example,
Pinochet was coded 4, public charge in the country, because it was the rst result and it
has not been until very recently that he had to face charges for corruption and assassination.
Policy reversals at this respect have been infrequent (Skaar, 1999) although international
pressure is becoming tougher currently.
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having to face any trial after leaving power or being removed3 . When leader
changes are peaceful, and often pacted, dictators do not usually have to fear
any kind of punishment or accusation. Actually, most of those who stay in the
country has previously left power voluntarily and opted for retirement or have
been substituted following the rules of the institutionalized regime4 . Largely in
Latin America, the outgoing rulers imposed immunity laws as a condition for a
peaceful transition to democracy in order to avoid or hinder prosecution for their
past excessesby the new democratic authorities. For example, in Argentina, a
partial amnesty was granted by the Alfonsín administration, even for those who
were prosecuted and convicted for their role in the military regimes repressive
abuses. Both the Due Obedience law (Obediencia Debida), which gave amnesty
to military personnel obeying orders, and the Full Stop law (Punto Final),
which operated as a statute of limitations, were inspired by the premise that
they would ease the transition to democracy.
51 rulers (9.6%) not only were able to stay in their countries without taking
any risks, but they also assured for themselves a prominent position in the new
institutions or remained in the old ones without being the most visible head.
When regime transitions are mainly driven by the hard-liners (see ODonnell
and Schmitter, 1986) they try to reserve for themselves important o¢ ces from
which they can either monitor the new policy-making process or simply take
an active part in the decision-making. Augusto Pinochet, leader of the bloody
1973 military coup, traded his position as commander of the armed forces for
a lifetime post in Chiles senate. Although compelled to surrender his military
3This includes members of the army who after handing power to civilians return to the
barracks.
4Like in most Communist one-party regimes, the PRI regime in Mexico, and even some
monarchies when succession takes place.
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command, Pinochet was guaranteed his lifetime senate seat by the Constitution
that he himself imposed on the country as dictator in 1980. On February 24
2004, Albert René, Seychelless president, announced that he would bow out in
favor of Vice President James Michel. After abdicating, he continued as leader
of the Peoples Progressive Front. All Mexican ex-presidents during the PRI
regime have had important positions after their six-year term. For instance,
Miguel de la Madrid was member of the Interaction Council and directed the
Fondo de Cultura Económica.
The second most common result is exile. 93 (18%) dictators were able
to y their countries and took shelter in other dictatorships or even friendly
democracies (often with former colonial links). In this case the result is driven
by two sorts of context. The rst one is the escape option; the dictator ights
the country when he sees that the situation of social unrest of his country may
endanger his own life. In the second case, it is the new power elite that sends
former leaders to exile for reasons similar to those that decide to put them in
prison, i.e., avoid the return of the messiah.For instance, Idi Amin escaped
from Uganda to Libya in 1979 at the invitation of the equally erratic Muammer
Gadda. Jean-Claude Baby DocDuvalier, Haitis former President, has lived
in exile in France since 1986. Paraguays dictator, Alfredo Stroessner, after
being toppled by a military coup ight to Brazil where he lived in a well-guarded
mansion in Brasilia until his death in 2006. King Mohammad Zahir Shah was
deposed in 1973 by his cousin while taking mud baths at an Italian resort; the
Afghani king settled into a rustic villa in a Roman suburb. Now in retirement,
the monarch reportedly practices gymnastics, is an avid chess player, and has
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experienced a much more peaceful times than his relatives in Afghanistan5 .
Only a few less, 88, were killed by those seizing power, or put in jail or under
house arrest. This is by far the worst situation or result for an ex-dictator and
they try to avoid it by all means. In Romania, in December 1989, the army
fraternized with the rebellions that were triggered after Ceaucescus order to
re to anti-regime demonstrators in Timi¸soara. Then, Ceaucescu and his wife
decided to ed the capital, Bucarest, in a helicopter. Faking an engine failure
the pilot landed and the couple was captured by the armed forces. On December
25, the two were condemned to death by a military court and later executed.
Chads rst President, Ngarta Tombalbaye eroded his main base of support,
the military, through criticisms and regular purges. Fearing an upcoming plot,
Tombalbaye ordered the arrest of several senior military o¢ cers. This was the
last straw, and on April 1975, several units of NDjamenas gendarmerie, acting
under the initial direction of junior military o¢ cers, killed Tombalbaye during a
mutiny. Mussolini was arrested in the lakeside town of Dongo with his mistress
Claretta Petacci, while trying to escape dressed as a German soldier. He was
executed the day after his capture, on April 28 1945, along with his mistress by
military forces of the Italian Resistance.
Not as bad as being killed but bad anyway is being prosecuted and impris-
oned. Those who have staged a coup or seized power by other means often
put overthrown leaders in jail. They do so largely to avoid his potential reap-
5For African rulers a new option for peacefully leaving power has been recently created by
the American Government: The African President in Residencechair at Boston University.
Seemingly, the chair does not require having been a democratic leader or respectful of human
rights. Leaders are, thus, allowed to y to Boston, get a nice house, travel freely around
the country and have their own sta¤ and security detail. Zambias former dictator, Kenneth
Kaunda (1964-1991), was the rst Balfour African President in Residence at Boston Univer-
sitys African Presidential Archives and Research Center. Ruth Perry, Liberias head of state,
was the second.
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pearance after a period of re-organization and adaptation to the new political
circumstances. A leader already deposed but free may constitute a too handy
and close referent that can become an alternative in times of crisis, either po-
litical or economic. Those who were part of the former regime elite or coalition
and, consequently, had privileged access to prebends and other rents will be
probably purged6 by the new coalition in power and may constitute a source
of opposition willing to see their benefactorback in power if he is available.
Suharto replaced Sukarno as e¤ective ruler of Indonesia after a military takeover
in 1965 and conned him to house arrest until he died in 1970. Suharto as well
as Sukarno was placed under house arrest on May 2000, when Indonesian au-
thorities began to investigate the corruption occurred during his regime. Habib
Bourguiba, Tunisias former President for life, died under house arrest as well
in 2000.
There is only one way to avoid any of these scenarios and it is to remain in
power for as long as possible. This was achieved by 63 dictators who died while
they were still in o¢ ce. On the other hand, by the year 2000 there were still 70
authoritarian rulers in power for whom the result is uncertain7 .
If we consider together the two options that imply staying in the country, we
get a more simplied and understandable gure of how di¢ cult punishing former
dictators actually is (see the third and fourth columns in Table 1). Most of the
dictators (54.18 percent) have been able to stay in the country without being
punished once they are out of o¢ ce. 23.5 percent managed to avoid punishment
by leaving their countries and exiling. And only in 22.27 percent of the cases
the outgoing ruler has been -more or less severely- punished by means of trials
6Many others will be co-opted and become part of the new coalition.
7Some were overthrown soon after that year, so they were coded and included in the sample.
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or executions.
7.4 A Simple Game-Theoretic Model
Post-exit fates enumerated so far may seem unpredictable at rst sight. How-
ever, as long as strategic considerations are involved in them, as we suggest,
we can trace the conditions under which they are made, look for the variables
that best capture them and develop concrete hypotheses about its e¤ect on the
outcomes under study. To do so, we develop a simple game-theory model in the
vein of those developed by Sutter (1995).
There are two players, the dictator -or ruling elite-, D, and the opposition,
O, which is considered to act as a unitary actor. The timing of the game is the
following: First, the dictator decides whether to keep power or give it up8 . If he
keeps power, the opposition must choose whether to rebel and try to seize power
or to not revolt. If the opposition rebels, it wins with probability p, and fails with
probability 1  p. On the other hand, if the dictator chooses to abdicate, then
the opposition has three options: Kill him in haste, pardon him or punish him.
If they pardon the outgoing ruler, there is a probability r that he will reintervene
in politics in the future to take over power. If the opposition decides to punish
the incumbent dictator, then he has three choices, either to accept it, ght for
power again or exile. If he ghts in reaction to any punishment, he wins with
probability w, and loses with probability 1 w; whereas if he exiles, he is hosted
by a neighbor or friendly country with probability h, and he is extradited with
probability 1  h. Figure 7.2 shows the game in extended form.
8He may want to give power up for several reasons that we do not analyse here.
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[Figure 7.2]
The payments of each player and their order are denoted byD and O, where
D1 > D2 > ::: > ? and, obviously, O1 > O2 > ::: > ?., respectively, and D
stands for the dictator and O for opposition, as remarked earlier. The opposition
prefers the dictator to give power up and punish him in some way for past abuses
and avoid, thus, costly confrontations and any potential reintervention. The
logic of the equilibria is very simple but helps to shed light to some determinants
of peaceful transition of power and accountability. Table 7.2 summarizes the
sub-game perfect equilibria and the conditions under which they exist.
[Table 7.2]
The results of this rst game show how di¢ cult is to punish dictators because
expected punishment (trial or death) will deter incumbent rulers from giving
power up. In 12 out of 16 of the resulting equilibria the dictator chooses to retain
power, even facing the probability of a rebellion. For the opposition to induce
the ruler to abdicate, it is necessary a high probability of a successful rebellion
in case he decides to keep power and a relatively good post-exit scenario, such as
being pardoned -what occurs if the dictator conserves enough power to oppose
any punishment- or is able to exile -with a high probability of being hosted (h).
This is the reason why punishment is so unlikely after a transition to democracy,
as we will show below. E¤ective punishment and peaceful transition only occurs
in the rst equilibrium, which implies a very strong opposition (p > p1 > p2)
and a weak incumbent regime (w < w1).
Let us now turn to a simpler setting in order to develop concrete hypotheses
about each of the possible post-exit outcomes. Assume now that the dictator, for
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whatever reason, has already given power up. Figure 7.3 presents this new game.
The order of preferences changes a bit because considerations about whether to
keep power or not are now ruled out of the game: The dictator does not want
to be punished -trial or killed-, and prefers to ght or to reintervene in politics
rather than that but, at the same time, he prefers to be pardoned or to exile
rather than a costly struggle for power, given that he has already abdicated.
The opposition wants to punish the outgoing ruler, but prefers to pardon or
let him leave the country rather than having to ght and face uncertainty and
maybe lose power.
[Figure 7.3]
Table 7.3 shows the equilibria and the conditions under which they hold.
The potential strength of the outgoing ruler can force the opposition to pardon
him if reintervention is not very likely. That the dictator accepts the punishment
is a more remote option, he has to be weak and with few chances to be hosted
if he exiles. The ruler will be also tried if his chances to exile are not very high.
If a successful escape is very likely, the opposition may prefer to kill the ruler.
[Table 7.3]
Summing up, the resulting equilibria are basically determined by two fac-
tors: The strength of the outgoing dictator -or, inversely, the strength of the
opposition-, measured by w and r, and by the international context, indirectly
captured by h. The dictator accepts the punishment if he is weak and has little
chance of being hosted if he exiles; the ruler will also be tried if his chances of
going into exile are not very high. If a successful escape is very likely, the op-
position may prefer to apply punishment in haste. Therefore, the international
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context could have two types of e¤ects. On the one hand, it may increase the
chances of punishment by o¤ering very good prospects of a successful exile. On
the other hand, if the probability of extradition is very high, the rulers utility
of resisting relative to that of eeing the country increases, which would indeed
induce the opposition to pardon him and let him stay in the country. The fol-
lowing subsections review how and under which institutional settings these two
factors (h and p) might operate and what variables can capture their e¤ects.
7.5 The Democratic Obstacles to Judicial Ac-
countability
Questions about justice commonly arise when a democratic regime succeeds an
authoritarian one. The debate focuses then on whether holding perpetrators
of massive human rights violations or corrupt rulers accountable or not, that
is, whether prosecuting predecessor regime leaders. The data reported and
the game-theoretic model developed in the previous sections show that post-
transition justice is an unlikely result. This is the less likely outcome, even taking
into account that jail and assassination have been coded together. Moreover,
the data focuses on rulers not regimes, that is, we code what happens to a
dictator once he has been replaced or overthrown either by another dictator or a
democratic government, i.e., of these 88 cases, not all correspond to prosecutions
carried out by the new democratic regimes. Actually, only 13 out of the 88 rulers
imprisoned or killed were prosecuted by successor democratic regimes.
Once authoritarian rule is over, a democratic transitional government has
three choices regarding past human rights violations: Truth commissions (unveil
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the facts about torture, assassination and other violations)9 , trials (prosecute
and judge those implied in such violations), or nothing10 . The nal choice is
not, obviously, a simple matter of taste. Many relevant issues are at stake:
International pressures, notions of justice, and the stability of the new regime.
The trial optionhas been the least common of the possible choices. The
obstacles can be divided into two groups: First, technical/practical problems
which refer to the lack of resources and judicial capacity for its e¤ective imple-
mentation; second, strategic considerations of the elite related to the strength
of the di¤erent actors directly involved in the transitional process, as the model
above reveals. Landsman (1996) and Lefranc (2004) enumerate various practical
problems for an e¤ective and satisfactory accomplishment of a broad prosecution
and punishment action.
The rst of these obstacles are the economic costs that many trials may en-
tail. Transition governments usually have to deal with economic crisis and
inherit precarious budgetary conditions that might lead them to look for a
cheaperalternative11 . To this, besides, one has to add the reparations that the
government will have to pay to hundreds or thousands of victims who were di-
rectly or indirectly a¤ected by past repression and brutality. The second most
pervasive problem has to do with the capacity of the judicial power of those
countries. Existing judges, courts and other judicial institutions may not be
su¢ cient to handle the huge amount of work that such trials would entail: Hun-
9Some dictators have also established o¢ cial commissions of investigations. For instance,
after Tourés death in 1984, the armed forces seized power and created a sort of Committee for
National Redressment to govern the country. An o¢ cial commission of inquiry was established
to investigate what happened to prisoners of the previous government. Nonetheless, no one
was brought to trial and the results were never published (Bronkhorst, 1995).
10The rst two options are not excludable. In fact, truth commissions may serve as the
basis for prosecuting some members of the previous regime using the gathered evidence.
11For instance, the Malan trialin South Africa costed about seven million rands (Lefranc,
2004: 84)
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dreds of witnesses, research, document revision, etc. The immediate result of
this structural incapacity would be that most of the trials could end without
an e¤ective sentence. To this lack of capacity one has to add the problem of
the scarce partiality and (potential) corruption of the judges in charge of the
investigations (Landsman, 1996), most of whom, having been appointed by the
previous regime, could be willing to express their loyalty by means of a biased
judicial activity and sentence. The third obstacle is the most usual and has to
do with the lack of adequacy of the existing laws. In this case, both the deni-
tion as well as the attribution of the charges might become highly problematic.
Many of the crimes could simply not be regarded as such in the existing laws
and would have to be adaptedor interpreted, creating, at the same time, more
problems and unsatisfactory results. Thus, the legal principle nullum crimen,
nulla poena sine lege would have a level of applicability that would disappoint
victims organizations and create more instability and frustration. To nish,
civil laws may contradict military ones. As a result, most of the committed
crimes could be perfectly legal according to still valid military laws.
What are then the strategic considerations faced by the transitional demo-
cratic government when deciding which of the options to apply (trial, truth
commission or nothing)? Here, most of the scholars on democratizations agree
in viewing this choice as a result of the existing balance of power between the
past elites, the new ones and the victims of human rights violations, although
the topic has received little attention in the comparative literature (see, for in-
stance, Przeworski, 1991; Agüero, 1992; Colomer, 1996). In Rosenbergs words,
the new democraciesstrategies for confronting the past depend largely on the
nature of the former authoritarian regime (1995: 136). However, no system-
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atic conclusion has been launched, only general recommendations based on the
desire of a democratic outcome rather than on a profound and systematic study.
Thus, for example, Huntington (1991), in his guidelines for democratizers, rec-
ommends them to avoid any trial if the outgoing elites are still powerful, and
carry out only a few very selective ones when the past regime was overthrown or
collapsed. Sutter (1995) presents di¤erent game-theoretic models on transition
between the opposition and the dictator. His conclusions are that punishment of
the ex-ruler(s) by the new government may have very negative consequences to
the transitional process by rendering a pact ine¤ective and preventing a peaceful
transition. As a consequence, a means to protect ex-dictators is necessary to al-
low a negotiated regime transition. A foreign nation can provide this protection
by o¤ering political asylum to an ex-dictator(Sutter, 1995: 119).
Indeed, the data show that staying in the country(without any e¤ective
punishment) is the most likely outcome if the new regime is a democratic one12 .
Table 7.4 shows the frequencies and the row percentages of the post-exit options
for each type of successive e¤ective head of government, that is, those who
substitute the incumbent dictator. Accountability -of some sort- is more likely
if the dictator is substituted by a military ruler.
[Table 7.4]
To my knowledge, the best comparative study addressing the question of
transitional justice from an analytical point of view is the piece by Skaar (1999).
He departs from the assumption that the transitional democratic governments
primary interest is staying in power and, second, it must try to achieve the
12Remember that actually most of dictators are substituted by another dictator.
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consolidation of the new regime (legitimacy, rule of law, etc.). His basic and
intuitive hypothesis is the following:
The governments choice of policy depends on the relative strength
of demands from the public and the outgoing regime, the choice
tending towards trials as the outgoing regime becomes weaker and
towards nothing as the outgoing regime becomes stronger, with
truth commissions being the most likely outcome when the relative
strength of the demands is roughly equal.(p. 1110)
An interesting point is that Skaar gauges the strength of the outgoing regime
by looking at the type of transition that took place in the country. Thus, the
outgoing regime is weak in transitions by collapse, and it is strong when
the transition was pacted or came as a result of a peace settlement promoted
by an international actor. Therefore, we can deduce that di¤erent types of
authoritarian regimes may lead to di¤erent post-exit outcomes because of their
di¤erent strength at the moment of exit. We discuss this possibility in the
next section.
7.6 Dictators, Regime Strength and Post-Exit
Results
Di¤erent types of dictatorships break down in di¤erent ways and due to the
intervention of diverse actors. Table 7.5 shows the relation between the way in
which the dictators were ousted (from an actor-centered perspective) and the
post-exit outcome they had to face. Rulers that died in o¢ ce or are still in
power are not considered here.
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[Table 7.5]
The data reveal some interesting insights. When the elite is the actor leading
the leadership change and this change took place in a somewhat regulated (non-
violent) way, as in monarchies after abdications, or one-party dictatorships after
resignation or term limits, most of the rulers (44 out of 74) were able to stay
in the country as civilians or with another public o¢ ce (19). Conversely, when
changes led by elite members are carried out by some kind of putsch, outgoing
rulers, although much of them are able to stay in the country, face a bit more
uncertain future and many y the country.
The most dangerous environment occurs when the ruler is overthrown by
the military. Most of them, 15 out of 43, were simply killed or put in jail by
the new leaders and ten exiled, perhaps to avoid a more tragic consequence.
When the masses drive the changes, exile has been the most recurrent option
for dictators (5 out of 13), while others seem to have been able to hand power
and stay in the country as civilians (4). Three were killed or imprisoned by the
new government. Hence, the patterns seem to diverge between types of exit
and, at the same time, we know that di¤erent types of dictatorships are more
prone to end in di¤erent ways. In other words, types of exitare endogenous
to the type of the former authoritarian regime (Rosenberg, 1995).
The literature on regime change and revolutions asserts that weakly insti-
tutionalized and highly repressive regimes tend to be overthrown by some kind
of popular uprising13 (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Geddes, 1999a; Good-
win, 2001). This is because, in patrimonial (weakly or) non-institutionalized
13Following the setting of the rst game, these are rulers that have much to lose leaving
power so they decide to keep it for as long as possible, and only a rebellion can denitively
oust them.
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regimes, insiders face the prospect of losing all visible means of support in a
political transition, they have little option but to cling to the regime, to sink
or swim with it(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 86). So these rulers try to
hold power for as long as possible until the regime collapse and, then, they run
away and y the country for exile. If caught before, they will be most probably
executed or imprisoned.
Furthermore, there is general agreement in that strongeroutgoing regimes
are able, thanks to their higher bargaining power, to impulse a negotiated tran-
sition and impose more favorable outcomes to themselves in terms of judicial
accountability or post-exit results. Some authors believe that higher bargaining
power pertains mainly to military regimes. As cited above, for Sutter (1995),
the military, during transitional processes or after power, retain, in general,
the capacity to reintervene in politics by means of a coup or the threat of it.
This would allow them to ensure compliance by other parties and avoid being
punished. For Agüero (1992) the strength of the military is conditional: Mili-
tary governments that lose wars or leave power in similar conditions have little
control to impose any condition to the new government14 (see also Goemans,
2000).
Geddes (1999a, 1999b) sees the type of transition as a result of the types of
relations between factions within di¤erent authoritarian regimes. Using simple
game theory she argues that, within the military, since most o¢ cers value the
unity and capacity of the military as an institution more than being in power,
military regimes tend to be more prone to hand power to civilians if their co-
hesion is threatened. Consequently, in this case, internal disagreements and
14The Argentinian military Junta would represent a notable exception as they did lose the
Falkland Islands war.
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splits usually lead to negotiated transitions. On the contrary, in personalist
and single-party regimes intra-elite competition does not lead to giving power
up. In these cases, according to Geddes, the benets of cooperation are su¢ -
ciently large to insure continued support from all factions (1999b: 13). This
is why personalist rulers do not hand power and prefer to y the country and
single-party rule is the most stable one.
Analyzing African regimes, Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) had already
noticed similar patterns. They note that in plebiscitary one-party regimes, when
a crisis of legitimacy occurs, the regime is predisposed to holding a national
conference and that personal rulers tend to be toppled from the bottom. On
the other hand, in competitive one-party systems, the opposition prefers to move
directly to an election without establishing rst a national conference.
As we argued and tested in the second chapter, institutions are endogenous
and they respond, among other factors, to the organizational strength of the
potential opposition. In this sense, electoral authoritarianism or multi-party
systems would be the most weak (as shown in Chapter 6), so dictators under
these regimes probably can not impose their most preferred post-exit solution.
Alternatively, new evidence on both regime and rulersstability shows that one-
party systems are the most secure and, hence, persistent ones (Brownlee, 2004a;
Smith, 2005). We can take thus the institutional conguration of the regime as
a good proxy for p in the model, that is, the strength of the outgoing regime and
the power coalition. So we assume fully institutionalized regimes to have a lower
p and, concomitantly, a lower probability of avoiding criminal accountability. In
fact, Goemans (2000) already noted that leaders of mixed regimesare more
prone to su¤er punishment when they lose a war.
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7.7 The International Context: Laws and Pres-
sure
Since the end of the Second World War, the international community has made
considerable e¤ort towards the recognition that past violations of human rights
and widespread corruption generate obligations for states, what has translated,
as Méndez (1997) observes, into a trend towards expanding universally applica-
ble norms mainly concerning investigation, prosecution and reparation15 . For
example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 194816 . For
the rst time, genocide was dened and outlawed17 . Attempts by the inter-
national community to tackle corruption began much later. In 1996, the OAS
signed the Interamerican Convention against Corruption. In 2003, the UN Gen-
eral Assembly nally adopted the UN Convention against Corruption, which
requires countries to establish criminal o¤ences to include acts of corruption.
There has also been an increase in the willingness of some states to make use
of the universal jurisdiction principle by which states claim criminal jurisdiction
over persons whose alleged crimes were committed outside the boundaries of
the prosecuting state18 . At the same time, there has been an important quan-
15These instruments can be classied into two categories: declarations, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948) and the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man adopted by the OAS (Organization of American States, 1948),
adopted by international organizations, which are not legally binding although they may be
politically so; and conventions, legally binding instruments included under international law
which commonly establish mechanisms to oversee their implementation.
16The rst time that the 1948 law was actually enforced was in September 1998 when the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found Jean-Paul Akayesu (the former mayor of
a small town in Rwanda) guilty of nine counts of genocide. Former Yugoslavian dictator
Milosevic was being tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
when he died.
17Much later, in December 1985 the OAS adopted the Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture, which entered into force in 1987. A more recent step has been the creation
of the International Criminal Court in 1998.
18As Amnesty International reports, since the Second World War, more than a dozen states
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titative and qualitative enhancement in the role that both the national and
international civil society plays in the identication and furthering of investiga-
tions and sanctions for human rights violations and corruption (see, for instance,
Crocker, 1998)19 .
Scholars in the eld have proposed di¤erent theories to account for this
process of increased support for international measures. Realist theories de-
fend the idea that governments accept international obligations because they
are forced to do so by other powerful countries20 . Conversely, ideational theory
attributes the emergence of the instruments to protect human rights to the per-
suasive power of established democracies. Moravcsik o¤ers a more rationalistic
view and proposes that this sort of delegation is a tactic used by governments to
lock inand consolidate democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their cred-
ibility and stability vis-à-vis nondemocratic political threats(2000, p.220). So
the main supporters of international regimes will be newly established democra-
cies, while large stable ones will accept only optional or rhetorical commitments,
and dictatorships will oppose them.
In sum, the recent evolution of the international context is causing, in the
context of our game-theory model, the probabilities of outgoing dictators being
hosted, h, to shrink. As the number of democracies increases especially, since
the 70s-, so does the number of countries endorsing conventions against crimes
have conducted prosecutions; completed trials based on universal jurisdiction or arrested and
extradited people. These states include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Israel, Mexico, Netherlands, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and the United States.
19Clear examples are Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The International
Center for Transitional Justice was created in 2001 with the aim of assisting countries pursuing
accountability for past mass atrocity or human rights abuse. This is also the case of Trans-
parency International, which through meetings, extensive reports and classications, aims at
raising awareness and international pressure to impede corruption.
20This could explain the adoption of a protocol against corruption by the Economic Com-
munity of West African States in 2001.
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and corruption, as the approaches depicted above contend. In contrast, a high
proportion of authoritarian regimes within the same region can have the oppo-
site e¤ect by sharply increasing the likelihood of being hosted, as the examples
of two of Africas most terrible rulers, Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire) and Idi Amin
(Uganda), make evident. The former ed to Togo, while the latter was hosted
by Gadda in Libya21 . The consequences of both factors are contradictory ac-
cording to our model. While the increase in the number of democratic countries
in the world does surely make exile di¢ cult, it may also hinder punishment
because the utility of resisting relative to that of eeing the country increases,
which would actually induce the opposition to pardon the dictator and let him
stay in the country. On the other hand, the presence of a high proportion of dic-
tatorships within the same region may increase to such a degree the likelihood
of exile that the opposition may choose to punish the ruler before he escapes
and potentially tries to return to power.
7.8 On the Predictability of Post-Exit Scenarios
7.8.1 Variables
We are not interested in whether the probability of some form of judicial ac-
countability for outgoing dictator can pave the way for democratic transition
and consolidation. Our goal is actually to assess the extent to which these
post-exit scenarios can be predicted by the socioeconomic or institutional char-
acteristics of authoritarian regimes. The question is: Is there any structural and
21The economic gures under their governments were disastrous. The average growth of
per capita income was negative in both countries, -2.57 during Mobutus rule and -1.45 during
Amins.
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institutional element that help to predict what will happen to a dictator once
he leaves power?
The literature reviewed so far has provided us with some clues in order to
intend to explain the occurrence of the di¤erent post-exit scenarios. Let us,
then, present the variables that will be included in the multinomial logistic
models below, which try to capture the di¤erent determining dimensions of the
topic. One of the key determinants of the situation a dictator may have to
face once he loses power is the strength of the regime he governs (see model).
This strength can be measured by the respective levels of security associated to
their institutional design and by their capacity to reintervene in politics after
their substitution. The previous chapter has shown that regimes with a single
institution are the ones that provide the rulers with the highest level of security,
while multi-party regimes tend to be the most unstable. Thus, if we consider
that staying in the countryand exile are the best options for an outgoing
ruler, we expect that dictators in multi-party regimes should have to face a
higher probability of being imprisoned or killed.
On the other hand, as Sutter (1995) points out, military rulers retain certain
capacity to threat the new government so they may have a greater capacity
to avoid post-exit punishment. Nonetheless, we have also shown that when
the military lead the ouster, jail or death are the most probable destinies of
deposed rulers, and military regimes are specially vulnerable to coups carried
out by other military factions. Therefore, we include the dummy variables that
distinguish the type of e¤ective head, civilian and military, the reference
category being monarch.
The international context is captured as in previous chapters by two di¤erent
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variables. The rst one, is the yearly percentage of democracies in the world.
This variable seeks to capture the trend to expand international laws to human
rights violations; it is, then, assumed that a bigger proportion of democracies
in the world can exert a more e¤ective pressure for the prosecution of former
dictators decreasing thus h. The second variable, is the regional proportion
of dictatorships. It is commonly thought that geographical closeness of other
dictatorial regimes may help rulers to nd a friendly country where to take
shelter once he is overthrown, so it increases h.
Natural resources, as said, allow the accumulation of rents in the hands
of authoritarian rulers. Once they foresee the end of their tenure, and given
their widespread corruption, some form of judicial accountability is expected
to be applied if they remain in the country. Concomitantly, dictators who
granted foreign rms and their former colonial states privileged access to the
mineral resources and other key sectors of their countries usually ask these
governments for help when they perceive any threat to their tenure. Some are
ignored, such as Bokassa and Mobutu who asked France and the United States
for shelter. Others receive help even without asking for it, like Sékou Touré,
who after a heart disease was hosted by the United States, following Reagans
instructions, to receive the appropriate treatment. We have, thus, included the
variables primary commodity exporting countryand oil exporting country.
Primary commodity exporting country is a dummy variable coded 1 if the
average ratio of non-fuel primary products exports in 1990-1993 exceeded 50%
of total exports, and 0 otherwise. Oil exporting country is coded 1 if the
average ratio of fuel exports to total exports in 1990-1993 exceeded 50%, 0
otherwise.
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We have also included two more control variables. The rst one measures the
level of past instability, and is the sum of past transitions to authoritarianism.
According to Gandhi and Przeworski (2004), this variable captures the propen-
sity towards repression, so it might have a positive e¤ect on the probability of
killing or imprisoning the deposed dictator. The second control variable is the
number of continuous years the ruler has been in power (i.e., the years he had
been in power when he was toppled or substituted). This is included in order
to control for the potential consolidation -or erosion- of leadership (Hite and
Morlino, 2004).
7.8.2 Multivariate Models and Results
In this section I present the results of the multinomial models where the depen-
dent variable is AFTEREXIT. This variable takes four values: 1 if the dictator
stays in the country as civilian, 2 if the dictator has been killed or imprisoned
(including house arrest), 3 if the dictator was able to exile, and 4 if the ruler
stays in the country and holds any other public o¢ ce22 . However, rudimentary
Wald and LR tests show that the categories 1 and 4 can be combined23 , so the
nal dependent variable consists of three values. The value 1, now generally
named stay in the countrywithout distinguishing positions or occupations, is
the base category. Given that the dependent variable is constant for each of
22The codication of the variable considers the scenario that took place immediately after
the dictator left o¢ ce and whether it lasted for a reasonable period of time. Thus, for example,
Pinochet was coded 4, public charge in the country, because this was the rst result and it was
not until very recently that he had to face charges for corruption and human rights violations.
Policy reversals in this respect have been infrequent (Skaar, 1999), although international
pressure is currently becoming tougher (see Appendix).
23Outcomes m and n being indistinguishable corresponds to the hypothesis that
H0 : 1;mjn = :::K;mjn = 0
See Long and Freese (2003).
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the rulers we have taken, for the independent variables, the value they took in
the last year those dictators were in power24 . Table 7.6 shows the results of the
estimations.
[Table 7.6]
The results obtained tend to conrm our basic propositions. Concerning the
strength of the regime and ruler, we can conclude that fully institutionalized
regimes, for which we claimed that the strength or bargaining power of the
authoritarian elite is low, have higher probabilities of being killed or imprisoned
once out of power. For instance, in Malawi, after growing pressure from the
opposition, aggravated by the suspension of foreign aid, Banda was forced to
accept a multi-party system. Once out of power, after losing an election, Banda
was accused and tried for having misappropriated ve million pounds (Sánchez
Piñol, 2006). On the contrary, regimes with single institutions, which are the
most secure, have a higher capacity to leave the country avoiding any kind of
punishment. Similarly, rulers governing non-institutionalized regimes are more
prone to stay in the country. Table 7.7 reports the predicted probabilities for
each of the institutional arrangements (the rest of the variables are held constant
at their means), or in formal terms, it shows the estimated q and (1   q) (see
section 2).
[Table 7.7]
Note that the patterns of judicial accountability are quite dissimilar. Au-
thoritarian leaders with the highest probability (0.48) of being kept accountable
24Using the rulers spells averages instead of the last observation yields almost identical
results.
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after leaving power are those governing regimes with multiple institutions. Dic-
tators of non-institutionalized regimes have little to fear; they will be able to
stay in the country almost for sure (having, thus, a high Uexit or a low q).
As it was also predicted, the presence of natural resources increases the
chances of ying abroad and enjoying the rents accumulated in a Swiss Bank
(see Table 7.6). The number of past transitions to authoritarianism has a pos-
itive e¤ect on the probability of being killed or imprisoned although it is not
statistically signicant. Military rulers have a higher probability of staying in
the country than monarchs, and so do civilian rulers. The longer a ruler has
remained in o¢ ce, the lower his probabilities of staying in his country.
The variables referring to the international context show results that are
coherent with the model above. Firstly, the proportion of dictatorships in the
region, instead of allowing and fostering exile, has the opposite e¤ect, it increases
the likelihood of accountability (death/prison). As we outlined above, the story
would be as follows: Foreseeing the option of an escape (high h), the opposition
forces, willing to prevent a possible return of the exiting ruler -with the help
of authoritarian neighbors-, prefer to kill him or retain him under house arrest
in the country. On the other hand, the percentage of democracies in the world
has a negative e¤ect on the chances of applying any accountability measure
to outgoing dictators (in this case, the coe¢ cient is signicant), but it also
diminishes the probabilities of the exileoption. These results are consistent
with what we expected, that is, the increase in the number of democracies in
the world, reduce the chances of nding an appropriate shelter after leaving the
country so it may increase the relative utility of ghting against punishment.
This is not by any means a guarantee since many dictators have been taken in
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by democratic systems with the alleged objective of facilitating the prospects of
democratization. Alternatively, the capture and prosecution of former dictators
is easier to be carried out once they are out of their own countries where the
legal systems tend to protect them. For example, Pinochet, former Chiles
military ruler, was arrested in October 1998 in London (England) under an
international arrest warrant issued by the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón, and
he was placed under house arrest. Chads former president, Hissene Habré,
was arrested in Senegal, where he had been living in exile ever since he was
deposed in 1990, after an international arrest warrant was issued in Belgium
under that countrys universal jurisdiction law. Knowing these risks caused by
the international context (an smaller h), dictators may become more reluctant
to leave their countries and even power as the game-theoretic model shows. This
is why the variable democracy share in the worldhas a negative e¤ect on both
the probability of accountability and exile.
7.8.3 An Actor-Centered Approach
The study of the mechanisms of accountability in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.2)
has permitted us to get a general measure of the strength and importance of
each actor -the elite, the military and the opposition- in toppling the incumbent
head of government by getting the predicted odds of each mode of exit. These
variables have been used alongside other controls to explain post-exit scenarios
from an actor-centered approach, which explicitly gauges regime and opposition
strength. The controls include the GDP per capita, the number of past transi-
tions to dictatorship (for the same reason described above), the years the ruler
have been in o¢ ce, the presence of exportable resources, and the percentage
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of moslems in the population (to capture potential distinct cultural attitudes
towards punishment). The results are reported in Table 7.825 .
[Table 7.8]
The importance of each group exerts an important e¤ect on the alternative
post-tenure results, some of which were already pointed out in section 6. Pun-
ishment is much more likely if those driving the change are either the military or
the citizen opposition or, in other words, when, as claimed in our game-theoretic
model, the outgoing ruler is weak. The way they do so di¤ers though. In the
second model we have separated the two punishment options, one is trial (in-
cluding house arrest and imprisonment) and the other assassination (without
previous trial). As we can observe, military intervention translates into a more
formalway of punishment, and although the ousted ruler may end up being
executed, it will occur as a result of a trial (often conducted by a military court).
In contrast, if after general turmoil the citizens take over power, dictators are
more likely to pay a very high price for years of oppression and extortion, i.e.,
execution. Indeed, Iqbal and Zorn (2004) show that the risk of assassination
of a head of state increases with repression. Changes promoted from within
the elite, as noted in Table 7.5, do not end up with punishment but with the
outgoing autocrat remaining in the country. Figure 7.4 portrays the sharp in-
creases in the probability of punishment as the power of both the military and
the opposition augment, as predicted by our model in Table 7.9, holding the
rest of th variables constant at their means.
[Figure 7.4]
25We ran models incorporating the categorical variable WAYOUT instead of the predicted
odds too. The results were very similar.
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7.9 Conclusions
The formal model we developed in Chapters 2 and 3 assigned a relevant role to
the utility the dictator may get after leaving power in determining the level of
graft. If the dictator foresees that his actions will not involve an important cost
in case he is unseated, he will plunder at will. If dictators expect that after losing
or handing over power they will be able to enjoy their booty in pleasant exile or
in their own countries, their level of rent-extraction will be higher and this will
lead growth rates to shrink. On the contrary, if the probability of being punished
is high enough, dictators will constrain their greed and economic performance
will improve. Formal modelling has been used to make this point clear.
Predicting the fate of dictators after leaving or being forced to leave power
has proved to be quite di¢ cult. Nonetheless, some very interesting patterns can
be identied. With regard to the institutional arrangements, the results show
that rulers with fully institutionalized regimes are those who will face with a
higher probability some kind of punishment once deposed. Conversely, dictators
governing single institution regimes have already been proved to be the most
secure in o¢ ce in previous chapters. This security translates in a better position
to negotiate a favorable exit. A similar pattern occurs for non-institutionalized
regimes. As we also predicted, military rulers are those with a lower probability
of su¤ering any kind of accountability measure due to their power to use force to
take over power again, while the highest probability of living in exile corresponds
to monarchs.
The results show that international pressure in the form of a higher pro-
portion of democracies in the world may have contradicting e¤ects. Actually,
a higher number of democracies is related with a lower probability of judicial
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accountability in the short term at least. On the other hand, possible strategic
considerations by the opposition forces may determine the fact that when more
dictatorships exist in the region, the lower the probability of exile are and the
higher those of imprisonment or assassination. The exports of natural resources
(oil or primary commodities) increase the chances of exile of a given authoritar-
ian ruler. Accumulated rents and international alliances or friendships may be
the causes behind this fact. In sum, if the expected post-exit utility is to have
any e¤ect on the current level of graft, we would observe dictators in multi-
party regimes to restrain their rapacious impulses. Conversely, for dictators in
less institutionalized authoritarian systems, the judicial accountability possibil-
ity is much more remote, so their potential abuse of power is less likely to be
punished in case of losing power.
Our models based on the actorsrole in the leader substitution show that
when leader changes are the result of military or citizen force -as they reect
the weakness of the regime- the likelihood of punishment increases. The former
tend to resort to imprisonment (which does not preclude posterior execution),
while the latter to assassination in haste.
Chapter 8
Economic Growth,
Dictators and Institutions
8.1 Introduction
It is now time to study economic growth. So far we have explored what con-
ditions determine the levels of security, sensitivity and the probability of pun-
ishment at the leadership level and how dictatorial institutions relate to each of
these parameters as well. The aim of this chapter is twofold.
First of all, we intend to test whether the constraints posed by the two sorts
of accountability identied do really help to explain dictatorspolicy decisions
a¤ecting growth and the size of government. We do so at the leadership level,
analyzing the e¤ect of the constraints on authoritarian governments, given that
if political and judicial accountability are to matter in determining predation
and, hence, economic growth under dictatorship, they do so by inuencing the
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actors making the decisions in a system characterized by power concentration:
Rulers/governments. This implies taking dictators as the cross-sectional units
in some of our regression models and introduce the variables which determine
the levels of political and judicial accountability.
Secondly, we turn to institutions and their e¤ects using econometric tech-
niques aimed at controlling for selectivity. The classication of the alternatives
degrees of institutionalization into the three dimensional space dened by the
political and judicial accountability dimensions allows us to predict their overall
performance in terms of growth. While fully institutionalized regimes present
the best conditions for growth according to these political-economic dimensions,
regimes with a single institution and those non-institutionalized show mixed
results. Regimes only partially institutionalized have been shown to be more
sensitive and with a slightly higher likelihood of judicial accountability than non-
institutionalized dictatorships; nevertheless, their levels of security are greater
too. The question is, then, does this higher security outweigh the other two di-
mensions? If so, these regimes with a single institution would show lower growth
rates than non-institutionalized ones. On the contrary, if sensitivity and judicial
accountability play a more decisive role in determining growth, then, only par-
tially institutionalized dictatorships are predicted to grow at higher rates than
regimes without institutions. The comparative statics of the model already
pointed that it is actually sensitivity the dimension which exerts an stronger
inuence on rent-extraction, but it requires complete empirical validation.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 analyses whether income
di¤erences between countries with authoritarian governments have increased or
decreased and what the e¤ect of initial income of averaged growth rates is. The
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third section deals with growth at the leadership level introducing the variables
-identied so far- that empirically matter for accountability. The model is also
applied to explain government consumption at the leadership level. Section 4
analyses the e¤ect of institutions, on both growth and government consumption,
at a ner grain using two-step methods to correct for selectivity. Section 5
o¤ers some tentative evidence of the e¤ect of the alternative mechanisms of
accountability on income growth. Section 6 summarizes the main ndings.
8.2 Any Catching up?
Convergence, one of the main predictions of the neoclassical model of growth
(e.g. Ramsey, 1928; Solow, 1956), states that the lower the initial level of real
per capita gross domestic product (capital in the models), the higher the pre-
dicted growth rate is going to be due to diminishing returns to capital. This
prediction would only hold if all economies had the same economic and struc-
tural conditions, except for their starting capital stocks. On the other hand,
the conditional convergence prediction assumes that economies di¤er in vari-
ous respects, so cross-country di¤erences are conditioned to the di¤erent steady
state levels each economy may have. In this case, the growth rate is expected
to be higher the further the initial income per capita is from its steady or long-
run position. So it is required to control for those di¤erences mentioned above.
More concretely, Sala-i-Martin (1990) distinguishes between -convergence and
-convergence. The former refers to the -above dened- absolute convergence,
that is, poor economies are expected to grow at higher rates than richer ones;
while the latter refers to the progressive reduction of the variance in per capita
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incomes within groups of economies.
In opposition, our political-economic model clearly predicted a negative,
although moderate, e¤ect of initial income, y0, on the rate of rent-extraction,
so richer dictatorships are expected to grow at higher rates than poorer ones.
According to this, di¤erences between country income levels along years should
be progressively increasing. What we should nd is, then, absolute divergence
instead of cross-country income convergence, as the rich would be getting richer
and the poor would be unable to catch up (and some becoming even poorer).
Figures 8.1.A to 8.1.C show the growth of real GDP per capita for both
countries1 , regime spells and dictators spells against its initial level (log of initial
GDP per capita) for the three alternative cross-sectional units2 as well as the
tted regression line. Figure 8.1.D displays the -lowess smoothed- trend from
1950 to 2000 of the annual standard deviation of the log of the GDP per capita
of authoritarian regimes3 .
[Figures 8.1.A to 8.1.D]
The portrait one gets from observing the Figures conrms our expectation
that within authoritarian regimes there is a positive correlation between initial
income and growth, especially if we take dictatorial e¤ective heads as the cross-
sectional unit. In this case, the correlation between the two variables is 0:157,
while for the other two cases it is about 0:11. The emerging pattern is, as
Figure 8.1.D shows, one of increasing income di¤erences among countries with
1Concretely, annual rate of growth of real GDP per capita, 1985 international prices, chain
index. Compiled from Penn World Tables 5.6. All income gures are in 1985 PPP dollars.
2 It means, the initial GDP per capita when a country enters the sample (and data is
available), the rst year of a dictatorship spell, and the rst year of a given e¤ective head
rule.
3Six Gulf oil countries have been excluded from the sample given that their income levels
do not stem from development. The pattern of the gure remains largely unaltered if we only
consider those regimes that lasted for 20 years or more.
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authoritarian governments in a yearly basis. The result is consistent with Quahs
research (1993, 1996, 1997), which shows that the actual pattern described
by the ergodic cross-sectional distribution of income is that of emerging twin
peaks, where there is actually a clustering together of the very rich, a clustering
together of the very poor, and a vanishing of the middle income class. Besides,
he proves that the cross-sectional distribution can diverge even when the initial
conditions regression shows a negative correlation between time-averaged growth
rates and initial levels.
The income dynamics under authoritarian leadership will help shed light on
this alarming process. Table 8.1 reports the number of dictator spells entering
and exiting the corresponding interval of income per capita detailed in the rows
and columns. So, for example, the number in the rst cell (upper left hand side
corner) indicates that 25 dictators began their tenure with an income per capita
between $0 and $500, and when they left o¢ ce income per capita in the country
was still between 0 and 500 dollars4 .
[Table 8.1]
The initial marginal distributions show again the high prevalence of author-
itarian regimes in poor countries; 282 out of 403 dictator spells began with
incomes below (or equal to) $2000; 75 with incomes between $2000 and $4000,
and only 46 with incomes above $4000. The nal distribution is quite similar
though: There are 248 spells with incomes below $2000; 92 ended with incomes
between $2000 and $4000, and 63 with incomes above 4000$. The variations
are marginal although some relative improvement can be observed. Once more,
4Recall that all income gures are in 1985 PPP dollars.
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then, persistence is the most prominent feature in the income evolution; the
cell entries of the main diagonal -in bold- are the ones with most cases for each
category of initial income. 25 out of 38 rulers that began with incomes below
$500, remained in that category at the end of the spell; 82 out of 112 for those
that began with incomes between $500 and $1000; 54 out of 80 for those be-
ginning with incomes between $1000 and $1500. The rate of persistence seems
to decrease with income and so does the percentage of spells in which income
increases so as to move to a superior income band5 .
8.3 Dictatorial Rulers, Growth and Accountabil-
ity
The model developed in Chapters 2 and 3 revealed that the rate of rulers rent-
extraction under equilibrium, , is a function of two sorts of political-economic
parameters. On the one hand, those describing the economy, and, on the other
hand, those depicting the political constraints that accountability imposes on
rulersdecisions; formally
5The same type of table -although not reported- was constructed for dictatorship spells.
The results are quite similar. Most of the dictatorships had very low initial income levels at
the beginning of the post-war period: 105 out of the 138 dictatorships for which data are
available had income levels below $2000 at the beginning of the spell (or the rst year for
which we have a data point). In fact, 58 out of those 105 had incomes below $1000 at the
beginning of the period. The incomes they had when exiting the sample exhibit a high level
of persistence in the relative positions of the dictatorship spells: 74 (out of 138) had incomes
below $2000, whereas 36 had incomes between $2000 and $4000.
Persistence within the same income interval is again the most common pattern for each
of the enter categories. 33 out of the 58 spells that began the period with incomes below
$1000 remained in that poverty interval. For the $1000-$2000 enter interval, there are 22
out of 47 spells that did not succeed in increasing substantially their per capita incomes. 7
out of 15 remained in the same $2000-$3000 interval. 4 out of the 47 spells that began with
incomes between $1000 and $2000, nished with incomes below $1000 (Benin, Madagascar,
Nigeria and Sierra Leone).
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 = (r; y0; ; | {z };A;B; q; Uexit| {z })
Economic Accountability
conditions function
where we have just added q, the probability of punishment, to the whole
expression to capture the renement to the model incorporated in Chapter 7.
Consequently, and given that the rate of economic growth  is a negative func-
tion of ,  is itself a function of the determinants of  under leadership j but
with the opposite sign of their respective e¤ects, formally
 = (r; y0; ; ;A ; B+ ; q+
; Uexit  ) (8.1)
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 were devoted to identify the general factors determining
the structural level of security and the conditions for sensitivity of dictators
rule at the empirical level, while in Chapter 7 we concentrated on exploring the
determinants and on getting predictions of the odds (q) for alternative values
of Uexit.
In sum, according to the comparative statics carried out in Chapter 3, se-
curity may exert two kinds of contradicting e¤ects depending on the form of
the accountability function that one assumes. When the probability is assumed
to be linear, concave or convex (but not exponential), the variables capturing
security levels are expected to show contradicting e¤ects between survival in
power and growth, in particular, those helping the ruler to stay in power in
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the next period are predicted to exert a negative e¤ect on the growth rate of
the economy. On the contrary, if the probability is exponential, more security
implies not only a higher probability of retaining power but also higher rates of
economic growth.
On the other hand, the variables measuring sensitivity will be proven to
have been correctly identied as long as their e¤ect is the same for both de-
pendent variables, i.e., they are expected to decrease the likelihood of an ouster
and to make economic growth rates shrink too (irrespective of the form of the
political accountability function). Recall that this set of propositions follow the
contention that growth and the probability of survival are jointly determined in
equilibrium by the same political-economic factors.
8.3.1 Average Growth: Dictators, Constraints and Devel-
opment
When modelling policy choice, specially under authoritarian settings, condi-
tional on some accountability function, governments or rulers are taken as the
basis of analysis since they are the actors making the decisions under some con-
straints. This has been the approach of this dissertation as well. Nonetheless,
the empirical literature has almost paid no attention to leadership and its po-
tential e¤ects. This results in a signicant inconsistency between theory and
empirical evidence.
Leaders and, specically, dictators, may matter. As the recent evidence
reported by Jones and Olken (2005) shows, leaders are decisive for economic
growth and to a greater extent in autocratic settings where decision-making is
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highly concentrated6 . Actually, when one takes either country, regime spells
(years of continuous rule under the same regime type) or dictators rule as the
cross-sectional unit, the overall standard deviation of real GDP growth and
growth of income per capita is about 8. Similarly, the within deviation is, for
all three cases, higher than 7. However, di¤erences emerge when one looks at the
between standard deviation, that is, the variability existing between the cross-
sectional units. These are 2.9 (for G) and 2.83 (for Y G) if we take countries
as the cross-sections7 . If one takes regime spells as the cross-section, then the
standard deviations are bigger: 3.03 and 3.15, respectively. Finally, taking
heads tenure (that is, the heads spell in o¢ ce), the standard deviations are
much higher: 4.8 and 4.83 for G and Y G, respectively. The means of these
variables for the whole period are 1.85 and 4.36, respectively.
If the decisions regarding taxes, expropriation, etc. are taken by autonomous
dictators facing di¤erent types of constraints, as shown in our model, it may
seem logical to nd greater di¤erences between them than between other cross-
sectional units and, therefore, to focus our attention rst on them at the empir-
ical level.
To analyze this variability between rulers, we will run regression models
taking leaders spells as cross-sectional units and taking the determinants of
the accountability functions as independent variables while controlling for other
socioeconomic variables. Table 8.2 reports the results of the estimations using
the averages for each ruler spell of all the variables of our interest which capture
the constraints on dictators decisions. Data include all dictators who ruled
6They also nd that the leadership e¤ect is especially important among autocrats ruling
without a legislature.
7The numbers refer to G (growth of income per capita) and Y G (real GDP growth),
respectively. Remember that Y G = G+Population growth.
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at any time between 1946-2000 in any of the 199 countries of the sample for
whom information is available8 . The dependent variable is the rate of growth
of per capita income9 . The independent ones are those capturing structural
levels of security and sensitivity (identied in Chapter 6) as well as the rest
in expression (1) such as initial income and the rate of capital return10 . From
the empirical models in Chapter 7 we have also estimated the predicted (log)
odds of punishment11 , which serves as a measure of qU low, that is, the rulers
likelihood of judicial accountability.
[Table 8.2]
The signs of the variables coincide with our theoretical expectations. The two
variables determining the levels of sensitivity -the availability of resources or pri-
mary commodities and foreign aid- have negative, signicant and strong e¤ects
on the rate of per capita income growth. The (log) odds of being punished as a
result of losing power exert an important positive e¤ect on performance, mean-
ing that a negative expected result as a consequence of leaving power increases
the incentives to retain it by altering policy decisions. The variables capturing
structural security are diverse in their e¤ects and measurements. Nonetheless,
their patterns are coherent with the theory: Those which reduced security in
the models reported in Chapter 6, now increase growth, while, conversely, those
increasing security, make growth rates shrink. In the case of ethnic fractional-
ization, its e¤ect is negative but not statistically signicant; its negative e¤ect
8See appendix for variablessources and denitions.
9Taken from Penn World Tables 5.6. See the codebook.
10The variable Democracy share in the worldwas ruled out due to correlation problems
with other covariates. Excluding it while keeping dictatorships in the region improves the
t of the model.
11There is greater variation allowed in the log-odds ratio compared to the probability mea-
sure; besides, in constrast to the probability construct, it is also linear in the covariates.
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on popular interventions showed in Chapter 6, thus, seems to prevail and make
it harmful for growth, but the fact that it increases insecurity at the elite level
renders its coe¢ cient small and insignicant. In sum, we can rmly conclude
that the political accountability function is not exponential as using this type
of function to dene the probability of survival yielded the opposite prediction,
namely, that more security would improve economic performance.
Table 8.3 reports a more simplied portray of the relation between account-
ability and economic growth. In this second case, the security dimension is
captured by a rough measure consisting of the average estimated odds and the
predicted probability of leader overthrown irrespective of the variables mea-
suring sensitivity, using the covariates we have been considering so far. Other
controls, such as those in Table 8.1 (share of agriculture, GDP per capita, etc.)
have been included, although they are not reported12 . The basic results and
patterns remain unaltered. Both measures of security show an strong positive
e¤ect on growth13 ; so do the variables capturing sensitivity and the likelihood
of judicial accountability.
[Table 8.3]
In the last column of both tables (8.2 and 8.3) the institutional variables
have been introduced into the regression analyses too. Although institutions will
receive a more careful examination in the next section, it is worth noting that
they perform in a rather coherent way. Given that multiple institutionshave
been found to be the institutional combination providing rulers with the lowest
level of security, the highest level of sensitivity and the greater probability of
12Their e¤ects are almost identical to those found in the models in Table 8.1.
13Recall that in this case, a higher value of the variable indicates greater insecurity, so its
e¤ect is expected to be positive on economic performance.
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judicial accountability, their e¤ect could be predicted to be high and signicant
as it certainly is in both types of the model specication. The single institution
dummy, though, is not signicant although positive in both cases. This shows
that the e¤ect of a higher sensitivity level and a bigger probability of punishment
prevail over the negative e¤ect of the higher security found under this concrete
institutional setting but not su¢ ciently to make its e¤ect signicant.
So far we have tested how variables measuring the di¤erent dimensions con-
tained in the accountability process a¤ect growth. Nonetheless, Figure 3.2 in
Chapter 3 yielded another interesting insight, in particular, that the e¤ect of
security (A) is stronger when sensitivity (B) to performance is low. As they feel
more secure in power, dictators decide to extract a higher portion of rents. If,
besides, these increases have little e¤ect on their probability of keeping power
(given that sensitivity is low), the economic tragedy brought about by unleashed
greed may become unavoidable. We put this point under scrutiny by dividing
the sample into two subgroups, those leaders ruling a resource-rich country ver-
sus those with resource-poor economies and, moreover, those with foreign aid
under average versus those receiving aid over the sample average. We use again
the security measure introduced in Table 8.3.
[Table 8.4]
Therefore, we are basically interested in the changes of the coe¢ cient of
the variable gauging security across the sub-samples. Although signicant in
both samples, the coe¢ cient of security more than doubles when the ruler is
insensitive thanks to resource and commodity abundance. With regards to the
division based on the amount of aid received, the results are similar again, the
coe¢ cient on security more than doubles when sensitivity is assumed to be
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low and it is highly signicant. Therefore, it is proven that, as shown earlier
in the model, when sensitivity is low, security matters to a greater extent in
determining the level of rent-extraction.
8.3.2 Government Consumption
Government consumption is often related to the scope of rulers mismanagement
of public resources as it does not include public productive expenditure (capi-
tal expenditure), social security benets and other transfers. Furthermore, this
consumption has been generally proved to have a negative e¤ect on economic
growth by various cross-country studies (see, for instance, Landau, 1986; Barro,
1995; Gomanee et al., 2005; Bates, 2006). In this sense, government consump-
tion can be thought to be the part of public spending which can be potentially
diverted and subject to state capture and, consequently, redirected to activities
such as patronage, cooptation and self-enrichment.
As Przeworski puts it, it can be generally assumed that patrimonial state
will undersupply the public inputs into production(2003: 91). This has been a
general proposition in the literature on state capture. For instance, in Overland
et al.s (2000) model, they allow the dictator to choose the split of output
between consumption and investment. Robinson (2000) models the increase of
domestic capital (infrastructure) as raising the risks for dictators, so, generally,
it is in their interest to retard development. As a result, predatory rulers are
characterized by a small provision of public investment14 . The logic in many
models (Barro, 1990; Robinson, 2000) is to consider government overall capture,
14See also Robinson (1995).
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Rt, as
Rt = Yt   gt
where gt stands for public investment, Yt for total output at time t and, obvi-
ously,  represents the tax rate . The expression is better approximated by using
government consumption, for which, besides, a more complete series of data is
available (see below). Furthermore, it is worth noting that public investment
may be subject to corruption and to the logic of white elephants, that is, the
engagement in huge investment projects aimed at making redistribution credible
but actually with negative social surplus (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Robinson
and Torvik, 2005).
According to our own specication, then, it may well be that the variables
so far identied and used to explain growth under dictators rule might have
also an e¤ect on government consumption but with the opposite sign. Thus,
security should have a positive e¤ect on public consumption, while sensitivity
as well as the likelihood of judicial accountability should reduce it.
The dependent variable is government consumption as a percentage of the
GDP and covers the 1960-2000 period. Once considering only authoritarian
regimes, the total amount of observations is 2690 and the sample mean is 15:23
(s.d.= 7:34)15 .
[Table 8.5]
Table 8.5 shows the results of the regressions and, indeed, the patterns ap-
pear to be coherent with the results of the growth models above, namely, the
15The number of observations of the variable capital expenditure (as a percentage of the
GDP), usually taken to gauge the level of public investment, in the World Development
Indicators database is less than half than those of consumption.
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e¤ect is just the opposite for all the dimensions of accountability under study.
In addition, in the model detailed in the third column, in which we have again
included the institutional dummies in the analysis, the results obtained are con-
sistent with those found in the growth regressions. The coe¢ cient for multiple
institutionsis negative and signicant, indicating that dictators allowing such
a degree of inclusiveness consume, on average, 2:30 percentage points less than
rulers who banned or closed all kind of institutions. The e¤ect of a single insti-
tution is quite strong and negative as well, ^ =  1:11, but it is not statistically
signicant. Neither was it in the growth models.
Column 1 in Table 8.6 conrms the type of e¤ect identied in Table 8.3 for
growth16 . Our alternative measure of security performs as expected, exerting a
strong negative e¤ect on consumption, while the rest of the variables perform
consistently to the results in Table 8.5. In column 2 we introduced the dummies
for institutions getting again coherent results with those in the previous table,
that is, the greater the degree of institutionalization, the lower the level of
consumption by the government.
[Table 8.6]
16Again, to keep the table small we have supressed the coe¢ cients of the control variables,
which basically follow the same specication that appears in Table 8.5.
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8.4 The E¤ect of Institutions under Authoritar-
ianism
8.4.1 E¤ects on Economic Growth
Do institutions e¤ectively constrain rulers under authoritarian regimes? The
previous section has clearly shown that most of the variables explaining the
existence of institutions have some kind of e¤ect on economic growth at the
leadership level and that institutions seem to play a role as well. The bias of
including institutions in the right hand side of the regression equation may stem
from observable factors then. Nonetheless, unobservable factors should not be
neglected. Suppose that leaders who have the will of allowing a greater level of
inclusiveness and representation within regime structures are also more prone to
self-restrain their voracity and engage in growth promoting policies17 . In that
case, an unobservable variable would be a¤ecting both our independent variable
and the dependent one so, again, the estimates of the e¤ect of institutions
would be biased. This is the reason why institutions and their e¤ect need a
more careful examination. Hence, we rely again on the methodology employed
in Chapter 5 to estimate the revenue models. We start with a simple barebones
model assuming a production function of the following form18
Y = r(KL)
where r denotes the level of technology, K stands for capital stock, and L
represents the size of the labor force. Accordingly,  and  gauge the e¢ ciency
17 In terms of the model in Chapter 4, it might well be that aD and growth were correlated.
18We have suppressed, for simplicity, the i and t subscripts.
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of capital and labour, respectively. The model is estimated in its growth form
and augmented by the Mills ratios, , for each degree of institutionalization j,
where j 2 f0; 1; 2g, to get the corresponding unbiased coe¢ cients with which
the counterfactuals can be estimated for the whole sample
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where  and  are now the estimated coe¢ cients which capture the e¤ect of
the growth of capital stock,
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, and the labour force,
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
,  is the coe¢ cient
of the lambdas for each group j, while the increases in technology become the
regression constant19 .
The empirical evidence provided in Chapters 4 and 7 has allowed us to clas-
sify dictatorial institutions into a three dimensional space, according to which
we can predict which ones will present higher growth rates (following the pre-
dictions of Table 3.4 in Chapter 3). Figure 8.2 graphically shows the expected
patterns. If the relative importance of the sensitivity and judicial account-
ability dimensions is, as assumed, greater than security, then regimes with a
single institution would present higher growth rates than non-institutionalized
regimes. Furthermore, given that fully institutionalized dictatorships present
better conditions for growth than the rest of the regime subtypes, it can be
argued than, potentially, a > b, as shown in the gure, that is, the di¤erences
between fully institutionalized regimes and the rest can be anticipated to be
bigger than those probably existing between regimes with a single institution
and those with none20 .
19See Przeworski et al. (2000) and Vreeland and Przeworski (2000) for similar specications.
20The results detailed in the previous section (Table 8.2 and 8.3) did already adjust to this
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[Figure 8.2]
In Table 8.7 we can appreciate both the observed and the selection corrected
averages -and their respective standard deviations- using alternative estimation
methods and specications. The dependent variable is real GDP growth. The
general pattern observed in both kinds of averages is the same and follows the
trend depicted in Figure 2, that is, the higher the degree of institutionalization,
the higher the growth rate of the economy. Nevertheless, it is when we control
for selection that the specic di¤erences between averages that we expected to
observe emerge.
[Table 8.7]
The di¤erences between the observed averages are almost marginal, although
we certainly can observe that the predicted distances between averages follow
the pattern described above. None of the di¤erences between these means is
statistically signicant though. The distances get broader after controlling for
selection, as said. It is in these cases were one can fully appreciate that, as
expected, a > b, that is, fully institutionalized regimes perform much better, in
economic terms, than the other two kind of dictatorial subtypes. Concretely, in
Table 8.8, where the di¤erences between means are reported, it can be easily
checked that, irrespective of the estimation method and the variables included
in the model, numbers in column 3 are bigger than those in column 1, given
that column 3 gauges a and column 1 measures b21 .
Furthermore, Table 8.8 reports the results of the t-tests on the equality of
hypothesis.
21Obviously, given that a > b, it follows that a > c, where c stands for the di¤erences
between the non-institutionalized and fully institutionalized regimesaverages, as c = a+ b.
8.4. THE EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONS UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM243
means22 . As can be observed, the t-statictics for the di¤erences between fully-
institutionalized regimes and the other two sub-samples are signicant at the
maximum level (0:01) in all cases, even after augmenting the model by including
the (log) initial income per capita or the lag of the log of income per capita.
The net e¤ect of institutions is quite big in this case. Having a legislature and
multiple parties entails growing more than one percentage point per year than
the other forms of regime organization.
On the other hand, the mean comparisons between non-institutionalized
regimes and those with a single institution are only signicant in two of the
results reported, specically, the two obtained by using a xed-e¤ects estimator
and one of them after including the lagged log of income per capita on the
right-hand side of the equation. In the rest of the gures, the di¤erences remain
relatively low and not signicant, at about  0:238 on average.
[Table 8.8]
The results we got from the regressions in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, therefore,
were not misleading at all. There the dummy capturing fully institutionalized
regimeswas signicant and exerted a considerable positive e¤ect on economic
performance. The coe¢ cient was about 1:6, very close to the estimates in col-
umn 2 of Table 8.7. Regarding the single institutiondummy, the selection-
corrected estimates yield smaller e¤ects than those in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, how-
ever, the general pattern remains, the e¤ect is positive, less than one and, in
general, not statistically signicant.
22The data have been treated as unpaired and with unequal variances.
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8.4.2 E¤ects on Government Consumption
Previously in this chapter we proved that the alternative accountability dimen-
sions are strong determinants not only of growth but also of the level of gov-
ernment consumption. We now proceed to study the e¤ect of institutions using
the same kind of Heckmans two-step methodology to correct for non random
selection, as we did for economic performance.
Table 8.9 reports both the observed as well as the selection-corrected aver-
ages for each type of institutional combination. The second stage regressions
include control variables usually considered in studies of the size of the pub-
lic sector such as the surface of the country, age dependency ratio, GDP per
capita, share of agricultural sector in GDP, urban population, trade openness,
presence of natural resources, and ethnic fractionalization23 . The dependent
variable is government consumption as a percentage of the GDP, which covers
the 1960-2000 period. The models, given the yearly nature of the data, use
lagged dependent variable and AR1 corrections to deal with likely autocorrela-
tion problems of the dependent variable.
[Table 8.9]
As one can appreciate, the di¤erences, once corrected for selection, are rel-
atively small, but, as detailed in Table 8.10, generally signicant and follow
the order we hypothesized. Having existed under the very same conditions,
authoritarian regimes with a bigger share of resources devoted to government
consumption are those without any institutional constraint, about 14:60 of the
GDP, while fully institutionalized regimes consume the least, just about 13:5 of
23See, among may others, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), Boix (2001) and Annett (2001).
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the GDP.
[Table 8.10]
Therefore, the results previously presented in the models in Tables 8.5 and
8.6 that included the dummies for institutions were not misleading at all, al-
though the estimated coe¢ cients were somewhat higher. Correcting for selection
informs us that the actual e¤ect is consistent -and signicant- but lower than
those found in those multivariate regressions.
8.5 Mechanisms of Accountability and Develop-
ment
How do the distinct mechanisms of accountability relate to growth? In other
words, how does the capacity of each of the actors to threat and punish the
dictator a¤ect his policy and the economic results? The question requires to
hypothesize about the preferences of each of these actors with respect to devel-
opment policy.
Group strength might determine to which of these social sectorsdemands
should the dictator pay more attention. Consequently, as the power of the mid-
dle and working classes becomes politically relevant, and so does their capacity
to impose a more credible threat on the dictators position, the better the rulers
policy choices can be expected to be with respect to the welfare of the general
population. This is the logic underlying the models in which public goods are
necessary to all citizens and there exists the threat of a revolution (Grossman,
1991; Grossman and Noh, 1994; Robinson, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003). Under authoritarianism, the principal must rely on the only instrument
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at her disposal (the power to remove the autocrat from o¢ ce by means of revo-
lutions, protests or guerrilla warfare) to provide the incumbent with incentives
to exert a costly e¤ort on her behalf.
With regard to the elites, the assignation of preferences is not so evident.
Elites may be interested in both retarding and fostering development depend-
ing on the economic context. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) claim, landed
elites attempt to block industrialization because it may entail a threat to their
political power, what particularly occurs when political rents are higher and
when monopoly prots from blocking are greater as well. In contrast, in indus-
trialized societies, elite power will translate in higher pressure for investment
and the adoption of better technologies. Thus, under these alternative settings,
a higher power of the elite could lead to diverging results in terms of economic
performance.
As for the military, do they act as a constraining force for rulers? There are
two opposed views concerning the role of the military on development24 . Some
decades ago, many social scientists considered the military a modernizing force.
Levys (1966) proposal was that the military provide societies with enormous
levels of stability and control and, hence, modernization through the following
mechanisms: Providing channels for social mobility, being a rationally based
organization and technology improvements. Likewise, Pye (1962) suggested
that the modernization of military organizations should produce spillover e¤ects
through their technology improvements.
Posterior studies have largely criticized this naive view by raising two basic
arguments. First, it is argued that, although possibly concerned about develop-
24See Kaldor (1976) for a review.
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ment, o¢ cer corps are unlikely to have the adequate political and economical
skills to pursue the correct economic policies (see, for instance, McAlister,
1966). And secondly, once in o¢ ce military governments are more likely to be
concerned about improving and securing their own status and conditions, in-
creasing, as a result, the size of military expenditures and reducing the amount
of productive investment.
Under authoritarianism, the armed forces may act as a compensating force
which could induce the ruler to curb his greed. Regarding its monitoring func-
tion, Kimenyi and Mbaku point out that military leaders assure that compet-
itive interest groups do not develop modes of behavior that are detrimental to
state security. Activities of such groups are carefully monitored by military
elites to ensure that none develops enough violence potential to capture the
government (1995: 701). Likewise, addressing the explicit preferences of the
military as an institution, the early literature on military intervention a¢ rmed
that what the armed forces hate the most is social unrest and mobilization
within the country (ODonnell, 1973), therefore they generally seize power with
the purpose of re-establishing order once it is clear that the incumbent govern-
ment is incapable to do so (Finer, 1976; Nordlinger, 1977). Indeed, Galetovic
and Sanhueza (2000) show that coup attempts are more likely when there is
widespread discontent against the incumbent ruler. Excessive rent-seeking may
trigger military intervention with the aim of preventing social conict.
Our data permit us to o¤er preliminary empirical evidence using the models
on the mechanisms of accountability reported in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.2). Tak-
ing the predicted odds of each of the mechanisms of accountability and averaging
them for a given dictators tenure we can get a general rudimentary measure of
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the relative strength of each of the political actors. We introduce those averages
into simple regression models with the aim of testing the theoretical intuitions
detailed above.
[Table 8.11]
The change in the elite preferences has been controlled by introducing an
interactive term which is the result of multiplying the measure of elite strength
with the level of development proxied by the GDP per capita and the value
added of agriculture as a percentage of the GDP. The intention is to test whether,
from a certain level of development and industrialization, a higher elite power
turns to exert a positive e¤ect on the growth rate of the economy.
The results show some interesting trends that could guide future research.
Keeping in mind that we have used predicted variables, the results are strong
and their explanatory power, albeit relatively modest, is relevant. We can ap-
preciate that the organizational capacity of the potential popular opposition
always leads to higher growth rates as a consequence of increased e¢ cacy in
the control of the rulers decisions. In order to defuse such tension, the ruler
must resort to the delivery of public goods as private ones can not reach broad
social sectors (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002, 2003). Nonetheless, the collective
action and coordination problems associated to popular movements explain the
low frequency of events such as revolution and massive protests (see the fre-
quencies in Table 6.1), which, at the same time, makes the e¤ect of opposition
strength smaller than that of other actors, although it is highly signicant.
Regarding the other two groups, there are similarities but also di¤erences
that merit comment. When no interactive term is included in the models, the
overall e¤ect of the elite power on development is clearly negative (see columns
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1, 2, 5 and 6). Regardless of dictatorsown preferences, rulersaccountability to
political and economic elites worsens the prospects for development. The logic
of the process was perfectly explained by Brough and Kimenyi:
When the dictator comes to power he does so through the help of
a small number of supporters who hope to gain from the leadership of
the dictator. The dictator maintains the coalition by distributing not
only direct monetary transfers, but also appointments to managerial
positions in government enterprises. Through such activities the
dictator is able to maintain a stable government(1986: 41)
The discretionary power and lack of skills lead to ine¢ ciency and the extrac-
tion of public rents. The greater the power of the elite, the higher the rewards.
At the same time, landed elitespower is higher when the agricultural sector
represents a large proportion of the economys whole production. However, this
situation can be reversed as models in columns 3 and 4 make clear. As a result
of including the interaction between development and elite power (model 3) the
coe¢ cient for elite power is
 1(Elite power) + 2(Log GDP per capita  Elite power) =
( 1 + 2  (Log GDP per capita))Elite power =
( 7:29 + 0:805  (Log GDP per capita))Elite power
which is positive when the log of GDP per capita is higher than 7:290:805  9,
that is, when GDP per capita is higher than $8500. The logic is the same when
considering the interaction with the share of the agricultural sector. As this
sector increases its weight within the economy, so does the power of the elite to
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block development.
The nature and preferences of the elite members change with development
and even though cronyism may be still extensive its consequences over growth
policy can be diametrically opposed. Take the well-known case of South Korea.
There, as Kang (2002) defends, the organizational strength of the industrial
business elite (chaebol) combined with the state control over nance created a
situation of mutual hostages. In exchange of credit, the government received
a constant ow of funds. In addition, previous regime change was led by social
protest so citizen strength was high by that time (Kim, 1996).
The overall e¤ect of military power on growth is positive and signicant (see
model 2). The interactive terms shows that, at very low levels of development,
military power is as predatory as elite leverage. Nevertheless, the reversal occurs
quite soon in development (after applying the same procedure as above), and
the two models (columns 5 and 6) yield almost the same turning point, 7, that is,
about $1100. This is why the positive sign on the general specication prevails.
Note too that these general results are fully consistent with the relation we
found between group strength and the dictatorspost-exit scenarios. In Table
7.8 we showed that the strength and, hence, the leading role of each group in
the process of leader substitution has an important impact in determining the
fate of the outgoing ruler. Concretely, it was proved that dictatorspunishment
is much more likely if the power of the military or the citizen opposition is high,
while if the elite leads the process the most likely result is that the deposed
ruler remains in the country unpunished. If the autocrat, as we have repeat-
edly detailed and empirically demonstrated, wants to prevent such post-tenure
sanctions and avoid being toppled, growth policy must improve. Consequently,
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military and opposition power should lead to higher growth rates, as they cer-
tainly do according to our results.
8.6 Conclusions
Accountability constraints on dictators or authoritarian governments are den-
itively e¤ective. As made clear by the formal model at the beginning of this
dissertation, accountability, be it political or judicial, is held to be one of the
political foundations for economic development(Bates, 2006: 31). This main
contention has received empirical support throughout this chapter for the con-
crete case of authoritarian regimes. The variables determining rulerslevels of
security and sensitivity have, in general, strong e¤ects on income per capita
growth; similarly, the likelihood of judicial accountability makes growth rates
increase. Furthermore, the signs of the variables are consistent with the predic-
tions derived from the formal model. Thus, those factors that increase (decrease)
the structural level of security of any dictator make the rate of growth of the
economy shrink (increase). For example, we found that regime history matters,
as well as the type of ruler and the number of dictatorial neighbors.
Regarding sensitivity, the two variables that make dictators less dependent
on cooperative taxation, resources and aid, both have strong negative e¤ects on
economic performance. Both variables signicantly reduce the level of rulers
sensitivity to extraction -as shown in previous chapters- and, accordingly, they
are proved to be extremely harmful for growth.
Finally, the parameter gauging the likelihood of punishment as a result of
losing power has been found to have a strong positive e¤ect on growth as it
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makes the utility of remaining in o¢ ce relative to that of losing it augment (as
detailed in Chapter 7).
These patterns are also relevant in determining the level of government con-
sumption at the leadership level but with the opposite sign, that is, in this
case, the less the accountability, the bigger de share of GDP consumed by the
government.
The second part of the chapter was fully devoted to explore the e¤ect of
dictatorial institutions using Heckmans two-step methodology to control for
the conditions under which these institutions exist or are created. The averages
of the counterfactuals generated showed that institutions e¤ectively constrain
rulers in terms of accountability and do e¤ect growth and government consump-
tion. Concretely, the higher the degree of institutionalization of an authoritarian
regime, the higher the growth rate is and the lower the percentage of government
consumption.
In the last section we have taken an alternative approach based on social
conict and group strength as reected in the overall probability of a given
mechanism of accountability taking place. The relative power of political groups
have important e¤ects on growth. Opposition strength translates into better
economic performance as those without chances of receiving any private good
are better endowed to e¤ectively hold rulers accountable to general welfare.
Elite power has an overall negative and very relevant impact on income growth,
however, once this e¤ect is conditioned by the level of development, it turns out
that, from a certain level of modernization, elite power exerts a positive e¤ect on
economic performance. This result could help us to understand the occurrence
of some developmental miracles.
Chapter 9
Conclusions. Holding
Dictators Accountable
9.1 A Summary of the Theoretical Questions
and Propositions
There have been almost as many authoritarian governments that did well in
terms of economic performance as governments that did tremendously bad. Al-
though corruption is a common feature under dictatorship, in some cases it
was so widespread and exercised at such a high level that made growth rates
dramatically shrink. However, the political science literature on authoritar-
ian regimes has tended to respond to that fact by either classifying dictatorial
regimes according to their results (in terms of repression or economic success) or
by assuming that di¤erent rulers have distinct goals they want to pursue while
being in power. On the other hand, economic literature dealing with the preda-
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tory state do not provide us with the comparative statics necessary to derive
hypotheses or, in some cases, it neglects the fact that time-preferences should
be made endogenous.
This dissertation was aimed at o¤ering a general answer to that variability
in economic results. We have focused in a common set of political-economic
constraints to dictators who seek to maximize self-enrichment. As long as these
constraints are binding, rent extraction will remain low and the economy will
grow. Specically, our approach has situated accountability at the core of devel-
opment by developing a general theory of accountability under dictatorship and
studying the e¤ects of dictatorial institutions in accordance to their associated
levels of accountability.
To do so, we have rst developed a new and broad theoretical framework
and a set of models, whose main theoretical propositions and hypotheses are re-
viewed in the following subsections. The next sections summarize the empirical
evidence reported in order to support our hypotheses.
9.1.1 Modelling Accountability: Types and Dimensions
Dictatorial regimes are essentially characterized by power concentration and
the centralization of the decision-making process. From this assumption, hence,
many could arguably assert that their leaders remain largely unaccountable.
However, if one thinks of accountability in broad terms and pays closer attention
to how authoritarian regimes work, the need to study the conditions that may
increase the levels of control or autonomy under such regimes becomes not only
unavoidable but central to properly comprehend policy choices and economic
performance.
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In fact, the study of accountability and its determinants is a growing eld
both in political science as well as in economics. The task, though, is far from
being complete. As Ho¤man and Gibson correctly put it, this new explicitly
political approach to development demands that development practitioners un-
derstand not only the link between accountability and development but, more
importantly, the causes of that accountability(2006: 2).
A basic denition of accountability is o¤ered by Manin, Przeworski and
Stokes:
Governments are accountable if citizens can discern represen-
tative from unrepresentative governments and can sanction them
appropriately, retaining in o¢ ce those incumbents who perform well
and ousting from o¢ ce those who do not (1999: 10).
Note that within this concrete denition there is no assumption about whether
governments must be democratic or not, or whether those aforementioned sanc-
tions must stem from the holding of competitive elections and the application
of a retrospective voting rule. In fact, Maravall (2005) has properly noted that
even under democracy, accountability may take place at two alternative levels.
One, that of voters and elections, and two, that of party or coalition members.
And as he claims, voters do not always share the criteria of politicians for
rewarding or punishing incumbents(Maravall, 2005: 29).
Dictators might be sanctioned as well and lose power. They can be over-
thrown through di¤erent ways too although, generally, they are more costly
than just casting a vote into a ballot box every four or ve years. Coups, revo-
lutions, plots, palace putschs are just some of the ways by which authoritarian
rulers may be deposed. Autocrats face a probability of being overthrown in the
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next period which depends on his own policy choices. Time preferences are thus
made endogenous. This is the way in which we have modelled political account-
ability in a general two-period model of growth in which the ruler maximizes
rents by choosing the rate of rent-extraction applied onto householdsincome.
We adopted a general simple form for this accountability function
Pr(survival) = A B
where, obviously, 0  (A B)  1. The function consists of two parameters
and one variable,  , that is, the rate of extraction (generally called the tax rate)
chosen by the autocrat. The two parameters capture two di¤erent dimensions of
political accountability, security (A) and sensitivity (B). The former gauges the
structural level of security that a given dictator enjoys in power independently of
the performance of the economy or his level of plunder. On the other hand, the
extent to which the tax rate,  , a¤ects the dictatorsprobability of remaining
in power is determined by the sensitivity parameter, B, which is, hence, the
coe¢ cient for the variable  . Sensitivity relates to what has been termed the
scal theories of governance, which contend that when citizen cooperation is
not needed for revenue to be raised, governments have fewer incentives to defer
to their interests. The characterization of these two dimensions permits to
specify the causal mechanisms through which accountability a¤ects economic
performance under authoritarianism.
Furthermore, there exists another type of accountability, which we have gen-
erally named judicial accountability. Whereas political accountability serves to
determine whether rulers are going to lose power or not, judicial accountability
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measures or classies what the consequences of losing power are for the outgoing
dictator or head of government. We have done so by introducing the parameter
Uexit -the exit value- into the model, which measures the utility that the auto-
crat obtains as a consequence of -or after- being unseated or handing over power.
In some cases losing power does not entail a bad result per se for a dictator. For
instance, in case he is able to ee the country and exile, a ruler may be able to
enjoy the rents accumulated during his tenure without facing any responsibility
for his past misdeeds. We study the consequences for economic performance of
the variability in the rulerspost-exit fate.
9.1.2 Hypotheses and Predictions
The development of the formal model, as done in Chapter 3, had a very specic
goal, namely, getting concrete hypotheses through the development of compar-
ative statics exercises with regard to the di¤erent elements contained in the
political accountability function and to the judicial accountability parameter.
We have been able to prove that, under all types of functions (excepting the
exponential one), the expected e¤ects of the political accountability parameters
on growth are as follows:
 As A increases, so does the overall level of dictators security, that is,
he faces lower probabilities of being toppled by whatever actor and, as a
result, the security parameter only inuences positively the likelihood of
staying in power in t + 1 and getting rents. So, more structural security
allows the autocrat to extract at higher rates and, consequently, it harms
economic performance.
 Through the sensitivity parameter, B, the extraction rate a¤ects the prob-
258CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS. HOLDING DICTATORS ACCOUNTABLE
ability of staying in o¢ ce and, therefore, the time preference of the au-
tocrat. This e¤ect forces him to trade o¤ self-enrichment at present time
with survival and more rents in the future. The lower the sensitivity, the
weaker the trade-o¤ the dictator has to face and, as a result, the higher
the level of graft and the lower the growth.
 In contrast, if the accountability function takes an exponential form, the
prediction for security changes. Under this alternative setting, more se-
curity involves a lower tax rate and, thereby, a higher growth rate. The
e¤ect of sensitivity remains unaltered, though.
 Regarding the post-exit value, Uexit, the results obtained from the simula-
tions are clear. The better-o¤ the dictator gets to be after leaving power,
the fewer reasons he has to restrain his propensity to self-enrich while in
o¢ ce. Nonetheless, in Chapter 7 we relaxed the assumption that these
post-exit scenarios are xed; instead, we assumed that there are only two
scenarios, one bad, such as punishment, and one good, such as to remain
unpunished in the country, which happen with probability q and 1   q,
respectively. Knowing that the lower the post-exit utility a dictator gets
after losing power is, the lower his level of plunder will be, it logically fol-
lows that the greater the probability q that the outgoing dictator gets this
low utility, the lower the level of rent-extraction will be, as the simulations
e¤ectively show.
After developing the general model, we moved to explore more in depth the
mechanisms of accountability to which dictators are subject with the aim of de-
veloping concrete hypotheses about the determinants of the two dimensions of
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political accountability, security and sensitivity, which were taken as exogenous
in the previous general growth model (see Chapter 4). The simple bargaining
model developed there has yielded three main insights to be put under empirical
scrutiny. First of all, the exogenous determinants of security are to be found
in the variables a¤ecting the relative strength of both the elite and the citizen
opposition groups. On the other hand, sensitivity levels are driven by the avail-
ability of non-cooperative rents such as non-tax revenues, taxes on international
trade and foreign aid.
The rest of the chapter was devoted to nd clues among the existing lit-
erature about what the determinants of the relative strength of the elite, the
military and the opposition groups might be. Specically, we proposed that to
keep the elitesloyalty when no cooperative rents are obtained, the rulers must
resort to distribute perks and privileges through a single institution system.
We also predicted that elite strength may be lower in monarchies where power
legitimacy hinges on tradition and dynastic descent. Furthermore, rulers may
nd themselves more secure in power as the legitimacy gained though their anti-
colonial activism might well prevent other elite members from plotting against
him. Moreover, external dependence and past instability are pointed by the lit-
erature to be major determinants of military interventions into politics, whereas
recent independence from colonial domination may inhibit it. Finally, regard-
ing citizen opposition, its organizational capacity is expected to be inuenced
by the following factors: Their initial organizational strength, which will be
greater if the previous regime was a democracy; the di¢ culties posed by a big
proportion of authoritarian regimes in the region; the support o¤ered by for-
eign democratic governments; the degree of ethnic fractionalization, which may
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hinder group coordination, and the creation of a multi-party system.
9.1.3 Dictatorial Institutions
The model in Chapter 4 allowed us to advance the determinants and expected
e¤ects on revenues and accountability of authoritarian institutions, that is, leg-
islatures, single-parties and multi-party systems. So far the main contributions
to the theory of authoritarian regimes have paid little or none attention to insti-
tutions1 , assuming that they were simply a democratic façade with no practical
function or real e¤ect on any policy outcome. However, we have hypothesized
the opposite idea: Institutions may play a role, even under dictatorial regimes,
since they a¤ect the underlying levels of accountability of dictators.
As already noted by Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), institutions under dic-
tatorship serve to coopt potential opposition and to mobilize economic support
in the form of tax compliance. Consequently, they are predicted to exist un-
der some specic conditions: The increasing benets of mobilizing cooperation
when aid or primary commodities are scarce lead the elite as well as the ruler
to accept a more open institutional system, while the organizational capacity
allows each of the actors that represent a credible threat to dictators stability
in o¢ ce to push for a more favorable policy outcome.
At the same time, institutions are associated to certain levels of both security
and sensitivity given that they are partly the result of the variables determin-
ing both dimensions of political accountability. The hypotheses regarding this
connection are the following: The relation between institutionalization and sen-
sitivity is straightforward and predicted to be monotonic, that is, the greater
1See Brooker (2000) for an excellent and exhaustive review of this literature.
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the inclusiveness of regimes institutions the higher the level of control and inu-
ence over policy o¤ered by the ruling elite. Security shows a di¤erent pattern,
though. It increases with a certain degree of institutionalization but it then
decreases sharply, therefore, showing a parabolic shape.
9.1.4 The Potential Punishment of Outgoing Dictators:
Judicial Accountability
The Economist (December 16th-22nd, 2006) recently published an interesting
article entitled ending impunitywhich emphasized the growing international
concern for prosecuting former rulers with large records of human rights viola-
tions and outrageous corruption. The author points out the turning point that
Pinochets case represented for international law as well, explicitly recognizing
that until the Pinochet ruling, most [dictators] had managed to avoid being
brought to account.
In Chapter 7 we studied the parameter Uexit of the model, to which we re-
ferred as the judicial accountability of dictators because punishment may take
place for actions committed during their rule, namely, it describes the conse-
quences of losing power or the exercise of it in terms of welfare. Actually, in
that chapter we assumed that punishment occurs with probability q as a result
of losing power and, consequently, q is found to exert a positive e¤ect on the
expected rate of economic growth, as noted earlier.
We basically proposed there, with the help of simple game theory, that
the resulting post-exit scenarios are basically determined by two factors: The
strength of the outgoing dictator -or, inversely, the strength of the opposition-,
and by the international context. The potential strength of the outgoing ruler
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can force the opposition to pardon him under certain conditions. The dictator
will accept the punishment if he is weak and has little chance of being hosted if
he opts to exile; the ruler will also be tried if his chances of going into exile are
not very high. In contrast, if a successful escape is very likely, the opposition
may prefer to kill the ruler before he ees. Therefore, the international context
has two types of e¤ects. On the one hand, it may increase the chances of
punishment by o¤ering very good prospects of a successful exile. On the other
hand, if the probability of extradition is very high, the rulers utility of resisting
relative to that of eeing the country increases, which would indeed induce the
opposition to pardon him and let him stay in the country.
A new constructed variable has permitted us to test the hypotheses described
thereof. For all dictators who ruled between 1946 and 2000 and for whom
information has been found, we have coded whether, as a result of leaving
power, they were either punished (arrested or assassinated), were able to exile,
or were able to stay in their respective countries without facing any trial or
being charged during a certain period of time. The description of the data
showed a quite discouraging portrait as already remarked by the article in The
Economist, namely, most of the dictators (54.18 percent) have been able to
stay in the country without being punished once they are out of o¢ ce, whereas
23.5 percent have been able to avoid punishment by leaving their countries and
exiling. Only in 22.27 percent of the cases the outgoing ruler has been -more
or less severely- punished by means of a trial or execution. Moreover, we have
found that, contrary to what intuition may lead us to think, punishment is less
likely if the outgoing dictator is substituted by a democratic regime. Indeed,
only 13 out of the 88 rulers imprisoned or killed were prosecuted by successor
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democratic regimes.
9.2 The Empirics of Accountability and Institu-
tions
9.2.1 Institutions and Public Revenue
This dissertation contains several empirical parts covering the whole political
economy of accountability, institutions, revenue and growth under autocracy.
Chapter 5 deals with the endogeneity of institutions and the political economy
of revenue of authoritarian systems according to the theoretical contends devel-
oped in Chapter 4. Thus, Chapter 5 contains two empirical parts, the rst one
briey analyzes the determinants of institutions, and the second one studies the
e¤ect of institutions on revenue policy. Regarding dictatorial institutions, the
results conrm that when natural resources do not abound and/or aid is scarce,
authoritarian regimes must seek the economic cooperation of some social sectors
due to the fact that these other tax bases at their disposal involve higher ad-
ministrative costs and more extended free-riding possibilities for taxpayers. In
exchange, these regimes o¤er limited political organization and representation
within authoritarian institutions. At the same time, a stronger opposition is
able to press for more openness, holding everything else constant. Hence, the
potential organizational capacity of the citizen opposition increases the likeli-
hood of the creation or the allowance of broader institutions within the regime
structure. On the other hand, the preferences of the incumbent dictator may
matter as well. These preferences can be only partly approximated by consid-
ering the type of leader, that is, if the dictator is a civilian, a monarch or a
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member of the armed forces, but the rest remains unobservable.
The endogeneity of institutions has profound consequences on the method-
ological approach needed, as remarked in both the Chapters 1 and 5 of this
dissertation, when trying to study their e¤ect on any political or economic out-
come. The core of the empirical problem is the following: If either the observable
or unobservable determinants of institutions have any e¤ect on the dependent
variable (such as revenues), then estimating the e¤ect of institutions by ordinary
least squares would yield biased coe¢ cients. This problem has been solved by
using the Heckmans two-step model, whose basics are detailed in Chapter 5.
Concerning revenue, we had predicted, according to the model in Chapter 4,
that the opening of institutions would entail a benet in the form of economic
cooperation which would translate in higher taxes raised from incomes, prof-
its and gains, goods and services and other taxes requiring compliance (such
as taxes on property). The selection-corrected averages e¤ectively show that
non-institutionalized regimes basically rely on two sources of revenue: Taxes on
international trade and non-tax revenue. On the other hand, in more institu-
tionalized dictatorships the reliance on the alternative revenue streams is much
more balanced, collecting more or less the same percentage (on average) from
taxes on income, prots and capital gain, taxes on goods and services, taxes
on international trade and even non-tax revenues. The higher the degree of
institutionalization of the regime, the higher the percentage of taxes it is able
to collect from income, prots and gains, from goods and services, and from
property and payroll taxes.
9.2. THE EMPIRICS OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND INSTITUTIONS 265
9.2.2 Political Accountability
As insistently repeated throughout this research, political accountability, once
made endogenous, has two dimensions, security and sensitivity. Nonetheless,
these two concepts have their own determinants explaining their respective vari-
ability across rulers which must be studied in order to understand the primary
political-economic causes of the variability in economic performance across such
units.
After having proposed some theoretical hypotheses in Chapter 4, we dealt
with both the determinants of security and sensitivity at the empirical level and
how institutions are related to both dimensions by applying alternative models
of event history analysis (Chapter 6). The rst step consisted in analyzing the
determinants of the di¤erent mechanisms of accountability to which autocrats
may be subject: Substitutions or putschs triggered by the elite members, mil-
itary coups and popular protests. Secondly, we have examined the economic
conditions of sensitivity.
The distinction between alternative actors and, hence, technologies for re-
placing rulerspermitted us to acknowledge the factors a¤ecting security at a
ner grain thanks to the estimation of models for each type of accountability
mechanism. To do so, we have constructed a new variable which, for each dic-
tator or authoritarian government that ruled between 1946 and 2000, identies
and codes which actor was the leading one involved in the leadership change:
The power elite, the military, the opposition or some foreign country. With
regard to the independent variables, they intend to capture the factors specied
at the theoretical level in Chapter 4, that is, those potentially a¤ecting and
explaining groups organizational capacity and dictatorsstrength.
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The results of the econometric models showed how variables like the type
of head of government (civilian, military or monarch), the nature of the pre-
vious regime (either democratic or a colony), ethnic fractionalization, and the
international context (namely, the number of dictatorships in the region and
the proportion of democracies in the world) help to understand the structural
levels of security that dictators may enjoy during their tenure.
Secondly, we have studied the economic conditions of sensitivity. The ev-
idence shows that the existence of exportable resources, primary commodities
and foreign aid makes rulers insensitive to economic results and extraction since
cooperative rents become unnecessary for revenues to be raised, as detailed in
Chapter 5. Actually, the models analyzing the mechanisms of accountability
had already made clear that the presence of this sort of rents helps autocrats
to deactivate potential conicts arising from the popular sectors of society as
well as to keep elites loyal to the incumbent leadership. We have also run gen-
eral models of dictators survival to explore whether the overall e¤ect of the
alternative variables had the predicted signs and size.
The third and nal step has consisted in classifying regimes (according to
their level of institutionalization) according to their levels of political account-
ability in the two dimensional space dened by the dimensions of security and
sensitivity. Using alternative measures, dictators ruling regimes with multiple
institutions are found to be characterized by the highest levels of sensitivity and
the lowest levels of security of all institutional combinations. Regimes with a
single institution are the most secure of all, and less sensitive than regimes with
multiple institutions. Finally, non-institutionalized dictatorships are the most
insensitive of all and relatively secure (slightly less than regimes with a single
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institution).
9.2.3 Judicial Accountability
Using a new variable specically constructed for this research which codes
whether, as a result of leaving power, outgoing dictators were either punished
(arrested or assassinated), were able to exile, or were able to stay in their respec-
tive countries without being prosecuted, we have estimated multinomial models
in order to get the predicted odds of punishment for our sample of dictators.
Predicting the fate of dictators after leaving or being forced to leave power has
proved to be quite di¢ cult. Nonetheless, some very interesting insights can be
identied.
Our results show that international pressure in the form of a higher pro-
portion of democracies in the world does have contradicting e¤ects. Actually,
a higher number of democracies is related to a lower probability of judicial
accountability, in the short term at least. On the other hand, strategic con-
siderations by the opposition forces determine the fact that when more dicta-
torships exist in the region, the lower the probabilities of exile and the higher
those of imprisonment or assassination are. Exports of natural resources (oil or
commodities) increase the chances of exile of a given authoritarian ruler. Accu-
mulated rents and international alliances or interestedfriendships may be the
causes behind this fact. As we also predicted, military rulers are those with a
lower probability of su¤ering any kind of accountability measure due to their
power to use force to take over power again, while the highest probability of
exiling corresponds to monarchs.
With regard to the institutional arrangements, the empirical evidence demon-
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strates that rulers with fully institutionalized regimes are those who will face
a higher probability of some kind of punishment once deposed. These regimes,
thus, are shown to be the most weak in transitional terms, that is, in their
capability to impose some sort of conditions to maintain or protect the outgo-
ing elite. On the contrary, dictators governing single institution regimes have
been proved to be the most secure in o¢ ce in previous chapters; this security
translates in a better position to negotiate a favorable exit. A similar pattern is
observed for non-institutionalized regimes, whose rulers are the most likely to
stay in their countries.
Our multinomial logistic models based on the actorsrole in the leader sub-
stitution -which capture the strength of the opposition and the regime- indicate
that when leader changes are the result of military or citizen force, the like-
lihood of punishment increases. The former tend to resort to imprisonment
(which does not preclude posterior execution), while the latter to assassination
in haste.
9.3 The Political Economy of Economic Growth
under Autocracy
In the nal step of this research we dealt with economic growth and put to-
gether all the elements developed so far (see Chapter 8). Our main ndings
could be summarized as follows: Accountability constraints posed on dictators
or authoritarian governments are denitively e¤ective, and they are e¤ective
because help to improve the economic results of autocratic governments.
The empirical evidence has been divided into two parts, as done throughout
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the whole empirical parts of this dissertation. The rst part, as usual, deals
with the e¤ects of the exogenous determinants of accountability on performance
at the leadership level; whereas the second one analyzes the specic e¤ects of
institutions.
9.3.1 Accountability, Autocratic Leaders and Growth
The variables determining rulerslevels of security and sensitivity have, in gen-
eral, strong e¤ects on income per capita growth; similarly, the likelihood of
judicial accountability makes growth rates increase. Furthermore, the signs of
the variables are consistent with the predictions derived from the formal model.
Thus, those factors that increase (decrease) the structural level of security of
any dictator make the rate of growth of the economy shrink (augment). For
example, we found that regime history matters, as well as the type of ruler and
the number of dictatorial neighbors.
Concerning sensitivity, the two variables that make dictators less depen-
dent on cooperative taxation, resources and aid, have strong negative e¤ects on
economic performance. Both variables signicantly reduce the level of rulers
sensitivity to extraction -as shown in previous chapters- and, accordingly, they
are proved to be extremely harmful for growth. Likewise, the parameter gauging
the likelihood of punishment as a result of losing power has been found to have
a strong positive e¤ect on growth as it makes the utility of remaining in o¢ ce
relative to that of losing it augment, thereby to retain power, extraction must
be reduced (as detailed in Chapter 7).
These very same political-economic variables have also been found to matter
in determining the level of government consumption -the unproductive share of
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the government- at the leadership level but with the opposite sign, that is, in
this case, the lower the accountability, the bigger the share of GDP consumed by
the government. Concretely, more security translates into a bigger share of GDP
consumed; more insensitivity has the same result, while a higher probability of
punishment reduces it.
9.3.2 Institutionalization and Economic Performance
The e¤ect of institutions needs a careful examination, so the second part of
Chapter 8 was devoted to explore the e¤ect of dictatorial institutions on growth
using Heckmans two-step methodology to control for the conditions under which
these institutions exist or are created. The evidence reported in Chapters 6 and 7
o¤ered us a three dimensional classication of the institutional variations accord-
ing to both political and judicial accountability. Briey, non-institutionalized
systems are found to be the less sensitive of all, while presenting relatively high
levels of security and granting the lowest probability of post-exit punishment.
Regimes with a single institution are the most secure ones, and present inter-
mediate levels of both sensitivity and judicial accountability likelihood. Finally,
fully institutionalized dictatorships, that is, those with a multi-party legisla-
ture, have the best preconditions for sustained growth; specically, they have
the highest levels of sensitivity (as they o¤er more leverage to opposition groups
in exchange for economic cooperation), the highest odds of punishment and the
lowest structural levels of security. As a result, fully institutionalized regimes
are clearly expected to present higher growth rates than the other two subtypes
of authoritarian regimes.
Regarding the other two -non-institutionalized systems and regimes with a
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single institution-, the remaining question is: Does the higher security found
in single institution systems outweigh the impact of sensitivity and judicial ac-
countability? If so, regimes with a single institution would show lower growth
rates than non-institutionalized ones. On the contrary, if sensitivity and judicial
accountability play a more decisive role in determining growth, then, dictator-
ships only partially institutionalized are predicted to grow at higher rates than
regimes without any institution. The comparative statics of the model already
hinted that it is actually sensitivity which exerts a stronger inuence, but it
needed to be proven. The selection-corrected averages reported in Chapter 8
showed that, e¤ectively, multi-party systems exhibit higher growth rates than
any other, and that those di¤erences are statistically signicant. However, the
mean comparisons between non-institutionalized regimes and those with a sin-
gle institution are only signicant in two of the results reported, specically,
those obtained by using a xed-e¤ects estimator and one of them after includ-
ing the lagged log of income per capita on the right-hand side of the equation. In
the rest of the gures, the di¤erences remain relatively low and not signicant.
The selection-corrected estimates of government consumption yield consistent
results as well. Hence, non-institutionalized systems are found to be those for
which the average level of public consumption is signicantly higher, whereas
fully institutionalized ones consume the least. Consequently, we can conclude
that formal institutions do matter, even under authoritarian regimes.
9.3.3 Mechanisms of Accountability and Development
In the last part of this dissertation we adopted a new tentative approach to
development, namely, the impact of structural group strength in shaping policy.
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We predicted that a higher strength of the opposition forces would be benecial
for growth as it increases the level of accountability of dictators. In contrast,
elite power was expected to exert a negative e¤ect on economic performance
due to increased rent-seeking. However, we have also taken into account the
possibility that a high level of modernization and industrialization may induce a
change in the preferences of elite members so their greater power could translate
into higher growth rates. Finally, military threat, acting as a monitoring force
willing to avoid social unrest, is predicted to lead the autocrat to adopt better
development policies. Besides, in Chapter 7 we had already showed that ousters
lead by the military or the opposition are more probable to end up with some
kind of punishment for the deposed ruler.
Through the construction of a new variable which codes the dictatorsmodes
of exit, we have been able to estimate the average odds that a given political
group (the elite, the military or the civil opposition) will oust the incumbent
dictatorial government, which provide us with a general measure of the organi-
zational strength and political power of each of them. This relative power has
been proven to have an important e¤ect on economic growth under authoritarian
government.
The results of simple growth regressions using alternative interactive terms
show that a stronger opposition as well as a higher military threat compel the
ruler to improve growth rates. In contrast, elite power is negative for growth,
although it turns positive when the country reaches a certain level of industri-
alization.
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9.4 About Mobutus, Somozas, Amins and Du-
valiers
There have been examples of all kind of dictators in the last fty years. Para-
noid, selsh, stubborn, egocentric, cruel and even relatively benevolent ones. A
ruler from Uganda proclaimed himself King of Scotland. And one who, looking
himself as the reincarnation of Napoleon, spent almost the whole annual budget
of his African Republic in his luxurious coronation ceremony as emperor.
However, these attitudes and personalities do not enter into our regressions
and, at best, are captured by the error term, so the starting point must be to
assume that all dictators make their decisions in concrete political-economic en-
vironments which might pose some (more or less binding) constraints on their
will to self-enrich. These constraints mark the basic di¤erences between eco-
nomic success and disaster. All in all, it seems that the time of outrageous
kleptocracy has come to an end. The most representative rulers embodying this
type of government style principally concentrated on the rst decades after the
Second World War and the period of numerous decolonizations in the context
of the Cold War, although many were able to extend their tenure well up to the
90s. It is within this concrete period that autocrats characterized by their ra-
pacity and widespread corrupt regimes became a terribly common phenomenon.
During the 50s or even earlier Anastasio Somoza (Nicaragua), François Duvalier
(Haiti), Mohammed Reza Pahlevi (Iran), Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic)
or Sukarno (Indonesia) took over power. In the 60s and the 70s we witnessed
the turn of Africa and the rise of its new postcolonial predatory rulers such as
Idi Amin (Uganda), Kamuzu Banda (Malawi), Tombalbaye (Chad), Ratsiraka
274CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS. HOLDING DICTATORS ACCOUNTABLE
(Madagascar), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire), Bokassa
(Central African Republic), and so on. The rest of the continents or regions did
not escape the emergence of such leaders and Asia saw , for instance, Suharto
(Indonesia) or Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines) becoming presidents; and in the
Middle East Saddam Hussein took control of Iraq. Some of them have become
well-known paradigms of bad governance and theft and even inspired novels.
The conditions were favorable for the emergence of such, using Chehabi
and Linzs (1998) terminology, sultanistic leaders for di¤erent reasons if we
attend to the causal mechanisms and arguments we have provided along this
research. The proportion of democracies in the world was small at the time,
under 0.5, and the wave of decolonizations made it actually sharply diminish;
and at the regional level, the presence of authoritarian regimes was, in some
places, crushing2 . Consolidating a new regime was considerably easy under that
circumstances where international pressure for democratization was practically
inexistent. To this we have to add that it was not until 1998 that, for the
rst time, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, approved in 1948, was actually enforced. The cases of dictators being
hold accountable, or simply punished, for their deeds during their tenure were
scarce, unless it was done by domestic forces. International law was not only
underdeveloped and lacked e¤ective enforceability mechanisms, but also few
countries were willing to apply them in the context of forming alliances and
supports due to Cold War increasing polarization.
Little or none previous democratic experience rendered the civil opposition
2 In some regions, the proportion of dictatorial regimes before 1960 or 1970 was almost 1,
such as in some parts of Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa. In others it was much bigger than 0.5,
such as in Latin America, Middle East and North Africa.
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to a weak position and easily subject to harsh repression by regime o¢ cial or
private forces. A poor and barely educated population without any external
support was relatively easy to control. Actually, some of these countries had re-
cently gained their independence after years of colonial administration from Eu-
ropean metropolises. Within generally articially designed borders, new leaders
were also able to manipulate ethnic diversity to divide their potential enemies.
Revenue was not a problem either. Natural resource and/or primary com-
modity abundance assured a constant ow of rents that allowed the government
to rule out citizen cooperation for the raising of income and other taxes and, as a
result, the need to open more representative institutions. When resources were
scarce, strategic alliances or former colonial links assured for some autocracies
tremendous amounts of foreign aid, which in some cases could represent more
than half of the annual government budget.
Strategic economic resources or sectors (such as co¤ee or sugar) were rapidly
conscated by rulers and his cronies or nationalized by the state. An alternative
strategy, specially in Latin America, consisted in allowing big foreign companies
to exploit and export such commodities in exchange of rents and monetary and
military aid from their respective governments. It was also common that such
cooperative autocrats were hosted by foreign allies or former colonial states
when there was no other way out for dictators than exiling and enjoy their loot.
A weak potential opposition and no need for economic cooperation rendered
institutionalization nearly useless and highly underdeveloped, reducing their role
to a pure distributive and controlling function rather than one of mobilization
and inclusion.
The emergence of multi-party authoritarian systems is a much recent phe-
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nomenon; although some of them appeared in the post-decolonization period
as a previous step to democratization, their existence was ephemeral and they
rapidly gave way to personalisms and one-party systems once regimes progres-
sively consolidated. This lack of institutionalization left the opposition with
little room and resources, although limited anyway, for organizing. Under these
conditions holding rulers accountable became a nearly impossible task. If, be-
sides, one adds greed to the mixture, the monster is ready to be unleashed.
The latest news from Zimbabwe seem to indicate that Robert Mugabe is
certainly willing to rediscover old political sultanistic styles as he tries to subvert
the post-colonial multi-party system. Some of the conditions are favorable for
such an attempt. Zimbabwe economic situation is rapidly deteriorating with
acute food shortages and ination of 1,700 per cent. Zimbabwe is endowed with
rich mineral resources and a primary-commodity exporter. Mugabe has been
Zimbabwes only ruler since the country was granted independence from Britain
in 1980 and after having had a leading role in the struggle for independence.
Some years ago Mugabe encouraged black people to take over white peoples
property as a way of thwart this group opposition against his regime. The
willing buyer, willing seller land reform program collapsed in 1997 after the
British government unilaterally decided to stop funding it on the basis that the
money allocated under the Thatcher administration had been used to purchase
land for members of the ruling elite and not landless peasants. As of September
2006, Mugabes family owns three farms (Higheld Estate in Norton, Iron Mask
Estate in Mazowe, and Foyle Farm in Mazowe renamed to Gushungo Farm
after Mugabes own clan name). These farms were expropriated forcibly from
their previous owners. The opposition is being harshly repressed, specially the
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leaders of the Movement for Democratic Change. The international community
has rapidly responded by condemning the attacks and economic sanctions were
approved in 2003. Elections are supposed to be held in 2008, but it has already
been proposed that Mugabes tenure should be extended for two years...
9.5 Further Research
The objective of comprehending to a large extent the functioning and policies of
authoritarian regimes is still far from complete, despite the fact that the amount
of literature devoted and the attention paid to such form of rule has vastly
increased in recent years. The rst obstacle is the availability of data. Although
large datasets covering almost all countries in the world for long periods of
time are increasingly at hand for researchers, the series about crucial political
aspects of policies such as public and private ownership, corruption, military and
uno¢ cial aid and spending are still incomplete or missing. We also lack general
and specic measures of repressiveness, which may be impossible to construct
due to the secrecy of such sensible information and its lack of reliability.
Patterns of accumulation and decisions on self-enrichment may vary accord-
ing to capital ownership. If assets come to be owned privately by rulers (for
example, as a result of expropriation), their decisions regarding rent maximiza-
tion may di¤er, resembling to a higher extent those of private rms rather than
those just a¤ecting revenue maximization by the state. The extension of the
series about state-owned enterprises should be of much help at this respect.
Concerning institutions, our knowledge, although increasing, may be still
incomplete. Although the classications of formal institutions, such as legisla-
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tures, has extremely improved, little is known about their internal functioning
and the conguration of other kind of institutions such as the judiciary, the
structure of the territorial administration and the bureaucracy.
Further research should then, apart from improving the quality of the data,
deepen our understanding of the determinants of the di¤erent mechanisms of
accountability present under di¤erent political systems and regimes as well as
to pay attention to their interaction in order to better comprehend the deter-
minants of political decisions and policy.
Appendix A
Denition of the Variables
and Sources
A.1 The Codebook
 Single institution: Dummy variable, coded 1 if either only one political
party, a legislature or both exist, 0 otherwise (Fronts are considered as a
single party). Compiled from Przeworski et al. (2000) and Gandhi (2004).
 Multiple institutions: Dummy variable, coded 1 if more than one political
party exists, 0 otherwise.
 Civilian: Dummy variable coded 1 if the e¤ective head of government is
civilian and 0 if the head is of either the military or of monarchy. Compiled
from Banks Political Handbook and other historical sources.
 Military: Dummy variable coded 1 if the e¤ective head is or ever was
a member of the military by profession, 0 if civilian or monarchy. Note
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that we code retired members of the military as military=1 since the
shedding of a uniform is not necessarily enough to indicate the civilian
character of a leader. Also note that we do not consider rulers who come
to power as head of guerilla movements as military. They are coded as
civilian or military=0. Compiled from Banks Political Handbook and
other historical sources.
 Democracy before: Dummy variable coded 1 if the previous regime was a
democratic one, 0 otherwise.
 Colony before: Dummy variable coded 1 if the previous regime was a
colony, 0 otherwise.
 British colony: Dummy variable coded 1 for every year in countries that
had been a British colony any time after 1919, 0 otherwise.
 Democracy share in the world: Other democracies in the world, percent-
age. Percentage of democratic regimes (as dened by regime) in the
current year (other than the regime under consideration) in the world.
Compiled from Przeworski et al. (2000).
 Regional share of dictatorships: Regional proportion of dictatorships (as
dened by regime) in the current year.
 Regime: Political Regime. Coded 1 if the current regime is a dictatorship
and 0 if it is a democracy. Compiled from Przeworski et al. (2000).
Updated by Cheibub and Gandhi (2004).
 Oil-producing country: Dummy variable coded 1 if the average ratio of
fuel exports to total exports in 1990-1993 exceeded 50%, 0 otherwise.
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This variable is time invariant. Source: IMF (1999) and Przeworski et al.
(2000).
 Primary commodity exporting country: Time invariant dummy variable
coded 1 if the average ratio of non-fuel primary products exports in 1990-
1993 exceeded 50% of total exports, 0 otherwise. Source: IMF (1999).
Updated.
 Past transitions to dictatorship: Sum of past transitions to authoritarian-
ism in a country. If a country experienced a transition to authoritarianism
before 1946, this variable was coded 1 in 1946. Compiled from Przeworski
et al. (2000).
 Moslem population: Percentage of Moslems in the population. This vari-
able lumps together the di¤erent strands of Islam, such as Sunni and
Shiite. Compiled from Przeworski et al. (2000).
 Aid: Foreign aid per capita. Source: World Development Indicators
(WDI).
 Ethnic fractionalization: Index of ethnic fractionalization. The index is
dened as: 1   ETHFRAC = 1  P p2i , i = 1; :::; I, where pi is the
proportion of the population belonging to ethno-linguistic group i and
I is the number of ethno-linguistic groups in the country. This index
measures the probability that two randomly selected persons from a given
country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group. So note that
to form the standard fractionalization index, it is necessary to subtract
the index from 1. This is a time invariant variable combining information
from both the Soviet ELF index and Fearon (2003).
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 Riots: Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens in-
volving the use of physical force. Source: Banks (1996).
 Demonstrations: Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for
the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to govern-
ment policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti
foreign nature. Source: Banks (1996).
 Population density: Population density. Source: WDI.
 Trade openness: Exports and imports as a share of GDP (both in 1985
international dollars). Source: OPEN in Penn World Tales 5.6.
 Urban population: Percentage of the total population living in urban ar-
eas. Source: WDI.
 Agriculture: Agricultural sector value added as a percentage of the GDP.
Source: WDI.
 Surface: Countrys surface area, squared kilometers. Source: WDI.
 Age dependency ratio: Age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age
population). Source: WDI.
 Log of GDP per capita: Logarithm of real GDP per capita, 1985 interna-
tional prices. Source: Penn World Tables 5.6.
 Per capita Income Growth: Rate of growth of real GDP per capita, 1985
international prices. Source: Penn World Tables 5.6.
 Output Growth: Annual rate of growth of real GDP.
 Tax revenue: Tax revenue as a percentage of the GDP. Source: WDI.
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 Non-tax: Non-tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, it includes requited
non-repayable receipts for public purposes, such as nes, administrative
fees, or entrepreneurial income from government ownership of property
and voluntary, unrequited non-repayable receipts other than from govern-
mental sources. Source: WDI.
 Income tax: Taxes on income, prots and capital gains as a percentage
of GDP, which includes taxes on the actual or presumptive net income
of individuals, on the prots of enterprises, and on capital gains, whether
realized on land, securities, or other assets. Source: WDI.
 International tax: Taxes on international trade as a percentage of GDP.
It includes import duties, export duties, prots of export or import mo-
nopolies, exchange prots, and exchange taxes. Source: WDI.
 Goods and services tax: Taxes on goods and services as a percentage of
GDP, which comprises all taxes and duties levied by central governments
on the production, extraction, sale, transfer, leasing, or delivery of goods
and rendering of services, or on the use of goods or permission to use goods
or perform activities. Source: WDI.
 Social security tax: Social security taxes as percentage of GDP, which
are employer and employee social security contributions and those of self-
employed and unemployed people. Source: WDI.
 Other taxes: Other taxes as a percentage of GDP, including employer
payroll or labor taxes, taxes on property, and taxes not allocable to other
categories. Source: WDI.
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 Government consumption: Government consumption as a percentage of
GDP. Final current expenditure of the central government excluding cap-
ital expenditure, social security benets or other transfers and interest
payments. Source: WDI.
A.2 Notes on the Codication of the Variables
AFTEREXIT and WAYOUT
We consider to be dictators those rulers who are the e¤ective heads of gov-
ernment under dictatorship as classied by regime: 1) general-secretaries of
the communist party in communist dictatorships, except in the case of Deng
Xiaoping in China; 2) kings, presidents, and de facto rulers in non-communist
dictatorships, except in the cases of Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, and
Myanmar where the e¤ective head is sometimes the prime minister; and 3) mil-
itary or other gure when sources indicate nominal head is puppet gure. See
Cheibub and Gandhi (2004). The denition and data on dictatorship are taken
from Przeworski et al. (2000).
 AFTEREXIT : Newly constructed variable that takes four values:
1 if the dictator stays in the country as civilian
2 if the dictator has been killed or imprisoned (including house arrest)
3 if the dictator was able to go into exile
4 if the ruler stays in the country and has any other public charge.
The variable has been compiled from Keesings Contemporary Archives
and various historical sources. House arrest is considered imprisonment.
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The codication considers the last level of punishment in a period up to one
year after the dictator abdicated or was overthrown. So, if, for instance,
imprisonment is followed by exile, we have coded exile. Politically mo-
tivated murder is considered to be punishment. The codication has been
contrasted and corrected by comparing my data with the variable post
tenure fate, which also indicates the fate of a ruler after leaving power,
contained in the Archigos Data set collected by Hein Goemans, Kristian
Skrede Gleditsch, Giacomo Chiozza, and Jinhee L. Choung.
 WAYOUT : The variableWAYOUT distinguishes the means by which the
dictator has been replaced focusing on the actors involved in that change.
The sources are historical, i.e., country studies, historical databases (such
as the Keesings Contemporary Archives), yearbooks, etc. The following
rules have been applied for the codication:
Focus on what group is responsible for changing the ruler or decide to
change it. As a result, changes due to revolutions, civil wars, strikes
or riots and demonstrations have been coded as changes carried out
by the masses or citizens.
 If changes take place by a military coup they are coded as military
interventions even though they may have been preceded by social
unrest.
For the case of military rulers, the distinction between coups and elite
changes is valid as well. It has been considered an elite driven change
when those who promoted and carried it out where close collaborators
of the incumbent ruler, or, in case of collective rule, were members
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of the Military Junta or Council of National Salvation -or whatever
name-. As a result, coups against military rule are considered to be
those staged by factions of the armed rule not included in the power
coalitions by reasons such that of ethnicity, territorial divisions, etc.
 If the ruler is either civilian or monarch, the identication of coups
is easy. They are considered so if members of the armed forces take
over power. Also note that we do not consider rulers who come to
power as head of guerilla movements as military.
 Leaders that died in power are not generally coded unless succession
was already established.
 It has been given, however, priority to the domestic actors. So where
there has been collaboration between domestic and foreign actors I
have coded as if only the domestic actor was involved. Consequently,
in the dataset there are just three leaders toppled almost purely by
foreign actors; in these cases the key role was played by the exter-
nal forces: Idi Amin (Uganda), Pol Pot (Democratic Kampuchea, by
then) and Manuel Antonio Noriega (Panama). Amin was toppled by
Tanzanian troops in 1979; Pol Pot was ousted after a Vietnamese in-
vasion, and Noriega by a US invasion (called Operation Just Cause).
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Figure 2.1.- Causal path from initial conditions to economic performance 
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Figure 3.1.- Effect of period length (n) on the rate of rent-extraction 
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Table 3.1.- Optimal tax rates for different values of A and B 
 
      B    
  exitU  0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.2 2 
 0.1 -4 1 0.333 (0.2) (0.142) (0.111) (0.083) (0.05) 
  -20 0.544 0.191 0.117 0.085 0.067 0.051 0.031 
 0.3 -4 1 0.883 0.557 0.416 (0.333) (0.25) (0.15) 
  -20 0.593 0.218 0.135 0.098 0.077 0.059 0.036 
 0.5 -4 1 0.891 0.599 0.454 0.369 0.291 0.192 
A  -20 0.633 0.245 0.152 0.111 0.088 0.067 0.041 
 0.7 -4 1 0.896 0.634 0.489 0.400 0.317 0.210 
  -20 0.665 0.270 0.169 0.124 0.098 0.075 0.046 
 0.9 -4 1 0.9 0.664 0.520 0.429 0.342 0.227 
  -20 0.692 0.294 0.186 0.136 0.108 0.082 0.051 
 1 -4 1 0.901 0.677 0.535 0.442 0.353 0.236 
  -20 0.703 0.305 0.194 0.143 0.113 0.086 0.053 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2.- The effects of Uexit on the tax rate for different values of A and B 
 
    exitU    
A B -2 -4 -7 -10 -14 
0.3 0.2 1 1 0.782 0.584 0.438 
0.3 0.7 0.428 0.416 0.262 0.190 0.139 
0.3 2 (0.15) (0.15) 0.104 0.073 0.052 
0.8 0.2 1 1 0.831 0.672 0.530 
0.8 0.7 0.802 0.505 0.330 0.245 0.182 
0.8 2 0.362 0.219 0.135 0.097 0.069 
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Table 3.3.- The effect of initial income on the rate of extraction 
 
    
0y    
A B 1 2 4 10 15 
0.3 0.2 1 1 1 0.936 0.884 
0.3 0.7 (0.428) 0.416 0.366 0.316 0.298 
0.3 2 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 0.128 0.120 
0.8 0.2 1 1 0.999 0.927 0.898 
0.8 0.7 0.576 0.505 0.450 0.393 0.373 
0.8 2 0.254 0.219 0.192 0.164 0.155 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4.- Combining the three accountability dimensions: Predicted growth rates 
 
  Sensitivity 
Security exitU  (0.1-0.9) (1-1.9) (2-3) 
(0.1-0.3) -4 -.214 -.012 .024 
 -20 -.039 .043 .055 
(0.4-0.6) -4 -.318 -.082 -.022 
 -20 -.060 .036 .051 
(0.7-1) -4 -.339 -.105 -.037 
 -20 -.080 .029 .047 
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Table 3.5.- Comparing linear and concave accountability functions 
 
   B (sensitivity) 
Security Function 0.5 1.5 3 
 0.2 Linear 0.126 0.044 0.023 
  Concave 0.249 0.146 0.104 
A 0.7 Linear 0.169 0.06 0.031 
  Concave 0.287 0.17 0.122 
 1 Linear 0.194 0.07 0.036 
  Concave 0.306 0.183 0.132 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.- The effect of security and sensitivity on the equilibrium tax rate for two values of 
the exit utility 
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Figure 3.3.- The effect of A on the growth rate and survival probability for three  
values of B (Uexit=-20) 
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Figure 3.4.- The effect of B on growth and survival probability for three values of A (Uexit=-20) 
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Figure 3.5.- Alternative forms of the political accountability function for the same values of 
security and sensitivity 
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Figure 3.6.- Multiple equilibria: The effect of A on optimal taxation 
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Figure 4.2.- The logic of institutionalization and cooperation under dictatorship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1.- Results and pay-offs of the game 
 
Pay-offs Outcome Policy 
D E O 
1 a=ae | | 'e Da a θ pi− − + −  | 1|
ea θ− − +  | 0 |ea− −  
2 a=1 |1 |D Da ω− − −  |1 1| pi− − −  |1 0 |− −  
3           a=x | | 'Dx a θ pi− − + −  | 1| Ex ω− − −  | 0 |x− −  
4           a=0 | 0 |D Da ω− − −  | 0 1| Eω− − −  | 0 0 |− −  
5 a=1 |1 |Da pi− − −  |1 1| pi− − −  |1 0 | Oω− − −  
6 a=1 |1 |Da pi− − −  |1 1| pi− − −  |1 0 | Oω− − −  
7 a=0 | 0 |D Da ω− − −  | 0 1| Eω− − −  | 0 0 |− −  
 
 
D 
O 
E 
Repress 
Offer policy to O 
Accept 
Accept 
Coup 
Rebel 
Win   1-h 
Lose  h 
Win   p 
Lose  1-p 
Win   g 
Lose  1-g 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
 337 
 
Figure 4.3.- The conditions for regime openness and accountability 
 
 
 
Table 4.3.- Equilibria of the game and their conditions 
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Figure 4.4.- Institutionalization and its associated levels of security and sensitivity 
 
 
 
 
Figures 4.5.a, b, c.- Revenue composition and economic endowments 
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b) Primary commodity exporting countries
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Table 4.4.- Social conflict in resource-rich and resource-poor dictatorships 
 
 Social Conflict 
Endowments Demonstrations Riots 
Oil 0.25 (1.12) 0.32 (1.28) 
Primary commodities 0.20 (0.87) 0.23 (0.90) 
Foreign aid -0.10 -0.11 
No resources 0.53 (1.81) 0.51 (1.72) 
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. For foreign aid, numbers report the correlation coefficient. 
T-tests show that the differences are all significant at the 0.001 level. Correlations are significant as well 
at 0.001. 
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Figure 5.1.- The composition of revenues under dictatorship (% of current revenue) 
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   Note: Time period: 1970-2000. 
    Source of revenue data: World Development Indicators. 
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Table 5.1.- The determinants of institutions under dictatorship: multinomial logit 
 
 Multinomial logit 
Independent Variables Single 
institution 
Multiple 
 institutions 
Ordered 
logit 
Constant  -1.01**    -1.72***  
 (0.472) (0.491)  
Resource rich    -0.368***     -1.37***    -.935*** 
 (0.126) (0.135) (.081) 
Aid per capita    -0.003***     -0.004***    -.002*** 
 (0.0009) (0.001) (.0006) 
Military ruler     0.945***    2.44***     1.51*** 
 (0.159) (0.206) (.130) 
Civilian ruler      3.30***    4.04***     1.97*** 
 (0.190) (0.229) (.120) 
Democracies in the 
world 
   -2.07***    4.35***    4.42*** 
 (0.700) (0.723) (.443) 
Dictatorships in region     0.765**   -1.98***    -1.76*** 
 (0.355) (0.354) (.227) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.219     -0.274  -.287** 
 (0.202) (0.220) (.131) 
Past transitions to dict. 0.058     -0.976***    -.868*** 
 (0.120) (0.146) (.098) 
Years in power     0.081***      0.089***     .041*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (.004) 
Democracy before    -1.25***    0.599**   .523** 
 (0.268) (0.283) (.206) 
British colony     -.203** 
   (.081) 
Observations 2980 2980 
LR-Chi2      1406.25*** 897.98*** 
                            Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 θ 
  g, h, p 
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Table 5.2.- Definitions of the revenue sources according to the WDI 
 
Revenue stream Include… 
Non-tax revenue …requited non-repayable receipts for public 
purposes, such as fines, administrative fees, or 
entrepreneurial income from government 
ownership of property and voluntary, unrequited 
non-repayable receipts other than from 
governmental sources. 
 
Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains …taxes on the actual or presumptive net income of 
individuals, on the profits of enterprises, and on 
capital gains, whether realized on land, securities, 
or other assets. 
 
Taxes on international trade …import duties, export duties, profits of export or 
import monopolies, exchange profits, and 
exchange taxes. 
Taxes on goods and services …all taxes and duties levied by central 
governments on the production, extraction, sale, 
transfer, leasing, or delivery of goods and 
rendering of services, or on the use of goods or 
permission to use goods or perform activities. 
 
Social security taxes …employer and employee social security 
contributions and those of self-employed and 
unemployed people. 
Other taxes …employer payroll or labor taxes, taxes on 
property, and taxes not allocable to other 
categories. 
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Table 5.3.- Averages of revenue streams (as a % of GDP) in dictatorships under different 
institutional arrangements 
 
  Type of Dictatorship 
Revenue source Estimation method No institution Single institution Multiple 
institutions 
Observed 7.74  (12.61) 6.46  (10.16) 4.86  (5.44) 
SURE 7.90  (12.25) 4.86  (7.80) 5.50  (7.63) 
Non-tax revenue 
Panel corrected 
errors with lag 
8.07  (12.33) 4.87  (7.89) 5.50  (7.80) 
Observed 3.78  (3.84) 4.46  (4.58) 5.84  (3.96) 
SURE 4.46  (3.42) 5.21  (4.01) 5.47  (4.33) 
Taxes on income, 
profits and capital 
gains Panel corrected 
errors with lag 
4.75  (3.62) 5.21  (4.00) 5.41  (4.35) 
Observed 4.38  (4.10) 5.65  (8.80) 4.51  (3.80) 
SURE 6.14  (5.28) 5.65  (6.47) 4.18  (5.57) 
Taxes on 
international trade 
Panel corrected 
errors with lag 
5.97  (6.08) 5.67  (6.46) 4.27  (5.72) 
Observed 3.34  (3.09) 4.54  (5.73) 5.11  (2.93) 
SURE 3.99  (3.98) 4.59  (4.11) 4.99  (4.44) 
Taxes on goods 
and services 
Panel corrected 
errors with lag 
4.16  (4.42) 4.57  (4.13) 4.98  (4.51) 
Observed 0.80  (1.54) 0.98  (2.32) 1.16  (1.99) 
SURE 0.57  (1.22) 0.72  (1.33) 0.66  (1.32) 
Social security 
taxes 
Panel corrected 
errors with lag 
0.60  (1.26) 0.72  (1.34) 0.67  (1.33) 
Observed 0.75  (1.24) 0.83  (1.05) 0.98  (1.02) 
SURE 0.63  (0.68) 0.83  (0.98) 0.88  (0.99) 
Other taxes 
Panel corrected 
errors with lag 
0.63  (0.72) 0.83  (0.98) 0.88  (1.00) 
Observations  306 539 541 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. The number of observations corresponds to the data available 
for each type of dictatorship (j). 
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Table 5.4.- Results of the t-tests and differences between averages for differently 
institutionalized dictatorships 
 
  Comparisons 
Revenue source Estimation method No inst. vs. Single 
inst. 
No inst. vs. 
Multiple inst. 
Single inst. vs. 
Multiple inst. 
Observed 1.27 
       t=1.50* 
2.87 
t=3.78*** 
1.60 
 t=3.22*** 
SURE 3.04 
t=6.27*** 
2.39 
t=4.98*** 
-0.640 
t=1.75** 
Non-tax revenue 
Panel corrected 
errors with lag 
3.19 
t=6.53*** 
2.56 
t=5.27*** 
-0.624 
t=1.68** 
Observed -0.675 
t=2.17** 
-2.05 
t=7.32*** 
-1.37 
   t=5.28*** 
SURE -0.750 
  t=4.26*** 
-1.01 
t=5.47*** 
-0.259 
        t=1.31* 
Taxes on income, 
profits and capital 
gains 
Panel corrected 
errors with lag 
-0.465 
   t=2.58*** 
-0.663 
 t=3.50*** 
-0.197 
        t=1.00 
Observed -1.26 
   t=2.37*** 
-0.135 
        t=0.48 
1.13 
 t=2.74*** 
SURE 0.486 
t=1.74** 
1.96 
 t=7.64*** 
1.47 
 t=5.16*** 
Taxes on 
international trade 
Panel corrected 
errors with lag 
0.304 
        t=1.02 
1.70 
 t=6.12*** 
1.40 
 t=4.87*** 
Observed -1.19 
 t=3.38*** 
-1.76 
t=8.26*** 
-0.570 
t=2.06** 
SURE -0.601 
 t=3.14*** 
-1.00 
t=5.04*** 
-0.402 
t=1.98** 
Taxes on goods 
and services 
Panel corrected 
errors with lag 
-0.409 
        t=2.02** 
-0.820 
t=3.89*** 
-0.411 
t=2.01** 
Observed -0.178 
        t=1.20 
-0.364 
t=2.75*** 
-0.185 
t=1.40* 
SURE -0.148 
  t=2.44*** 
-0.093 
        t=1.55* 
0.054 
t=0.859 
Social security 
taxes 
Panel corrected 
errors with lag 
-0.118 
t=1.93** 
-0.067 
        t=1.10 
0.051 
t=0.809 
Observed -0.076 
        t=0.95 
-0.225 
t=2.84*** 
-0.148 
     t=2.33*** 
SURE -0.206 
   t=5.15*** 
-0.256 
t=6.32*** 
-0.050 
          t=1.07 
Other taxes 
Panel corrected 
errors with lag 
-0.201 
   t=4.92*** 
-0.251 
t=6.09*** 
-0.050 
t=1.07 
Note: ***p<.01   **p<.05   *p<.10. In each cell, the first value is the difference between averages, and 
the second, the t-statistic and its level of significance from one-sided tests.   
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Appendix to Chapter 5: The selection corrected coefficients 
 
 
Table A.- Selection-corrected coefficients for non-institutionalized authoritarian regimes 
(SURE) 
 
 Revenue variables 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
variables Non-tax Income tax Internacional 
tax 
Goods and 
services tax 
Social 
security tax 
Other tax 
Lag     0.204*** 0.597*** 0.605*** 0.712*** 0.803*** 0.549*** 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.035) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
1.383* 0.546** -0.373 -0.656*** -0.159 -0.153** 
 (0.725) (0.262) (0.273) (0.162) (0.099) (0.074) 
Oil-exporting      6.427***    1.014**   -3.208***    -1.460*** 0.005 -0.227* 
 (1.231) (0.423) (0.490) (0.268) (0.159) (0.123) 
Primary 
commodity 
0.208 0.148   -1.041***    0.412*** -0.150 0.057 
 (0.722) (0.255) (0.279) (0.156) (0.098) (0.075) 
Foreign aid 0.010*** -0.001   -0.003** -0.001 -0.000 0.001* 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ethnic fract. -2.913** -0.777* 0.365 0.123 0.332* 0.343** 
 (1.281) (0.453) (0.479) (0.271) (0.180) (0.135) 
Pop. Density 0.011*** -0.002** -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade   -0.042*** -0.001     0.032*** -0.006** 0.000 -0.002** 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban pop. 0.004    -0.035*** 0.005     0.022***     0.013***     0.009*** 
 (0.022) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Agriculture 0.047 -0.018    0.042***    -0.024*** 0.007 -0.005 
 (0.035) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) 
Surface -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 
dependency 
5.920* 0.275 2.710** -0.805 -0.459 0.163 
 (3.051) (1.077) (1.141) (0.665) (0.449) (0.312) 
Current 
revenue 
0.616*** 0.035** 0.062***   0.050*** 0.004 0.004 
 (0.044) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) 
λ0 0.326 0.010 0.181**   -0.180*** -0.049* -0.035 
 (0.217) (0.077) (0.081) (0.046) (0.030) (0.022) 
Constant   -21.620*** -1.073 -0.844   5.453*** 0.732 0.824 
 (6.908) (2.436) (2.579) (1.583) (0.975) (0.710) 
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 219 
Chi-2 1587.33 1582.19 1585.87 3604.93 1925.01 1482.46 
  Standard errors in parentheses.  * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table B.- Selection-corrected coefficients for dictatorial regimes with a single institution 
(SURE) 
 
  
 Revenue variables 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
variables nontaxgdp inctaxgdp inttaxgdp gstaxgdp sstaxgdp othertaxgdp 
Lag 0.796*** 0.827*** 0.792*** 0.864*** 0.977*** 0.890*** 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.025) (0.019) (0.015) (0.021) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
-0.580 -0.022 -0.093 0.068 -0.009 -0.005 
 (0.377) (0.230) (0.351) (0.176) (0.037) (0.038) 
Oil-exporting 1.398** 0.659** -0.900* -0.679** -0.036 0.071 
 (0.568) (0.335) (0.518) (0.266) (0.054) (0.055) 
Primary 
commodity 
-0.457 0.248 -0.316 0.077 -0.006 0.011 
 (0.315) (0.195) (0.289) (0.147) (0.031) (0.032) 
Foreign aid -0.002 0.008*** 0.003 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic fract. 0.647 -0.816** 0.415 -0.172 0.071 0.066 
 (0.555) (0.347) (0.500) (0.255) (0.054) (0.055) 
Pop. Density -0.001 0.001*** -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade 0.004 -0.003 0.013*** -0.004 0.000 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban pop. 0.039** -0.044*** -0.017 -0.000 0.002 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.015) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
Agriculture 0.016 -0.047*** 0.019 -0.005 0.001 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
Surface -0.000 -0.000** 0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 
dependency 
-0.692 -1.681** -0.875 0.627 0.172 0.246* 
 (1.317) (0.796) (1.207) (0.609) (0.129) (0.134) 
Current 
revenue 
0.045*** 0.021*** 0.079*** 0.018*** 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
λ1 -0.139 0.146 0.143 0.086 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.159) (0.097) (0.145) (0.074) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant 2.425 5.264*** 0.267 -0.118 -0.219 -0.331 
 (3.236) (1.980) (2.949) (1.506) (0.313) (0.325) 
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 340 
Chi-2 5722.98 3190.25 7186.52 10638.84 5377.79 3758.49 
 Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table C.- Selection-corrected coefficients for fully institutionalized regimes (SURE) 
 
 Revenue variables 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
variables nontaxgdp inctaxgdp inttaxgdp gstaxgdp sstaxgdp othertaxgdp 
Lag     0.556***     0.844***      0.742***      0.961***      0.950***      0.907*** 
 (0.034) (0.023) (0.033) (0.018) (0.014) (0.021) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
0.445     0.498*** -0.056 -0.015 -0.045 -0.069* 
 (0.292) (0.170) (0.251) (0.121) (0.048) (0.041) 
Oil-exporting 0.617     2.243*** -0.710    1.292** -0.017 0.071 
 (1.360) (0.752) (1.167) (0.563) (0.214) (0.191) 
Primary 
commodity 
-0.579*    0.393** -0.426 0.076 0.055    -0.130*** 
 (0.321) (0.185) (0.280) (0.135) (0.050) (0.046) 
Foreign aid     0.015*** -0.003 0.003 -0.005** -0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ethnic fract.     1.340*** -0.491* -0.116 -0.340* 0.088 0.199*** 
 (0.464) (0.269) (0.387) (0.193) (0.077) (0.067) 
Pop. Density    0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade -0.008* 0.004* 0.005 -0.002 0.001     0.002*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban pop.   -0.028**    -0.021*** 0.004 0.001 0.003* -0.000 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Agriculture -0.031 0.003 0.040** -0.007 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.016) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
Surface 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 
dependency 
   3.647*** 0.062 -0.009 0.586 -0.148 0.213 
 (0.952) (0.515) (0.788) (0.391) (0.146) (0.132) 
Current 
revenue 
   0.201***     0.050***     0.043*** 0.015** 0.005* 0.005** 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) 
λ2 0.195* 0.013     -0.320***    0.112** -0.025 0.011 
 (0.118) (0.066) (0.103) (0.049) (0.019) (0.016) 
Constant    -7.166***    -3.354** -1.497 0.568 0.031 0.208 
 (2.495) (1.353) (2.093) (1.032) (0.387) (0.338) 
Observations 334 334 334 334 334 334 
Chi-2 2597.59 5588.20 1555.96 5347.18 10951.87 6196.84 
 Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLES AND FIGURES. CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1.- Mechanisms of accountability and actors involved 
 
Main actor involved Frequency Percentage 
Elite/coalition 242 60.05 
Military 111 27.54 
Masses/society 47 11.66 
Foreign forces 3 0.74 
Total 403 100% 
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Table 6.2.- Modes of exit and their determinants: Multinomial logit 
 
Dependent  variable:  WAYOUT 
 g=Pr(Elite/coalition) g=Pr(Military) p, h=Pr(Masses/society) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1)           (2)           (3) 
Constant -3.10***   -2.76***    -2.84*** -1.92* -1.84 -1.86     -4.92***   -4.21**     -5.33*** 
 (0.739) (0.770) (0.747) (1.15) (1.29) (1.18) (1.64) (1.70) (1.71) 
Resource rich country -0.309*       -0.288  -0.306* 0.107 0.164 0.104 -0.769* -0.716* -0.575 
 (0.180) (0.181) (0.181) (0.236) (0.243) (0.236) (0.420) (0.427) (0.426) 
Aid per capita -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0008 -0.002 -0.017* -0.017* -0.019* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Military ruler 0.821** 0.432     0.936**     1.96***   2.12**     2.10*** 1.20 1.29 0.920 
 (0.381) (0.438) (0.393) (0.745) (0.964) (0.756) (0.813) (0.927) (0.820) 
Civilian ruler 0.816**   0.696*     1.22***  1.66**   2.23**    2.29*** 0.540 0.826 0.174 
 (0.370) (0.400) (0.396) (0.737) (0.943) (0.768) (0.810) (0.883) (0.830) 
Democracies in the world 1.76* 1.25 1.34 -1.98  -2.89* -2.07   4.22**   3.80*   3.85* 
 (0.921) (0.946) (0.931) (1.43) (1.49) (1.42) (2.15) (2.26) (2.25) 
Dictatorships in the region   -0.929** -0.712*   -0.851** -1.52**  -1.49** -1.39** -1.76* -1.98* -1.56 
 (0.409) (0.423) (0.417) (0.625) (0.638) (0.638) (1.05) (1.06) (1.04) 
Previously democracy 0.506** 0.343 0.379 0.008 -0.147 -0.162   1.27**     2.40***     1.44*** 
 (0.238) (0.332) (0.241) (0.339) (0.515) (0.346) (0.509) (0.873) (0.504) 
Colony before     -0.653**     -0.749**         -0.326  
  (0.260)   (0.351)   (0.643)  
Past transitions to dict.  0.069   0.086   -0.734  
  (0.142)   (0.254)   (0.508)  
Ethnic fractionalization    0.524* 0.449     0.669** -0.071 -0.176 0.193 -0.794 -1.01 -0.879 
 (0.314) (0.321) (0.317) (0.398) (0.411) (0.407) (0.759) (0.770) (0.763) 
Single institution     -1.10***     -1.46***   0.795 
   (0.264)   (0.340)   (0.766) 
Multiple institutions     -0.536**      -1.02***     1.49** 
   (0.227)   (0.329)   (0.716) 
Log years in power     -0.458***      -0.316***     -0.313***  -0.079     0.501**  0.346 
 (0.085)  (0.094) (0.117)  (0.133) (0.230)  (0.242) 
Duration       -0.112***      -0.077**   0.063  
  (0.025)   (0.031)   (0.057)  
Duration2       0.002***       0.002***   -0.0001  
  (0.0006)   (0.0008)   (0.001)  
Observations 3078    (1) 3078    (2) 3078    (3) 
LR-Chi2 170.16*** 211.29*** 185.42*** 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 
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Table 6.3.- Sensitivity and non-cooperative rents: The effect of tax increases on dictators’ 
stability (coefficients and marginal effects)   
 
Dependent variable: HEADOUT 
 Resource availability in the country 
Independent variables Resource rich or 
foreign aid receiver 
Resource poor Resource poor and aid 
under average 
Constant   -2.17** -2.32* -1.73 
 (1.01) (1.27) (1.56) 
Democracies in the world 0.176 1.004 0.066 
 (1.23) (1.71) (1.89) 
Dictatorships in the region -0.548  -1.55**    -2.26*** 
 (0.555) (0.681) (0.769) 
Previously democracy 0.113       0.663***       0.642*** 
 (0.153) (0.192) (0.198) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.602   0.980* 0.698 
 (0.401) (0.586) (0.670) 
Military ruler   0.916* 0.945 1.40 
 (0.510) (0.801) (1.08) 
Civilian ruler   0.848* 1.11 1.51 
 (0.502) (0.776) (1.05) 
Urban population (%) -0.007              -0.012 -0.014* 
 0.006 (0.007) (0.008) 
Foreign aid per capita    -0.012**  
  (0.005)  
∆ Taxes on incomes, profits 
and capital gains 
0.032   0.320*     0.422** 
 (0.098) (0.181) (0.188) 
Log years in power      -0.378*** -0.082 -0.090 
 (0.118) (0.160) (0.166) 
Marginal effect of ∆ Taxes 0.0021 0.0183 0.0304 
Observations 1034 622 479 
LR Chi2        29.68***          44.25***          38.37*** 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1.- Non-cooperative rents availability and dictators’ sensitivity 
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Table 6.4.- Dictators’ survival, security and sensitivity (1946-2000) 
 
 Dep. Variable: HEADOUT 
Independent variables Weibull Clog-log Clog-log 
Intercept   -2.29***   -1.71***    -3.19*** 
 (0.397) (0.403) (0.384) 
Civilian      0.833***       0.691***       0.926*** 
 (0.253) (0.273) (0.277) 
Military       0.736***       0.587***       0.989*** 
 (0.280) (0.300) (0.282) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.030 0.052 0.279 
 (0.209) (0.211) (0.206) 
Dictatorships in the region     -0.749***    -0.738***  
 (0.281) (0.280)  
Democracies in the world     1.24** 
   (0.609) 
Previously democracy    0.354**    0.316**       0.423*** 
 (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) 
Previously colony     -0.617***     -0.518***  
A
  
 (
S
ec
u
ri
ty
) 
 (0.176) (0.176)  
Resource-rich country -0.125 -0.132 -0.214* 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) 
Foreign aid per capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
B
 (
S
en
si
ti
v
it
y
) 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Duration     -0.069***      -0.081*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) 
Duration
2       0.001***      0.001*** 
   (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Ln_p 0.007   
 (0.045)   
LR-Chi2/ Wald Chi2     77.79***     95.16***      63.84*** 
Observations 3070 3143 3004 
    Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 
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Figure 6.1.- Fitted survival and cumulative hazard functions from Weibull model 
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Table 6.5.- Political dissent and security under differently organized authoritarian regimes 
 
 Type of dictatorship 
Variable Averages No institutions Single institution Multiple institutions 
Observed 0.388  (1.22) 0.280 (1.36) 0.628  (1.89) 
Panel 0.458  (1.02) 0.187  (1.22) 1.62  (1.35) 
Demonstrations 
Poisson -1.58  (1.07) -3.90  (2.38) 0.879  (1.35) 
Observed 0.428  (1.26) 0.251 (1.24) 0.659  (1.91) 
Panel 0.338  (.629) 0.161  (1.01) 2.27  (1.21) 
Riots 
Poisson -1.82  (1.27) -3.50  (3.48) 2.24  (1.46) 
Observations 432 1073 577 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. The number of observations corresponds to those used to get 
the unbiased coefficients under each institutional setting. 
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Table 6.6.- Differences between averages and t-test results under differently organized 
dictatorships 
 
 Comparisons 
Variable Averages No inst. vs. Single 
inst. 
No inst. vs. 
Multiple inst. 
Single inst. vs. 
Multiple inst. 
Observed diff=0.107 
t=1.88** 
diff=-0.239 
t=3.03*** 
diff=-0.347 
t=5.88*** 
Panel diff=0.271 
 t=7.74*** 
diff=-1.16 
    t=31.45*** 
diff=0.907 
   t=35.98*** 
Demonstrations 
Poisson diff= 2.31 
   t=40.48*** 
diff=-2.46 
   t=65.39*** 
diff=-4.78 
   t=79.78*** 
Observed diff=0.177 
t=3.29*** 
diff=-0.230 
t=2.87*** 
diff=-0.407 
t=7.18*** 
Panel diff=0.177 
 t=6.77*** 
diff=-1.93 
   t=64.50*** 
diff=-2.10 
   t=60.82*** 
Riots 
Poisson diff= 1.68 
   t=20.68*** 
diff=-4.06 
   t=95.62*** 
diff=-5.74 
   t=69.37*** 
 ***p<.01   **p<.05   *p<.10. In each cell the first value is the difference between averages, and the 
second, the t-statistic and its level of significance.  
Note: “No inst. vs. single inst.” means that the average of second institutional setting is subtracted to the 
average of the first, so a negative difference shows that the average of the second, “single inst.” in this 
example, is bigger. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.7.- Estimated levels of security under differently institutionalized dictatorships 
 
 Security measures (A) 
Regime type Pr( 1| 0, )y Xs meanτ= ∆ = =  Demonstrations Riots 
No institutions 0.0803 0.458/ -1.58 0.338/ -1.82 
Single institution 0.055 0.187/ -3.90 0.161/ -3.50 
Multiple institutions 0.1106 1.62/   0.879 2.27/   2.24 
Note: For the columns of Demonstrations and Riots, the first number is the average estimated  
using panel techniques, while the second is the average obtained using Poisson models.  
The estimates of the first column correspond to the first model in Table 7. 
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Table 6.8.- Dictatorial institutions and sensitivity (logit models) 
 
Dependent variable: HEADOUT 
 Sub-sample 
Independent variables No institutions Single institution Multiple institutions 
Constant    -1.18**    -1.59***    -1.93*** 
 (0.498) (0.619) (0.478) 
∆Taxes as % of GDP -0.117 0.0142  0.128* 
 (0.086) (0.075) (0.070) 
Marginal effect of 
∆Taxes as % of GDP 
-0.0094 0.0007 0.0115 
Observations 278 475 496 
 
Independent variables No institutions Single institution Multiple institutions 
Constant -0.797    -3.42** -1.51* 
 (0.632) (1.36) (0.836) 
∆Taxes as % of GDP -0.174 .065     0.204** 
 (0.110) (.111) (0.102) 
Growth income per 
capita 
0.013    -.109** -0.051* 
 (0.029) (.048) (0.028) 
Inflation -0.011 .015 0.003 
 (0.008) (.014) (0.002) 
Government spending 
(% GDP) 
-0.018 .003   -0.045** 
 (0.023) (.040) (0.020) 
Marginal effect of 
∆Taxes as % of GDP 
-0.0138 0.0014 0.0155 
Observations 196 303 406 
LR-Chi2 18.91*** 19.59*** 13.72** 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3.- Estimated patterns of sensitivity for each regime type 
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TABLES AND FIGURES. CHAPTER 7 
 
Figure 7.1.-The relation between the rate of rent-extraction and the probability of punishment 
(q) to dictators 
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Table 7.1.- Post-exit scenarios for dictators: 1946-2000 
 
Post-exit scenarios Frequencies Percentage Frequencies Percentage 
Still in power 70 13.18   
Died in office 63 11.86   
Live as civilian in the country 163 30.70 
Public charge in the country 51 9.60 
 
214 
 
54.18 
Exile/living abroad 93 18.08 93 23.54 
Assassinated or in jail 88 16.57 88 22.27 
Total 531 100% 395 100% 
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Figure 7.2.- The transition and accountability game 
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Table 7.2.- Strategies and conditions of the equilibria of game 1 
 
Equilibria 
(D2, D1; O2, O1) Conditions 
(Accept, give up; punish, rebel) 
1
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Figure 7.3.- The Judicial Accountability model 
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Table 7.4.- Type of successive ruler and post-exit scenarios 
 
     Post-exit options  
Next ruler is…  Stay in country Jail/death Exile Total 
Civilian dictator Frequency 74 22 36 132 
 Row % 56.06 16.67 27.27 100 
Monarch Frequency 5 2 4 11 
 Row % 45.45 18.18 36.36 100 
Military Frequency 59 38 37 134 
 Row % 44.03 28.36 27.61 100 
Democratic Frequency 50 13 11 74 
 Row % 67.57 17.57 14.86 100 
Note: Likelihood ratio Chi2=14.736 significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.5.- Ways of exiting power and post-exit scenarios 
 
 Post-exit scenario  
Overthrown by… Live as civilian Public charge Jail/killed Exile Total 
Elite (regulated) 44 19 6 5 74 
Elite (putsch) 11 2 5 6 24 
Military coup 15 6 15 10 43 
Masses 4 1 3 5 13 
Foreign force 0 0 1 1 2 
Total 71 30 27 28 156 
Note: Pearson Chi2=35.235 significant at the 0.001 level. 
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Table 7.6.- A multinomial logit for post-exit scenarios 
 
Independent variables Death/jail Exile 
Constant -0.522  0.907 
 (1.73) (1.48) 
Single institution  0.802   2.21* 
 (1.30) (1.19) 
Multiple institutions   2.55* 1.55 
 (1.47) (1.29) 
Democracy share in the world -4.47* -2.90 
 (2.65) (2.32) 
Dictatorship share in the region    1.81** -0.706 
 (0.843) (0.685) 
Past transitions to dictatorship 0.294 -0.302 
 (0.208) (0.249) 
Primary commodity exporting country -0.037   0.585* 
 (0.340) (0.323) 
Oil exporting country 0.328   0.919* 
 (0.602) (0.573) 
Military ruler -0.913 -1.06 
 (0.994) (0.941) 
Civilian ruler -1.10  -2.02** 
 (1.04) (0.985) 
Years in power       0.083***     0.075*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
No inst.*λ0 -0.042 -0.114 
 (0.160) (0.159) 
Single inst.*λ1 0.184 0.557 
 (0.349) (0.349) 
Multiple inst.*λ2 0.907*** 0.162 
 (0.348) (0.232) 
Observations 341 
LR Chi2       65.29*** 
Pseudo R-Square 0.095 
 Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10. 
 Base category=1, ‘Stay in the country’ 
 
 
 
Table 7.7.- Dictatorial institutions and the probabilities of post-exit 
scenarios: q and (1-q) 
Pr(y=j|institutions, rest=mean) Stay in country Death/jail Exile 
No institutions 0.8074 0.0925 0.1001 
Single institution 0.4188 0.1070 0.4742 
Multiple institutions 0.3268 0.4822 0.1911 
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Table 7.8.- Group strength and criminal accountability: Multinomial logit 
 
 (1) (2) 
Independent variables Death/jail Exile Trial Exile Assassination 
Constant -1.84* 0.855 -0.377 1.78  -3.35* 
 (1.03) (1.02) (1.45) (1.19) (1.91) 
Past transitions 
to dictatorship 
      0.729***   -0.669**      0.780***   -0.638** 0.014 
 (0.230) (0.316) (0.252) (0.316) (0.575) 
GDP per capita -0.0002*      -0.0002 -0.00009 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Moslem population     1.97***       -0.372     2.20*** -0.220 1.18 
 (0.499) (0.569) (0.570) (0.581) (0.831) 
Oil-exporting country -0.909 0.694       -1.11 0.654 0.298 
 (0.610) (0.712) (0.707) (0.711) (0.955) 
Primary-commodities 
exporting country 
  -0.884** 0.567    -1.41*** 0.368 0.072 
 (0.442) (0.436) (0.527) (0.452) (0.711) 
Years in power -0.095* 0.050 0.010    0.080* -0.147* 
 (0.052) (0.040) (0.062) (0.47) (0.081) 
Elite power   -0.926** -0.022    -1.24** -0.131  -1.91** 
 (0.409) (0.369) (0.553) (0.453) (0.789) 
Military threat       1.34*** 0.652 -0.117 
   (0.507) (0.407) (0.540) 
Opposition strength   0.295* 0.213 0.005 0.176     0.718** 
 (0.164) (0.179) (0.191) (0.192) (0.328) 
Observations 238 239 
LR-Chi2      56.34***      87.01*** 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1313 0.1523 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10. 
Base category=1, ‘Stay in the country.’ 
 
 
Figure 7.4.- Predicted probability of punishment and group strength (log odds) 
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TABLES AND FIGURES. CHAPTER 8 
 
Figure 8.1.- Growth, (log) initial income and divergence among dictatorships, 1950-2000 
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Table 8.1.- Dictator spells: Per capita income at the beginning and end of their rule  
 
Exit 
Income 
bands 
0-
0.5 
0.5-
1 
1-
1.5 
1.5-
2 
2-
2.5 
2.5-
3 
3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7- Total 
0-0.5 25 12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 
0.5-1 6 82 16 1 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 112 
1-1.5 0 4 54 15 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 80 
1.5-2 0 0 3 28 13 4 1 0 1 0 2 52 
2-2.5 0 0 0 1 18 5 2 2 3 0 0 31 
2.5-3 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 2 0 1 0 21 
3-4 0 0 0 0 0 3 11 7 1 2 0 23 
4-5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 3 2 2 14 
5-6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 3 1 13 
6-7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 7 
7- 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 10 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enter 
Total 31 98 74 45 37 26 29 17 15 15 16 403 
Note: by bands of $500 until $3000, and $1000 until $7000 or more. “Enter” stands for the first year of the 
dictator’s rule or the first year for which data are available. “Exit” stands for the last year of rule or the last 
year for which we have data. 
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Table 8.2.- Dictator spells average growth regressions and accountability determinants 
 
  Dependent variable: Dictators’ growth averages 
 Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -13.21 5.021    16.92** 8.731  
 (22.74) (32.15) (6.648) (22.55) 
Log initial GDP per capita 4.817 1.535      -1.912*** 0.398 
 (6.366) (9.29) (0.630) (6.465) 
Log GDP per capita squared -0.458 -0.268  -0.169 
 (0.450) (0.675)  (0.458) 
Regional average growth        0.277***        0.232***       0.303***        0.195*** 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.102) (0.069) 
Log agriculture (% GDP)  -0.437 -0.814 -0.906 
  (0.480) (0.597) (0.621) 
Population over 65 (%)        -0.537**  
   (0.247)  
Surface (Sq. km.) -1.42e-07 -1.66e-07 -1.25e-07 -2.03e-07 
 (1.86e-07) (1.82e-07) (1.79e-07) (1.84e-07) 
Lagged investment     0.210***       0.190***       0.212***       0.206*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Urban population (%) 0.035    
y 0
 ,
 r
 ,
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
va
ri
a
b
le
s 
 (0.024)    
Single institution    0.485 
    (0.818) 
Multiple institutions        1.605** 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s 
    (0.812) 
Military ruler    3.140**    2.218*      3.979*** 2.167 
 (1.234) (1.34) (1.361) (1.354) 
Civilian ruler       3.623***         3.719***      4.419***     3.277** 
 (1.313) (1.31) (1.416) (1.311) 
Democracy before    2.113**     2.279**     2.607**       2.759*** 
 (1.062) (1.024) (1.044) (1.045) 
Colony before  -1.501  -1.786* 
  (1.014)  (1.016) 
Dictatorships in the region   -3.484**    -4.60**   -4.163** -3.245* 
 (1.713) (1.857) (1.822) (1.829) 
Past transitions to 
dictatorship 
 -0.879*    -0.857* -0.829*   -0.966** 
 (0.464) (0.461) (0.453) (0.468) 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.880 -1.129 -.0026 -1.166 
A
 (
S
ec
u
ri
ty
) 
 (1.003) (1.012) (0.003) (1.010) 
Resource-rich country -1.838**      -2.262***     -2.076***      -2.264*** 
 (0.723) (0.737) (0.722) (0.754) 
Log foreign aid per capita    -0.595***   -0.452**      -0.848***      -0.613*** 
B
 (
S
en
si
ti
vi
ty
) 
 (0.221) (0.216) (0.218 (0.229) 
Pr (judicial accountability)   0.899*        1.991***       1.818***        1.890*** 
q
U
lo
w
 
 (0.500) (0.618) (0.518) (0.621) 
2074  (272) 1953  (253) 1878  (240) 1952  (252) Observations (Groups) 
R-Squared 0.24 0.27 0.32 0.29 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 
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Table 8.3.- Security, sensitivity, judicial accountability and growth 
 
  Dependent variable: Dictators’ spells averaged per capita 
growth 
 Independent 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Log odds --       2.027***      2.623*** 
  (0.741) (0.920) 
Probability    15.22** -- -- 
A (security) 
 (7.260)   
Resource-rich 
country 
 -2.066**   -2.093**   -2.162** 
 (0.929) (0.922) (1.059) 
Log foreign aid per 
capita 
    -0.824***     -0.816***    -0.896*** 
B (sensitivity) 
 (0.190) (0.189) (0.231) 
Pr (Punishment)       1.147***       1.277***       1.428*** qUlow (judicial 
accountability)  (0.394) (0.398) (0.418) 
Single institution -- -- 0.852 
   (0.797) 
Multiple institutions -- --    1.656** 
Institutions 
   (0.775) 
Observations (groups) 1864  (247) 1864  (247) 1839  (242) 
R-Squared 0.27 0.28 0.28 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 8.4.- The effect of security when sensitivity varies 
 
  Dependent variable: Dictators’ spells averaged per capita growth 
Independent variables No resources 
 
(sensitive) 
Resource-rich 
 
(insensitive) 
Aid under 
average 
(sensitive) 
Aid over 
average 
(insensitive) 
Log odds     1.666**       3.550*** 1.286      2.823*** A (security) 
 (0.799) (1.095) (0.916) (0.902) 
Resource-rich 
country 
-- --    -2.451** -1.079 
   (1.02) (1.59) 
Log foreign aid 
per capita 
     -0.968***  -0.590* -- -- 
B (sensitivity) 
 (0.202) (0.310)   
Pr (Punishment)       1.159***   1.188*       1.529***       1.513*** qUlow (judicial 
accountability)  (0.416) (0.626) (0.522) (0.499) 
Observations (groups) 1710  (225) 939  (116) 977  (179) 1014  (151) 
R-Squared 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.33 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 
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Table 8.5.- Government consumption and accountability determinants under authoritarian 
leadership 
 
 Dependent var.: Government consumption (% GDP) 
 Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Constant     -62.86***    -52.39** -53.48*  
 (23.05) (23.05) (32.12) 
Log GDP per capita     15.57***       15.42*** 13.75 
 (5.99) (5.91) (8.90) 
Log GDP per capita squared -1.03**   -1.06*** -0.903 
 (0.405) (0.400) (0.626) 
Age dependency ratio 1.32 -1.490 -0.159 
 (3.50) (3.60) (3.67) 
Surface (Sq. km.)    5.27e-07**    5.19e-07** 5.06e-07* 
 (2.59e-07) (2.56e-07) (2.65e-07) 
Urban population (%)     0.071**     0.088**   0.071* 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
va
ri
a
b
le
s 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.038) 
Single institution   -1.11 
   (1.18) 
Multiple institutions     -2.29** 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s 
   (1.10) 
Military ruler -0.876 -1.72 -1.19 
 (1.86) (1.86) (2.01) 
Civilian ruler  -2.91*     -4.88*** -2.63 
 (1.74) (1.86) (1.95) 
Democracy before -0.383 -0.956 -0.397 
 (1.48) (1.47) (1.48) 
Colony before       4.72***       5.83***      4.68*** 
 (1.38) (1.42) (1.42) 
Dictatorships in the region        10.10***       10.28***       9.26*** 
 (2.42) (2.39) (2.46) 
Democracies in the world        -17.89***  
  (6.35)  
Past transitions to 
dictatorship 
0.011 0.068 -0.236 
 (0.678) (0.670) (0.688) 
Ethnic fractionalization     3.18**    3.08**     3.36** 
A
 (
S
ec
u
ri
ty
) 
 (1.35) (1.34) (1.39) 
Resource-rich country     2.99**      3.72***    3.08** 
 (1.27) (1.28) (1.40) 
Log foreign aid per capita    1.92***     2.10***      2.003*** 
B
 (
S
en
si
ti
vi
ty
) 
 (0.289) (0.921) (0.305) 
Pr (judicial accountability)  -1.71**      -3.58*** -1.52* 
q
U
lo
w
 
 (0.869) (1.08) (0.909) 
2084  (274) 2084  (274) 1969  (265) Observations (Groups) 
R-Squared 0.33 0.35 0.32 
         Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 
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Table 8.6.- Security, Sensitivity, Judicial Accountability and Government Consumption  
(% of GDP) 
 
 Dependent variable: Dictators’ spells averaged government 
consumption 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
 Constant 9.76   7.18* 
  (5.94) (3.99) 
Log odds      -3.41***     -3.24*** A (security) 
 (1.22) (1.25) 
Resource-rich 
country 
     4.24***      3.69*** 
 (1.30) (1.32) 
Log foreign aid per 
capita 
   2.03***    2.02*** 
B (sensitivity) 
 (0.324) (0.325) 
Pr (Punishment) -1.41* -1.68** qUlow (judicial 
accountability)  (0.763) (0.739) 
Single institution -- -1.80 
  (1.10) 
Multiple institutions --   -2.74** 
Institutions 
  (1.12) 
Observations (groups) 2038  (266) 2020  (259) 
R-Squared 0.36 0.39 
                Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 
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Figure 8.2.- Political and judicial accountability, predicted growth and the degree of 
institutionalization 
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Table 8.7.- Observed and selection-corrected growth averages under differently institutionalized 
dictatorships 
 
  Dictatorial subsamples 
Extra variables Estimation 
method 
No institutions Single institution Multiple 
 institutions 
Observed 4.280 
s.d.= 10.80 
4.302 
s.d.= 6.833 
4.499 
s.d.= 7.508 
Pooled 3.991 
s.d.= 7.183 
4.194 
s.d.= 7.735 
5.356 
s.d.= 5.560 
Fixed-effects 3.833 
s.d.= 7.238 
4.224 
s.d.= 7.838 
5.618 
s.d.= 5.094 
“Barebones” 
Panel corrected 
standard errors 
3.991 
s.d.= 7.183 
4.194 
s.d.= 7.735 
5.356 
s.d.= 5.560 
Lagged log 
income per capita 
Fixed-effects 3.021 
s.d.= 9.019 
3.818 
s.d.= 8.054 
6.190 
s.d.= 5.269 
Pooled 3.992 
s.d.= 7.182 
4.269 
s.d.= 7.759 
5.350 
s.d.= 5.567 
Log initial income 
per capita 
Panel corrected 
standard errors 
3.992 
s.d.= 7.182 
4.269 
s.d.= 7.759 
5.350 
s.d.= 5.567 
Note: s.d. stands for standard deviation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.8.- Results of the t-tests and differences between averages for differently 
institutionalized dictatorships 
 
  Comparisons 
Model Estimation method No inst. vs. Single 
inst. 
(1) 
No inst. vs. 
multiple inst. 
(2) 
Single inst. vs. 
multiple inst. 
(3) 
Observed -0.022 
 t=0.048 
-0.219 
t=0.446 
-0.196 
 t=0.656 
Pooled -0.202 
  t=0.850 
-1.364 
      t=6.66*** 
-1.161 
       t=5.41*** 
Fixed-effects -0.391 
    t=1.62* 
-1.785 
      t=8.94*** 
-1.394 
       t=6.61*** 
“Barebones” 
Panel corrected 
standard errors 
-0.202 
  t=0.850 
-1.364 
       t=6.66*** 
-1.161 
       t=5.41*** 
Lagged log 
income per capita 
Fixed-effects -0.797 
    t=3.06** 
-3.16 
         t=14.08*** 
-2.37 
         t=11.44*** 
Pooled -0.276 
t=1.16 
-1.357 
         t= 6.63*** 
-1.080 
         t= 5.02*** 
Log initial income 
per capita 
Panel corrected 
standard errors 
-0.276 
t=1.16 
-1.357 
         t= 6.63*** 
-1.080 
          t= 5.02*** 
Note: ***p<.01   **p<.05   *p<.10. In each cell the first value is the difference between averages, and 
the second, the t-statistic and its level of significance from one-sided tests.   
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Table 8.9.- Average government consumption and dictatorial institutions 
 
 Subsamples 
Estimation method No institutions Single institution Multiple institutions 
Observed 15.73 
s.d.= 8.15 
15.77 
s.d.= 7.53 
14.38 
s.d.= 6.65 
Pooled with lagged 
dep. var. 
14.60 
s.d.=5.56 
13.93 
s.d.= 5.20 
13.78 
s.d.=4.95 
Panel (AR1) 14.14 
s.d.= 3.40 
13.68 
s.d.= 3.12 
13.12 
s.d.= 3.23 
PCSE (AR1) 14.67 
s.d.= 4.31 
14.18 
s.d.= 2.77 
13.45 
s.d.= 3.49 
Note: s.d. stands for standard deviation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.10.- Differences between averages and t-tests results: Government consumption and 
dictatorial institutions 
 
 Comparisons 
Estimation method No inst. vs. Single inst. 
(1) 
No inst. vs. multiple inst. 
(2) 
Single inst. vs. multiple 
inst. 
(3) 
Observed -0.038 
t= 0.091 
1.34 
     t= 3.31*** 
1.38 
     t= 4.47*** 
Pooled with lagged 
dep. var. 
0.670 
      t= 3.06*** 
0.820 
     t= 3.83*** 
0.150 
             t= 0.72 
Panel (AR1) 0.458 
     t= 3.67*** 
1.019 
      t= 8.04*** 
0.561 
     t= 4.62*** 
PCSE (AR1) 0.487 
     t= 3.52*** 
1.22 
     t= 8.14*** 
0.734 
      t= 6.09*** 
Note: ***p<.01   **p<.05   *p<.10. In each cell, the first value is the difference between averages, and 
the second, the t-statistic and its level of significance from one-sided tests. 
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Table 8.11.- Mechanisms of Accountability and Economic Growth (1946-2000) 
 
 Dependent variable: Dictators’ spells averaged per capita growth 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -9.12*     -13.08***      -21.29*** -5.23      -43.59***      -37.79*** 
 (5.06) (4.55) (8.06) (7.40) (9.66) (9.85) 
Log GDP per capita    1.34**   1.74**    2.62**    1.69**      5.43***      4.77*** 
 (0.599) (0.756) (1.09) (0.669) (1.23) (1.24) 
Log agriculture (% GDP)    -2.62*   
    (1.36)   
Regional growth        0.287***      0.298***       0.338***       0.293***       0.299***       0.287*** 
 (0.075) (0.102) (0.070) (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) 
Surface 2.67e-07 7.54e-08 2.07e-07 2.10e-07 3.41e-07* 2.71e-07 
 (1.80e-07) (2.58e-07) (1.80e-07) (1.78e-07) (1.78e-07) (1.78e-07) 
Urban population %         -0.429 -0.332 0.321 -0.023 -0.017 -0.005 
 (0.681) (0.935) (0.618) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) 
MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY:       
Elite power    -1.63***    -3.01***      -7.29*** 1.35   -1.72***    -2.19*** 
 (0.439) (0.842) (2.59) (1.19) (0.591) (0.605) 
Elite power * log (GDP per capita)       0.805**    
   (0.336)    
Elite power * log agriculture        -1.02***   
    (0.366)   
Military threat     1.26**        -6.21***    -5.42*** 
  (0.638)   (2.07) (0.206) 
Military threat* log(GDP per capita)           0.887***       0.764*** 
     (0.251) (0.251) 
Popular sector strength       0.991***      1.28***       0.732***       0.849***         0.784*** 
 (0.263) (0.384) (0.256) (0.266)  (0.267) 
Observations (Groups) 2197  (278) 2260  (294) 2521  (309) 2198  (278) 2198  (278) 2198  (278) 
R-squared 0.1657 0.1108 0.1414 0.1932 0.1746 0.2004 
       Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND GROWTH 
UNDER DICTATORSHIP 
 
Abel Escribà Folch 
(Resumen en castellano) 
 
 
INTRODUCCIÓN 
 
1.- El Estudio de las Dictaduras…y el Desarrollo Económico 
 
 Hoy en día, y después de tres olas de democratización, la mayoría de la 
población mundial vive todavía bajo algún tipo de régimen no democrático. La 
clasificación de Freedom House (1997) nos ofrecía sólo un 22% de países cuyos 
sistemas políticos podían considerarse como plenamente democráticos, atendiendo a sus 
niveles de libertades civiles y políticas (Mueller, 2003). Por su lado, en la base de datos 
ACLP
1, que distingue entre democracias y dictaduras de forma dicotómica, los 
regímenes autoritarios representaban todavía el 40% del total en 2002. Sin embargo, y a 
pesar de esta evidencia abrumadora, se ha prestado poca atención a entender qué 
determina las condiciones económicas y el bienestar general bajo los cuales esa gran 
mayoría de población debe subsistir. 
 Las dictaduras, particularmente aquéllas más grotescas, han inspirado casi tantas 
novelas como estudios académicos. Estos retratos literarios, aunque generalmente 
exagerados, contienen en muchos de los casos pistas e indicaciones relevantes sobre 
cómo se toman ciertas decisiones, cómo aparecen las corruptelas y sobre cuáles son los 
factores que desencadenan la tragedia. Como se defenderá a lo largo de esta tesis, las 
decisiones políticas que afectan los resultados económicos son principalmente una 
cuestión del nivel de efectividad de la accountability, a nivel político y judicial. Los 
autócratas de estos libros ilustran en cierta manera las condiciones que permiten escapar 
tal control. Así, por ejemplo, en The Man of the People, Chinua Achebe describe de 
forma extraordinaria el proceso de degradación de los sistemas multipartidistas post-
coloniales en África. Apelando supuestamente a la defensa de las tradiciones y valores 
africanos pre-coloniales y en contra de la influencia europea de los intelectuales, el 
Ministro Nanga consigue ganarse el apoyo y la confianza populares mientras que, 
                                                 
1 Base de datos originalmente desarrollada por Przeworski et al. Para su conocido libro Democracy & 
Development (2000). Los datos han sido actualizados recientemente. Véase Cheibub y Gandhi (2004). 
simultáneamente, va amasando una fortuna a base de desviar fondos públicos. La 
dependencia exterior de los ingresos de muchos regímenes aparece perfectamente 
reflejada en la obra de Miguel A. Asturias El Señor Presidente cuando el Presidente 
envía urgentemente a uno de sus colaboradores a Estados Unidos para que trate de 
restablecer el flujo de ayuda económica de este país hacia su régimen. El excéntrico 
Patriarca de la novela de García Márquez2 incluso se atreve a venderles el Mar Caribe a 
los americanos por su ayuda al régimen. El Recurso del Método, de Alejo Carpentier, 
introduce otro elemento clave para entender el comportamiento de los dirigentes 
autoritarios: su capacidad para escapar a todo tipo de castigo tras dejar el poder 
mediante el exilio. En el libro, el Primer Magistrado, acaba por huir su país 
latinoamericano con la ayuda de agentes estadounidenses tras una huelga general y 
estableciéndose en su mansión de París. De forma similar, en la obra de Tomás Eloy 
Martínez La Novela de Perón, se relata cómo el dirigente argentino escribe sus 
memorias durante su exilio en Madrid. 
 No obstante, uno de los aspectos más interesantes de estas novelas es la forma en 
la que consiguen reflejar las amenazas a las que los dictadores están sometidos: sus 
colaboradores, los militares y la oposición. Los autócratas en El Recurso del Método y 
La Fiesta del Rey Acab (de Enrique Lafourcade) se enfrentan ambos a los disturbios 
revolucionarios encabezados por la oposición estudiantil mientras que, 
simultáneamente, deben mantener un ojo vigilante sobre los militares, los ministros, e 
incluso su propia familia. El Tirano Banderas de Valle-Inclán empieza con la represión 
de grupo de campesinos insurgentes y acaba con la muerte y decapitación del tirano a 
manos de los rebeldes. El Patriarca de García Márquez, por contra, es traicionado por 
sus más cercanos aliados: su doble y su general predilecto. Es precisamente un complot 
dirigido por algunos capitanes el que logra finalmente matar a Trujillo tal y como se 
describe en la obra de Vargas Llosa La Fiesta del Chivo.   
 Por otro lado, hasta hace poco la literatura de tipo teórico sobre regímenes 
autoritarios ha estado básicamente dedicada a producir clasificaciones de los diferentes 
tipos de dictaduras de acuerdo a distintas dimensiones. Los primeros trabajos se 
centraron en el estudio sobre la emergencia y forma de gobierno de lo que era por 
entonces un nuevo tipo de autoritarismo, los gobiernos totalitarios del periodo de entre 
guerras. En esta línea, los trabajos clásicos de Arendt (1951) y de Friedrich y Brzezinski 
                                                 
2 El Otoño del Patriarca. 
(1956) consistían en estudios en profundidad de los orígenes y de las principales 
características de estos regímenes3.  
 Estudios posteriores ampliaron las categorías de regímenes no democráticos 
aunque básicamente siguieron la misma línea de análisis de los anteriores. Así, el 
trabajo de Linz (1970, 1975) buscaba llenar el vacío dejado por los autores anteriores 
desarrollando un teoría amplia de ‘autoritarianismo’ que debía yuxtaponerse a la ya 
existente sobre totalitarismo. Aunque pretendía ser de alcance limitado, el concepto de 
Linz contiene demasiada variabilidad interna como para ser empíricamente útil puesto 
que su caracterización sigue un método de eliminación, incluyendo aquellos regímenes 
que no podían ser clasificados como totalitarios4. Otro grupo de trabajos tendieron a 
basar sus distinciones en variables como la ideología para sistemas de partido único, 
como es el caso de Tucker (1961)5, o el grado de influencia de los militares sobre el 
poder (Perlmutter, 1977; Nordlinger, 1977). 
 Por último, buscando entender las condiciones bajo las cuales ciertos regímenes 
se sustentan, algunos estudios contribuyeron a darnos aviso de la naturaleza endógena 
de las dictaduras, sus variedades y su grado de institucionalización. Este es el caso de 
las aportaciones de Huntington (1970) y O’Donnell (1973), quienes identificaron las 
causas para la organización de los regímenes según las necesidades de movilización y el 
nivel de modernización respectivamente. Parecidamente, algunas contribuciones –más 
descriptivas- enfatizaban las diferencias observables entre las formas tradicional y 
moderna de dictadura, siendo el totalitarismo una expresión extrema de las segundas 
(Perlmutter, 1981; Rubin, 1987; sobre tiranía moderna véase Chirot, 1994).   
  Sin embargo, si uno quiere estudiar la variabilidad existente en términos de 
resultados económicos y políticas públicas entre dictaduras y dictadores, estas 
categorías mencionadas son de poca ayuda debido a su carácter opaco y no exclusivo.  
  De hecho, la discusión acerca de la relación entre regímenes políticos y 
crecimiento económico estaba, por aquel momento, lejos de ser clara, especialmente en 
lo concerniente al rol que los gobiernos autoritarios jugaban en el proceso de 
                                                 
3 La teoría  de Friedrich y Brzezinski proponía seis rasgos diferenciadores de los sistemas autoritarios: 
una ideología, un partido único, una policía terrorista, el monopolio de las comunicaciones, el monopolio 
de las armas y una economía centralizada y planificada. Véase también Burch (1964), Schapiro (1972) y 
Unger (1974). 
4 Las principales características de su concepto o categoría son relativamente vagas y no del todo 
excluyentes: i) presencia de un grado limitado de pluralismo, ii) ausencia de una ideología elaborada, iii) 
ausencia de movilización política y iv) un líder (o pequeña elite) que ejerce el poder sobre unas bases 
confusas pero predecibles. 
5 Su tipología incluye regímenes fascistas, comunistas y nacionalistas. 
desarrollo6. Dos visiones completamente opuestas dominaban el debate. Por un lado, 
algunos teóricos defendían que los regímenes dictatoriales promoverían mayores niveles 
de crecimiento que las democracias. En su opinión, los regímenes no democráticos 
podían estimular más eficazmente la inversión al no estar sometidos a las presiones 
consumistas –en forma de redistribución- de los votantes miopes, los sindicatos o 
cualquier otro grupo de interés (Huntington, 1968). La asunción subyacente en tales 
postulados es que el estado debe jugar –y quiere jugar- un rol determinante en el buen 
funcionamiento de la economía, un rol que no puede ser ejercido si el estado carece de 
autonomía.  
 Estos argumentos se vieron pronto atacados por ser extremadamente ingenuos y 
simplistas debido a que menospreciaban los riesgos de la autonomía del estado. Aunque 
la redistribución y la búsqueda de beneficios por parte de los votantes, sindicatos y otros 
grupos de interés puedan prevenirse, una excesiva autonomía estatal puede conducir a la 
falta de constreñimientos sobre las decisiones de los gobiernos, permitiendo así que el 
dictador pueda acumular rentas para sí mismo o para sus colaboradores, lo que 
conllevaría un nivel de ineficiencia incluso mayor que el resultante de bajo una 
democracia redistributiva (véase, por ejemplo, Olson, 1991; Przeworski, 1990). En 
consecuencia, los derechos de propiedad estarían tan en riesgo bajo estas condiciones 
que bajo una democracia o, casi seguramente, más. 
 La evidencia empírica reciente ha demostrado que, tras controlar por las 
condiciones bajo las cuales existen, los regímenes políticos (democracia vs. dictadura)  
no tienen ningún efecto sobre la tasa de crecimiento económico (Przeworski et al. 
2000). Sin embargo, con respecto a las dictaduras, la historia nos ofrece numerosos 
ejemplos de gobiernos exitosos y desastrosos en términos de desarrollo. De hecho, ha 
habido sobre unos 122 gobiernos autoritarios –para los que hay datos- durante los cuales 
la media de crecimiento fue negativa; mientras, en claro contraste, ha habido unos 164 
dictadores bajo los cuales la media de crecimiento fue superior a 7 puntos porcentuales. 
La pregunta es, pues, ¿por qué algunos perjudican sus economías y otros no? ¿Existe 
algún conjunto de constreñimientos que nos ayude a explicar estas diferencias? Si es 
así, ¿Qué factores las causan? 
 Las anteriores preguntas nos conducen directamente a las instituciones, 
especialmente tras afirmaciones tan rotundas como la de de Douglas C. North: “yo 
                                                 
6 Véase Przeworski i Limongi (1993) para una excelente revisión de la literatura. Véase también Durham 
(1999). 
deseo a rol mucho más fundamental para las instituciones en las sociedades; ellas son el 
determinante del crecimiento económico a largo plazo” (1990: 107). La afirmación, 
aunque fuerte, dejó algunos puntos abiertos al debate. La mayor parte de la discusión 
giraba entorno la identificación de cuáles eran las instituciones realmente esenciales 
para el desarrollo y a través de qué mecanismos. A raíz de ello, nuevos conceptos como 
‘gobernanza’, ‘estabilidad’ o ‘cohesión social’ fueron acuñados para al ya tradicional de 
derechos de propiedad una vertiente más político-económica (véase, Keefer, 2004). La 
trampa tautológica se repetía de nuevo, no obstante; las sociedades que crecían eran 
aquellas que estaban bien gobernadas, mientras aquellas que se empobrecían eran 
aquellas que sufrían de una mala ‘gobernanza’. Conscientes de este fallo, los 
académicos en este campo empezaron a examinar los elementos específicos incluidos en 
tales conceptos. En el campo de las instituciones políticas, la discusión se ha ido 
estrechando progresivamente hacía un reconocimiento, aunque tácito, de que la 
accountability es uno “de los fundamentos para el desarrollo económico” (Bates, 2006: 
31; véase también, Przeworski, 2004a; Keefer, 2005).  
 Aún así, la evidencia empírica ha estado casi totalmente sesgada hacia el estudio 
de los sistemas democráticos, donde las instituciones que promueven la accountability 
pueden ser fácilmente reconocidas y codificadas. Los regímenes autoritarios han sido 
por lo general ignorados o simplemente tomados como una categoría residual con la 
cual poder comparar a los distintos sistemas democráticos. Esta tesis pretende llenar 
este vacío. Como Cheibub y Przeworski expresan, “es necesario un análisis más 
minucioso del impacto de la política tanto de las diferentes instituciones democráticas 
como de las diferentes formas de dictadura” (1997: 121). Nosotros hemos elegido la 
segunda de las opciones para esta investigación.  
 
2.- Accountability, Instituciones y Dictaduras 
 
 La accountability, definida en términos generales, no tiene porque excluir 
necesariamente a los sistemas autoritarios, aunque los mecanismos a través de los cuales 
es ejercida nos parezcan solamente regulados y eficaces bajo regímenes democráticos. 
Sin embargo, dado que tanto los gobernantes democráticos como los autoritarios pueden 
anticipar que ciertas malas ‘acciones’ o políticas dañarán sus probabilidades de 
permanecer en el poder power (Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson, 1995; Manin, 
Przeworski and Stokes, 1999), la accountability puede actuar como un constreñimiento 
en ambos tipos de régimen.  
 La accountability no existe de por sí. Por el contrario, es un resultado de 
segundo orden de ciertas características institucionales de los sistemas políticos, es 
decir, es el resultado de la combinación de ciertas condiciones y combinaciones 
instituionales (Przeworski, 2004a). En consecuencia, los sistemas políticos difieren en el 
grado de control político que permiten. De acuerdo con Lederman, Loayza y Soares 
(2005), en los regímenes democráticos, dicho grado de control depende de tres factores: 
el nivel de competición, la existencia de ‘checks and balances’, y el nivel de 
transparencia del sistema. No obstante, poco sabemos acerca de los factores que hacen 
variar el grado de accountability en regímenes dictatoriales. La lógica de la anticipación 
se mantiene, esto es, si el dictador prevé que ciertas políticas acarrearán malos 
resultados para su estabilidad no serán aplicadas. Pero en este caso, en lugar de fijarnos 
en las elecciones, deberemos prestar atención a la ocurrencia potencial de protestas, 
revoluciones y golpes. Si los mecanismos de accountability varían, también variarán sus 
variables explicativas.  
 En este estudio hemos identificado dos tipos principales de accountability. Por 
un lado, la accountability política relaciona las decisiones del dictador con sus 
probabilidades de retener el poder en el futuro. La accountability, así, permite a 
aplicación de sanciones en caso de que el gobierno adopte políticas en su propio 
beneficio. Las sanciones, en este caso, implican la pérdida del poder. Por otro lado, la 
accountability judicial hace referencia a las sanciones criminales aplicadas como 
resultado de la pérdida de poder. Hemos considerado el castigo en términos generales a 
fin de medir el grado de bienestar o utilidad del dictador tras ser depuesto. 
 Uno de nuestros principales argumentos es que la accountability política es 
endógena y, por tanto, también lo son las preferencias temporales de los dictadores. 
Bajo esta premisa, el argumento de Olson (1993) de que una perspectiva largo-placista 
es esencial para que los dictadores desarrollen un interés ‘encompassing’ y promuevan 
un mayor crecimiento económico podría ser erróneo. Si la probabilidad de 
supervivencia en el poder es hecha endógena con respecto al grado de extracción 
(impuestos, para simplificar), al elegir la tasa de extracción, los gobiernos autoritarios 
determinan al mismo tiempo tanto sus probabilidades de permanecer en el poder como 
la tasa de crecimiento económico. A resultas de esto, los constreñimientos político-
económicos que afecten a tal decisión constituirán las raíces explicativas de las 
diferencias en los resultados económicos y no un horizonte temporal exógeno como en, 
por ejemplo, el trabajo de Clague et al. (1996). La lógica subyacente es alterada en 
consecuencia, dado que para que el tipo de interés ‘encompassing’ a la Olson emerja, se 
requiere de un alto nivel de seguridad en el poder si el “bandido” ha de devenir estable. 
Sin embargo, en los modelos constreñimientos endógenos, como en el nuestro, la 
acumulación de rentas será moderada siempre y cuando la accountability sea efectiva, 
por tanto, en estos casos, un gobierno aislado y estable será capaz de extraer mayores 
rentas para su propio beneficio y el crecimiento será menor.  
 
3.- Plan de Estudio 
 
 Los problemas y cuestiones comentados anteriormente contienen un componente 
teórico y empírico. Esta tesis sigue esta división también, y sus capítulos pueden 
dividirse en dos grandes partes, la primera de las cuales incluye cuatro capítulos y 
contiene una revisión de la literatura, los conceptos teóricos y el modelo formal; 
mientras que la segunda parte, que también incluye cuatro capítulos, está dedicada a 
comprobar empíricamente todo lo propuesto en la primera parte.  
 En el Capítulo 2 introducimos el marco teórico y conceptual que subyace esta 
investigación. Repasamos las distintas aproximaciones a las instituciones y las 
principales aportaciones que relacionan a éstas con el desarrollo económico. Luego 
describimos el marco causal adoptado, definimos la accountability, y defendemos su 
posible rol en la determinación de las políticas de los regímenes autoritarios. El capítulo 
termina con una discusión sobre la literatura acerca del estado depredador a fin de 
encontrar sus puntos débiles. Así, argumentamos que el problema de los modelos con 
preferencias temporales exógenas es que obvia el hecho de que las decisiones de los 
dictadores afectan sus probabilidades de retener el poder. Por otro lado, los modelos con 
preferencias temporales endógenas han tendido a comparar el resultado con 
constreñimientos con el resultado sin ellos; sin embargo, los ejercicios de estática 
comparativa son dejados generalmente de lado lo que priva a estos estudios del 
desarrollo de hipótesis concretas. 
 En el Capítulo 3 se desarrollan los conceptos y funciones incluidas en nuestro 
modelo general, como son la función de accountability, y el valor post-poder, y 
ofrecemos una solución general a éste. Después especializamos la función de 
accountability y estudiamos el significado y efecto de cada uno de sus componentes, 
introduciendo los conceptos de seguridad y sensibilidad. También llevamos a cabo 
detallados ejercicios de estática comparativa con la ayuda de simulaciones numéricas, y 
analizamos el efecto de distintos tipos de función de probabilidad. 
 El modelo del Capítulo 3 es netamente económico. Sin embargo, los parámetros 
de la función de accountability son tratados como exógenos. El Capítulo 4 pues estudia 
las interacciones estratégicas, antes ignoradas por simplicidad, que dan forma a los 
distintos niveles de accountability a los que los dictadores están sujetos. Para ello 
introducimos los diferentes mecanismos de accountability presentes en los sistemas 
autoritarios y los actores que los implementan. 
 Los Capítulos 5 y 6 están dedicados a explorar las consecuencias empíricas y 
proposiciones del Capítulo 4. En concreto, el Capítulo 5 analiza las fuentes de ingresos 
de los regímenes autoritarios, comprobando la validez de la proposición que mantiene 
que las instituciones dictatoriales sirven para movilizar la cooperación económica hacia 
el régimen, permitiendo, así, una mayor recaudación de impuestos para los que la 
colaboración es necesaria. Así pues, se muestra que las instituciones dictatoriales son el 
resultado de la combinación de dos factores: la fuerza de la oposición y la 
disponibilidad de ingresos que no requieren de cooperación. Por su lado, el Capítulo 6 
se centra en la accountability política, estudiando las condiciones que determinan los 
diferentes niveles de seguridad y sensibilidad de los dictadores. Después nos movemos 
al campo de las instituciones y se analiza cómo éstas se relacionan con las dos 
dimensiones de la accountability política. 
 El Capítulo 7 explora el otro tipo de accountability considerado, la judicial, que 
determina el grado de bienestar que los dictadores disfrutan tras dejar el poder. Tras 
describir los diferentes escenarios que el dictador puede encontrar tras ser depuesto, 
presentamos los datos específicamente creados para este capítulo. También se propone 
un modelo simple de teoría de juegos a fin de entender los condicionantes de los 
diferentes resultados post-poder como son la fuerza relativa del régimen (o la oposición) 
y el contexto internacional. Posteriormente ponemos a prueba empíricamente las 
hipótesis y, como antes, estudiamos la relación entre las instituciones dictatoriales y este 
tipo de accountability.  
 El Capítulo 8 analiza el crecimiento económico. Tras observar las crecientes 
desigualdades a nivel de renta per cápita entre los regímenes autoritarios, de nuevo 
analizamos primero los determinantes del crecimiento a nivel de gobierno. Así, las 
variables que en los capítulos anteriores demostramos que tenían un efecto positivo 
sobre el nivel de seguridad, se muestra que tienen un impacto negativo sobre la tasa de 
crecimiento, mientras que aquellas que aumentan el grado de sensibilidad tienen un 
efecto positivo. El mismo tipo de modelo se emplea para analizar el consumo del 
gobierno, con resultados plenamente consistentes a los anteriores. Luego se estudia el 
efecto de las instituciones mediante el uso del método en dos pasos de Heckman. Dado 
que las instituciones formales están asociadas a distintos grados de accountability, es 
esperable que tengan un efecto diferente sobre el nivel de crecimiento y el consumo 
público. En la última parte del capítulo, ofrecemos evidencia tentativa sobre el impacto 
que los distintos mecanismos de accountability tienen sobre la tasa de crecimiento de la 
renta. 
 Finalmente, en el Capítulo 9 se resumen los principales hallazgos de la presente 
tesis. 
 
4.- Acerca de los Datos 
 
 En esta investigación se emplea una base de datos enorme que es el resultado de 
la suma de varias bases ya existentes y la creación de nuevas variables. Nuestra 
principal fuente de datos es la base ACLP, que fue desarrollada por Przeworski et al. 
para la elaboración de su libro Democracy & Development (2000) y que ha sido 
recientemente actualizada. Dicha base incluye numerosas variables institucionales a las 
que Gandhi (2004) añadió la clasificación de las instituciones dictatoriales que nosotros 
empleamos. Los datos políticos fueron, además, extendidos y actualizados por José 
Antonio Cheibub y Jennifer Gandhi (2004). El periodo cubierto por los datos es extenso 
y va de 1946 (o el año de independencia del país) al 2000. 
 Dado que esta investigación se centra en los regímenes dictatoriales, 
necesitamos de antemano una clasificación a fin de elegir los regímenes de nuestra 
muestra. Para ello hemos tomado la clasificación desarrollada por Przeworski et al. 
(2000) que contiene una clasificación dicotómica de los distintos regímenes. Tras 
dividir la ase de datos tomando solamente aquellas unidades clasificadas como 
dictaduras, nuestra muestra consiste de 139 países y 550 periodos bajo el mismo 
gobierno autoritario. Consideramos, al tomar las unidades de análisis, como cabezas 
efectivos de gobierno a los siguientes casos: 1) secretarios generales del Partido 
Comunista en dictaduras comunistas, excepto en el caso de Deng Xiaoping en China, 2) 
reyes, presidentes y gobernantes de facto en regímenes no comunistas , excepto en los 
casos de Singapur, Malasia, Camboya, Laos y Myanmar, donde el jefe efectivo de 
gobierno es a veces el primer ministro, y 3) militares o otras figuras cuando las fuentes 
indican que el jefe nominal es una ‘marioneta’ (Cheibub y Gandhi, 2004). 
 Los datos sobre crecimiento económico proceden de las Penn World Tables 5.6 
y cubren el periodo 1950-2000. Otras series económicas y demográficas provienen de 
los World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002), aunque algunas de sus 
variables, como los datos de ingresos públicos, cubren sólo el periodo 1970-2000. 
 El Apéndice de la tesis ofrece una detallada descripción de todas las variables 
empleadas y las fuentes de las que proceden. También se incluye una descripción de las 
normas de codificación de las dos nuevas variables creadas para esta investigación: la 
forma de derrocamiento del dictador y su destino tras dejar el poder. 
 
CONCLUSIONES 
 
1.- Un Resumen de las Cuestiones y Proposiciones Teóricas 
 
1.1.- Modelizando la Accountability: Tipos y Dimensiones 
  
Los regímenes dictatoriales se caracterizan esencialmente por un alto grado de 
concentración del poder y por la centralización del proceso de toma de decisiones. 
Partiendo de esta premisa, podría pues argumentarse que los líderes de estos regímenes 
pueden eludir cualquier rendición de cuentas. Sin embargo, si uno piensa la 
accountability en términos generales y presta atención a como funcionan los sistemas 
autoritarios, la necesidad de analizar las condiciones que pueden incrementar los niveles 
de control o autonomía del poder bajo dichos regímenes deviene no sólo inevitable sino 
central a fin de comprender sus políticas y sus resultados económicos. 
De hecho, el estudio de la accountability y sus determinantes es un campo 
creciente no sólo en ciencia política sino también en economía. No obstante, su estudio 
está lejos de estar completado. Como Hoffman y Gibson correctamente afirman, “este 
nuevo y explícitamente político acercamiento al desarrollo pide que los estudiosos del 
desarrollo entiendan no sólo la relación entre accountability y desarrollo sino también, y 
más importante, las causas de dicho accountability” (2006: 2). 
Una definición básica de accountability nos la ofrecen Manin, Przeworski y 
Stokes: 
“Los gobiernos son ‘accountable’ si los ciudadanos saben distinguir entre 
gobiernos representativos y no representativos y pueden sancionarlos 
apropiadamente, manteniendo en el poder a los candidatos con buenos resultados y 
sustituyendo a aquellos sin éstos” (1999: 10)  
 
Obsérvese que en esta definición no se realiza ninguna asunción respecto a si los 
gobiernos deben ser democráticos o no, o acerca de si dichas sanciones deben derivar de 
la celebración de elecciones competitivas y la aplicación en ellas del voto retrospectivo. 
De hecho, Maravall (2005) apunta de forma adecuada que incluso bajo un sistema 
democrático, la accountability puede tener lugar a dos niveles distintos. Uno, el de los 
votantes y las elecciones y, dos, el del partido y los miembros de la coalición. Y como 
él mismo defiende, “los votantes no siempre comparten los mismos criterios que los 
políticos a la hora de recompensar o castigar a los gobernantes” (Maravall, 2005: 29). 
Los dictadores también pueden ser sancionados y perder el poder. Asimismo, 
pueden ser derrocados mediante distintos métodos, aunque éstos suelen ser más 
costosos que el simple hecho de introducir una papeleta en una urna cada cuatro o cinco 
años. Golpes militares, revoluciones, complots, golpes palaciegos son tan sólo algunas 
de las formas mediante las cuales los dirigentes autoritarios pueden ser depuestos. Así 
pues, todo autócrata debe enfrentarse a una probabilidad de ser derrocado en el siguiente 
periodo que depende de sus propias decisiones políticas. De este modo, la preferencia 
temporal del dictador pasa a ser endógena. Esta es la manera en que la accountability 
política ha sido modelizada dentro del marco de un modelo general de crecimiento en el 
que el gobernante busca maximizar las rentas del poder eligiendo la tasa de extracción a 
ser aplicada sobre la renta de los hogares. Para ello se ha elegido una función sencilla 
para la accountability 
Pr(supervivencia) A Bτ= −  
Donde, obviamente, 0 ( ) 1A Bτ≤ − ≤ . La función, pues, consiste de dos parámetros y 
una variable, τ, es decir, la tasa de extracción (llamada generalmente, tasa impositiva) 
elegida por el dictador. Los dos parámetros buscan capturar dos distintas dimensiones 
de la accountability política: la seguridad (A) y la sensibilidad (B). La primera mide el 
nivel estructural de seguridad de que un dictador disfruta independientemente del 
comportamiento de la economía o su nivel de pillaje. Por otra parte, el grado en que la 
tasa impositiva afecta las probabilidades de permanencia en el poder es determinado por 
el parámetro de sensibilidad, B, que es, en definitiva, el coeficiente de la variable τ. La 
sensitividad está relacionada con las que se han venido a denominar las ‘teorías fiscales 
de la gobernanza’, las cuales establecen que cuando la cooperación de los ciudadanos no 
es necesaria para la obtención de ingresos fiscales, los gobiernos tienen pocos 
incentivos para atender a sus intereses. La caracterización de estas dos dimensiones nos 
permitirá especificar los mecanismos causales a través de los cuales la accountability 
ejerce un efecto sobre los resultados económicos de las dictaduras. 
 Las posibilidades de accountability no acaban aquí, sin embargo. Existe otro tipo 
de accountability que denominamos accountability judicial. Mientras que la 
accountability política sirve para determinar si los dirigentes van a perder el poder o no; 
la accountability judicial mide o clasifica cuáles son las consecuencias para el dictador 
saliente de perder dicho poder. Para considerar esta accountability hemos introducido el 
parámetro exitU  -el valor de salida- en nuestro modelo formal que mide la utilidad que 
obtiene el dictador como consecuencia –o después- de ser desposeído de su cargo. En 
algunos casos la pérdida del poder no acarrea graves consecuencias para el ex-dictador, 
por ejemplo, si consigue exiliarse, puede disfrutar del dinero acumulado durante su 
mandato sin tener que hacer frente a responsabilidades. Exploraremos más adelante las 
consecuencias de esta posibilidad en términos de corrupción. 
 
1.2.- Hipótesis y Predicciones 
  
 El desarrollo del modelo formal, realizado en Capítulo 3, tiene un objetivo muy 
concreto, a saber, la obtención de hipótesis mediante la realización de ejercicios de 
estática comparativa con respecto a los diversos elementos contenidos en la función de 
accountability política y el parámetro de accountability judicial. De este modo hemos 
podido comprobar que, bajo todas las formas funcionales (excepto la exponencial), los 
efectos esperados de loa parámetros del modelo son los siguientes: 
• Cuando A aumenta, también lo hace el nivel general de seguridad del dictador, 
es decir, éste se enfrenta a una probabilidad menor de ser derrocado por 
cualquier actor y, como resultado, el parámetro de seguridad sólo tiene una 
influencia positiva la probabilidad de permanecer en el poder en t+1 y obtener 
rentas. Por tanto, una mayor seguridad estructural permite al autócrata extraer 
beneficios para sí mismo a una tasa más alta dañando así el crecimiento 
económico. 
• A través del parámetro de sensibilidad, B, la tasa de extracción afecta la 
probabilidad de retener el poder y, en consecuencia, la preferencia temporal del 
dictador. Dicho efecto fuerza al dictador a hacer frente a un trade-off entre 
enriquecimiento en el presente o permanecer en el poder en el futuro. A menor 
sensibilidad, pues, más débil es el trade-off y, como resultado, mayor es el nivel 
de pillaje y menor el crecimiento. 
• Por el contrario, si la función de accountability toma una forma exponencial, la 
predicción o resultado respecto a la seguridad varía. Bajo esta distinta base, más 
seguridad conlleva menores tasas impositivas y, por tanto, mayor crecimiento. 
Sin embargo, el efecto de la sensibilidad no cambia. 
• Respecto al valor post-salida, exitU , los resultados obtenidos de las simulaciones 
son claros. Cuanto mayor sea el bienestar que el dictador consigue asegurarse 
tras dejar el poder, menos son las razones para que, mientras gobierne, auto-
constriña su avaricia. En el Capítulo 7 hemos introducido un elemento de 
incerteza en dichos resultados post-poder. Para ello hemos asumido que solo 
existen dos posibles escenarios tras dejar el poder, uno bueno, como permanecer 
en el país sin castigo alguno, y otro malo, como ser juzgado y/o ejecutado. 
Ambos ocurren con probabilidad 1-q y q respectivamente. La lógica establece, 
pues, que una mayor probabilidad de recibir algún de tipo de castigo en el futuro 
llevará al dictador a controlarse en sus afanes de enriquecimiento.  
 
 
En el Capítulo 4 se analizan con mayor detenimiento los mecanismos de 
accountability a los que los dictadores están sujetos con el fin de desarrollar hipótesis 
concretas acerca de los determinantes de la variabilidad de las dos dimensiones antes 
mencionada, seguridad y sensibilidad, que fueron tomadas como exógenas en el modelo 
inicial de crecimiento. El modelo de negociación desarrollado a este fin contiene tres 
resultados básicos a ser contrastados empíricamente. Primeramente, los determinantes 
exógenos del nivel de seguridad deben buscarse en las variables que afectan la fuerza 
relativa de la elite y la oposición. Segundo, los niveles de sensibilidad vienen 
determinados por la disponibilidad de rentas o ingresos no cooperativos  como ingresos 
no procedentes de impuestos, impuestos sobre el comercio internacional o ayuda 
externa. 
El resto del capítulo está dedicado a la búsqueda de pistas entre la literatura 
existente acerca de los determinantes empíricos de la fuerza relativa de la elite, los 
militares y la oposición ciudadana. Concretamente, se propone allí que para mantener la 
lealtad de las elites cuando no se dispone de rentas no cooperativas, los dictadores 
deben recurrir a la creación de instituciones para distribuir réditos y privilegios. 
También exponemos que la capacidad de la elite puede es menor en regímenes 
monárquicos, donde la legitimidad reside en la tradición y los derechos dinásticos. 
Además, los gobernantes pueden hallarse más seguros en el poder si gozan de cierta 
legitimidad adquirida mediante su participación en la lucha anticolonial de sus países.  
Por otro lado, la dependencia externa y la inestabilidad pasada se muestran, de 
acuerdo con la literatura sobre el tema, como los principales detonantes de la 
intervención de los militares en política; mientras que la reciente independencia del país 
tras la dominación colonial parece reducir tal riesgo. Finalmente, y respecto al poder de 
la oposición ciudadana, su capacidad organizativa está influenciada por los siguientes 
factores: su fuerza organizativa inicial, que se espera que sea mayor si el régimen 
predecesor era una democracia; las dificultades que una alta proporción de sistemas 
autoritarios en la región supone; el apoyo ofrecido por gobiernos democráticos 
extranjeros; el grado de fragmentación étnica, que puede dificultar la coordinación entre 
grupos, y la creación de un sistema multipartidista.  
 
1.3.- Instituciones Dictatoriales 
 
 El modelo del Capítulo 4 nos permite avanzar a su vez los determinantes y los 
efectos esperados en los ingresos estatales y el nivel de accountability de las 
instituciones dictatoriales, esto es, parlamentos, sistemas de partido único y sistemas 
multipartidistas. Hasta el momento, las principales contribuciones a la teoría sobre los 
regímenes autoritarios han prestado poca o ninguna atención al rol desempeñado por las 
instituciones7, asumiendo que éstas servían simplemente para dotar al régimen de una 
fachada democrática pero sin atribuirles ninguna otra función específica ni ningún 
efecto sobre las políticas. No obstante, nosotros proponemos la idea contraria: las 
instituciones tienen un papel relevante puesto que afectan los niveles subyacentes de 
accountability de los dictadores. 
                                                 
7 Véase Broker (2000) para una excelente revisión de esta literatura. 
 Según lo observado ya por Gandhi y Przeworski (2006), las instituciones en 
regímenes dictatoriales sirven para cooptar a la oposición potencial así como para 
movilizar apoyo económico en forma de conformidad y colaboración en la recaudación 
de impuestos. En consecuencia, podemos predecir que las instituciones existen bajo 
ciertas condiciones. Los beneficios crecientes de movilizar la cooperación cuando la 
ayuda externa o los recursos naturales escasean conducen a la elite y al dictador a 
aceptar un sistema institucional más abierto; mientras que la capacidad organizativa de 
la oposición conlleva una mayor poder de ésta a la hora de presionar por un resultado en 
cuanto a políticas más favorable y una mayor grado de autonomía organizativa. 
 Al mismo tiempo, las instituciones están asociadas a ciertos niveles de seguridad 
y sensibilidad dado que ellas mismas son resultado de algunas de las variables que 
afectan a ambas dimensiones de la accountability. Las hipótesis concernientes a esta 
relación son las siguientes: la relación entre institucionalización y sensibilidad es simple 
y se espera que sea monotónica, es decir, a mayor apertura institucional, mayor el grado 
de influencia que el régimen permite. La seguridad sigue un patrón diferente no 
obstante. Ésta aumenta con un cierto nivel de institucionalización, pero después cae 
drásticamente mostrando, pues, una forma de parábola.  
 
1.4.- El Castigo Potencial a los Dictadores Salientes: La Accountability Judicial 
 
 La revista The Economist (16 al 22 de Diciembre de 2006) publicó 
recientemente un artículo titulado “Ending impunity” que enfatizaba la creciente 
preocupación internacional para perseguir antiguos dirigentes con antecedentes de de 
corrupción y violaciones de los derechos humanos. El artículo recalca al punto de 
inflexión que el caso Pinochet para el derecho internacional reconociendo de forma 
explícita que “hasta el caso Pinochet, la mayoría de dictadores de las habían apañado 
para evitar cualquier rendición de cuentas”. 
 En el Capítulo 7 se estudia el parámetro exitU  del modelo, al cual nos referimos 
como el accountability judicial de los dictadores puesto que existe la posibilidad de que 
éstos sean castigados tras dejar el poder por los actos cometidos durante sus respectivos 
gobiernos. Concretamente, en dicho capítulo hemos asumido que tal castigo tiene lugar 
con probabilidad q tras la pérdida de poder y, en consecuencia, demostramos como q 
ejerce un efecto positivo en la tasa esperada de crecimiento económico, como ya 
mencionamos antes. 
 Lo que se propone en este capítulo, con la ayuda de la teoría de juegos, es que 
los resultados post-poder son básicamente consecuencia de dos factores: la fuerza del 
gobierno saliente –o, inversamente, la de la oposición- y el contexto internacional. La 
fuerza del gobierno puede llevar a la oposición a perdonar sus delitos si el riesgo de 
reintervención no es excesivamente alto. En cambio, el dictador se somete al castigo si 
su posición es débil y tiene pocas posibilidades de ser hospedado en caso de exiliarse. 
También se juzgará al dictador si sus posibilidades de salir del país son relativamente 
pequeñas. Por el contrario, si las opciones de fuga son muy elevadas, la oposición puede 
preferir optar por ejecutar al ex-dictador antes que éste huya. Así pues, el contexto 
internacional tiene dos tipos de efecto. Por un lado, si la probabilidad de extradición es 
muy alta, la utilidad relativa del dictador de resistir respecto a dejar el país aumenta, lo 
que podría inducir a la oposición a ofrecer el perdón. Por otro lado, una alta 
probabilidad de fuga puede conducir a la ejecución a fin de evitar que el dictador escape 
del castigo. 
Una nueva base de datos elaborada específicamente para esta investigación nos 
ha permitido poner a prueba las hipótesis antes mencionadas. Para todos los dictadores 
que gobernaron entre 1945 y 2000, para quienes se encontró información, se ha 
codificado si, tras dejar el poder, fueron castigados, se exiliaron o permanecieron en sus 
países sin ser juzgados. La descripción de los datos nos muestra un escenario 
desesperanzador como ya apuntaba el artículo de The Economist. A saber, la mayoría de 
los dictadores (54,18%) pudieron quedarse en sus países sin ser castigados. El 23,5% 
lograron evitar su castigo exiliándose. Y sólo el 22% de los casos ha sido –más o menos 
severamente- castigado, ya sea mediante juicio o asesinato. Además, hemos encontrado 
que, contrariamente alo que podría esperarse, el accountability judicial es menos 
probable si el dictador saliente es sustituido por un líder y un régimen democrático. 
Ciertamente, sólo 13 de los 88 dictadores que fueron encarcelados o ejecutados lo 
fueron a manos de gobiernos democráticos.  
 
2.- Resultados Empíricos sobre Accountability e Instituciones 
 
2.1.- Instituciones e Ingresos Públicos 
 
 La presente tesis contiene numerosas partes empíricas y de análisis de datos que 
cubren los diferentes aspectos de la economía política de las dictaduras. El Capítulo 5 se 
centra en la endogeneidad de las instituciones y la economía política de los ingresos 
públicos de los regímenes autoritarios siguiendo los postulados teóricos desarrollados 
en el Capítulo 4. 
 De este modo, el Capítulo 5 contiene dos partes empíricas distintas. La primera 
analiza cuáles son los factores que explican la existencia o creación de instituciones de 
corte democrático bajo regímenes autoritarios; mientras la segunda se centra en analizar 
los efectos de dichas instituciones en la política fiscal de los regímenes. 
  En lo que respecta a las instituciones y sus orígenes, los resultados confirman 
que cuando los recursos naturales y la ayuda externa escasean, los sistemas autoritarios 
buscan movilizar la cooperación ciudadana, puesto que las otras bases impositivas o 
fuentes de ingresos conllevan mayores costes administrativos y opciones de evasión. A 
cambio el régimen ofrece un grado limitado de organización política y representación 
dentro de las instituciones del propio régimen. Paralelamente, una oposición más fuerte 
es capaz de presionar hacia una mayor apertura institucional manteniendo el resto de 
factores constantes. Por tanto, las variables que captan la fuerza potencial de la 
oposición hacen aumentar las probabilidades de creación o permisión de instituciones 
más amplias dentro de la estructura del régimen vigente. Por otro lado, las preferencias 
de los dirigentes del gobierno pueden desempeñar un rol también. Dichas preferencias 
tan sólo pueden aproximarse teniendo en cuenta el tipo de líder, es decir, si el dictador 
es civil, militar o monárquico.  
 La endogeneidad de las instituciones bajo dictaduras tiene profundas 
consecuencias en la metodología a emplear para estimar sus posibles efectos (como ya 
se recalcó en los Capítulos 1 y 5). La base del problema es la siguiente: si los factores 
observables o no observables de las instituciones influyen a su vez en la variable 
dependiente (como el crecimiento o los ingresos), el uso de mínimos cuadrados 
ordinarios producirá resultados sesgados. Es por eso que esta tesis empleamos el 
modelo en dos pasos de Heckman, cuyos entresijos de detallan en el Capítulo 5. 
 Respecto a los ingresos públicos, habíamos predicho, siguiendo lo expuesto en el 
juego del Capítulo 4, que la apertura institucional de un régimen conllevaría un 
beneficio para la elite en forma de mayores ingresos procedentes de impuestos sobre la 
renta, los beneficios, bienes y servicios, y sobre la propiedad. Las medias obtenidas tras 
corregir por posibles sesgos de selección efectivamente corroboran que los regímenes 
no institucionalizados recurren principalmente a dos fuentes de ingresos: los impuestos 
sobre el comercio internacional y los ingresos no procedentes de impuestos. Por su lado, 
en dictaduras más institucionalizadas la dependencia fiscal entre las diversas fuentes 
está más equilibrada, recaudando así más o menos el mismo porcentaje de las diferentes 
tipos de impuestos. A mayor nivel de institucionalización, mayor es el porcentaje que 
los regímenes consiguen recaudar de impuestos sobre la renta, los beneficios, bienes y 
servicios, y sobre la propiedad.  
 
2.2.- La Accountability Política 
 
 Como se ha repetido de forma insistente en este estudio, la accountability 
política, una vez hecha endógena, tiene dos dimensiones, la seguridad y la sensibilidad. 
Sin embargo, estos dos conceptos tienen sus propios determinantes que explican su 
variabilidad entre los diferentes dictadores.  
 En el Capítulo 6 nos concentramos en identificar dichas variables y en estudiar 
como seguridad y sensibilidad se relacionan con el nivel de institucionalización de los 
regímenes dictatoriales. El primer paso ha consistido en analizar los factores 
explicativos que están detrás de los distintos mecanismos de accountability a los que los 
dictadores están sujetos: sustituciones o complots desde la elite, golpes militares, y las 
protestas o revoluciones populares. En segundo lugar, se analizan las condiciones 
económicas de la sensibilidad. 
 La distinción entre diferentes actores políticos y, por tanto, entre “tecnologías 
para la sustitución de líderes” (Przeworski, 2003) nos ha permitido conocer con mayor 
detalle los factores explicativos de los distintos niveles de seguridad de los dictadores 
mediante la estimación de modelos de regresión para cada tipo de derrocamiento. Para 
ello hemos construido una nueva variable que, para cada dictador o gobierno autoritario 
que existió entre 1946 y 2000, identifica y codifica cuál fue el principal actor o grupo 
implicado en el derrocamiento del dictador: los miembros de la elite, los militares, la 
oposición, o un país extranjero. Respecto a las variables independientes, éstas buscan 
captar y medir los factores que identificamos en el Capítulo 4, es decir, aquellos que 
miden la fuerza organizativa de cada grupo.  
 Los resultados de los modelos econométricos muestran como el tipo de dictador 
(civil, militar o monárquico), la naturaleza del régimen anterior (democrático o 
colonial), la fragmentación étnica, y el contexto internacional (el número de dictaduras 
en la región y la proporción de democracias en el mundo) ayudan a entender y explicar 
los distintos niveles de seguridad estructural de que gozan los dictadores en el poder. 
 Por otra parte, hemos estudiado las condiciones económicas de la sensibilidad. 
La evidencia demuestra que la existencia de recursos naturales, materias primas y ayuda 
externa hace a los gobiernos autoritarios más insensibles a los resultados económicos y 
la extracción de rentas dado que no requieren de la cooperación ciudadana para recaudar 
sus ingresos. De hecho, los modelos que analizan los mecanismos de accountability ya 
mostraron que la presencia de este tipo de rentas ayudan a los autócratas a desactivar los 
potenciales conflictos procedentes de los sectores populares de la sociedad así como 
para comprar la lealtad de las elites. 
 También se han llevado a cabo modeles de supervivencia de los dictadores a fin 
de comprobar el efecto general de las variables arriba expuestas y la dirección de su 
efecto. 
 El tercer y final paso ha consistido en clasificar a los regímenes (siguiendo su 
grado de institucionalización) de acuerdo con sus niveles asociados de accountability 
dentro del espacio bidimensional definido por la seguridad y la sensibilidad. Mediante 
el uso de varias medidas e indicadores, se demuestra que los dictadores que gobiernan 
sistemas multipartidistas son los más sensibles de todos y, a su vez, los más inseguros 
en promedio. Los regímenes con una única institución (parlamento, partido único, o 
ambos), por su lado, son los más seguros de todos pero más insensibles que los 
multipartidistas. Por último, las dictaduras sin instituciones son las más insensibles 
respecto a la extracción de rentas y muestran niveles relativamente altos de seguridad 
(algo menores que los de única institución). 
 
2.3.- Accountability Judicial. Resultados 
 
 Empleando la nueva variable antes mencionada, se han estimado modelos de 
regresión logística multinomial con el objetivo de estimar la probabilidad de castigo 
para los dictadores de nuestra muestra. Predecir el destino de los dictadores tras dejar el 
poder es una tarea difícil, no obstante, pueden identificarse algunos patrones 
interesantes. 
 Los resultados muestran que la presión internacional (en la forma de una mayor 
proporción de democracias en el mundo) tiene efectos contradictorios. De hecho, una 
mayor proporción de democracias reduce la probabilidad de castigo a corto plazo. Pero 
por otro lado, consideraciones estratégicas de las fuerzas opositoras pueden conducir a 
que a mayor número de dictaduras en la región, menor es la probabilidad de que el 
dictador huya al exilio y mayores son las de que reciba algún castigo. La exportación de 
recursos naturales aumentan las opciones de exilio de los autócratas salientes. Las rentas 
acumuladas y las alianzas internacionales cosechadas pueden ser los determinantes 
detrás de este hallazgo. Como también predijimos, los dirigentes militares son aquellos 
que gozan de una menor probabilidad de sufrir algún tipo de accountability judicial 
debido a su mayor fuerza relativa. La mayor probabilidad de encontrar exilio 
corresponde a los monarcas. 
 Respecto a las combinaciones institucionales consideradas, los resultados 
obtenidos revelan que los dirigentes de sistemas multipartidistas son los más 
vulnerables en términos de accountability judicial. Por el contrario, los dictadores en 
sistemas de institución única ya fueron identificados antes como los que de más 
seguridad gozan; esta seguridad se traduce en una mejor posición para negociar una 
salida más favorable. Un proceso similar se observa en el caso de regímenes no 
institucionalizados, cuyos líderes tienen una mayor probabilidad de poder permanecer 
en el país sin riesgo alguno. 
 Los modelos basados en la fuerza relativa de los actores políticos ponen en 
evidencia que los cambios de gobierno que son resultado de la intervención militar o de 
las fuerza de la oposición conducen con mayor probabilidad al encarcelamiento o 
ejecución del dictador derrocado. Mientras los militares tienden a arrestar y juzgar a los 
dirigentes que deponen; la oposición, tras la revuelta, tiende a librarse de ellos por la vía 
rápida.  
 
3.- La Economía Política del Crecimiento Económico en Dictaduras 
 
 El Capítulo 8 afronta, finalmente, la explicación de las diferencias en los 
resultados económicos de las dictaduras. Los principales hallazgos pueden resumirse de 
la siguiente manera: los constreñimientos que la accountability supone en la toma de 
decisiones son definitivamente efectivos, y lo son porque ayudan a mejorar los 
resultados económicos de los gobiernos autoritarios.  
 La evidencia empírica se divide de nuevo en dos partes. La primera se refiere a 
los efectos sobre el crecimiento de las variables hasta ahora analizas a nivel de 
gobierno; mientras que la segunda analiza los efectos específicos de las instituciones. 
 
3.1.- Accountability, Líderes Autoritarios y Crecimiento 
  Las variables independientes que determinan el grado de seguridad y 
sensibilidad de los dirigentes dictatoriales ejercen, en general, un fuerte efecto sobre la 
tasa de crecimiento del PIB per cápita, así como también la probabilidad estimada de 
accountability judicial. Además, los signos de dichos efectos son consistentes con las 
predicciones derivadas de nuestro modelo formal. Así pues, aquellos factores que hacen 
aumentar (disminuir) el grado de seguridad estructural de los gobiernos dictatoriales, 
hacen que la tas media de crecimiento se reduzca (aumente). Por ejemplo, hemos 
hallado que el pasado del régimen importa, así como el tipo de líder y el número de 
vecinos con regímenes autocráticos.   
 En lo referente a la sensibilidad, las dos variables que posibilitan que los 
dictadores sean menos dependientes de los impuestos que requieren de conformidad y 
cooperación, recursos exportables y ayuda externa, ambas desempeñan un importante 
efecto negativo, como esperábamos, sobre los promedios de crecimiento.  
 Asimismo, el parámetro estimado a fin de medir la probabilidad de castigo a los 
dictadores salientes ejerce un impacto positivo sobre la tasa de crecimiento puesto que 
conlleva que la utilidad de permanecer en el poder en relación a la de perderlo aumenta 
vertiginosamente; y para conservar el poder, el dictador debe controlar su apetencia por 
la corrupción (como muestra el Capítulo 7).  
 
3.2.- Institucionalización y Resultados Económicos 
 
 La segunda parte del Capítulo 8 está dedicada a explorar el efecto de las 
instituciones dictatoriales usando la metodología de Heckman a fin de controlar por las 
condiciones bajo las cuales dichas instituciones existen. Los capítulos anteriores nos 
han servido para obtener una clasificación en tres dimensiones de las variedades 
institucionales de acuerdo con sus niveles de accountability política y judicial. 
Brevemente, los regímenes no institucionalizados son los menos sensibles de todo, 
mientras que sus niveles de seguridad son altos así como su probabilidad de escapar al 
castigo. Por su lado, los regímenes de institución única  son los más que garantizan un 
mayor nivel de seguridad y tienen, a su vez, niveles intermedios de sensibilidad y de 
probabilidad de castigo. Por último, las dictaduras plenamente institucionalizadas, es 
decir, aquellas con un parlamento multipartidista presentan las mejores precondiciones 
para el crecimiento; concretamente, tienen los mayores niveles de sensibilidad (ya que 
ofrecen mayor influencia  a los grupos opositores), las mayor probabilidad potencial de 
castigo y los niveles más bajos de seguridad estructural.  
 Como resultado, es en los regímenes con múltiples instituciones donde 
esperamos encontrar las mayores tasas de crecimiento. En lo referente a los otros dos, la 
pregunta que cabe hacerse es: ¿es el peso de la seguridad mayor al de la probabilidad de 
castigo y la sensibilidad a la hora de determinar el promedio de crecimiento? Si es así, 
los regímenes de institución única mostrarán en promedio menores tasas de crecimiento 
que aquellos sin ninguna institución. Si, por el contrario, la sensibilidad y la 
accountability judicial, como parece ser, tienen un papel más importante, entonces 
podemos predecir que las dictaduras parcialmente institucionalizadas crecerán a 
mayores tasas que aquellas sin instituciones. 
 Los promedios obtenidos tras corregir por sesgo de selección detallados en el 
Capítulo 8 dan la razón a la segunda de las opciones. Así pues, comprobamos que los 
mayores niveles de crecimiento se encuentran en aquellas dictaduras con múltiples 
instituciones. Las diferencias con respecto a los dos otros tipos son estadísticamente 
significativas. Sin embargo, las comparaciones medias entre los regímenes no 
institucionalizados y aquellos con una institución son sólo significativas en dos de los 
resultados estimados, concretamente, en los obtenidos empleando el estimador de 
efectos fijos y los resultantes de incluir el rezago del logaritmo de la renta per cápita. En 
el resto de los promedios, las diferencias son pequeñas y no significativas a nivel 
estadístico. Las estimaciones corregidas por selección del consumo del gobierno 
producen resultados consistentes también. En este sentido, es en los regímenes sin 
instituciones donde encontramos el mayor promedio de consumo público (como 
porcentaje del PIB), mientras que las dictaduras más institucionalizadas son las que 
menos consumen. Por tanto, podemos concluir que las instituciones importan, incluso 
en regímenes no democráticos.  
 
3.3.- Mecanismos de Accountability y Crecimiento 
 
 La última sección del Capítulo 8 se centra en una nueva y tentativa 
aproximación a la economía política del desarrollo, a saber, el impacto de la fuerza 
estructural de cada actor política en la aplicación de las políticas. Nuestra predicción va 
en la siguiente dirección: a mayor poder relativo de las fuerzas opositoras, mayor será el 
nivel de crecimiento observado puesto que el nivel de control sobre las decisiones del 
dictador aumenta. Por contra, el poder de la elite, debido a la compra de su lealtad a 
cambio de rentas y privilegios, se espera que ejerza un impacto negativo sobre el 
crecimiento observado de la economía. No obstante, se ha tenido también en cuenta la 
posibilidad de que un alto nivel de modernización e industrialización puedan inducir un 
cambio en las preferencias de los miembros de la elite, por lo que bajo estas condiciones 
un mayor poder de este sector social repercutiría positivamente en los resultados 
económicos. Por último, la amenaza de una intervención militar, actuando como 
elemento de control sobre el nivel de descontento social, se espera que tenga un efecto 
positivo sobre la tasa de crecimiento de la renta per cápita.  
 Mediante la construcción de una nueva variable que codifica cómo fueron los 
dictadores desalojados del poder, hemos podido estimar la fuerza relativa de cada grupo 
mediante el promedio de la probabilidad de derrocamiento para cada actor (la elite, los 
militares y la oposición). Los resultados demuestran que esta medida de fuerza 
organizativa ejerce un fuerte efecto sobre el crecimiento esperado. Así, a mayor fuerza 
de la elite, menor desarrollo, aunque dicho efecto deviene positivo a partir de un 
determinado nivel de modernización. Por el contrario, la capacidad de la oposición y de 
los militares se traduce en un mayor control sobre el dictador y, por tanto, en un mejor y 
más rápido crecimiento del PIB per cápita. 
  
4.- Sore Mobutus, somozas, Amins y Duvaliers 
 
 En los últimos cincuenta años ha habido ejemplos de todo tipo de dictadores. 
Paranoicos, egoístas, egocéntricos, crueles, despóticos e incluso algunos bastante 
benevolentes. Presenciamos como un dirigente militar de Uganda se autoproclamaba 
Rey de Escocia y uno que, considerándose la reencarnación del mismo Napoleón, se 
gastó prácticamente el presupuesto anual de su república africana en una lujosa 
ceremonia de coronación como Emperador. 
Sin embargo, estas actitudes o rasgos no entran en nuestras regresiones y, como 
mucho, quedan capturadas dentro del término residual; por tanto, nuestro punto de 
partida debe ser el asumir que los dictadores toman sus decisiones en entornos político-
económicos concretos que pueden representar algún tipo de constreñimiento sobre su 
voluntad de enriquecerse. Estos constreñimientos marcan la diferencia entre éxito 
económico y desastre. Con todo, parece ser que la época de la tradicional dictadura 
depredadora ha llegado a su fin. Los líderes más paradigmáticos de este tipo de 
gobierno se concentran en las primeras décadas después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial 
y durante el periodo de descolonizaciones dentro del contexto de Guerra Fría, aunque 
muchos de ellos consiguieron perpetuarse en el poder hasta bien entrados los 90. Es 
durante este concreto periodo de tiempo que los gobiernos caracterizados por la 
corrupción masiva y el auto-enriquecimiento devinieron desgraciadamente frecuentes. 
Durante los 50, e incluso antes, Anastasio Somoza (Nicaragua), François Duvalier 
(Haití), Mohammed Reza Pahlevi (Irán), Rafael Trujillo (República Dominicana), 
Sukarno (Indonesia) llegaron al poder. En los 60 y 70, fuimos testigos del turno de los 
dictadores africanos de la época postcolonial, como Idi Amin (Uganda), Kamuzu Banda 
(Malawi), Tombalbaye (Chad), Ratsiraka (Madagascar), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), 
Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire), Bokassa (República Centro Africana), etc. El resto de 
continentes no quedaron al margen de la emergencia de nuevos déspotas y, por ejemplo, 
Asia vio a Suharto (Indonesia) o Ferdinand Marcos (Filipinas) erigirse en presidentes; y 
en Oriente Próximo, Saddam Hussein se hizo con el poder en Irak. Muchos de ellos se 
han convertido en símbolos del mal gobierno e incluso han inspirado numerosas 
novelas.  
Las condiciones del momento eran favorables para el ascenso de semejantes 
gobernantes de tipo, usando la terminología de Chehabi y Linz (1998), sultanístico 
debido a distintas razones que hemos apuntado a lo largo de esta investigación. Así, por 
ejemplo, la proporción de democracias en el mundo era por entonces pequeña, por 
debajo de 0,5, y la ola de descolonizaciones hizo que se redujera aún más; mientras que 
a nivel regional, la presencia de regímenes autoritarios era en algunos sitios absoluta8. 
Consolidar un nuevo régimen era considerablemente fácil bajo esas circunstancias 
donde la presión internacional a favor de la democratización era prácticamente nula. A 
esto cabe añadir, además, que no fue hasta 1998 que por primera vez la Convención 
para la Prevención y el Castigo de les Crímenes de Genocidio, aprobada en 1948, fue 
aplicada. El número de dictadores que tuvieron que rendir cuentas por sus acciones 
durante su estancia en el poder era escaso y debido a la intervención de los grupos 
opositores del propio país. El derecho internacional era aún embrionario a este respecto 
y carente de mecanismos de control y aplicación, a lo que hay que añadir el reducido 
                                                 
8 En algunas regiones, la proporción de dictaduras antes de 1960 o 1970 era prácticamente 1, como es el 
caso de ciertas partes del África sub-Sahariana. En otras zonas era mucho mayor a 0,5, como en América 
Latina, Oriente Próximo o el norte de África. 
número de países con voluntad de hacer uso de él teniendo en cuenta el contexto de 
formación de alianzas que la polarización de la Guerra Fría suponía. 
 La escasez o falta de experiencia a democrática previa ayudó a relegar a la 
oposición a un lugar marginal y hacerla víctima fácil de la represión desmesurada de los 
nuevos regímenes. Una población pobre, con niveles bajísimos de educación y con 
escaso apoyo desde el exterior resultaba fácil de someter. De hecho, muchos de estos 
países habían obtenido la independencia recientemente tras décadas de dominación 
colonial europea. Dentro de fronteras artificialmente diseñadas (por lo general), los 
nuevos gobernantes aprovecharon también las diversidades étnicas para dividir a sus 
potenciales enemigos.  
 A nivel económico, la obtención de ingresos no resultaba demasiado 
problemática. La abundancia de recursos naturales y materias primas garantizaban el 
flujo constante de rentas hacia el gobierno lo que permitió la exclusión de ambos 
sectores sociales cuyo colaboración resultaba innecesaria para las arcas públicos, por lo 
que, a su vez, el principio de “no impuestos sin representación” pudo ser ignorado. 
Incluso en casos donde los recursos eran escasos, las alianzas estratégicas y los antiguos 
vínculos coloniales propiciaron la donación de inmensas sumas de dinero en ayuda 
externa a manos de gobiernos de dudosa solvencia. Estas sumas llegaron a representar el 
50% del presupuesto anual de algunos de estos gobiernos. 
 Los recursos naturales y sectores económicos estratégicos (como el café o el 
azúcar) pronto fueron objeto de confiscación por parte de la elite o nacionalizados por el 
estado. Aunque otra estrategia consistía, especialmente en América Latina, en permitir a 
grandes compañías extranjeras la explotación y exportación de dichos recursos a cambio 
de suculentas sumas de dinero y ayuda militar de sus gobiernos. En caso de apuros, los 
dictadores de estos países exportadores encontraban asilo en sus antiguas colonias o sus 
aliados exteriores donde gozar de un placentero exilio. 
           Una oposición débil y la falta de necesidad de conformidad respecto a sistemas 
impositivos basados en la renta y el intercambio, propiciaron que los sistemas 
institucionales de las dictaduras de posguerra permanecieran subdesarrollados y 
relegados a un rol de distribución de privilegios y favores en lugar de promover la 
inclusión y la movilización. Esta falta de institucionalización dejó a la oposición 
potencial, si cabe, con aún menores recursos para la organización y con nula influencia 
política. Ciertamente, la aparición de lo que se ha venido a denominar como 
“autoritarismo electoral” o “regímenes híbridos”, es decir, regímenes dictatoriales 
multipartidistas, es un fenómeno relativamente reciente. Aunque después del periodo de 
descolonización diversos casos emergieron como paso previo a la democratización, su 
duración fue corta y la mayoría de ellos dieron rápidamente lugar a regímenes 
netamente personalistas o de partido único. 
